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Abstract  
 
This thesis examines the impact of financial integration on growth, poverty 
and inequality and crises. Chapter 1 surveys the theoretical linkages proposed in the 
literature between financial integration and growth, poverty and inequality and crises.  
 
Chapter 2 examines the impact of financial integration on growth using a 
panel dataset covering 175 countries over the time period 1970-2013. The Panel 
Threshold Regression (PTR), Logistic Smooth Transition Regression (LSTR) and 
OLS estimation methods are deployed. For developing countries, a high threshold 
level is observed above which increasing openness is severely damaging for growth. 
On the contrary, for emerging markets, with increasing financial liberalization, 
growth increases both below and above the threshold. For transition economies, the 
threshold level is low, but above this threshold increase in financial openness results 
in decreasing growth.  
 
Chapter 3 looks at the impact of financial integration on poverty and 
inequality using 79 developing countries over the time period 1980-2013. Similar to 
chapter 2, the PTR, LSTR and OLS estimation methods are used. A low threshold 
level is found when measuring the impact on poverty, above this threshold it is 
observed that increasing openness decreases poverty. When measuring the impact on 
income groups, below the threshold it is observed that income share increases for all 
income groups, but above the threshold income only increases for the richest 20% and 
10%. On the contrary income share decreases for the poorest 10% and 20%. Increased 
openness also results in increased income inequality. 
 
Finally, chapter 4 examines the impact of the intensity of financial 
liberalization on the likelihood of crises using 93 developing countries over the time 
period 1980-2013 using multivariate probit regression models. It is observed that 
increasing the intensity of financial liberalization reduces the likelihood of a banking, 
currency and twin crises. Improvements in the conditions of political institutions 
lowers the likelihood of crises but rising political polarization increases the likelihood 
of crises.  
4 
 
Impact Statement 
 
In examining the linkage between financial integration and growth, poverty 
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contributions to the associated field of research. Given the nature of the findings 
obtained in this thesis, it is expected that it can have a beneficial impact both within 
and outside the realms of academia. 
 
There are numerous benefits that can be drawn from this thesis within 
academia. Firstly, this thesis, in exploring key researching avenues, it provides a 
thorough understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of financial integration and 
thereby opens a multitude of avenues for further research that can be hugely 
beneficial from the researching viewpoint for academic scholars in this researching 
arena. For example, an avenue for further research that should be examined in greater 
detail is the role political factors play both independently and jointly with financial 
integration on macroeconomic stability. Secondly, the research methodologies used in 
this thesis, predominantly the Panel Threshold Regression (PTR) and Logistic Smooth 
Transition Regression (LSTR) methodologies are effective tools to not only examine 
the relationship between two variables, but to determine thresholds, thereby making it 
applicable on a policy level. These methodologies could be used in other researching 
fields; for example, various other sectors that focus on public policy and politics. 
 
This thesis also has the potential to have great practical relevance particularly 
to governments and the relevant ministries of developing countries along with 
officials in central banks, think tanks and policymaking agencies. Government 
officials, particularly that of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning can 
take into consideration the shortcomings and benefits of financial integration outlined 
in this thesis. They can take into consideration the recommended level of financial 
liberalization that can ensure that the benefits of financial integration are fully 
realized, while minimizing poverty and inequality, and reducing the risk of crises. 
Therefore, this thesis should serve as a guide and thereby assist policymakers to 
determine the level of financial openness that is best suited for the relevant financial 
markets and also ensure macroeconomic stability in an increasingly interdependent 
global market. For instance, policymakers can better dictate and determine the 
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appropriate level of portfolio inflows and/or foreign direct investments. Government 
officials can also have a better understanding of the extent to which they should 
regulate financial markets without compromising growth.   
 
The intention is to publish this thesis in Bangladesh and present this to the 
general audience there and perhaps, eventually, attract an audience that extends 
beyond South Asia. Even if the findings of this thesis do not drastically affect 
policymaking decisions, at the very least it should be seriously considered by 
government officials and think tanks, because even if it does not help to determine 
their policies, it could still be used as a bedrock for further research.  
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Introduction  
 
The identification of the macroeconomic repercussions of financial integration 
is integral for effective policy making decisions. While there have been extensive 
studies, both theoretical and empirical, in the associated field of research, due to the 
nature and the complexity of financial integration, inferences and opinions are highly 
polarized. The degree of integration of financial markets in the global context, 
increased significantly in the last two decades of the 20th century. The fundamental 
driver behind this underlying process is the increased level of financial investments in 
the global financial market, seeking high rates of return while having the availability 
of diversifying these investments internationally. Governments and policymakers 
have loosened restrictions and capital controls by deregulating the domestic financial 
markets and liberalising restrictions of capital inflow and outflow. For instance, many 
developing, transition and emerging economies in Latin America, Eastern Europe and 
East Asia annulled restrictions on international financial restrictions. These countries 
also reduced the degree of (domestic) financial market regulations, in turn, moving 
away from regimes of financial repression.  
 
Baele et al. (2004) give a broad definition of financial integration1. They state 
that a market can be considered an integrated financial market when all potential 
market participants with the same relevant characteristics (1) face a single set of rules 
when they decide to deal with those financial instruments or financial services, (2) 
have equal access to financial instruments or financial services and (3) are treated 
equally when actors are active in the market. They specify that full integration require 
that there is no discrimination among market participants based on their country of 
origin. Moreover, they suggest that the definition of financial integration can be 
linked to the law of one price2. Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) provide a 
                                                 
1 Financial integration can broadly be measured in three distinctive categories: (1) price-based 
measures, (2) quantity-based measures, and (3) regulatory measures. The price based measures stem 
from the LOOP and is related to the interest rate differentials and equity price movements. The 
quantity-based measures include the various forms of capital flows and are based on stocks and flows 
of assets (de facto measures) e.g. foreign direct investment, equity portfolio inflow, and non-resident 
bank loans. The regulatory measures include primarily the de jure measures, for instance, the de jure 
measure of capital account openness e.g. capital account openness index developed by Chinn and Ito 
(2006). 
2 The law of one price states that if assets have identical risks and returns, then they should be priced 
identically regardless of where they are transacted (Baele et al, 2004).  
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multidimensional definition of financial liberalization stating that financial 
liberalization consists of (1) deregulation of the financial/capital account, the (2) 
liberalization of the domestic financial sector and the (3) liberalization of the 
equity/stock market.  
 
The increase of financial globalisation of the world capital markets has 
resulted in a significant rise in private capital flows to the developing and emerging 
economies (Agenor, 2003). For example, there was a sharp increase in FDI inflow to 
developing economies in the 1980s and this accelerated in the 1990s. Portfolio flows 
on the other hand, increased until the mid-1990s; however, there was a sharp decline 
soon afterwards, indicating macroeconomic fragility and financial volatility. In the 
periods of global financial market volatility, intermediated bank flows (as a 
proportion of total capital flows) fell significantly. This is because cross-border 
lending or cross-border flows became responsive to changes in the relative rates of 
return, particularly due to the increased linkages between the world capital markets.  
 
There are numerous benefits attributed to financial integration, however, there 
is a pressing need to weigh the scales of benefits and negatives. The Mexican Peso 
Crisis of 1994, the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, the Russian Financial Crisis of 
1998, the Brazilian Currency Crisis of 1999, and the Argentinean Peso Crisis of 2002 
suggest the need to explore these issues further. If there are benefits, to what extent 
are these benefits maximized? The key issue from the policymaking perspective is to 
identify the prerequisites and determine (on a country to country basis) the 
appropriate level of regulation or liberalisation in order to minimize the risks and at 
the same time, realize and exploit the gains of financial integration.  
 
The benefits of an open capital account or increased financial 
openness/integration are the benefits of international risk sharing for consumption 
smoothing, capital flows boosting domestic investment and stimulating growth, 
enhanced macroeconomic discipline and improved efficiency (Dooley, 1995). The 
consumption smoothing argument states that access to the world capital market allows 
countries to engage in risk sharing. This means, during slumps or recessionary 
periods, countries are able to borrow and during times when economic conditions are 
stable, they are able to lend. This allows domestic households to smooth their 
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consumption path over time, thereby enhancing welfare. In developing economies, the 
capacity to save is constrained due to the low level of income (Agenor, 2002). If for 
instance, the marginal return from investment is equal to or greater than the cost of 
capital, then capital inflow will stimulate domestic saving, which in turn increases the 
efficiency of capital per worker, in turn causing enhanced growth levels and 
improving standard of living (Obstfeld, 1999). It has been observed, in both the 
developed and the developing world that free flow of capital across borders results in 
countries adapting and following constructive and disciplined macroeconomic 
policies. This reduces the risk of making poor policymaking decisions (Obstfeld, 
1998). Furthermore, Bartolini and Drazen (1997) state that external financial 
liberalisation is, in fact, a signal that indicates the country is ready to adopt sound 
macroeconomic policies. Economists tend to argue that financial openness increases 
the efficiency of the banking system, resulting in financial stability. The theoretical 
argument states that financial openness increases the depth of the domestic financial 
market leading to efficiency of the process of financial intermediation. Improved 
efficiency tends to result in lower mark-up rates in the banking sector, thereby 
reducing the cost of borrowing and cost of investment and hence increasing growth 
(Baldwin and Forslid, 2000). Foreign banking penetration is said to improve the 
quality and availability of financial services and to mobilize financial resources. It is 
also said to improve the technical sophistication of the banking sector through 
advanced integration of technology in the domestic economy (Levine, 1996).  
 
The macroeconomic vulnerability associated with financial liberalization and 
openness leads to the recognition of the failings financial of integration. Financial 
openness tends to lead to concentration of capital flows. For instance, historical 
evidence, for developed and developing countries, particularly those in Latin America 
and Asia, shows that cross-border lending tends to be highly concentrated in only a 
few recipient countries (Fernandez-Arias and Montiel, 1996). In the sub-Saharan 
countries, foreign capital is only directed to countries with natural resources, for 
example, Angola, Nigeria, and South Africa (Basu and Srinivasan, 2002). Therefore, 
despite the pro-liberalisation camp stating that it allows for risk sharing, borrowing 
and lending during ‘bad’ and ‘good’ times respectively, it is undeniable that some of 
these developing countries could be ‘rationed out’ of the global capital market, even if 
their financial markets are highly liberalised.  
20 
 
 
There is also an argument that capital flows, especially if certain 
macroeconomic policy and institutional prerequisites are not in place, may lead to 
misallocation of financial resources i.e. financing low-quality domestic investments, 
for instance, in the non-tradable sector e.g. real estate. These low productivity 
investments, in the non-tradable sector, can also cause external imbalances by 
weakening the exporting prowess of the domestic economy. A highly liberalized 
capital account may result in a volatile movement of capital across borders. This 
comes with the risk of having reversals in short-term flows intertwined with 
speculative attacks on the currency. Short-term equity flows, tend to be rather 
sensitive on a purely reactionary basis amongst investors. These herding behaviours 
and other contagion effects can cause large inflows or outflows to the detriment of the 
domestic economy.  
 
There are some arguments supporting foreign banking penetration, but there 
are also drawbacks associated with this form of financial integration. There is a 
tendency for foreign banks to allocate credit to firms that may be in the non-tradable 
sector (housing), and is, therefore, detrimental to the external balance. There is also a 
tendency for foreign banks to concentrate their credit allocation on selected domestic 
firms; this monopolization thereby hampers domestic competition. There is also the 
fear that foreign banks may abruptly withdraw from the domestic economy if they fail 
to meet their expected profit levels. The final argument of criticism of financial 
globalization is the notion of ‘rationing out’ the people of the lower income bands. 
This is a concept that is theoretically explored, but, in terms of empirical analysis, 
there is a major concentration on growth in general; however, these issues will be 
addressed in this thesis.  
 
Regardless of the substantial interest in the concept of financial integration 
over the past few decades, the inconclusiveness of the empirical evidence invites 
academic scholars to revisit this relationship, both from the theoretical viewpoint as 
well as that of empirical research. This study makes an arduous attempt to provide a 
comprehensive picture of the relationships between financial integration, 
macroeconomic performance, poverty and inequality and crises.  
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Researching Objectives, Motivation and Contribution  
 
This thesis comprises four chapters3, excluding the introductory and the 
concluding chapter. The first chapter presents the theoretical arguments and 
thoroughly examines and evaluates the existing empirical literature in the associated 
field of research. The second chapter investigates the link between financial 
integration and growth using threshold regression analysis and also executes a 
comparative study for developing, emerging and transition economies. The third 
chapter examines the effect of financial integration on poverty and inequality using 
threshold regression analysis for developing countries. The fourth chapter examines 
the impact of financial integration4 and crises by investigating the likelihood of 
banking, currency and twin crises at various levels of financial liberalization.  
 
Through the examination and evaluation of the theoretical arguments along 
with the empirical evidence, the first chapter revealed loopholes in the literature, and 
more importantly, outlined the scope for contribution in the researching arena. The 
second chapter5 used threshold techniques in the form of the Panel Threshold 
Regression (PTR) methodology and the Logistic Smooth Transition Regression 
(LSTR) methodology to examine the impact of financial integration on growth for 
developing, emerging and transition economies over the time period 1970-2013. The 
key objective of this chapter was to determine threshold levels, thereby facilitating 
effective decision making for policymakers in developing and emerging economies. It 
addresses a fundamental issue that concerns governments in developing countries in 
an interdependent and interconnected global economy by examining the impact of 
financial integration on growth. The results suggest that thresholds and coefficients 
both below and above the thresholds, vary across the developing, emerging and 
transition economies. For developing countries, above the threshold6, increase in 
openness is severely damaging to growth. For emerging economies, the threshold 
                                                 
3 For detailed descriptions of the empirical research, refer to the abstract sections of each research 
paper, or alternatively, for a concise description, refer to the abstract section in the preceding section of 
the thesis. 
4 The proxy variable that is used for the empirical chapters (chapter 2, 3 and 4) is the de jure measure 
of capital account openness, which is the Chinn-Ito index developed by Chinn and Ito (2006).   
5 This is the first empirical chapter of the thesis as the first chapter only reviews the theoretical 
arguments along with the empirical evidence.  
6 The threshold level is the threshold for the key independent variable of interest that is used in the all 
the empirical chapters (chapter 2, 3 and 4) which is the Chinn-Ito Index, the proxy variable used for 
financial integration.    
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level is low, for which the growth effects are positive below and above the threshold. 
For transition economies, the threshold is significantly low, and below this threshold 
it is growth retarding. The fundamental contribution that this research paper makes is 
through the use of the LSTR model, as the PTR methodology is commonly deployed 
in the literature. This chapter also identifies an exact threshold level, which is an 
aspect that is left obscure or unclear in the literature. On a technical note, in the 
threshold literature, the PTR methodology fails to account for the problem of 
heteroscedasticity but this chapter tackles this problem. The research paper also tests 
the validity of the thresholds in the sense that it tests the accuracy of nonlinearities 
then it also tests for remaining nonlinearities i.e. if there is more than one threshold. 
Generally, the literature tends to assume that there is a single threshold with two 
regimes, however, this research paper addresses this key technical fallacy.  
 
Chapter 3 empirically examines the impact of financial integration on poverty 
and inequality using 79 developing economies over the time period 1980-2013 while 
deploying the PTR and LSTR techniques (these threshold regression methods are also 
used in chapter 2). The fundamental objective of this research paper and the basis 
upon which the trajectory of the research route was selected is in part due to the fact 
that there is a tendency to systematically focus on growth and avoid inclusive growth. 
In the empirical examination, it was observed that increase in the intensity of financial 
liberalization (KAOPEN) decreases poverty above the threshold. Increase in 
openness, below the threshold, also results in an increase in the income share of the 
poorest and richest 10% and 20%. However, above the threshold, it is observed that, 
with increasing openness income share of the richest 10% and 20% increases, 
whereas the income shares of the poorest 10% and 20% decreases. Furthermore, in 
analyzing the impact of de jure measure of financial integration on inequality, it is 
observed that increased openness results in increased inequality both below and above 
the threshold. Although, and rather interestingly, it is observed that below the 
threshold, when the level of financial openness is low, inequality increases faster as 
opposed to when it is above the threshold. In the context of developing countries, 
while there is substantial growth in the emerging economies, inclusive growth, which 
should also include the poorest 20% and 10%, are often overlooked in the empirical 
assessment. Thus, it was important to address this issue also due to the fact that there 
is a scarcity of empirical studies examining the linkages of financial integration on 
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poverty and inequality. Furthermore, the threshold techniques have not been 
previously used in the literature focusing on the relationship between financial 
integration and poverty.  
 
Chapter 4 empirically investigates the impact of the intensity of financial 
liberalization on the likelihood of banking, currency and twin crises using 93 
developing countries over the time period 1980-2013. This research paper also 
examines the impact of political institutions and political polarization on the 
likelihood of banking, currency and twin crises, both independently and jointly (with 
financial liberalization). The research paper deploys the multivariate probit regression 
method in order to measure the scale of the impact on crises. It is observed that for 
developing countries, increasing the intensity of financial liberalization reduces the 
likelihood of crises, which includes banking, currency and twin crises. It is also 
observed that while improvement in the conditions of political institutions generally 
reduce the likelihood of crises, rather interestingly, increase in political polarization 
increases the likelihood of banking, currency and twin crises. The fundamental 
contribution that this research paper makes to the existing literature is the assessment 
using the de jure measure of capital account openness or, the intensity of financial 
liberalization. Typically, the literature tends to use the de jure measure of financial 
liberalization, which would usually be a binary variable, taking the values of 0 and 1, 
indicating closed and liberalized financial markets respectively. Furthermore, this 
research paper also examines the impact of key political variables on the likelihood of 
crises, not to serve as controls, but treating it as the bedrock for macroeconomic 
stability.  
 
The concluding chapter summarizes all the findings, contextualizing them 
within the literature, and it also discusses the policy-making implications of the study 
executed in this thesis.  
Chapter 1: Theoretical and Literature Review   
 
 In this chapter, section 1 presents the key concepts of financial integration. 
Section 2 explores the theoretical linkages linking financial integration with growth, 
poverty and crises are examined, highlighting various channels of influence.  Section 
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3 provides a concise summary of the empirical evidence of the linkage between 
financial integration, growth, poverty and crises. Section 4 concludes.  
 
1.1 Key Concepts of Financial Integration  
 
 In order to understand the concept of financial integration, the notion of the 
Law of One Price (LOOP) must be understood; the Law of One Price (LOOP) states 
that despite the geographical location, identical goods must always have the same 
price. The LOOP concept was initially only applicable to the international trade of 
goods; however, as global capital markets developed, LOOP became applicable to 
financial markets, particularly for financial instruments. In the case of financial 
markets, the definition of the LOOP states that despite the variation in geographical 
location, identical risks should provide identical returns. In the case that the LOOP 
does not hold, the opportunity of arbitraging arises, and this opportunity is exploited 
by investors until the LOOP holds.  
 
The LOOP concept was introduced in the 1760s, but more recently, the 
concept of globalization, or more specifically financial globalization, is an alternative 
approach that is used to define financial integration. The notion of globalization that 
is of significance for this research is that of economic globalization citing the 
increasing economic and financial interdependence between economies through 
increases in cross-border movement of goods and services, technology and capital. 
This is otherwise referred to as economic integration between countries, which 
eventually, at least in theory would lead to the emergence of a single world market. 
Historically, globalization can be divided into three phases, the first phase being the 
archaic globalization, the second being the proto-globalization phase, and the third 
being modern globalization phase. The first phase of globalization, otherwise known 
as archaic globalization, refers to the idea of Eastern Origins, or Eastern ideas being 
adapted by Western states from the earliest of civilizations up until the 1600s 
(Martell, 2000). Proto-globalization or ‘Early modern’ globalization is thought to 
span from 1600 to 1800 (Chaudhuri, 1999). This term specifically describes the phase 
in which there was an increase in trade linkages and cultural exchanges. Modern 
globalization, according to historians, was in the latter stages of the 1800s. It was 
during the 19th century that globalization intertwined with the Industrial Revolution. 
25 
 
Innovations in transportation technology reduced trading costs substantially and 
thereby allowing nation states to embrace international trade. In the aftermath of 
World War I, globalization came to a standstill. At the end of World War II, after the 
agreement of the Bretton Woods Conference, the formation of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was later succeeded by World Trade 
Organization (WTO), provided a solution to formalize trading agreements and resolve 
trading disputes. This caused a resurgence in globalization. The wave of globalization 
that the world currently resides in is the one that began in the 1980s. This wave of 
globalization marks the end of the Bretton Woods era along with the introduction of 
the elimination of tariffs, creation of free trade zones, reduction in capital controls, 
harmonization of intellectual property and various other measures to improve free 
trade.   
 
1.1.1 Measures of Financial Integration: De Jure and De Facto Measures   
 
The broad consensus of the measurement framework of financial integration 
can be classified in two categories, the de jure measures and de facto measures of 
financial integration. The commonly used indicators of the de jure measures of 
financial integration are computed based on the information that is publicly available 
in IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
(AREAER). Up until 1995, the AREAER used binary codes to denote the following 
categories: (1) capital account openness, (2) openness of the current account, (3) 
requirements for repatriation and/or surrender of export proceeds and (4) existence of 
multiple exchange rates for capital account transactions. After 1995, these categories 
were disaggregated. In the literature, it is evident that researchers tend to use either a 
de jure measure of capital account openness that is binary (taking the value of 0 or 1 
depending on financial market regulation) or one that is an index. For the de jure 
measures of capital account openness, as is used by the author in this study as a proxy 
for financial integration, a major advantage lies in the fact that AREAER has been 
available since 1967 and moreover, it covers 184 countries. While binary indicators 
have the notable shortcoming of failing to incorporate the intensity of controls or 
market regulations, but an index, as the one developed by Chinn and Ito (2006), 
otherwise known as the Chinn-Ito index incorporates these factors and develops an 
index that scales from -2.66 to 2.66, where -2.66 is full regulation and 2.66 indicates 
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full liberalization. Similarly, Quinn (1997) and Montiel and Reinhart both developed 
their own set of indices to measure the intensity of capital controls. Mody and 
Murshid (2005) on the other hand developed an index to measure financial 
integration.  
 
De facto measures of financial integration are proxied using various forms of 
capital flows in the associated researching arena. There is a distinction to be made 
between private capital flows and foreign capital stock as proxies for financial 
integration used by researchers in this field. Private capital flows include Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI), cross-border lending and portfolio investments. Financial 
integration is proxied using both capital outflow as well as capital inflows. This is due 
to the fact that this reflects the ability of foreign investors to invest in a country, as 
well as domestic investors having the capacity to invest abroad. On the contrary, there 
is the argument that stock data is a better measure of financial integration than capital 
flows. Stocks could include gross holding of foreign assets and liabilities and this 
cannot be incorporated using flows.  
 
There are benefits and drawbacks to using de jure or de facto measures 
proxying financial integration. However, for the purposes of this paper, the de jure 
measure capital account openness is used to proxy for financial integration. The index 
developed by Chinn and Ito (2006) has the advantage that it measures the intensity of 
financial liberalization and the intensity of capital controls in one index. Furthermore, 
this is also lucrative from the policy viewpoint as policymakers need to be made 
aware the level of openness that fosters the highest levels of growth, reduces poverty 
to the lowest levels and minimizes the risk of financial crashes.       
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1.2 Theoretical Arguments  
 
For policymakers in developing, transition and emerging economies, this 
particular research topic is still of particular researching and practical relevance. 
Financial integration is not only intriguing due to the sheer policy relevance, but due 
to the fact that the nature, approach, and repercussions of financial globalization is 
constantly varying, and therefore there is always scope for contribution in a constantly 
evolving interdependent global market. The literature tends to examine and focus on 
the indirect relationship of financial integration and growth. However, recently, newer 
theoretical approaches tend to overlook the standard neoclassical framework that 
resulted due to the early wave of financial integration. The fundamental conceptual 
notion that can be deduced from both the theoretical arguments as well as the 
overview of the empirical literature is that the merits of financial integration can only 
be realized when it is indirect. From this particular perspective, there is increasing 
theoretical and empirical studies that tend to show that increasing financial openness 
tends to develop the domestic financial system, induces efficiency gains by exposing 
domestic firms to foreign entities, instigates macroeconomic policymaking discipline 
and results in better corporate governance.  
 
Indirect benefits of financial integration are expected to be realized in 
empirical studies when using de facto7 measures of financial integration. Direct 
benefits are often observed using de jure measures of financial openness. The indirect 
benefits are particularly significant because despite the theoretical arguments, in the 
empirical literature, while equity market liberalization (taking place with various 
policy reforms and this is a de jure measure) is observed as having a positive and 
                                                 
7 It is fundamental to distinguish between the differences between de jure and de facto measures of 
financial integration. De jure measures of financial integration are associated with regulatory policies 
on capital account liberalization and the de facto measures of financial integration refer to capital 
movement. The de jure measures computed and regularly used are those developed by IMF’s Annual 
Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). AREAER reported 
binary in the past for the following categories: (1) capital account openness, (2) current account 
openness, (3) export and importing and trading stringencies, and (4) existence of multiple exchange 
rates for capital account transactions. The de facto measures can be broadly classified into private 
capital flows and foreign capital stocks. Private capital flows for instance, include FDI, portfolio flows, 
and cross-border lending. Foreign capital stock includes for example international investment position 
(IIP) and stock measures developed by Lane and Milessi-Ferretti (2007).  
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statistically significant effect on growth, portfolio inflows (de facto measure) tend to 
have a significantly weaker effect on growth.  
 
1.2.1 Financial Integration and Growth  
 
The ever-present question that divides policy makers is whether or not 
financial integration spurs long term economic growth in developing countries. The 
benchmark or the simplest one-sector neoclassical growth model suggests that 
financial integration will cause capital flows from countries rich with capital to 
countries starved off capital. This is because the returns to capital in the capital-poor 
economies should in theory, be higher. The remainder of this subsection looks at the 
theoretical arguments between financial integration and growth.  
 
The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade 
Organization believe that financial integration does indeed enhance growth, even in 
the cases of developing countries. Krugman (1993) opposes this claim and argues that 
financial integration is incapable of fostering economic development for specific case 
of developing economies. He pins his argument on the basis that large capital flows 
have never occurred from rich to poor countries; this indicates that financial 
integration will not enhance domestic capital stock and would only result in a 
marginal improvement to long-run economic growth. Blomstrom, Lipsey and Zejan 
(1996) assess whether or not fixed investment is the key to economic growth by 
examining 100 countries over the time period 1965 to 1985. They complement the 
argument presented by Krugman, and find that more investment does not cause faster 
growth. International financial integration, in the presence of existing institutional and 
legal distortion, can have a growth retarding effect.  
 
Levine (2000) examines the theoretical implications of international financial 
liberalization on economic growth and opposes the claims made by Krugman. Levine 
bases his arguments on the following points: (1) TFP (total factor productivity) 
accounts for the cross-country differences in the growth rate of GDP per capita; (2) 
substantial evidence exists supporting the claim that domestic financial systems have 
a significantly high causal impact on economic growth by boosting TFP growth and, 
(3) liberalization of capital controls and financial markets enhances the functional 
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capacity of the domestic financial system. Therefore, the arguments stated by Levine 
suggest that financial integration can potentially increase the operational capacity of 
the domestic financial systems and as a result stimulate efficient resource allocation 
which in turn will foster economic growth. Levine makes the following theoretical 
inferences: (1) liberalization of the financial markets and removal of capital controls 
results in enhanced stock market liquidity which in turn accelerates economic growth 
by boosting productivity levels, (2) exposure to foreign banking systems causes a 
significant enhancement of the efficiency levels of the domestic banking systems 
resulting in increased productivity growth and as a result, increased economic growth 
and, (3) international financial integration enhances the capacity to absorb capital 
inflow which translates to greater growth levels.  
 
An important consideration to make in the FI-growth nexus is the channels of 
influence as the “collateral” influence is of fundamental importance (Kose et al. 
2009). For example, the impact of financial integration on boosting and invigorating 
the credibility and the fluidity of the banking sector is an integral argument in support 
of financial integration. Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) infer that the development 
of the domestic banking system has a direct causal impact upon economic growth. 
Moreover, they infer that domestic banking system progression influences growth by 
predominantly affecting the TFP growth levels. Domar (1946) forecasted that growth 
is proportional to the ratio of investments over GDP; this implies that higher levels of 
investment would translate into higher growth levels. This view reinforces the 
argument set out by Levine in suggesting that developing countries should look for 
strategies that induce improvements in domestic savings, use international financing 
to fill the domestic financing gaps via international development bank loans and by 
opening the financial markets to international capital flows. This for instance, 
supports the need for financial integration, without explicitly defining the level of 
financial openness. However, Levine (2000) and Easterly (1999) point out that 
Domar’s model (denoted by Domar himself) should not be used as a model for long-
run growth. Easterly and Levine (2000) deduce that TFP growth accounts for 90% of 
the cross-country growth differences. This claim is supported by Klenow and 
Rodriguez-Clare (1997). They argue that cross-country growth differences are due to 
the differences in TFP growth levels.  
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Baile et al. (2004) denote risk sharing, improved capital allocation and higher 
growth to be three fundamental benefits of financial integration. Financial integration 
offers extra opportunities to share the level of risks and to smooth out the 
consumption levels inter-temporally. Baile et al. (2004) also stress that financial 
integration increases economic growth by inducing greater financial development8 i.e. 
financial integration increases the flow of funds for investment opportunities in 
otherwise capital starved regions. With greater access to capital, projects that were 
initially deemed to be unfeasible due to the sheer magnitude of the financial 
requirements, can become a reality. However, they do point out that the essentiality of 
financial integration is the increased availability of intermediated investment 
opportunities i.e. in the form of external financing, domestic or international banking 
lending or through portfolio flows which in turn also enhances the liquidity of the 
stock markets. The impact of financial intermediaries on growth is explored in the 
subsequent sub-section as this is an important channel of influence.  
 
1.2.1.1 Financial Development and Growth  
 
It would be fundamentally misleading for the reader if the theoretical effect of 
financial development on growth was to be overlooked in this analysis. As previously 
stated, financial development is one of the routes via which financial integration 
indirectly affects growth. The assessment of the linkages between financial 
development and growth are highly polarized. One position argues that financial 
development is an essential stimulus for industrialization as it facilitates the necessary 
capital to mobilize and enhance the functionality of the case specific industry or firm. 
This could for example include the effectiveness of fully functional banks that may 
enhance technological innovations as it will have the capacity to find the most capable 
entrepreneur (Hicks, 1969). Bencivenga and Smith (1991) emphasize the importance 
of the development of financial institutions, which in turn enhances the relationship 
between financial intermediaries and economic growth. They also suggest that the 
development of financial institutions enhances the efficiency of investments; leading 
to optimal allocation of capital. However, the opposing argument suggests that, 
“where enterprise leads, finance follows” (Robinson, 1952). This view suggests that 
                                                 
8 This linkage will be explored later in this section. 
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economic progression fulfills a vacuum with financial intermediaries and enhanced 
credit providing facilities.  
 
In order to conceptualize the effect of financial intermediation on growth 
consider the following equation: 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑓 (𝑘𝑡), where 𝑦𝑡 denotes output and 𝑘𝑡 is the 
stock of capital at time t; note that 𝑦𝑡 and 𝑘𝑡 are both in per capita terms. If this 
equation is differentiated then the following equation is derived: 𝑦𝑡⏞ =
𝑑𝑘𝑡
𝑦𝑡
𝑓′(𝑘𝑡) =
𝑠𝑡∅𝑡, where 𝑦𝑡⏞  is the growth rate, 𝑠𝑡 is the savings rate, and ∅𝑡 is the marginal 
productivity of capital. This equation implies that the rate of output growth is the 
product of the savings rate and the marginal productivity of capital. The theoretical 
notion in the existing neo-classical literature suggests that via a dynamic process the 
economy will reach a steady-state equilibrium in which the growth rate of output 
would diminish gradually over time. Theoretically, the assumption of the declining 
marginal productivity of capital is an essential lynchpin in the convergence to the 
steady-state level i.e. as 𝑘𝑡 grows over time, ∅𝑡 and 𝑦𝑡⏞  tend towards zero
9. However, 
endogenous growth literature argues that marginal productivity of capital does not 
converge to zero with increase in levels of capital as a result of positive productive 
externalities from the knowledge component of capital.  Development of the domestic 
financial institutions and the domestic financial markets enhances the efficiency of 
capital accumulation, thereby increasing ∅𝑡. Moreover, improvement of domestic 
financial systems will enhance the efficiency of financial intermediation and thereby 
increase the savings rate. This will result in an increase in the investment rate and 
consequently the growth rate (Gregorio and Guidotti, 1995).  
 
Goldsmith (1969) finds that there is positive association between financial 
development and the level of real GNP per capita. Furthermore, McKinnon (1973) 
and Shaw (1973) find that financial deepening results not only in increased 
productivity of capital, but also in an increase in the level of savings and therefore 
increase in the investment levels. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) also argue that 
financial repression policies may lead to negative real interest rates. As a result, this 
will erode the incentives to have savings, which will mean lower investments and 
therefore lower growth. However, Diaz-Alejandro (1985) oppose this view presented 
                                                 
9 Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) examine this theoretical relationship.  
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by McKinnon and Shaw and use the Latin American example to show that financial 
deepening does not induce higher savings, thereby suggesting the fulcrum of growth 
depends on the increasing levels of the marginal productivity of capital rather than on 
the level of investments or savings. Bencivenga and Smith (1991) illustrate using their 
model that growth increases when financial development improves, even when 
financial development reduces the level of savings. This suggests that financial 
development has a large effect on the efficiency of investments, which overrides the 
negative effect of financial development on the savings level.  
 
There is a substantial debate surrounding the assessment of the linkage 
between domestic financial systems and growth. Financial intermediation is the 
channel via which the merits of financial integration are often realized. Therefore, it is 
important (albeit briefly discussed) to understand the theoretical linkages of financial 
intermediation and growth. This would serve as a backdrop in deducing the linkages 
between financial integration and growth. Schumpeter (1912) stresses the importance 
of the banking system and its effective functionality on actively spurring innovation 
and long-term growth; as banks supposedly have the technical and informational 
capacity to effectively identify and fund productive investments due to their 
profiteering motives. However, Lucas (1998) argues that economists systemically 
over-exaggerate the impact of financial intermediaries on growth. King and Levine 
(1993) highlight the importance of financial intermediaries in assisting long-run 
economic growth, capital accumulation and increasing productivity growth. Levine 
(1991) uses a theoretical model to illustrate that the higher the liquidity levels of the 
stock market the less expensive it is to trade securities, which in turn decreases the 
disincentive to invest in long-term projects as investors always have the option of 
selling their stakes before the project matures. He also shows that increased liquidity 
will facilitate higher investment levels in the long run, especially for projects that 
yield higher returns and this as a result will be a major factor in boosting productivity 
growth. Smith (1994) and Obstfeld (1994) through their theoretical discussions 
illustrate that increased international risk sharing through international financial 
integration (resulting in integrated stock markets) will cause a shift in the portfolio 
demands from safe and low-risk investments to the high-risk and high return 
investments. This accelerates productivity growth. However, the theoretical 
discussion also points out that international stock market integration have an 
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ambiguous effect on the savings rate; savings rate may fall to the extent that 
financially integrated markets may in fact slow down overall growth levels. On the 
contrary, Bhide (1993) argues that higher levels of stock market liquidity may not 
necessarily induce a shift to demanding high-risk and high return projects, which is a 
prerequisite that would boost productivity growth. He makes this argument based on 
the presumption that increased liquidity makes it easier for investors to sell off their 
shares. Moreover, increased liquidity causes stakeholders to have reduced incentives 
to monitor the management schemes of firms. This causes a deterioration of the 
corporate governance, which hinders effective allocation of resources and as a result 
weakens productivity growth.  
 
Stock markets enhance growth by increasing the efficiency of capital 
(resource) allocation. From the theoretical viewpoint, when stock markets become 
increasingly liquid, agents of interest will have incentives to disburse their financial 
resources in a wide variety of firms (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993). Moreover, stock 
market enhancements result in improved corporate control and increase the possibility 
of facilitating takeovers, especially in the case of malfunctioning firms (Stein, 1988). 
In turn, agents can take over the firms that tend to underperform and change the 
managerial and infrastructural set up of the respective firms they have made 
investments in and improve the overall efficiency levels on the whole. Therefore, it 
can be said that stock market performance is associated with effective managerial 
alterations, which, in turn, boosts resource allocation. Empirical evidence 
investigating the relationship between stock market progression and growth suggests 
that there is a positive linkage between stock market liquidity and growth. Moreover, 
stock market liquidity affects growth by increasing the total factor productivity 
growth. Therefore, if financial integration does have an impact on the liquidity levels 
of stock markets, this could have a significant effect on growth (Levine, 2000). 
Levine (1992) analyzes the effects of alternative financial infrastructures and systems 
and their consequent effect on economic growth via a theoretical model. The model 
shows that financial institutions raise the proportion of total savings set for investment 
and also shows that enhancement of these institutions results in the avoidance of 
premature liquidation of credit. Furthermore, he reiterates that banks, stock markets, 
mutual funds, and investment banks enhance growth by inducing efficient allocation 
of investment.  
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Liberalization of equity markets gives foreign investors the opportunity to 
invest in domestic equity securities and gives domestic investors the ability to carry 
out transactions in foreign equity securities. When the assessment is carried out from 
the neoclassical perspective, intuitively, the results confirmed by Bekaert, Harvey and 
Lundblad (2005) suggesting equity market liberalization increases real GDP growth 
per capita by 1%, makes sense theoretically. Improved risk sharing post-equity market 
liberalization reduces the cost of equity capital. Equity market liberalization reduces 
financing constraints as foreign investment and capital become readily available. 
Foreign investors could also potentially improve corporate governance which, as a 
result, could reduce the cost of internal and external financing (Bekaert and Harvey, 
2000). Better corporate governance and improvement in investor protection could 
enhance financial development and consequently growth (King and Levine, 1993).  
 
1.2.1.2 Financial Integration and Investment 
 
Capital controls are a means to ensuring domestic savings remain in the 
country. Capital controls increase transaction costs and theoretically would reduce the 
prospect of capital flight. There is an argument that states that capital control can 
funnel foreign investment directly to specific domestic investment projects while, at 
the same time, deterring domestic capital outflows. In the presence of capital controls, 
central banks will also not have to take precautions i.e. fearing shifts in market 
sentiments and as a result, stacking up international reserves; which in turns leaves 
more capital for domestic investments. When capital controls are lifted and the 
economy is open to private capital flows, if the marginal returns to capital are higher 
in relation to the world interest rate, then, theoretically, substantial capital will enter 
the domestic economy, which will boost domestic savings, resulting in a robust 
linkage between foreign capital inflows and domestic investments (Mody and 
Murshid, 2005).  
 
The entrance of Portugal and Greece into the European Monetary Union, 
otherwise considered as lifting of capital controls and entering the world capital 
market, resulted in a significant rise in capital inflows, which in turn fueled domestic 
investments and increased consumption levels (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2002). 
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However, in the case that when the domestic economy is open to capital flows and 
domestic returns are lower than or equal to the world interest rate, then foreign capital 
will enter the country simply to achieve the notion of portfolio diversification on the 
part of foreign investors (Kray and Ventura, 1999). According to Mody and Murshid 
(2005), some developing countries often have domestic returns that are lower than or 
equal to the world interest rate and are often scapegoats to foreign diversification 
motives by foreign investors. Technological spillover is regarded as an essential 
motive for developing countries in opening up to capital inflows.  
 
Mody and Murshid (2005) question the inability of capital inflows in 
developing countries to transform into fruitful domestic investments. They question 
the assessment that shortage of capital is attributed to the lack of progress in 
developing countries, and why inflow of capital did not increase domestic 
investments in developing nations. They attribute the inability to foster domestic 
investment to: (1) the inability of developing countries to absorb external capital and 
smoothly transform to domestic investment, (2) governments of developing nations 
diverting the capital inflow into reserve holdings, (3) foreign investors having a 
diversification motive and (4) capital inflow being offset by capital outflow as 
domestic residents invest abroad to diversify their portfolios. Bosworth and Collins 
(1999), in their study of capital flows to developing countries find that, on average, a 
dollar of external finance increases domestic investment by more than 50 cents. This 
corresponds to the findings made by Mody and Murshid (2005) and reiterates the 
effectiveness of financial integration in fostering fruitful domestic investments.  
 
1.2.1.3 Financial Integration and Precautionary Savings Motive 
 
Keynes (1963) indicated that corporate cash holdings10 are affected by the 
‘precautionary savings motive’ and that precautionary demand for cash or liquid 
holdings increases with growing levels of uncertainty. Intuitively, the theory suggests 
that integrated capital markets should enhance the capacity of firms to develop their 
ability to raise funds. On the other hand, the argument states that financial integrated 
                                                 
10 The level of corporate cash holdings is the balance between the marginal cost of raising additional 
funds and the marginal benefit of holding liquid assets or cash and equivalents divided by net assets 
(Senay Agca, 2012).  
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markets are prone to contagion risk that has the potential to increase macroeconomic 
instability. Financially integrated markets are associated with enhanced capital flows, 
which can potentially lead to volatility in exchange rates and domestic interest rates. 
In periods where economies are exposed to financial risk, a contraction in capital 
inflows is often observed, having adverse consequences on the economy (Bhagwati, 
1998). Therefore, heightened levels of uncertainty have the potential to increase 
precautionary savings when economies are exposed to risk and hence it is presumed 
and empirically evident that firm liquid holdings levels increase in times of high 
contagion risk. Conversely, as long as financial integration reduces transaction costs 
(financial integration, at least in theory, reduces capital market distortions which 
causes a reduction in the transaction cost of raising capital in the domestic market), 
the marginal cost of raising funds will also decline which therefore reduces the 
marginal value of cash holdings. Therefore, firms will depend less on cash holdings 
(Stulz and Williamson, 1999).  
 
The following authors support the theoretical linkage between financial 
integration and cash holdings: Forbes (2006), Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005), 
Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) and Faulkender and Wang (2006). Forbes 
(2006) finds that increased capital flows cause a reduction in the financial constraints 
of small-to-medium sized firms. Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005) reiterate the 
fact that capital account liberalization has positive and statistically significant effect 
on growth due to reduced cost of capital. Faulkender and Wang (2006)11 examine the 
cross-sectional variation in the marginal value of corporate cash holdings that arises 
due to differing corporate financial policies. They find that marginal value of cash 
increases (hence the incentive to hold liquid assets increase) when firms are faced 
with financial constraints.   
 
1.2.2 Financial Integration and Poverty 
 
The neoclassical view, linking financial integration or external financial 
liberalization to poverty is that financial integration helps mobilize savings, induces 
                                                 
11 Faulkender and Wang (2006) examine the variation in excess stock returns over the period of one 
fiscal year. They find that marginal value of cash declines when (1) cash holdings are larger, (2) 
leverage level increases and (3) access to capital markets enhances; enhanced access to capital markets 
could be attributed to financial integration. 
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investments and allocates capital to productive investments, which thereby increases 
efficiency of physical capital and hence productivity. As a result, this means that 
financial liberalization stimulates growth, which results in higher income levels and 
therefore reduces poverty. Fry (1995) states that financial repression and this resulting 
credit rationing worsens income distribution. In other words, this implies that 
financial liberalization and freeing of credit markets will improve income 
distributions and therefore reduce poverty. However, it would be naïve to presume 
that financial liberalization reduces poverty merely through this growth channel. 
There are two distinctive channels via which the effect of financial integration can be 
felt for the impoverished and on poverty and they are the growth channel and the 
crises channel (Arestis and Caner, 2004).  
 
The growth channel that looks at the linkages between financial liberalization 
and financial integration on growth are discussed in both the theoretical arguments 
section as well as in the empirical review. The important factor that needs to be 
investigated here is the relationship between growth and poverty. This linkage needs 
to be settled before focusing on other issues of relevant importance. The World Bank 
(2001) states “for a given growth rate, the extent of poverty reduction depends on how 
the distribution of income changes with growth and on initial inequalities in income, 
assets, and access to opportunities that allow poor people to share in growth.” Broadly 
speaking, there are two ways growth benefits the poor, that is by direct and indirect 
channels of influence (Klasen, 2001). The empirical evidence tends to depict the 
message that when growth increases, and as countries get richer, incidence of income 
poverty falls. Dollar and Kray (2002) uses 80 countries to empirically assess this 
relationship and they find that income share of the poor (bottom 20% of the 
population) rises, almost equal to, one-for-one with overall growth in GDP per capita. 
Kray (2004) finds that most of the variations in poverty are accounted for mostly by 
growth. However, Ravallion (2001) states that there is always the need to go and look 
beyond averages, because, benefits are often not realized by the poor to the extent that 
it is realized by the rich and the growing inequality today is testament to this fact. 
Perhaps, as a motivation for this thesis, it would be interesting to decompose the 
effect of financial integration on growth, and thereby take a closer look at poverty as a 
result.  
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The crises channel focuses on the effect of financial liberalization on financial 
fragilities and how this affects the poor. The empirical evidence for these issues will 
be presented in the empirical review section under the section focusing on financial 
integration and poverty. Therefore, the question ultimately to look for in this section 
is how do crises (banking and/or balance of payment crises) affect poverty? There are 
various channels through which crises can affect poverty. Banking, currency or twin 
crises typically leads to fall in income levels of workers in both the formal and 
informal sectors, firstly due to job losses in the formal sector and a decline in the 
demand of services from workers in the informal sector (e.g. household cleaning 
services). Changes in relative prices due to crises can have effects on the distribution 
of income. For instance, currency depreciation results in decline in the price of goods 
and services in the non-tradable sector, this causes in a fall in earnings of workers in 
the non-tradable sector. Fiscal contractionary policies, which may include social 
welfare cuts, can be detrimental particularly for the poor. Agenor (2002) refers to the 
concept of “labor hoarding” which suggests that in times of economic downturns, the 
poor are the first to lose their jobs as firms tend to not hire due to existence of high 
costs. Furthermore, the poor tend to have their wealth in liquid form and during 
inflationary periods suffer more than the rich (Easterly and Fischer, 2001).    
 
It may well be undeniable that financial liberalization has profound effects on 
the availability of credit, and often it is argued that this credit is also more available 
for the poor when liberalized as opposed to when it is highly regulated. However, this 
is always going to require closer empirical and evidential scrutiny as there is a 
distinction between the formal financial sector and the informal sector, the latter being 
more prominent in developing countries. Therefore, an important and rather 
interesting research question is to see the whether or not financial integration 
improves availability of financial services and credit for the bottom fifth of the 
population.  
 
1.2.3 Financial Integration and Crises 
 
From the theoretical perspective, the impact of financial integration on growth 
volatility is ambiguous. Financial integration allows for countries that are capital-poor 
to diversify, typically away from agriculture or resource dependent production 
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frontiers, this in turn reduces macroeconomic volatility. However, when the economy 
reaches an advanced stage of development, financial integration is supposed to trigger 
specialization. This could in turn cause developing countries that fall in the middle-
income category, to be vulnerable to industry-specific shocks, thereby causing 
volatility. Furthermore, heavy reliance on foreign capital flows, in the form of, for 
instance, external debt, could expose these developing countries to world interest rate 
shocks, thereby leading to growth volatility (Kose, Prasad, and Terrones, 2004).  
 
In terms of the crises, the balance of payment crisis is an important channel to 
consider. This was explored heavily by Krugman (1979) and as a result garnered 
international attention. Initially, the literature assumed that crises were caused by 
fundamental economic indicators being weak, for instance, excessive expansion of 
fiscal or monetary policies (results in loss of foreign reserves). Krugman (1979) 
shows that in a fixed exchange rate regime, heavy domestic credit expansion (that 
exceeds money demand), will lead to a persistent loss of foreign reserves, thereby 
resulting in a speculative attack on the domestic currency. This will ultimately lead to 
a crisis because agents will tend to believe that the fixed exchange rate regime will 
collapse. Therefore, the gist of the model suggests that there will be a loss of 
international reserves preceding the crisis. Recent models however, have shown that a 
crisis can occur even when the macroeconomic signal indicators are unperturbed. For 
these particular models, macroeconomic policies are not predetermined, however, 
they are responsive to changes to the economic conditions and agents in the economy 
take this into account when forming their own set of expectations. This opens up the 
notion of the possibility of multiple equilibria and the concept of the self-fulfilling 
crisis.  
 
Stiglitz (2000) analyzes the macroeconomic repercussions of capital market 
liberalization, focusing specifically on the short-term speculative capital flows. The 
following are the key inferences: 
 
1. Banking, currency, twin and debt crisis have been more prevalent following 
the era of globalization, which is indicative of a fundamental weakness in the 
current global arrangements. The fact that the East Asian Crisis spread to 
Russia, and then to the Latin American countries suggest that even economies 
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that have sound institutional infrastructures and prominent policy makers can 
be adversely affected.  
2. The key purpose of financial and capital markets is to ensure sound 
information transmission mechanisms, in terms of assessing which projects or 
firms are likely to give the highest returns and ensuring the allocated funds are 
used efficiently. The theoretical proposition supporting capital market 
liberalization is based on standard efficiency arguments, which employs the 
conventional neoclassical model i.e. capital account liberalization leads to 
higher output levels and increased efficiency.  
3. Even in developed countries, following a period of macroeconomic instability, 
the poor bear a disproportionate burden, for example, increased 
unemployment (Furman and Stiglitz, 1999). The notion that improved 
transparency reduces the chances of a crisis was ousted when the most 
transparent countries (Norway, Sweden, and Finland) could not prevent a 
crisis.  
 
A follow up from Stiglitz’ (2002) analysis, would be to consider the 
mechanisms via which the global recession of 2008-09 was triggered. Marcel 
Fratzscher (2011) analyzes the drivers behind the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 
by determining whether it was push factors or pull factors12 that have been the 
defining factor in the global capital flow. They find that (push factors) specific 
banking, currency, twin or debt crises, variations in global liquidity and risk levels 
have a substantial effect on global capital flows. The rise in the level of risk and key 
crises results in the reallocation of capital from the emerging market economies to the 
advanced economies (in the duration of the crisis); which they denote as the “flight-
to-safety” hypothesis. They also find that the existing cross-country heterogeneity to 
common shocks is due to the country-specific determinants; the findings indicate that 
push factors (i.e. shocks to liquidity, risk levels, macroeconomic conditions, policies 
of the developed economies) have had a significant effect on the capital flows to and 
from (post-recovery capital flow) the emerging market economies. However, the 
authors do underline that pull factors have been fundamental for post-crisis recovery.  
                                                 
12 Push factors refer to shocks in the form of currency or twin crisis that any economy is susceptible to, 
be it emerging or developed. Pull factors refer to specific countries macroeconomic fundamentals such 
as the institutions, the policies implemented (Agenor and Montiel, 2008). 
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1.3 Literature Review: Empirical Evidence 
 
There are not many issues that have triggered such polarized opinions amongst 
economists, governments and policymakers in general than the benefits and 
drawbacks of financial integration. This section summarizes the key results deduced 
by researchers in the associated field of research. This is a concise summary prepared 
for the convenience of the reader. Tables 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 present the scholarly papers 
that explore the relationship between financial integration and growth, financial 
integration and poverty and inequality, and financial integration and crises 
respectively. For a detailed description of these papers along with various other 
research studies, refer to the literature review sections of chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
 
Table 1.1 summarizes the scholarly papers that explored the relationship 
between financial integration and growth. There are other studies in this researching 
arena that ventured into similar researching avenues, however, the research papers 
that added value to this thesis are presented here.  
 
Table 1.1: Review of FI-Growth Literature   
Author and Dataset Estimation Method  Key Findings  
Author: Masten, Coricelli and 
Masten (2008) 
Time: 1996-2004  
Data: Macro and Industry Level  
Countries: 31 European Economies  
GMM  (1) Financial integration and 
financial development 
enhance growth. 
(2) Essential for financial 
development to reach certain 
threshold before benefits of 
financial integration are 
realized.  
Author: Edison, Levine, Ricci and 
Slock (2002) 
Time: 1980-2000 
Data: Macro-level  
Countries: 57 (includes high 
income, middle income and lower 
middle-income countries)  
OLS, 2SLS, GMM (1) Financial integration does not 
accelerate growth.  
(2) Financial integration 
improves growth only with 
sound institutional factors.  
Author: Schularick and Steger 
(2010) 
Time: 1980-2002 
Data: Macro-level  
Countries: 24  
GMM (1) Financial integration is not 
associated with positive 
growth levels. 
(2) Financial integration does not 
induce increased aggregate 
investment.  
Author: Bekaert, Harvey and 
Lundblad (2005) 
Time: 40 years 
Data: Macro-level  
Countries: 95 
OLS, GMM (1) Equity market liberalization 
increases real GDP per capita 
growth by 1%. 
(2) Higher levels of financial 
development results in 
greater growth benefits from 
equity market liberalization.  
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Author: Galindo, Micco and 
Ordonez (2002) 
Time: 1973-1998 
Data: Macro and Industry Level  
Countries: 95 
OLS, Fixed Effects (1) Financial liberalization 
boosts growth rate of 
industries. 
(2) Firms with higher external 
financing benefit more with 
financial liberalization. 
Author: Kray (1998) 
Time: 1985-1997 
Data: Macro  
Countries: 42 
OLS, 2SLS (1) Higher levels of capital 
account openness does not 
lead to higher levels of 
growth or investment. 
(2) Capital account liberalization 
has no statistically significant 
effect on growth.  
Author: Bosworth and Collins 
(1999) 
Time: 1978-1995 
Data: Macro  
Countries: 58 Developing Countries 
OLS, Fixed Effects, 
2SLS 
(1) FDI increases domestic 
savings and investments, 
which in turn leads to higher 
growth. 
Author: Mody and Murshid (2005) 
Time: 1979-1999 
Data: Macro  
Countries: 60 Developing Countries 
GMM (1) Inflow of capital caused 
investors to diversify rather 
than fulfill unmet investment 
needs in the domestic 
economy. 
(2) Developing countries are 
scapegoats to foreign 
diversification motives. 
Author: Chen and Quang (2014) 
Time: 1984-2007 
Data: Macro 
Countries: 80 
Panel Threshold 
Regressions by 
Caner and Hansen 
(2004) 
(1) Financial integration 
enhances growth if 
institutional quality and 
financial depth meet a 
specific threshold level.  
Author: Ding and Jinjarak (2012)  
Time: 1980-2003 
Data: Macro 
Countries: 130 
Panel Threshold 
Regression by 
Hansen (1999) 
(1) For low income countries, 
capital flight increases with 
rising income level, but after 
income level reaches a 
specific (threshold) income 
level, capital flight declines. 
Author: Karadam and Ocal (2014) 
Time: 1970-2010 
Data: Macro 
Countries: 82 
Panel Smooth 
Transition 
Regression Model  
(1) Improved financial systems 
and stable macroeconomic 
policies result in financial 
integration enhancing 
growth. 
 
It is quite evident in table 1.1 that numerous researching studies have 
attempted to explore and examine the FI-growth nexus as only the most relatable and 
value enhancing papers are enlisted in the table. However, it is quite evident that there 
is a shortage of papers that examine this nexus using threshold regression methods. 
The reason why emphasis must be placed on the use of threshold estimation methods 
is in part due to the fact that it can play an instrumental role in assisting policymakers 
set their policies in order to foster the highest growth levels possible. While, there is 
no doubt that understanding the benefits and shortcomings of financial integration is 
important, as is the channels of influence, the level of financial integration that helps 
43 
 
the economy realize its economic potential hinges on threshold models. Therefore, 
economists and policymakers must be aware of the intensity of controls or the level of 
financial openness that is appropriate in order to maximize growth levels. Therefore, 
this research paper uses threshold techniques to address the FI-growth nexus.   
 
Table 1.2 presents the research studies that explored the linkages between 
financial integration and poverty.  
 
Table 1.2: Review of FI-Poverty Literature   
Author and Dataset Estimation Method  Key Findings  
Author: Arestis and Caner (2010) 
Time: 1985-2005 
Data: Macro-level  
Countries: Developing Economies  
GMM (1) Increase in capital account 
openness does not result in 
reduced poverty or increase 
in income share of the poor.  
Author: Santarelli and Figini (2002)  
Time: 1970-1998 
Data: Macro-level  
Countries: Developing Economies  
OLS (1) Financial globalization leads 
to higher levels of relative 
poverty.  
Author: Lundberg and Squire 
(2004) 
Time: 1960-1997 
Data: Macro 
Countries: 125 
OLS, 3SLS (1) Increased openness results in 
reduction in income share of 
lowest two income quintiles.  
 
It is observable in table 1.2 that there is a scarcity of empirical research that 
surrounds the FI-poverty nexus. Although it is not prominently highlighted in this 
table, there are researching studies that tend to discuss the shortcomings of 
globalization. However, there are very few research papers that directly look at the 
relationship between financial integration and poverty. The case is similar when 
assessing the impact of financial integration on inequality. While research studies 
tend to discuss these issues, particularly that of the lack of inclusive growth due to 
financial globalization, there are no empirical attempts to decipher the relationship. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence of threshold estimations executed in order to 
provide fruitful policy level solutions to government agencies and policymakers. 
Therefore, in addressing the FI-poverty and FI-inequality nexus, not only is an 
empirical assessment executed to understand, explore and examine this relationship 
further, but, threshold estimates are also in place to understand the intensity of 
financial liberalization at which poverty and inequality can best be minimized. The 
empirical examination for this research trajectory is available in chapter 3 of this 
thesis.  
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Table 1.3 presents the research studies that examine the linkage between 
financial integration and banking, currency and twin crises. It is noteworthy that only 
the research papers that were relevant and added value to the thesis were included.   
 
Table 1.3: Review of FI-Crisis Literature   
Author and Dataset Estimation Method  Key Findings  
Author: Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detriagache (1998) 
Time: 1980-1994 
Data: Macro-level  
Countries: Industrial and 
Developing Economies  
Logit  (1) This researching study does 
not incorporate financial 
integration as a key 
independent variable of 
interest, but, it allows for the 
author of this thesis to 
incorporate the ‘benchmark’ 
control variables, particularly 
that of explicit deposit 
insurance scheme, which is 
positively linked to the 
likelihood of a banking crisis. 
Author: Hardy and Pazabasioglu 
(1999)  
Time: 1980-1994 
Data: Macro-level  
Countries: 50  
Logit (1) Heavy capital flows increase 
the likelihood of banking 
crises. 
Author: Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999)  
Time: 1970-1995 
Data: Macro-level  
Countries: 20 
N/A (1) Banking and currency crises 
are preceded by financial 
liberalization.  
(2) Twin crises prominent in 
emerging economies that are 
liberalized. 
Author: Eichengreen and Arteta 
(2002)  
Time: 1975-1997 
Data: Macro-level  
Countries: 75 Emerging Economies 
Probit (1) Capital account liberalization 
does not lead to a crisis but 
internal liberalization 
(liberalization of the interest 
rate) does.  
(2) When countries are 
liberalized internally, capital 
account liberalization 
increases the likelihood of 
banking crises. 
Author: Noy (2004)  
Time: 1975-1997 
Data: Macro-level  
Countries: 61 non-OECD countries 
Probit (1) Financial liberalization is a 
medium run threat to the 
health of the banking sector. 
They specify that the danger 
with financial liberalization is 
in the fact that domestic 
banks lose monopoly power. 
Author: Edwards (2004)  
Time: 1970-2001 
Data: Macro-level  
Countries: 157 
Probit (1) Restriction of financial 
openness or capital account 
liberalization does not reduce 
the probability of 
experiencing current account 
reversals. 
Author: Jomo (1998)  
Time: 1997 
Data: Macro-level  
Countries: Malaysia  
N/A (1) Financial liberalization, not 
financial regulation resulted 
in the Malaysian Ringgit 
crisis in 1997. 
Author: Glick and Hutchinson Probit  (1) Occurrence of banking and 
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(1999)  
Time: 1975-1997 
Data: Macro-level  
Countries: 90 Industrial and 
Developing Countries 
currency crisis at the same 
time is only evident in 
emerging market economies. 
(2) There is no observable 
evidence that suggests 
financial liberalization results 
in increased likelihood of a 
currency crisis.  
 
From table 1.3 and from the FI-crisis literature in general, it is observed that 
there is a tendency to use binary indicators to proxy for financial liberalization which 
in turn proxies for financial integration. However, there is a scarcity of papers that 
uses the intensity of capital controls or the intensity of financial liberalization to proxy 
for financial openness or financial integration. Therefore, this is an important gap in 
the literature that must be fulfilled effectively using appropriate variables. The other 
fundamental researching loophole that is observable in the FI-crisis literature is the 
avoidance of the usage of key political variables in empirical examinations. Often, it 
is observed that political variables are only used to serve as control variables. 
However, for developing countries in particular, political factors are fundamental in 
determining economic outcomes. Therefore, in this thesis, in the context of 
developing countries, political factors are given the importance that they demand, due 
to the effect they have on macroeconomic stability. Furthermore, this thesis uses the 
intensity of financial liberalization instead of binary indicators to account for financial 
integration.  
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1.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter contributes to the debate on the financial integration and 
macroeconomic performance nexus by providing an in-depth examination of the 
theoretical linkages and analysis of the existing empirical evidence. This issue has 
been researched vigorously, however, due to the nature of the opinions being largely 
polarized, economists and policymakers tend to address and redress these issues. The 
close analysis of the existing body of literature allows the reader to formulate the 
necessary synopsis to further examine the causal linkages from different theoretical 
perspectives or to use different econometric techniques to deduce plausible 
inferences. The researching routes examined in the associated field of literature is not 
to be understated, however, as there are researching avenues and researching routes 
that have not been examined to the desired extent of the author.  
 
For policymaking decisions, it is important for government officials, 
economists and policymakers alike to be adequately equipped in terms of the level of 
financial openness that is best suited for the country. For this particular reason, an 
avenue that must be explored with urgency and greater intensity, is the determination 
of the level of financial liberalization that yields the highest growth levels, while 
minimizing poverty and inequality at the same time. In order to venture into this 
researching route, the use of the threshold regression methods is quintessential. 
However, in the literature, while it is commonly observed that there is a tendency to 
locate and fixate on the impact of one variable on the other, there is an insufficiency 
in the examinations that uses the threshold techniques for the determination of the 
appropriate level of financial liberalization for the country or, for a particular income 
group.  
 
In the FI-crisis literature, there is a series of discussion and determination of 
precursors of crises, however, the empirical literature does not use continuous 
variables to proxy for financial liberalization. From the policymaking viewpoint, it is 
important that policymakers know the risks that financial markets and the economy 
on the whole are susceptible to at different levels of financial liberalization. 
Furthermore, an observable loophole in the FI-crisis literature is the lack of theoretical 
and empirical importance given to the key political factors. Due to the fact that this 
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research paper focuses on developing and emerging nations, political factors remain 
decisive players in ensuring macroeconomic stability. Often, it is addressed and left to 
the sidelines of the theoretical discussion and in the empirical analysis, these political 
variables are often only used as control variables, but no special significance is given 
to these variable in the context of the empirical analysis that is evident in the existing 
literature. There is a select group of papers that discuss these issues, but there are 
interesting researching trajectories that must be examined, particularly from the 
viewpoint of effective policy level decisions in developing countries, as politics plays 
an instrumental role in the economic arena.   
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Chapter 2: Impact of Financial Integration on Growth in 
Developing, Transition and Emerging Market Economies: 
Quest for Threshold Analysis 
 
Abstract  
 
This research paper assesses the impact of financial integration proxied by de-facto 
measures, namely, various forms of capital flows, and de jure measures, namely, 
capital account openness, on economic growth. Panel Threshold regression (PTR) and 
logistic smooth transition regression (LSTR) methods are deployed to find the 
threshold estimates for each of these proxy variables for international financial 
integration. These nonlinear growth regressions are carried out for 175 countries over 
the period 1970-2013. The prime focus of this research paper is the threshold 
determination of the de jure measure of financial integration. The de jure measure of 
capital account openness issued for threshold analysis is the (1) Chinn-Ito Index 
(KAOPEN). Proxy variables are also employed when taking into account the de 
facto13 measures of financial integration and this includes the following: (2) Net 
Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI as % of GDP), (3) Equity Foreign 
Portfolio Inflow (EFPI as % of GDP), (4) Cross-Border Lending e.g. Loans from 
Non-Resident Banks (CBL or NRBL as % of GDP), and (5) Net Financial Account 
(NFA as % of GDP). However, these results should be interpreted with caution given 
the problem of endogeneity due to reverse causality between de facto measures of 
financial integration and growth. The obtained results acquired for these IFI proxy 
variables are not uniform across all measures of financial integration utilized in this 
research and country groups focused on here, to suggest that the effect of financial 
integration on growth is positive. There are distinctive thresholds for different income 
groups, some that are very interesting for policymaking purposes. The results that are 
of notable importance are related to the de jure measure of capital account openness. 
                                                 
13 With respect to the de facto measures of financial integration, FDI tends to have a positive 
association with growth (both below and above the threshold) for all income groups, except for 
transition economies. The threshold level for EFPI approximates between 0 to 4% for all income 
groups, indicating positive growth effects below the threshold and negative growth effects above the 
threshold. For cross-border lending, growth effects are negative above the threshold, but inconclusive 
below for all income groups other than the emerging markets. Increase in cross-border lending, is 
surprisingly associated with negative growth effects for all income groups. The results for the 
relationship between the financial account and growth are inconclusive given their statistical 
insignificance, sensitivity to robustness checks and low number of observations. However, these results 
are impractical for usage in policymaking purposes due to the problem of endogeneity. 
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These results indicate that transition economies have the lowest threshold, followed 
by emerging economies, whereas developing economies have the highest threshold. 
However, while it is growth retarding above the threshold (growth enhancing below 
the threshold) for all income groups, for emerging markets, it is growth enhancing 
both below and above the threshold. The accuracy of these threshold estimates is 
validated via various robustness checks.  
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2.1 Introduction  
 
Determination of the optimal level of financial integration has been at the 
forefront of policymaking objective for governments and policymakers in developing, 
transition, and emerging market economies14. Maximizing output growth with varying 
levels of financial integration is a conundrum that leaves economists, politicians, and 
policymakers alike, highly polarized. Maximizing output growth with varying levels 
of financial integration is a policy-level conundrum. For instance, what is the optimal 
level of (net) capital inflow that reaps the highest growth levels? Is there a tipping 
point for capital flows or capital account openness after which macroeconomic 
performance may be growth retarding? The existing literature examines various 
channels via which financial integration or various forms of capital flows may 
increase or diminish growth. However, the existing literature fails to sufficiently 
examine the tipping point for various measures of financial integration i.e. various 
forms of capital flows, including, for example, the de jure measure of capital account 
openness – the Chinn-Ito index.  
 
This research paper assesses the impact of financial market liberalization by 
deploying the (de jure) capital account openness and various forms of capital flows on 
growth. The focus of this research paper centers around the threshold determination of 
the de jure measure of financial integration, this is proxied by the (1) Chinn-Ito 
Capital Account Openness Index. However, associations between various forms of 
capital flows are also explored, such as the following proxies: (2) net inflows of 
foreign direct investment (% of GDP), (3) equity foreign portfolio inflow (% of 
GDP), (4) cross-border lending e.g. loans from non-resident banks (% of GDP), and 
(5) net financial account (% of GDP). These are the four de facto measures of 
financial integration. Panel Threshold regression (PTR) and logistic smooth transition 
regression (LSTR) methods are utilized to find the threshold estimates for each of 
these variables. This non-linear growth regression is carried out for 175 countries over 
the period of 1970-2013. The accuracy of these threshold estimates is validated 
predominantly via various robustness checks.  
                                                 
14 The classifications for developing economies are determined based on the categorization made by 
the World Bank which, in the context of this researching study, excludes the high-income economies. 
The classifications for transition and emerging market economies are determined by the IMF.  
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The key research questions that this particular research paper seeks to address 
are the following:  
 
1. What are the effects of different financial integration proxy variables on 
growth? Are such relationships linear or non-linear? How do they differ for 
developing, transition, and emerging economies?  
2. If FI-growth relationships are non-linear, what is the threshold level for each 
of the FI proxy variables and how does it differ for developing, transition, and 
emerging economies? 
3. Which FI proxy variables have multiple thresholds (more than 2 regimes)? 
a. Do the coefficients signify a large difference from one regime to the 
other?  
b. Is there a positive and negative relationship, thereby indicating a kink?  
c. Is the tipping point applicable for all countries on a policy making 
level?  
4. What is the speed of transition from one regime to another i.e. is it a ‘smooth’ 
transition?  
 
The fundamental contribution15 of this research paper stems around the usage 
of the de jure measure of capital account openness (as an IFI proxy variable) using the 
LSTR methodology. The research papers in the associated field of research tend to 
generally use de facto measures of financial integration and deploy the panel 
threshold model. However, the LSTR method has not been previously used in the FI-
growth literature. Furthermore, this research paper also uses the test for nonlinearity 
developed by Gonzalez, Terasvirta, and van Dijk (2005). It is a notable flaw in the 
existing literature to not incorporate the test for nonlinearities; this test determines the 
validity of the result by testing whether or not the model is linear and by determining 
the number of regimes/thresholds, it may have.  
 
The research paper is structured as follows; the first section illustrates the 
theoretical linkages of financial integration and growth. The second, third, and fourth 
                                                 
15 The contribution that this research paper makes to the associated field of research is discussed 
extensively in the conclusion (refer to the conclusion).  
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sections include the methodology, the empirical framework, and the variable 
description. Section 5 illustrates the results and section 6 concludes. The appendix 
(refer to sections 2.9, 2.10 and 2.11) includes the explorative data analysis and the 
robustness checks.   
 
2.2 Theoretical Framework   
 
The theoretical disposition of the growth effects of international financial 
integration is highly polarized. For instance, some theories suggest that IFI induces 
increased risk sharing and thereby enhances specialization of production, production 
capacity, allocation of capital and growth (Obstfeld, 1994). The standard neoclassical 
growth model suggests that the international financial integration facilitates and eases 
the flow of capital, to capital-starved economies, accompanying positive growth 
effects in the process. Furthermore, the theory also suggests that IFI enhances the 
functionality of the domestic financial systems via the means of intensification of 
competition and the fundamental importation of international financial services; from 
the neoclassical theoretical viewpoint, this is growth enhancing. On the contrary, the 
theoretical assumptions that suggest that IFI may in fact be growth retarding argue 
that IFI, in the presence of pre-existing institutional distortions (e.g. weak institutions, 
institutional policies, under-developed legal and financial systems), may be growth 
retarding (Boyd and Smith, 1992). Therefore, this theory argues that financial 
integration is only growth enhancing in the presence of effective policymaking 
ordeals and sound institutional setup.  
 
Baile et al. (2004) illustrate the three widely accepted benefits of financial 
integration: (1) risk sharing, (2) improved capital allocation and (3) higher growth. 
Financial integration offers extra opportunities to share the level of risks and to 
smooth out the consumption levels inter-temporally. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001) 
show that risk sharing across differing regions does enhance specialization in 
production, which also improves productivity growth. Adjaoute and Danthine (2003) 
find that the growth rates of consumption in the Euro Area are less correlated than 
that with growth rates of GDP per capita; this means that risk sharing potential has not 
been tapped. Adam et al. (2002) support this view by rejecting the notion that 
consumption growth rates are unaffected by idiosyncratic variations in GDP growth 
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rates. Therefore, financial integration can reap added benefits; however, even in the 
Euro Area, these potential additional gains have not been exploited fully. The removal 
of the barriers to trade, easing restrictions of capital control, induces improved 
allocation of capital. This will also induce investors to invest in productive and 
promising investment projects, which will stir competition and result in efficiency 
gains.  
 
Smith (1994) and Obstfeld (1994), through their theoretical discussions, 
illustrate that increased international risk sharing through international financial 
integration (resulting in integrated stock markets) will cause a shift in the portfolio 
demands from safe and low-risk investments to the high-risk and high return 
investments. This will accelerate productivity growth. International financial 
integration, in the presence of existing institutional and legal distortion can have a 
growth retarding effect. Boyd and Smith (1992) infer that international financial 
integration induces capital outflow from the capital-scarce countries to capital-
abundant countries in countries that have relatively weaker financial and legal 
institutions. 
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2.3 Literature Review: Empirical Evidence  
 
This section looks at the existing empirical literature in the associated field of 
research. The literature assessing international financial integration (or external 
financial liberalization) and growth predominantly addresses these key research 
questions: Is there a robust relationship between financial integration and growth? 
What are the channels via which international financial integration influences growth? 
Is there an optimal level (threshold) of financial integration? Is there the supposed 
‘kink’ in the relationship that may suggest that up until a certain threshold it is growth 
enhancing, after which it is growth retarding? What are the institutional prerequisites 
for financial integration to effectively transcend to escalated growth levels? This 
chapter aims to pinpoint the threshold level and determine the effects of IFI below 
and above this threshold. This research paper deploys the logistic smooth transition 
regression (LSTR) and the panel threshold regression model (PTR) introduced by 
Hansen (1999). The logistic smooth transition regression (LSTR) model has not been 
previously used in the international financial integration and growth literature.  
 
2.3.1 Financial Integration and Growth Literature 
 
The existing empirical evidence assessing the relationship between IFI and 
growth provide conflicting and polarizing inferences. Financial globalization includes 
the integration of equity, bond, and money markets as well as for instance the direct 
ownership of foreign capital or FDI. Economists and policymakers see financial 
globalization as a stepping-stone for the middle-income emerging markets; for them 
to aspire to reach the levels of income and financial stability achieved by the 
developed industrial economies.  Schularick and Steger (2010) look at the effect of 
financial integration (globalization) on growth in two different eras. The first time 
period stretches from 1880 to 1913, consisting of 24 countries. The second time frame 
stretches from 1980 to 2002. They use the econometric methodology used by Edison 
et al. (2012) i.e. they run both a cross-sectional regression analysis as well as a GMM 
dynamic panel regression. They use a total of three econometric regression models 
and run it using both the historical dataset as well as the contemporary dataset. When 
they use the GMM panel estimation, they use 5-year averages in order to reduce the 
cyclicality of the data. It is also important to consider that the GMM estimation helps 
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to address the bias of reverse causality i.e. increased growth rates causing an increase 
in the capital flow (something that the OLS regressions fail to consider). The results 
show that financial integration had a strong positive association with economic 
growth before 1915; however, they imply that this is not the case when results are 
drawn using the more contemporary dataset. Moreover, opening up to international 
capital markets (using the contemporary dataset) do not lead to increased aggregate 
investment. 
 
Brezigar Masten, Coricelli and Igor Masten (2008) investigate nonlinear 
effects of financial development and financial integration on growth in Europe, using 
both macro and industry level data. The empirical analysis16 is divided into two 
sections. The first empirical section comprises of the cross-country panel of 
macroeconomic data; which measures the effect of financial integration on growth. A 
total of 31 European countries are taken over the period of 1996 to 2004 with a host 
of control variables. The GMM estimation method is used to carry out the regression 
analysis; this also controls for potential endogeneity biases. The second empirical 
section uses industry level data to investigate how increased availability of external 
finance affects growth. This approach directly investigates the extent to which the 
effect of financial integration on growth is dependent on the absorptive capacity17 of 
institutional factors; the proxy variable used to measure the absorptive capacity is 
financial depth. This approach looks at the effect of financial integration on the 
growth of real sales in various industries, in 30 European countries over the time 
period 1996 to 2003. Furthermore, the authors also use a multiple threshold model18 
to effectively measure the nonlinear effects on growth. The key inference deduced 
from this paper suggests that financial integration and development of financial 
markets do have a positive but nonlinear effect on growth. They find that a sufficient 
absorptive capacity (measured by financial depth noted above) must be in place for 
financial integration to have a significantly positive effect on growth i.e. financial 
                                                 
16 Brezigar Masten, Coricelli and Igor Masten (2008) use the WDI database. For robustness purposes, 
several measures of financial integration are taken into consideration: (1) stock of total foreign assets 
and liabilities as a percent of GDP, (2) total liabilities as a percent of GDP and (3) sum of stocks of 
portfolio equity and other debt inflows and outflows as a share of GDP.  
17 Absorptive capacity is the appropriate supply of human capital, infrastructural functionality and 
technological capability to be able to generate new technologies and consequently use productive 
resources efficiently. In turn, this is expected to translate into productivity growth for firms as well as 
countries (Narula, 2004).   
18 The threshold model used in this paper replicates the approach taken by Hansen (1999).  
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integration becomes beneficial for growth only after the development of the financial 
markets pass a specific threshold. The authors stipulated at the time, that the 
emergence of the European Monetary Union would accelerate the process of financial 
integration and the repercussions would be positive; convergence of the new EU 
member states, however, and the European Debt Crisis post 2009 illustrates the risks 
associated with financial integration.  
 
Edison and Warnock (2003)19 analyze the effect of capital flows to emerging 
market economies. The capital flows data are monthly equity flows from the U.S. to 
the emerging market countries. They use a regional panel dataset and fixed effects 
estimation method to carry out their regression analysis. The dependent variable is the 
average monthly equity inflows from one month to the next and is also scaled by the 
local market capitalization. The inferences deduced from this paper imply that effects 
of changes in capital controls on financial flows are dependent on whether or not 
controls were binding.  
 
Bosworth and Collins (1999) investigate the effect of capital flows to 
developing economies and intensively examine the implication this has on savings 
and investments. They use a panel dataset that comprises 58 developing countries 
over the time period 1978 to 1995. They use OLS and fixed effect estimation (allows 
the authors to account for relationships between the variables of interest over time) 
methods to deduce regression inferences. They use an instrumental variable, as they 
believe that domestic conditions are likely to influence capital inflows; this accounts 
for the endogeneity and the reverse causality problem. The authors conclude the 
following: (1) that a large proportion of capital inflows are used to finance the deficits 
the developing countries have in their current accounts; where the majority of the 
resource transfer is for investment, as a result, consumption is compromised, (2) 
capital inflows are heavily concentrated on a small number of developing economies 
                                                 
19 Edison and Warnock (2003) use Montiel and Reinhart (1999) measure of capital controls; they 
measure capital controls by using the 0, 1 and 2 categorical variable to measure intensity of capital 
control. They also use the dummy variable measured by Bekaert, Harvey and Lumsdaine (2002) where 
1 indicates the initial opening of a market to foreign investment and 0 indicates the closed market. 
Edison and Warnock (2003a) use the capital controls measure, which captures the opening date of the 
market as well as the intensity of subsequent change in controls. The data for the portfolio equity flows 
from the U.S. to the emerging markets is taken from U.S. Treasury International Capital Reporting 
System.  
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i.e. the emerging markets of Asia, (3) portfolio capital inflow does not have a 
significant effect on domestic investment and, (4) FDI often generates large increases 
in domestic savings and investments.   Borensztein, Gregorio and Lee (1997) find that 
foreign capital inflows (predominantly in the form of FDI) result in increasing 
investment and growth levels when there is a certain threshold of human capital; in 
order for the economy and the domestic entrepreneurs to absorb the spillover of 
technical knowledge.  
 
Edison, Levine, Ricci, and Slok (2002) examine the growth effects of IFI. 
They incorporate nonlinearities by assessing whether or not these growth effects are 
reliant on the level of financial development, institutional sophistication, economic 
development and broad macroeconomic policies. They use three econometric 
methods to determine this relationship. They use the OLS regressions (one 
observation per country) over the period 1980-2000, the two-stage least squares 
instrumental variable estimator (cross-country), and generalized method of moments 
(GMM). For the two-stage least squares method, they use two sets of instrumental 
variables, an exogenous indicator that accounts for the legal tradition and the other 
that uses geography and its subsequent effect on economic institutions and policies. 
They use 57 countries. Their results indicate that IFI does not accelerate economic 
growth per se, even when controlling for economic, financial, institutional, and policy 
characteristics. However, the authors do state a positive association between real per 
capita GDP and IFI, but still underline that it does not stimulate growth.  
 
Mody and Murshid (2005) examine the relationship between capital flows and 
domestic investments using 60 developing economies over the time period 1979 to 
1999. Using econometric regression analysis, the authors measure the effect of gross 
long-term capital flows (measured as a percentage of GDP; key independent variable 
of interest) on domestic investment (measured as a percentage of GDP), with a host of 
macroeconomic control variables. They use the GMM estimation method. The 
authors find that each dollar of long-run flows raised domestic investment by 66 
cents. The authors conclude that despite the theoretical notion suggesting that foreign 
capital inflow adds to the existing capital stock and raises the marginal returns, it also 
raises a significant argument stating that financial integration could simply mean 
agents optimize their portfolio by investing in developing countries; this plays no part 
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in increasing domestic investment. The authors conclude that the surge in capital 
flows (predominantly through portfolio flows or through FDI) in developing countries 
during the 1990s did increase international reserves and led domestic residents to 
diversify by investing abroad, but inflow of capital, can be attributed to the 
“diversification motive” (as previously discussed in this thesis) rather than fulfilling 
unmet investment needs domestically. Moreover, they conclude that sounder policy 
environments enhanced the association between inflow and investments. According to 
Mody and Murshid (2005), some developing countries often have domestic returns 
that are lower than or equal to the world interest rate and are often scapegoats to 
foreign diversification motives. Technological spillover is regarded as an essential 
motive for developing countries in opening up to capital inflows.  
 
2.3.1.1 Financial Liberalization and Growth  
 
In this thesis, financial integration and financial liberalization are used 
interchangeably, as financial liberalization is considered to be a proxy measure for 
financial integration. The research papers cited in this subsection use financial 
liberalization (without associating it with financial integration directly) and measure 
the its impact on growth. For instance, Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005) 
investigate the effect of financial liberalization20 on economic growth using a panel 
dataset of 95 countries over a period of 40 years.  The empirical model tests the effect 
of equity market liberalization (allowance for foreign investors to have freedom to 
transact in domestic securities, vice versa) on growth; this is their contribution to the 
existing literature. The OLS and GMM estimation methods are used. They reiterate 
the existence of an endogeneity problem i.e. whether or not the decision to liberalize 
the equity markets had a political implication; where the political reformation had a 
bearing that is perhaps even unaccounted for. Their analysis shows that when 
countries do liberalize the respective equity markets, it is associated with the removal 
of restrictions on foreign exchange, the deregulation of the banking systems, 
                                                 
20 Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005) use the three following measures for financial liberalization: 
(1) Intensity equity market liberalization indicator (IFC Global Index for each country); measures 
liberalization intensity, (2) IMF capital account openness indicator (AREAER), (3) Quinn capital 
account openness indicator; scored from 0-4, using half integer units, where 4 indicates a fully 
liberalized economy and (4) official equity market liberalization dates. For the latter parts of the paper, 
UNIDO (United National Industrial Development Organization) Industrial Statistics Database has been 
used. Judicial efficiency measured based on Business International Corporation’s assessment of the 
legal environment.  
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improvement in judicial structure and investor protection and enhancement of 
financial development. In order to avoid the omitted variable bias, a host of control 
variables have been used, accounting for macro, financial and legal reforms. The 
authors conclude that equity market liberalization leads to an approximate and 
statistically significant 1% increase in annual real GDP per capita growth. However, 
the authors reiterate that this could merely be an association between the variables of 
interest, rather than a direct causal impact, as the indirect linkages may not have been 
taken into consideration. Therefore, the 1% increase in growth of real GDP per capita 
may be partially higher, if all the indirect channels of growth were accounted. 
Moreover, they find that countries that have higher levels of financial development 
experience a larger boost from equity market liberalization. The magnitude of the 
effect of equity market liberalization on growth is larger when the legal systems, 
institutions and investor protections are robust. 
 
Galindo, Micco and Ordonez (2002)21 assess the repercussions of financial 
liberalization. They define financial liberalization as the removal of restrictions on the 
domestic financial system and the capital account. The empirical model of interest 
that they look at has the growth rate of real value added of a particular sector in a 
given country at a particular time, as the key dependent variable of interest. The 
independent variables of interest are the requirement of a particular industry for 
external funds and the measures of financial liberalization. They use a host of control 
variables and interact with the key variables of interest with legal protection and 
external dependence. They find the following results from their econometric 
regression analysis: (1) on average, financial liberalization boosts the growth rates of 
industries that depend on external funding, (2) firms that have higher external funding 
dependence grows 1.3 percent higher after liberalization as opposed to firms that are 
not dependent on external financing, (3) countries that are associated with a low level 
of legal and judicial protections benefit less from financial liberalization than 
countries that have higher levels of institutional protections.  
 
                                                 
21 Galindo, Micco and Ordonez (2002) use the data for the indicator ‘Value Added’ from the Industrial 
Statistics Yearbook database of the UNSD (United Nations Statistical Division).  
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Kraay (1998)22 examines the medium to long-run macroeconomic effects of 
capital account liberalization and tests the predetermined notion that the benefits of 
capital account liberalization are offset by the increased level of volatility associated 
with it and that capital account liberalization is only beneficial for countries with a 
sound financial and institutional infrastructure. The dataset includes a host of different 
countries from the time period 1985 to 1997. The dependent variables are real GDP 
growth per capita, gross domestic investment as a share of GDP and the logarithmic 
form of the annual CPI inflation rate. The key independent variable of interest is 
capital account openness. He uses the OLS and IV estimation methods. The IV 
instrument (accounting for endogeneity) is the financial openness average for the 
years 1975 to 1984. The cross-sectional regression shows no evidence of growth or 
domestic investment levels being higher in countries with higher levels of financial 
openness. Moreover, for event study, capital account liberalization has no statistically 
significant effect on growth, investment or inflation. Kraay also tests the hypothesis 
that benefits of capital account liberalization are offset by capital reversals, as 
observed in the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. He finds no statistically significant 
evidence that volatility is higher in countries with a higher degree of financial 
openness. 
 
  
                                                 
22 Kraay (1998) uses three measures to account for capital mobility: (1) IMF’s annual report on 
exchange arrangements and exchange restrictions (AREAER), (2) Quinn’s (1997) measure of openness 
and (3) constructs his own index i.e. the sum of inward and outward FDI, portfolio investment and 
other investment items in the financial account of the balance of payments, representing it as a share of 
GDP. Note that cross sectional regression analysis is carried out. To account for the effect of volatility  
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2.3.2 Threshold Literature 
 
This subsection presents the empirical findings for those papers that deploy 
various threshold techniques. Both the developing and the developed countries have 
illustrated over the years that countries’ characteristics are signals that precondition 
the impact of capital flows and dictate, for instance elevated growth levels or increase 
the likelihood of banking, currency, or twin crisis. The threshold studies often tend to 
focus on the various forms of contingencies that may influence growth, positively or 
negatively. For instance, Brecher and Alejandro (1977) find that financial integration 
without the presence of trade openness could lead to misallocation of resources in the 
case when foreign capital flows into the non-competitive industries of the domestic 
economy. Arteta, Eichengreen, and Wyplosz (2001) on the other hand, do not find 
trade openness to be a contingent factor for the growth effects of financial integration.  
 
Chen and Quang (2014) look at the effect of international financial integration 
on economic growth using threshold effects with an annual panel dataset consisting of 
80 countries over the time period 1984 to 2007. They use the panel threshold 
regression framework developed by Hansen (1999). Additionally, they use an 
extension made by Caner and Hansen (2004) that allows for the endogeneity of 
regressors. The dependent variable of interest is the growth rate of real GDP per 
capita. A host of control variables is used; they use the level of initial income in order 
to control for conditional convergence. They predominantly use the de facto measure 
of financial integration. They use the following threshold variables: income level, 
trade openness, institutional quality, financial development, and macroeconomic 
policy. They use a multiple threshold model i.e. accounting for three potential breaks. 
They find that financial integration could be a facilitator of growth given countries 
satisfying specific threshold conditions concerning their institutional quality, level of 
financial depth and inflation rate. The criticism associated with this paper would be 
the fact that they have not heavily discussed the possibility of heteroscedasticity 
affecting the results.  
 
Ding and Jinjarak (2012) use a panel dataset comprising of 130 countries over 
the period 1980-2003. They use the Hansen (1999) threshold estimation. They take 
into consideration four measures of capital flows: total capital inflow, total capital 
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outflow, net capital outflow, and capital flight. They find that the magnitude of capital 
flows is positively correlated with the income level of the economy. Using Hansen’s 
threshold estimation, they introduce a three-stage threshold effect: for low-income 
countries (GDP per capita below US$3000), capital flight tends to increase as income 
level rises, but only after the income level rises above US$ 5000, capital flight 
declines with income.  
 
Karadam and Ocal (2014) deploy panel smooth transition models to examine 
the effect of financial integration on growth for a panel dataset comprising of 82 
countries over the period 1970-2010. The specialty of the PSTR models is that it 
allows endogenously determining and revealing for instance, the degree of 
institutional quality and/or the level of financial development asymmetries in the IFI-
growth nexus. The dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP per capita and the 
key independent variable of interest is the de facto measure of financial integration, 
the ratio of the sum of total stocks of external assets and liabilities as a share of the 
GDP. The data is acquired from the database of Lane and Milesi-Feretti. For the 
entire dataset (all countries), it is found that countries with better developed financial 
systems, qualified institutions and stable macroeconomic policies seem to benefit the 
most from financial integration. These findings are consistent with that for emerging 
market economies, however, for industrial economies, higher levels of trade openness 
(with increasing financial integration) tend to decrease growth. Furthermore, for 
industrial countries, a budget deficit has a significantly higher negative growth effect 
with increasing integration compared to emerging economies.  
 
Due to the fact that this research paper deploys FDI as a proxy measure for 
financial integration, it is only appropriate to find an existing research paper that uses 
the threshold technique for the FDI-growth nexus. The causal relationship between 
foreign direct investment (robust positive relationship) is not definitive, especially in 
the case of emerging market economies, it is in fact ambiguous (Gorg and 
Greenaway, 2004). The underlying view is that there is a positive association that is 
almost universally accepted, however, the contingency effects have not been explored 
sufficiently to give a decisive inference. Azman-Saini, Law, and Ahmad (2010) look 
at the effect of FDI and growth using a threshold measure, where the threshold 
variable is financial development. They use data for 91 countries over the period 
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1975-2005. They surprisingly find that until the level of financial development 
reaches a certain threshold level, the effect of FDI on growth is nonexistent. The 
positive impact is realized only after the financial development threshold is reached.   
 
2.4 Methodology  
 
This research paper incorporates a dataset that includes 175 countries over the 
time-period 1970-2013. All the countries largely available are included in the dataset 
for cross-comparative purposes. In order to investigate the nonlinear effects of 
financial integration on growth, two distinctive statistical techniques are deployed. 
They are the (1) Panel Threshold Regression model (PTR) and the (2) Logistic 
Smooth Transition Regression (LSTR) method. The technical mechanisms of these 
two statistical techniques are explained in the empirical framework section of this 
report. This research paper averages data over five-year periods23 to smooth business 
cycle fluctuations.  
 
There are five proxy variables selected to measure international financial 
integration, starting from the de jure financial integration measure, (1) Chinn-Ito 
Index (de jure measure of capital account openness), and de facto financial integration 
measures such as (2) Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP), (3) Equity Foreign 
Portfolio Inflow (% of GDP), (4) Non-Resident Bank Loans (% of GDP), and (5) 
Financial Account (% of GDP). These are the key independent variables of interest. 
The dependent variable of interest is real GDP per capita growth (Annual %), which 
is used to reflect macroeconomic performance. Furthermore, regression analysis is 
carried out for these specific country groups: (1) All Economies (this refers to the 
global economy i.e. all the economies in the dataset), (2) Developing Economies, (3) 
Transition Economies, and (4) Emerging Market Economies24. The classifications for 
developing economies are determined based on the categorization developed by the 
World Bank. The classifications for transition and emerging market economies are 
determined by the IMF. The reason for including all the economies in the dataset is to 
                                                 
23 Five-year averages are deployed for this panel dataset to account for business cycle fluctuations. The 
panel dataset spans from 1970-2013, therefore, there are 10 periods of non-overlapping five-year 
averages.  
24 Refer to appendix 3 in section 2.11 for the detailed list of countries.  
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get an overview of the repercussions of financial integration on macroeconomic 
proceedings on an international level as well as for cross-comparative purposes.  
The research paper focuses predominantly on developing, transition, and 
emerging market economies and therefore segregates the income group classification 
in this manner. The regression results assessing the relationship between IFI (proxy 
variables) are presented in tables 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6. Each table (segregated 
based on the IFI proxy variable) contains the OLS, PTR, and LSTR estimation results 
for all economies, developing economies, transition economies, and emerging market 
economies. Appendix 125 presents the explorative data analysis that looks at historical 
trends, scatter graphs (de facto and de jure proxies of financial integration and 
growth), and quadratic relationships. Appendix 226 illustrates the robustness checks 
carried out for all of the IFI proxy variables, de facto and de jure. These robustness 
checks include taking the 3-year non-overlapping averages, lagged financial 
integration proxy variables, post-1990 estimations and quadratic estimations (only for 
the de jure measure of financial integration). 
 
The focal point of this research paper centers around the de jure measure of 
capital account openness due to the novel contribution it makes to the associated field 
of research. While, the threshold regression (PTR and LSTR) results for the other IFI 
proxy variables are illustrated, due to issues associated with endogeneity (especially 
for FDI and growth), it would be erroneous to make policy deductions. Therefore, the 
threshold findings for the financial flows are merely there to gain an understanding of 
the association before progressing to our key independent variable of interest, which 
is the parameterized Chinn-Ito Index (KAOPEN).   
 
  
                                                 
25 Refer to section 2.9. 
26 Refer to section 2.10.  
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2.5 Empirical Framework  
 
2.5.1 Panel Threshold Regression (PTR) 
 
This section presents the theoretical intuition of the Panel Threshold 
Regression (PTR)27 and Logistic Smooth Transition Regression (LSTR) methodology 
using the practical exposition of the financial integration theory. The initial 
component of the empirical framework section will discuss the technical intuition of 
the PTR model. Hansen (1999) introduced the technical model. The purpose of this 
model is to provide an endogenous estimation of the threshold parameter in two 
distinctive regimes that is unaccounted for in the regular simple regression 
methodology. The gist of the PTR model suggests that there is a threshold level after 
which, growth for instance, may have a distinctively different (growth enhancing or 
growth retarding) growth effect. The special and distinctive feature in comparison to 
the LSTR model with the PTR model is that the PTR model suggests that there is an 
instantaneous change from one ‘regime’ to another. The empirical model is based on 
the assumption that international financial integration affects growth in a nonlinear 
way. The empirical formulation of the Panel Threshold Regression (PTR) is as 
follows: 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙1
′𝐹𝐼𝑖,𝑡𝐼(𝐹𝐼𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝑇) + 𝜙2
′𝐹𝐼𝑖,𝑡𝐼(𝐹𝐼𝑖,𝑡 > 𝑇) + 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜃 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡  
 
The subscript “i” refers to the individual countries and the subscript “t” refers 
to time period indexes. The dependent variable that accounts for macroeconomic 
performance is Real GDP per capita Growth. The constant term is denoted by ait. The 
specific threshold level is denoted by T. The threshold variable is defined by 𝑞𝑖𝑡, but 
for purposes of simplicity it is denoted in this equation by 𝐹𝐼𝑖,𝑡. The indicator function 
is defined by 𝐼(𝐹𝐼𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝑇) and 𝐼(𝐹𝐼𝑖,𝑡 > 𝑇); this indicator function equals 0 when 𝐹𝐼𝑖,𝑡 
is less than or equal to the threshold parameter T and 1 otherwise. The error term, 𝑒𝑖𝑡, 
is assumed to be independent and identically distributed with a mean of 0 and 
variance of 𝜎2. It is important to understand that the observations are divided into two 
distinctive regimes depending on whether or not the threshold variable is greater than 
                                                 
27 Chen and Quang (2014) in their paper measure the impact of financial integration on economic 
growth (using threshold effects) using the PTR methodology.    
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or less than the threshold, T. When the regime is below the threshold level, this is 
represented by the coefficient 𝜙1
′ ; the regime after the threshold level is represented 
by the coefficient 𝜙2
′ . The financial integration variable is represented by 𝐹𝐼𝑖,𝑡; it is 
important to note that there are 5 proxy variables selected as a means to measure the 
impact of IFI on growth. The 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′  variable represents the set of control variables that 
may affect the output growth. The control variables have been selected based on those 
that are predominantly used in the growth and international financial integration 
literature.  
 
2.5.2 Logistic Smooth Transition Regression (LSTR) 
 
This research paper deploys the logistic smooth transition regression (LSTR)28 
model. The focal point of the empirical analysis is hinged on the LSTR model for the 
purposes of this particular paper. The growth and IFI literature tends to have and use 
the PTR model as a backdrop for threshold analysis; however, the LSTR model is 
significantly different, as the smooth transitional model does not have the 
instantaneous change (from one regime to another) as a feature of the model like the 
PTR model. The key explanatory variable of interest is the Financial Integration, 
which has five distinctive proxies: (1) net inflows of foreign direct investment (% of 
GDP), (2) equity foreign portfolio inflow (% of GDP), (3) cross-border lending e.g. 
loans from non-resident banks (% of GDP), (4) net financial account (% of GDP), and 
(5) de jure Chinn-Ito capital openness index.  
 
This research paper averages data over five-year periods to smooth business 
cycle fluctuations. This allows for a more precise focus on the medium and the long-
term effects of financial integration as it mitigates the business cycles and in some 
instances the problem of endogeneity, furthermore, it helps to avoid the problem of 
moving average dynamics.  
 
The logistic smooth transition regression (LSTR) model is estimated in the 
following manner: 
                                                 
28 The paper by Gonzalez, Terasvirta, and van Dijk (2005) is the benchmark paper for the empirical 
methodology used in this research paper. The tests of nonlinearity are also applied from this particular 
research paper.  
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{
 
 
 
 
 
 
Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽
𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝑐
∗) + 𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝑐
∗) + Θ𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑡 =
𝐼𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤 = 1 −𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ =
1
1 + exp [−γ∗
(𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝑐∗)
𝜎 ]
 
 
The real per capita GDP growth rate is denoted by Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡; 𝛼𝑖𝑡 is the constant 
term or the intercept of the regression model; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of control variables; 𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑡 
is the share of financial integration as a % of GDP, where 𝐼𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑡 are the proxy 
variables of international financial integration expressed in constant 2005 US$ (with 
the exception of the de jure measure of capital account openness). The standard 
deviation of 𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑡 is denoted by 𝜎; 𝑐
∗ is the threshold parameter; t is the time series 
index; i refers to the countries; 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term.  
 
There are two regressors via which the key explanatory variable(s)29 of 
interest, 𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑡, enters the LSTR model, and they are the following: (1) 𝑊
𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝑐
∗) 
and (2) 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝑐
∗); in this case 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑤 and 𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ are coefficients of lower and 
higher regimes respectively. Therefore, this implies that when 𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑡 is above the 
threshold parameter  𝑐∗, the impact of 𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑡 on real per capita GDP growth is closer to 
𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ. Similarly, when 𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑡 is below the threshold parameter  𝑐
∗, the impact of 𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑡 on 
real per capita GDP growth is closer to 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑤. The weights are represented by 𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤 
and 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ, where 𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤 = 1 −𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ. For instance, when 𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑡 is equal to 𝑐
∗, then 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ = 𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤. The speed of transition from the low regime to the high regime is 
represented by γ∗. Therefore, the higher the value of γ∗, the faster the speed of 
transition, and the lower the value of γ∗, the lower the speed of transition. It is 
important to comprehend effectively that when γ∗ is high30, the PTR is the more 
appropriate statistical technique. In contrast, when the γ∗ is low, the LSTR is the more 
applicable methodology due to the fact that the speed of transition is low from one 
                                                 
29 There are five proxy variables chosen to measure international financial integration (IFI).  
30 The range for the γ∗ (gamma value) is set between 1 and 15, where 1 indicates slow transition from 
one regime to another and therefore would suggest that the LSTR is the appropriate methodology for 
the regression model. Conversely, if the value of γ∗ was to be 15, then this indicates fast transition 
from low to high regime and therefore this would indicate that the PTR methodology is more 
applicable for the purposes of this regression analysis.  
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regime to the other, this means that there is a rather ‘smooth’ transition, hence, the 
usage of the LSTR technique. The regression results provide the estimations of the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) method, the PTR, and the LSTR model for cross-
comparative purposes.  
 
The LSTR model assumes that there are precisely two regimes i.e. low and 
high regimes; if for instance, there are more than two regimes then the model is said 
to be misspecified and the relationship is assumed linear (linear model), resultantly 
the parameters defined in this model are not identified. The specification test used to 
determine the existence of nonlinearities and the number of regimes is presented by 
Gonzalez, Terasvirta, and van Dijk (2005). This specification test therefore, estimates 
two p-values, (a) for nonlinearities (otherwise it is a straightforward linear model) and 
(b) for remaining nonlinearities – if there were to be remaining nonlinearities then this 
would imply that there are more than two regimes, for instance. There is a 
fundamental flaw in the existing literature that calculates the threshold level but fails 
to account for the validity of the threshold or even test for the existence of 
nonlinearities, which is a fundamental prerequisite. In order to check the validity of 
the threshold measures, various robustness techniques are deployed to validate and 
confirm the efficiency of the results.  
 
2.6 Variable Description  
 
Table 2.1 presents the descriptions of the dependent variable, the key 
independent variables of interest and the control variables. For these variables, the 
name of the variable is appropriately defined, a brief description of the variable is 
provided, and the source from which the data for this indicator was collected is 
enlisted. Furthermore, it provides descriptive statistics of each of these 
aforementioned variables. The descriptive statistics include the mean value, the 
maximum value, the minimum value, the standard deviation, and the total number of 
observations for all the indicators; note that they are averaged over 5-years as this is 
the dataset used to acquire the final regression results. The key dependent variable, 
which takes into account macroeconomic performance, is real per capita GDP growth. 
The key independent variables of interest (proxy variables for IFI) are broadly divided 
into two categories, the de jure and the de facto measures of IFI. The focus of this 
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research paper is the threshold determination of the de jure measure of financial 
integration, i.e. KAOPEN. The de facto measures include FDI (% of GDP), EFPI (% 
of GDP), Non-Resident Bank Loans (% of GDP) and Net Financial Account (% of 
GDP).  
 
The Chinn-Ito index (denoted as KAOPEN) or the de jure measure of capital 
account openness measures the degree of financial openness. The Chinn-Ito index 
ranges from +2.66 to -2.66, where +2.66 indicate a financial system that is fully 
liberalized and -2.66 indicates a fully regulated financial system. The index has a 
mean of zero. However, to simplify interpretation of the results this variable has been 
transformed in the following manner: KAOPEN = (Chinn-Ito Index+2.66)*10. This 
shows that the original version of the Chinn-Ito index is taken and every value is 
added by 2.66 (this is to take away all the negative values and it is multiplied by 10 to 
have an easier statistical reading. The transformed index (KAOPEN) has a minimum 
value of 7.71, a maximum value of 50.49, mean of 26.76, and a standard deviation of 
16.18 for the observations in this particular dataset. However, it is important to note 
that the financial market is fully regulated when KAOPEN equals 0 and it is fully 
liberalized when KAOPEN equals 53.2. KAOPEN has a mean value that equals to 
26.6. The original value or the original level of impact of a unit increase in the Chinn-
Ito index can be found by dividing by 10 and then subtracting 2.66.  
 
The standard control variables31 for this research paper are the following: 
Initial GDP per Capita (constant 2005 US$), Investment (% of GDP), Inflation (%), 
Population Growth (%), Life Expectancy (Years), and School Enrolment (% Gross). 
The additional control variables included to avoid the problem of multicollinearity are 
the following: Savings (% of GDP) and Trade (% of GDP).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
                                                 
31 The control variables were decided upon after looking at the most renowned papers in the growth 
literature, like the following authors: Islam (1995), Forbes (2000), Barro (2000), and Hausmann, 
Pritchett, and Rodrik (2004).  
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Table 2.1: Variable Description and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable/Parameter Description of Variable  Data Source Mean Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation Observations Variable Type 
Real per Capita GDP 
Growth (Annual %) 
Real per capita GDP growth is based on constant 2005 
US$. This is the dependent variable of interest and is the 
proxy measure for macroeconomic performance.  
World Bank 
Data  
3.941 -21.66297 56.84105 4.255258 1755 
Dependent Variable: 
Measuring 
Macroeconomic 
Performance 
Foreign Direct Investment, 
Net Inflows (% of GDP) 
Foreign direct investment as a share of GDP is based on 
constant 2005 US$.   
World Bank 
Data 
2.790 -21.95122 466.5622 12.25781 1851 
IFI Proxy Variable: Key 
Independent Variable of 
Interest 
Equity Foreign Portfolio 
Inflows (% of GDP) 
Portfolio equity includes net inflows from equity securities 
and direct purchases of shares in local stock markets 
represented as a share of GDP.  
Global 
Financial 
Development 
Database  
0.708 -4.775941 316.4705 12.06782 1852 
IFI Proxy Variable: Key 
Independent Variable of 
Interest 
Non-Resident Bank Loans 
(% of GDP) 
Non-resident bank loans as a share of GDP is based on 
constant 2005 US$. This accounts for cross-border 
lending.  
International 
Financial 
Statistics, IMF 
66.97   0 4170.101 317.0486 905 
IFI Proxy Variable: Key 
Independent Variable of 
Interest 
Financial Account (% of 
GDP) 
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) is used as a proxy 
for FA i.e. FA=-CA.   
International 
Financial 
Statistics, IMF 
2.437 -190.95 44.3769 16.17711 523 
IFI Proxy Variable: Key 
Independent Variable of 
Interest 
Capital Account Openness: 
Chinn-Ito Index  
 
The index has a mean of 0 and ranges from -2.66 to 
+2.66, where -2.66 represents full capital control and 
+2.66 represents complete liberalization. However, for 
the purposes of technical simplicity, it has been 
parameterized by addition of 2.66 and multiplying with 10 
e.g. KAOPEN=(chinnito+2.66)*10 
International 
Financial 
Statistics, IMF 
26.76 
 
7.71105 
 
50.49669 15.05006 1439   
IFI Proxy Variable: Key 
Independent Variable of 
Interest 
Total Investment (% of 
GDP) 
Total Investment as a share of GDP is accumulated total 
gross investment in constant 2005 US$.  
International 
Financial 
Statistics, IMF 
24.02 -3.636 176.0546 10.43442 1190 Control Variable 
Gross Domestic Savings (% 
of GDP) 
Total domestic savings as a share of GDP is used as an 
alternative to total investments (due to multicollinearity 
problem).  
International 
Financial 
Statistics, IMF 
16.96 -120.65 83.13451 17.64589 1625 Control Variable 
Initial GDP per Capita 
(constant 2005 US$) 
Initial GDP per capita refers to the initial level of GDP 
per capita of every 5-year period (or 3-year period).  
International 
Financial 
Statistics, IMF 
9505.1 96.768 145456.3 15721.22 1762 Control Variable 
Inflation, consumer prices 
(Annual %) 
 
Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects 
the annual percentage change in the cost to the average 
consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services. 
International 
Financial 
Statistics, IMF 
27.81 -4.2534 6517.11 220.3279 1462 Control Variable 
Population growth (Annual 
%) 
 
Population growth (annual %) is the exponential rate of 
growth of midyear population. 
United National 
Statistics Data 
1.812 -4.104643 16.27661 1.595406 2325 Control Variable 
Life Expectancy, Total 
(Years) 
Total average  life expectancy in years.  
World Bank 
Data 
63.84 22.95472 83.57805 11.40845 2176 Control Variable 
School Enrollment, 
Secondary (% Gross) 
Secondary over primary school enrolment is a 
significantly better reflection of educational attainment.   
World Bank 
Data 
61.45 0.24349 164.5681 34.15557 1477 Control Variable 
Trade (% of GDP) 
 
Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and 
services measured as a share of GDP. 
IMF Data 79.28 0.5659665   447.8819 50.54554 1690 Control Variable 
Net Foreign Assets (% of 
GDP) 
Net foreign assets as a share of GDP is used as a control 
variable to take into account the de facto influence of IFI. 
Lane-Milessi 
Ferretti (2006) 
-0.301 -24.54762 14.51919 1.381884 1473 Control Variable 
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2.7 Results 
 
This section presents the regression results using the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) method, the instantaneous panel threshold regression (PTR), and the logistic 
smooth transition regression (LSTR) method. Regression analysis is carried out 
initially for all countries, and then specifically tailored for developing, transition and 
emerging market economies. In order to account for business cycle fluctuations, 5-
year non-overlapping averages have been taken for all the variables of interest used in 
the regression analysis. The de facto measures of financial integration are presented as 
stylized facts. Therefore, while we look at the association of these financial flows 
with growth (only exploring at the level of endogeneity32), we do not conclude to 
policy-making references. The de jure measure of financial integration (capital 
account openness) is the lynchpin of this research paper as this is the only paper that 
uses the de jure measure of financial integration to determine the threshold (even 
though the same regression estimation methods are deployed for all the FI proxy 
variables, de facto and de jure).  
 
Each table presents the results related to a specific measure of financial 
integration. Each table also contains regression findings for various country groups, 
which includes that of all economies in the dataset, then the developing economies, 
followed by the transition, and finally the emerging market economies. For each of 
these country groups, three types of estimation methods are deployed (aforementioned 
in this section) and they include the OLS, PTR, and LSTR methods. Table 2.2 reports 
our key set of the results, focusing on the relationship between the de jure measure of 
financial integration, proxied by Chinn-Ito index, and growth. Tables 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 
and 2.6 present the results related to each de facto measure of financial integration.   
 
Tables 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 have the initial set of control variables 
followed by the proxy IFI variable denoted as KAOPEN, FDI, EFPI, CBL, and FA, 
where KAOPEN refers to the capital account openness index, CBL refers to cross-
border lending (non-resident bank loans as a % of GDP), and FA refers to the 
financial account. Following the IFI proxy variable, the coefficients for the regime 
below the threshold and above the threshold are reported e.g. 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 −
                                                 
32 The endogeneity problem exists for all forms of de facto measures of financial integration.  
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𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 < 𝑇 and 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 > 𝑇 (example taken from table 
2.2) respectively. Note that these are the coefficients for the PTR model. This is 
followed by the coefficients of the LSTR model for the ‘low’ regime and the ‘high’ 
regime33, this is exemplified by the following denotation on the table: 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 − 𝑐∗) and 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 − 𝑐∗). PTR (T) or LSTR (c*) indicate 
the threshold level of the PTR model and LSTR model. The LSTR parameter, 
gamma, indicates the speed of transition from the ‘low’ regime to the ‘high’ regime 
(speed of transition from one regime to the other). This is followed by the tests of 
Gonzalez, Terasvirta, and van Djik (2005) that tests whether or not the regression 
model is linear or nonlinear34 which is denoted by the following notations in the table 
‘LM Test (GTD 2005) H0: Linear Model’ and ‘p-value nonlinearity’. The second test 
of Gonzalez, Terasvirta, and van Djik (2005) tests for any remaining nonlinearities35 
(denoted by ‘LM Test for remaining nonlinearities’ and ‘p-value for remaining 
nonlinearity’ on each of the tables).  
 
2.7.1 Threshold Regression Findings: Capital Account Openness (Chinn-Ito 
Index36) 
 
The de jure measure of financial integration (de jure measure of capital 
account openness) is the key independent variable of interest in this research paper. 
The contribution of this research papers stems from the threshold determination of 
capital account openness index. The OLS, PTR, and the LSTR estimation methods are 
deployed for all the countries in the dataset, for developing economies, transition 
economies, and emerging market economies separately. These findings are further 
validated by various robustness checks carried out in the appendix. The robustness 
checks (also illustrated for the de facto measures of financial integration) presented in 
appendix 237, include the (1) 3-Year Non-Overlapping Averages; (2) Lagged IFI 
                                                 
33 Refer to the empirical framework section for conceptual clarification of the LSTR model and its 
mechanisms.  
34 The null hypothesis indicates that the model is linear and therefore this would mean the LSTR model 
is invalid for analytical purposes. The alternative hypothesis states that the model is nonlinear and 
therefore the LSTR model may be more appropriate. 
35 The null hypothesis for this test states is that there is a single threshold with two regimes. The 
alternative hypothesis for this test states that there are more than two regimes or there are multiple 
thresholds.  
36 This is the parameterized version of the Chinn-Ito index developed by Chinn and Ito (2006). Refer to 
the variable description to understand how the index has been parameterized.  
37 Refer to section 2.10. 
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Proxy Variables; (3) Post-1990 Estimations; these findings for KAOPEN are 
illustrated in tables 2.11, 2.16 and 2.21 respectively. Furthermore, the (4) Quadratic 
Estimations38; are carried out just for KAOPEN as robustness checks; they are not 
carried out for the other de facto measures of financial integration. The findings that 
are statistically insignificant in table 2.2, we will refer to the robustness checks to see 
if anything concrete can be found for policy deduction purposes.  
 
Table 2.2 illustrates the relationship between capital account openness 
(KAOPEN) and growth. For all economies, the estimated OLS coefficient of 
KAOPEN is statistically insignificant for all significance levels. The threshold level 
of the PTR model is 21 (this is just below the mean and therefore indicates that the 
financial system is more regulated than it is liberalized). The coefficients for 
KAOPEN below and above this threshold level are 0.067 (statistically significant at 
5%) and -0.037 (statistically significant at 1%). This indicates that it is growth 
enhancing when the financial market is partially liberalized, however, it is growth 
retarding after this threshold level as the financial market becomes more open. Note 
that this is the result of particular interest for all the countries in the dataset or the 
global economy on the whole. The high gamma value (equals 11) shown in the LSTR 
column indicates that the PTR model is better suited for analysis due to the high speed 
of transition from one regime to the other. Therefore, the inferences drawn from the 
LSTR column are not taken into consideration for analytical purposes. However, it 
must be noted that the coefficients of interest (coefficients below and above 
thresholds and coefficients for ‘low’ and ‘high’ regime) in the PTR and LSTR column 
are similar. The numbers of observations in the regression model are relatively high 
and the R-squared value has a respectably high value. Furthermore, the test for 
linearity suggests that the model is nonlinear and the test for measuring any remaining 
nonlinearities suggest that there is a single threshold (two regimes). These tests are 
found in the LSTR column.  
 
For developing and transition economies, the coefficients of interest are 
mostly statistically insignificant. Therefore, this is not dissected further for analysis. 
                                                 
38 This is presented in tables 2.22, 2.23, 2.24, and 2.25 for all the countries in the dataset, the 
developing, transition, and emerging economies respectively. Note that this is presented in “Appendix 
2: Robustness Checks” under the sub-heading “Robustness Test 4: Quadratic Estimations” in section 
2.10.  
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Only for transition economies, for the LSTR column, the low regime has a coefficient 
that equals 0.172 (statistically significant at 10%) where the threshold level is 21. 
Furthermore, it can be seen that the model is nonlinear and there are no more than two 
regimes. A reference should be made in the robustness checks illustrated in the 
appendix to test to see if there are any policymaking deductions that can be taken 
onboard. In table 2.16, the regression analysis carried out using lagged values for 
capital account openness shows a statistically significant (at 1%) finding for 
developing economies. Due to the fact that the gamma value is so high, the LSTR is 
not taken into consideration. The threshold level of the PTR is 47, this means that the 
financial markets are highly liberalized. The coefficient below this threshold is 
insignificant, but the threshold above this value is -0.278 (statistically significant at 
1% significance levels). Furthermore, the linearity test suggests that the model is 
nonlinear and that there are no more than two regimes. For developing economies, the 
quadratic estimations in table 2.2339 show that the threshold level is at 25.25. This 
result is consistent with the quadratic illustration40 of KAOPEN, which illustrates a 
threshold level of approximately 32. For transition economies, the threshold levels for 
PTR and LSTR are 22 and 21 respectively. While, the coefficient for the ‘low’ regime 
in the LSTR column is 0.172 and statistically significant at 10%, the coefficients for 
the PTR column are both insignificant above and below the threshold. Furthermore, 
unfortunately other than one finding, none of the robustness checks provide any 
empirically or statistically significant findings. This finding from the robustness 
checks section shows the threshold level to be 10; below this threshold the coefficient 
(0.78 and statistically significant at 10|%) is growth enhancing but above this 
threshold the coefficient is statistically insignificant, therefore inconclusive. Reverting 
to the graphical illustrations also is not a solution, because, the threshold level seems 
to be very low, but, the maxima is not definitive.   
 
For emerging market economies, the OLS estimated coefficient is 0.054. This 
suggests that for a unit increase in KAOPEN, growth increases by 0.054%. This is 
shown in regression model 10 of table 2.2. The LSTR column (regression model 12) 
shows that the coefficients for the ‘low’ and ‘high’ regimes are 0.236 (statistically 
                                                 
39 Refer to appendix 2 under the sub-section “Robustness Test 4: Quadratic Estimations” in section 
2.10.  
40 Refer to figure 2.50 in appendix 1 (refer to section 2.9.3) under the sub-section “Explorative Data 
Analysis 3: Quadratic Relationships”.  
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significant at 1%) and 0.042 (statistically significant at 1%). The threshold level of the 
LSTR is 14. This suggests that when the financial markets of emerging market 
economies are more regulated the economy grows at 0.236%. While it is not growth 
retarding above this threshold, there is a significant fall in the average growth rate 
down to 0.042%. The LSTR column shows that the model is linear (null hypothesis 
rejected at the with 90% confidence) and that the regression model has a single 
threshold (fail to reject the null hypothesis). The gamma parameter equals 15, which 
suggests that the PTR is a significantly better measure than the LSTR due to the high 
transition speed from one regime to the other. The threshold level of the PTR is 15. 
The coefficients below and above this threshold are 0.244 (statistically significant at 
1%) and 0.041 (statistically significant at 5%). The results of the coefficients are 
similar to that acquired by the LSTR. These coefficients reiterate the fact that for 
emerging market economies, the economy tends to grow faster when there is more 
regulation rather than when it is more liberalized.  
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Table 2.2: De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness (Chinn-Ito Index) on Growth 
Time Period: 1970-2013 (5-year non-overlapping averages) 
Income Groups: Developing, Transition, and Emerging Market Economies 
Estimation Methods: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), PTR (Panel Threshold Regression), and LSTR (Logistic Smooth Transition Regression) 
 All Economies Developing Economies Transition Economies Emerging Market Economies 
 (1) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(2) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(3) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(4) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(5) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(6) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(7) 
Ordinary 
Least Squares 
(8) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(9) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(10) 
Ordinary 
Least Squares 
(11) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(12) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
Variable             
Initial GDP per Capita 
-2.81e-05* 
(1.41e-05) 
-2.51e-05* 
(1.42e-05) 
-2.51e-05* 
(1.42e-05) 
-7.17e-05 
(7.62e-05) 
-7.47e-05 
(7.64e-05) 
-7.48e-05 
(7.65e-05) 
-0.00038*** 
(0.000102) 
-0.0003*** 
(0.000102) 
-0.00032** 
(0.000101) 
-0.00167** 
(8.22e-05) 
-0.000148* 
(8.04e-05) 
-0.000149* 
(8.05e-05) 
Invest to GDP 
0.0218 
(0.0135) 
0.0214 
(0.0133) 
0.0214 
(0.0133) 
0.0254* 
(0.0142) 
0.0257* 
(0.0140) 
0.0257* 
(0.0140) 
0.0358 
(0.0272) 
0.0381 
(0.0276) 
0.0378 
(0.0274) 
0.0444 
(0.0394) 
0.0415 
(0.0393) 
0.0417 
(0.0392) 
NFA to GDP 
0.572** 
(0.222) 
0.585*** 
(0.221) 
0.585*** 
(0.221) 
0.607** 
(0.285) 
0.616** 
(0.281) 
0.616** 
(0.281) 
1.058 
(0.884) 
0.732 
(0.852) 
0.752 
(0.856) 
2.738** 
(1.116) 
2.842** 
(1.092) 
2.842** 
(1.093) 
FDI 
0.289*** 
(0.112) 
0.294*** 
(0.112) 
0.294*** 
(0.112) 
0.397*** 
(0.130) 
0.400*** 
(0.130) 
0.400*** 
(0.130) 
0.0611 
(0.0945) 
0.0582 
(0.0914) 
0.0575 
(0.0910) 
0.135 
(0.101) 
0.146 
(0.0982) 
0.146 
(0.0985) 
Population Growth 
0.496*** 
(0.145) 
0.512*** 
(0.146) 
0.512*** 
(0.146) 
0.672*** 
(0.189) 
0.678*** 
(0.190) 
0.678*** 
(0.190) 
0.792** 
(0.391) 
0.795** 
(0.387) 
0.795** 
(0.386) 
0.209 
(0.300) 
0.196 
(0.292) 
0.196 
(0.293) 
Inflation 
-0.0187** 
(0.000167) 
-0.0183*** 
(0.000142) 
-0.0183*** 
(0.000143) 
-0.0177*** 
(0.000140) 
-0.00175*** 
(0.000128) 
-0.00175*** 
(0.000128) 
-0.0266*** 
(0.00933) 
-0.0245*** 
(0.00867) 
-0.0245*** 
(0.00855) 
-0.00252*** 
(0.000555) 
-0.00215** 
(0.000566) 
-0.00216** 
(0.000566) 
Literacy Rate 
-0.0122* 
(0.00741) 
-0.0122* 
(0.00739) 
-0.0122* 
(0.00739) 
-0.0113 
(0.00920) 
-0.0109 
(0.00919) 
-0.0108 
(0.00919) 
-0.0175 
(0.0158) 
-0.0153 
(0.0157) 
-0.0156 
(0.0155) 
-0.0351*** 
(0.0118) 
-0.0379*** 
(0.0117) 
-0.0379*** 
(0.0117) 
Trade to GDP 
0.00361 
(0.00663) 
0.00240 
(0.00655) 
0.00238 
(0.00655) 
0.0129 
(0.00996) 
0.0117 
(0.00988) 
0.0117 
(0.00988) 
0.0104 
(0.0195) 
0.0142 
(0.0196) 
0.0142 
(0.0196) 
-0.00316 
(0.0114) 
-0.00362 
(0.0114) 
-0.00356 
(0.0113) 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 
-0.0117 
(0.00944) 
  
-0.00187 
(0.0121) 
  
0.0295 
(0.0260) 
  
0.0542*** 
(0.0143) 
  
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 < 𝑇  
0.0673** 
(0.0285) 
  
0.0424 
(0.0320) 
  
0.153 
(0.0942) 
  
0.244*** 
(0.0780) 
 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 > 𝑇  
-0.0366*** 
(0.0132) 
  
-0.0219 
(0.0179) 
  
-0.00601 
(0.0369) 
  
0.0407** 
(0.0158) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑐∗)   
0.0653** 
(0.0280) 
  
0.0408 
(0.0312) 
  
0.172* 
(0.103) 
  
0.236*** 
(0.0768) 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑐∗)   
-0.0357*** 
(0.0130) 
  
-0.0212 
(0.0175) 
  
-0.00499 
(0.0354) 
  
0.0418*** 
(0.0156) 
Constant  
3.380*** 
(0.542) 
3.610*** 
(0.570) 
3.587*** 
(0.569) 
2.121*** 
(0.649) 
2.415*** 
(0.759) 
2.396*** 
(0.757) 
5.896*** 
(1.447) 
6.763*** 
(1.346) 
6.778*** 
(1.340) 
5.088*** 
(1.290) 
6.403*** 
(1.353) 
6.366*** 
(1.353) 
Observations 914 914 914 615 615 615 99 99 99 136 136 136 
R2 0.244 0.249 0.249 0.308 0.310 0.310 0.373 0.387 0.389 0.423 0.442 0.441 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*)   21 22  22 23  22 21  15 14 
LSTR parameter (𝛾*)   11   9   14   15 
LM Test (GTD 2005) H0: 
Linear Model  
  41.46   23.83   20.49   19.55 
p-value nonlinearity    0.00131   0.04161   0.0889   0.09359 
LM Test for remaining 
nonlinearities  
  13.22   5.446   13.88   11.21 
p-value remaining 
nonlinearity  
  0.778   0.998   0.459   0.598 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors and the coefficients for time and country dummy variables are not displayed on the final results table.  
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2.7.2 Stylized Factual Findings  
 
This section will look at the stylized factual findings for the relationship 
between financial integration and growth using the de facto measures of financial 
integration. These findings do not formulate to be the center piece or the focal point 
of this research paper due to the problem of endogeneity and reverse causality. It is 
important to recognize that it is challenging to address the endogeneity problem in the 
context of the PTR and LSTR models. There have been recent developments that 
have attempted to address this issue (Kourtellos et al. 2015)41, requiring the use of 
structural threshold modeling, but this paper has not explored this approach as of yet, 
leaving it as a subject for future research. Furthermore, there have been research 
papers that have already addressed these endogeneity issues. Nonetheless, the 
association between the de facto measures of financial integration on growth are 
investigated and presented in tables 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6. Therefore, the results 
reported here should be interpreted only from the point of association of the de facto 
FI measures with growth but do not deduce policy making inferences due to possible 
endogeneity bias.   
 
2.7.2.1 Stylized Factual Analysis 1: FDI (% of GDP) 
 
Table 2.3 illustrates the econometric relationship between Foreign Direct 
Investment42 (% of GDP) and growth. Before commencing with the analysis of the 
threshold regressions, it must be noted that there is an existing body of literature that 
has underlined the problem of endogeneity (reverse causality as well) in the FDI-
growth literature. Furthermore, there have been research papers that have addressed 
these endogeneity issues. For all economies, regression model 1 looks at the linear 
OLS estimation results. This indicates that if FDI increases by 1% then growth 
increases by 0.121% and this is statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels. The PTR model indicates that the threshold level of FDI is at 38% 
of GDP. Below this threshold level, 1% increase in FDI increases growth by 0.0828% 
and above this threshold level, 1% increase in FDI increases growth by 1.583%. Both 
these coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% significance level. For the 
LSTR model, the threshold FDI level is at 55% of GDP. The ‘low’ regime has a 
                                                 
41 Kourtellos, Stengos, and Tan (2015) Structural Threshold Regression, Econometric Theory, 1-34.  
42 Note that the data acquired for the FDI variable is for net inflows.  
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coefficient of 0.140, the ‘high’ regime has a coefficient of 16.16, and they are both 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level. The reason why the growth rate 
may increase so drastically after this threshold level is that there are only a handful of 
observations above this particular threshold, which are associated with excessively 
high growth rates. The parameter, gamma (gamma equals to one), indicates a very 
low transition speed from one regime to the other and therefore the LSTR model is 
more appropriate for analytical purposes than the PTR model given that the linear 
model test shows that we reject the null hypothesis. However, the test for remaining 
nonlinearities shows that we must reject the null hypothesis and this indicates there 
are more than two regimes and therefore this is a multiple threshold model, which is 
not taken into consideration by the LSTR43 model. This particular report only 
accounts for single thresholds (no more than two regimes). Furthermore, there are 885 
observations and the R-squared value is above 42% (for regression models 1, 2, and 
3) that means the selection of the control variables is well suited for the model.  
 
For developing economies, the OLS estimation indicates that a 1% increase in 
FDI results in a 0.242% increase in growth. This is statistically significant at the 1% 
significance level. This is also higher than the coefficient of FDI on growth for all 
countries. The FDI threshold level of the PTR model is 25% of GDP. The coefficients 
below the threshold and above the threshold are 0.165 and 0.979 respectively and they 
are both statistically significant at the 1% significance level. The threshold level for 
the LSTR model is at 24% of GDP. The coefficients in the ‘low’ and ‘high’ regimes 
are 0.195 and 0.942 respectively. The fact that the gamma value that equals to one 
indicates that the LSTR is more suitable than the PTR model. The null hypothesis of 
for the test of linearity is rejected, however, we also reject the null hypothesis for 
remaining nonlinearities (this suggests there are multiple thresholds). However, the 
LSTR model shows that FDI causes a higher increase in growth above the threshold 
than below it (even though in both cases it is growth enhancing for developing 
countries). For transition economies, the OLS estimation for the FDI coefficient is 
statistically insignificant. The PTR model indicates a threshold level for FDI that 
equals 16% of GDP. The coefficients below the threshold and above the threshold are 
0.419 (statistically significant at 5% significance levels) and -2.603 (statistically 
                                                 
43 The LSTR model is only applicable for regression models that have two regimes and therefore has a 
single threshold.  
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significant at 1% significance level). However, the gamma value (equals one) 
indicates that the LSTR is more appropriate than the PTR model for analytical 
purposes. The threshold level of the LSTR model is 19%. The null hypothesis for the 
test of nonlinearity is rejected and we fail to reject the test for remaining 
nonlinearities. The coefficients of the ‘low’ and ‘high’ regime for the LSTR model 
are 0.018 (statistically insignificant) and -5.729 (statistically significant at the 1% 
significance level). However, the only flaw with this particular regression model is 
the number of observations (101 observations) there are for transition economies 
(note that there are 5-year non-overlapping averages).  
 
For emerging market economies, the OLS estimation of the FDI coefficient is 
statistically insignificant. The threshold level of the PTR model is 8% of GDP. The 
coefficients above the threshold and below the threshold are 0.462 (statistically 
significant at 1%) and -0.348 (statistically significant at 1%). However, the gamma 
value equaling one indicates the LSTR model is more appropriate. The threshold level 
of the LSTR model is 9% of GDP. The coefficients of the ‘low’ and ‘high’ regime are 
0.461 and -0.347. This indicates that below the threshold value of 9% of GDP the 
economy grows at 0.461% and above this threshold, the economy shrinks at 0.347% 
(for 1% increase in FDI inflow). The results are further justified given that the null 
hypothesis for the test of nonlinearity is rejected and furthermore we fail to reject the 
null hypothesis of the test for remaining nonlinearities (indicating a single threshold). 
However, albeit the numbers of observations are larger than that for transition 
economies, the number of observations is still fairly small (only 126 observations). 
This is the only limitation of this particular regression model.  
 
2.7.2.2 Stylized Factual Analysis 2: EFPI (% of GDP) 
 
Table 2.4 depicts the econometric relationship between EFPI and growth for 
all countries in the dataset, for developing economies, transition economies, and 
emerging market economies. The OLS, PTR, and LSTR estimation methods are 
deployed for each country group. For all economies, referring to regression model 1 
or the OLS estimation column, 1% increase in EFPI results in a reduction in growth 
by 0.015% (statistically significant at 1%). Quick reference to the speed of transition 
parameter, gamma (equates to 15), indicates that the LSTR model is not appropriate 
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for analysis. Furthermore, it confirms that the model is nonlinear (result significant at 
5% significance level) and that there are no more than two regimes (single threshold). 
The threshold level for the PTR model is 0% of GDP. The coefficients above and 
below this threshold are 0.823 (statistically significant at 5%) and -0.016 (statistically 
significant at 1%). This means that if there is EFPI inflow then this reduces growth by 
0.016% and if there is outflow of EFPI (domestic investment in foreign securities) 
then growth increases by 0.823%. Furthermore, the deductions are strengthened given 
the high number of observations for this sample group as well as the fact that these 
results are robust.  
 
For developing economies, the coefficient of EFPI is statistically insignificant 
under the OLS estimation method. The gamma value (equates to one) indicates the 
PTR model is not appropriate for analysis. Therefore, attention is shifted to the LSTR 
estimation method (refer to regression model 6 in table 2.4). The threshold level is 
0%. The coefficients of the ‘low’ and ‘high’ regime are 3.576 (statistically significant 
at 5%) and 0.0361 (statistically insignificant). Therefore, we can conclude that when 
domestic investors in developing countries invest in foreign securities, it is growth 
enhancing. The null hypothesis for the test of nonlinearity is rejected at the 10% 
significance level. We fail to reject the null hypothesis of any remaining nonlinearities 
at all significance levels. It can be inferred that we are 90% confident about the 
deductions induced from this regression model. For transition economies, the 
coefficient of EFPI under OLS estimation is statistically insignificant. The PTR 
model is not used for analysis, as the gamma value equals one. The threshold level of 
the LSTR model is at 2%. The coefficients of the ‘low’ and ‘high’ regime are 1.07 
(statistically insignificant) and 44.77 (statistically significant at 10%). However, the 
even though the linearity test can be rejected at the 10% significance level, the test for 
remaining nonlinearities suggest that there are multiple thresholds for the case of 
transition economies.  
 
For emerging market economies, under the OLS estimation, increase in EFPI 
by 1% increases growth by 0.978%. This is statistically significant at the 5% 
significance level. The threshold level of the PTR model is equal to zero. The 
coefficients below and above the threshold are 2.397 (statistically significant at 1%) 
and 0.791 (statistically significant at 10%). This indicates that it is beneficial to invest 
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in foreign equities rather than have foreigners investing in domestic securities. 
However, the LSTR technique is more applicable for policy oriented issues given that 
the value of gamma equals one. The coefficient of the high regime is statistically 
insignificant but the coefficient of the low regime is 3.125 and it is statistically 
significant at 1%. This complies with the results acquired for the previous country 
groups and reiterates the fact that it is beneficial for the home country if domestic 
investors invest in foreign securities. However, we cannot say if it is growth retarding 
if foreign investors invest in domestic securities as the result is statistically 
insignificant. The linearity test shows that the model is linear, however, the test for 
remaining nonlinearities shows that there are multiple thresholds i.e. more than two 
regimes (statistically significant at 5%).  
 
2.7.2.3 Stylized Factual Analysis 3: Non-Resident Bank Loans (% of GDP) 
 
Table 2.5 looks at the relationship between non-resident bank loans (cross-
border lending denoted as CBL) and growth. For all economies, under the OLS 
estimator, the coefficient of CBL indicates that it is growth retarding and it is 
statistically significant at 5%. This means that if CBL increases by 1% growth 
reduces by 0.04%. The threshold level of CBL for the PTR model is 1% of GDP. The 
coefficients below and above the threshold are 3.664 (statistically insignificant) and -
0.416 (statistically significant at 5%). The gamma value from the LSTR model 
indicates that the speed of transition from one regime to the other is relatively high 
and therefore the PTR model is more appropriate for analytical and/or policy-oriented 
purposes than the LSTR model. The tests of the LSTR model also confirm that the 
model is nonlinear and that there are no more than two regimes (single threshold).  
 
For developing economies, under the OLS estimation method, the coefficient 
of the CBL is -0.012. This indicates that a unit increase in CBL causes a reduction in 
growth by 0.012%. The threshold level for PTR is 1%. The coefficient below is 
statistically insignificant but the coefficient above is -0.013 and statistically 
significant at 10%. The gamma parameter of LSTR is 15; therefore, it is certain that 
PTR is more appropriate than the LSTR. Furthermore, the tests of the LSTR model 
also confirm that the model is nonlinear and that there are no more than two regimes 
(single threshold). Hence, for developing economies, it cannot be said that the impact 
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of cross-border lending abroad as the coefficient is statistically insignificant; however, 
borrowing money from abroad is growth retarding.  
 
For transition economies, the CBL coefficient is -0.039 under the OLS 
estimation, indicating a decline in growth with increased non-resident bank loans. The 
threshold level of the PTR is 1%. The coefficients below and above this threshold are 
8.394 (statistically insignificant) and -0.475 (statistically significant at 5%). The 
gamma parameter in the LSTR column is 15, which indicates the PTR model is more 
applicable than the LSTR. Furthermore, tests of LSTR model also confirm that the 
model is nonlinear and there is a single threshold. For emerging market economies, 
the OLS estimated coefficient of CBL is statistically insignificant. The PTR column 
in this case should not be considered for analytical purposes because the value of 
gamma equals to two; therefore, the LSTR should be the focal point of analysis. The 
results are in direct contrast to the results obtained for developing, transition and all 
economies. For emerging markets, the LSTR threshold level is 52% (this is also 
drastically different from the threshold levels for other country groups). The 
coefficients of the ‘low’ and ‘high’ regimes are -0.045 (statistically significant at 
10%) and 4.212 (statistically significant at 1%). This suggests that above this 
threshold it is in fact growth enhancing; this contradicts the results that is obtained for 
developing and transition economies. However, while it can be concluded that the 
model is nonlinear, it is also confirmed with 99% confidence that there are more than 
two regimes (multiple threshold). Furthermore, another limitation may be the lack of 
observations.  
 
2.7.2.4 Stylized Factual Analysis 4: Financial Account (% of GDP) 
 
Table 2.6 looks at the relationship between the financial account (FA) and 
growth. For this particular analysis, the theoretical assumption taken is that financial 
account is equal to the negative value of the current account i.e. FA=-CA. When FA 
increases by 1%, growth reduces by 0.053% (statistically significant at 1%) under the 
OLS estimation for the all countries group, in regression model 1. The PTR column 
indicates that the threshold level is at 30% of GDP. The coefficients below and above 
this threshold level are -0.056 (statistically significant at 1%) and 0.055 (statistically 
insignificant). The gamma parameter in the LSTR column shows that it is 6, which 
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suggests that while the speed of transition may be fast, we would still choose to use 
the LSTR as the appropriate technical model for analytical purposes. The coefficients 
of the ‘low’ and ‘high’ regime are -0.055 (statistically significant at 1%) and 0.036 
(statistically insignificant).  
 
For developing economies, the OLS estimation for the FA coefficient 
indicates that 1% increase in FA results in a reduction of growth by 0.061% 
(statistically significant at 1%). The LSTR column will not be taken into 
consideration because the gamma value is equal to 11. The PTR threshold value 
equals 29. The coefficients below and above the threshold are -0.067 (statistically 
significant at 1%) and 0.100 (statistically insignificant). For transition and emerging 
market economies, the number of observation do not exceed 60 and it may be open to 
interpretation if these results have any statistical importance. For emerging market 
economies, the OLS, and PTR estimated coefficients of interest are statistically 
insignificant. For the LSTR column (regression model 12), the coefficients of the 
‘low’ and ‘high’ regime are -0.117 (statistically significant at 5%) and -5.01 
(statistically significant at 10%). It can be concluded that the model is nonlinear, but 
the test of remaining nonlinearities shows that there are more than two regimes 
(multiple thresholds).  
 
2.7.2.5 Stylized Facts: Summary of the Results  
 
The stylized factual findings deduced from this research paper are the 
following (note that the deductions are noted for each of the de facto IFI proxy 
variables and then the subsequent findings for each country groups are also noted):  
 
1. FDI (% of GDP) 
a. For all economies, the threshold level of FDI is at 55% of GDP. While 
both regimes indicate a positive increase in growth, above the 
threshold growth increases significantly higher than that below the 
threshold. However, tests of nonlinearity indicate the existence of 
multiple thresholds.  
b. For developing economies, the threshold level of FDI is at 24% of 
GDP. While coefficients below and above the threshold are both 
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growth enhancing, results indicate there is a larger increase in growth 
above the threshold than below. However, there are multiple 
thresholds. 
c. For transition economies, the threshold level of FDI is at 19% of GDP. 
Interestingly, while it is growth enhancing below the threshold, it is, in 
fact, growth retarding above this threshold. However, observations are 
low. 
d. For emerging market economies, the threshold level of FDI is at 9% of 
GDP. Quite surprisingly, despite the low threshold level, it is growth 
enhancing below the threshold but it is, in fact, growth retarding above 
this threshold. However, observations are low.     
2. EFPI (% of GDP) 
a. For all economies, the threshold level is at 0-3%44 of GDP, where it is 
growth enhancing (0.823%) below this threshold and growth retarding 
(-0.016%) above this threshold.  
b. For developing economies, the threshold level is at 0-2% of GDP, 
growth enhancing below and above the threshold. However, there is a 
larger increase in the growth rate below the threshold than above it.  
c. For transition economies, the threshold level is at 2% of GDP. Growth 
effects are both positive, below and above the threshold, but, 
interestingly, growth increases significantly higher above the 
threshold. However, tests indicate that there are multiple thresholds. 
d. For emerging market economies, the threshold level is at 0% of GDP. 
The growth effect above the threshold is statistically insignificant, but 
below the threshold, it is positive and significant.  
3. Non-Resident Bank Loans (% of GDP) 
a. For all economies, developing, and transition economies, the threshold 
level of CBL is at 1% of GDP. The growth effects are negative above 
this threshold for all country groups. The growth effects are 
inconclusive below the threshold as they are not statistically 
significant.  
                                                 
44 This incorporates the threshold findings for the ‘robustness checks’ section as well.  
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b. For emerging market economies, the results are inconclusive as the 
model is linear and the coefficient is statistically insignificant. 
However, the coefficients for the linear model in the robustness checks 
show that it is growth retarding overall.  
4. Financial Account (% of GDP) 
a. For all economies and developing economies, the threshold level is at 
30-31% of GDP. The growth effect below the threshold is growth 
retarding, but above the threshold, it is statistically insignificant. 
However, for all economies, the test results point to multiple 
thresholds.  
b. For transition economies, threshold level is at 1% of GDP. The growth 
effects are negative below the threshold, but above the threshold, the 
growth effect is inconclusive. However, the observations are very low. 
c. For emerging market economies, the threshold level is at 16% of GDP. 
The growth effects both below and above the threshold, are negative. 
However, the observations are very low and the robustness checks give 
differing results for the growth effects as well as for the threshold 
measures. 
 
These findings show that for developing economies, taking FDI, for instance, 
is that regardless of the level of FDI as a percentage of GDP, it will not be growth 
retarding. This is applicable for transition economies as well. However, for emerging 
economies, there is need for caution, as FDI above a certain threshold tends to be 
growth retarding. However, once again, it is crucial to emphasize that these results 
may be subject to potential endogeneity bias, and therefore should be treated 
cautiously. For developing, transition, and emerging economies, EFPI below 1-4% is 
growth enhancing, and in many cases, above this threshold, it is, in fact, growth 
retarding. This suggests that domestic investors in these economies, especially in 
developing and transition economies, are better off purchasing foreign securities as 
opposed to foreign investors buying domestic securities. Cross-border lending does 
not seem to enhance growth levels for developing and transition economies; therefore, 
the deployment of foreign funds must be used with caution. In terms of the level of 
financial openness, there is no doubt that higher levels of capital account openness is 
often associated with negative growth effects, probably due to a range of factors that 
86 
 
destabilize the macroeconomic indicators of known relevance. The results show that 
governments should regulate the market to reap the highest growth levels in the case 
of the benefit of the global economy overall. 
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Table 2.3: FDI (% of GDP) on Growth 
Time Period: 1970-2013 (5-year non-overlapping averages) 
Income Groups: Developing, Transition, and Emerging Market Economies 
Estimation Methods: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), PTR (Threshold Regression), and LSTR (Logistic Smooth Transition Regression) 
 All Economies Developing Economies Transition Economies Emerging Market Economies 
 (1) 
Ordinary 
Least Squares 
(2) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(3) 
Logistic Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(4) 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
(5) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(6) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(7) 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
(8) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(9) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(10) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(11) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(12) 
Logistic Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
Variable             
Initial GDP per Capita 
-1.72e-0.5* 
(9.66e-06) 
-1.72e-0.5* 
(9.66e-06) 
-1.72e-0.5* 
(9.66e-06) 
-9.68e-05 
(6.13e-05) 
-0.000113 
(7.15e-05) 
-0.000115* 
(6.93e-05) 
-0.000258*** 
(9.16e-05) 
-0.000211** 
(8.65e-05) 
-0.00026** 
(8.74e-05) 
-0.000115 
(8.94e-05) 
-9.97e-05 
(8.67e-05) 
-1.00e-04 
(8.67e-05) 
Investment to GDP 
0.164*** 
(0.0347) 
0.120*** 
(0.0217) 
0.121*** 
(0.0209) 
0.140*** 
(0.0316) 
0.0969*** 
(0.0266) 
0.0940*** 
(0.0251) 
0.0122 
(0.104) 
0.00664 
(0.102) 
0.00444 
(0.105) 
0.172*** 
(0.0292) 
0.165*** 
(0.0278) 
0.165*** 
(0.0278) 
Population Growth 
0.548*** 
(0.123) 
0.549*** 
(0.129) 
0.551*** 
(0.126) 
0.714*** 
(0.164) 
0.658*** 
(0.162) 
0.657*** 
(0.162) 
0.927* 
(0.536) 
0.841 
(0.506) 
0.834* 
(0.500) 
0.649* 
(0.341) 
0.654** 
(0.323) 
0.653** 
(0.323) 
Inflation 
-0.00656** 
(0.00166) 
-0.00653*** 
(0.00162) 
-0.00647*** 
(0.00161) 
-0.0064*** 
(0.00164) 
-0.00644*** 
(0.00161) 
-0.0064*** 
(0.00161) 
-0.00901*** 
(0.00172) 
-0.00846*** 
(0.00176) 
-0.0089*** 
(0.00169) 
-0.0051** 
(0.00229) 
-0.00480** 
(0.00221) 
-0.00480** 
(0.00221) 
Literacy Rate 
-0.0173*** 
(0.00663) 
-0.0177*** 
(0.00653) 
-0.0194*** 
(0.00652) 
-0.0163* 
(0.00872) 
-0.0164* 
(0.00856) 
-0.0163* 
(0.00856) 
-0.0473* 
(0.0271) 
0.0055848 
(0.0271) 
-0.0539** 
(0.0263) 
-0.0321** 
(0.0132) 
-0.0385*** 
(0.0129) 
-0.0385*** 
(0.0129) 
Life Expectancy 
0.0242 
(-0.0213) 
0.0403** 
(-0.0194) 
0.0384** 
(0.0190) 
0.0462** 
(0.0230) 
0.0643*** 
(0.0241) 
0.0661*** 
(0.0236) 
0.320 
(0.222) 
0.310 
(0.215) 
0.313 
(0.221) 
0.0768* 
(0.0414) 
0.0285 
(0.0372) 
0.0286 
(0.0372) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼 
0.121*** 
(0.0390) 
  
0.242*** 
(0.0645) 
  
0.206 
(0.156) 
  
0.104 
(0.108) 
  
𝐹𝐷𝐼 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝐷𝐼 < 𝑇  
0.0828*** 
(0.0276) 
  
0.165*** 
(0.0552) 
  
0.419** 
(0.199) 
  
0.462*** 
(0.129) 
 
𝐹𝐷𝐼 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝐷𝐼 > 𝑇  
1.583*** 
(0.188) 
  
0.979*** 
(0.165) 
  
-2.603*** 
(0.952) 
  
-0.348*** 
(0.0727) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐹𝐷𝐼 − 𝑐∗)   
0.140*** 
(0.0242) 
  
0.195*** 
(0.0508) 
  
0.0176 
(0.0925) 
  
0.461*** 
(0.128) 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐹𝐷𝐼 − 𝑐∗)   
16.16*** 
(1.906) 
  
0.942*** 
(0.135) 
  
-5.729** 
(2.834) 
  
-0.347*** 
(0.0724) 
Constant  
-1.615 
(1.032) 
 
1.685 
(1.540) 
6.286*** 
(1.721) 
-3.006*** 
(1.128) 
1.357 
(1.830) 
1.977 
(1.692) 
-14.58 
(13.28) 
-7.606 
(10.90) 
-13.64 
(12.16) 
-3.641 
(2.846) 
3.155 
(3.144) 
3.132 
(3.141) 
Observations 885 885 885 587 587 587 101 101 101 126 126 126 
R2 0.423 0.470 0.473 0.465 0.504 0.505 0.517 0.544 0.532 0.556 0.594 0.594 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*)   38 55  25 24  16 19  8 9 
LSTR parameter (𝛾*)   1   1   1   1 
LM Test (GTD 2005) 
H0: Linear Model  
  25.64   21.47   25.73   26.95 
p-value nonlinearity    0.0287   0.0902   0.0204   0.0259 
LM Test for remaining 
nonlinearities  
  182.8   48.69   19.750   14.76 
p-value remaining 
nonlinearity  
  0   1.01e-05   0.638   0.395 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors and the coefficients for time and country dummy variables are not displayed on the final results table.  
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Table 2.4: EFPI  (% of GDP) on Growth 
Time Period: 1970-2013 (5-year non-overlapping averages) 
Income Groups: Developing, Transition, and Emerging Market Economies 
Estimation Methods: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), PTR (Threshold Regression), and LSTR (Logistic Smooth Transition Regression) 
 All Economies Developing Economies Transition Economies Emerging Market Economies 
 (1) 
Ordinary 
Least Squares 
(2) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(3) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(4) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(5) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(6) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(7) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(8) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(9) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(10) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(11) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(12) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
Variable             
Initial GDP per Capita 
-2.59e-05* 
(1.02e-05) 
-2.59e-05** 
(1.02e-05) 
-2.77e-05*** 
(1.01e-05) 
-1.42e-05 
(9.01e-05) 
-3.04e-05 
(9.17e-05) 
-2.15e-05 
(9.07e-05) 
-0.000180* 
(0.000102) 
-0.000180* 
(0.000102) 
-0.000171* 
(0.000102) 
-0.00020** 
(8.63e-05) 
-0.00020** 
(8.56e-05) 
-0.00019** 
(8.51e-05) 
Trade to GDP 
0.0195** 
(0.00901) 
0.0199** 
(0.00906) 
0.0202** 
(0.00914) 
0.0333** 
(0.0152) 
0.0340** 
(0.0152) 
0.0339** 
(0.0152) 
-0.00102 
(0.0107) 
-0.00330 
(0.0109) 
-0.00224 
(0.0108) 
3.12e-05 
(0.00497) 
0.00158 
(0.00517) 
0.00216 
(0.00519) 
Population Growth 
0.728*** 
(0.129) 
0.724*** 
(0.129) 
0.724*** 
(0.131) 
0.973*** 
(0.184) 
0.978*** 
(0.183) 
0.981*** 
(0.184) 
1.090* 
(0.584) 
1.145* 
(0.589) 
1.122* 
(0.588) 
0.322 
(0.320) 
0.329 
(0.320) 
0.362 
(0.318) 
Inflation 
-0.0033*** 
(0.00119) 
-0.0033*** 
(0.00119) 
-0.00336*** 
(0.00119) 
-0.0032*** 
(0.00115) 
-0.00322*** 
(0.00113) 
-0.00324*** 
(0.00114) 
-0.0099*** 
(0.00160) 
-0.00986*** 
(0.00161) 
-0.00986*** 
(0.00161) 
-0.00542** 
(0.00212) 
-0.00546** 
(0.00214) 
-0.00541** 
(0.00212) 
Literacy Rate 
-0.0159** 
(0.00710) 
-0.0160** 
(0.00710) 
-0.0167** 
(0.00709) 
-0.0191** 
(0.00876) 
-0.0204** 
(0.00878) 
-0.0196** 
(0.00877) 
-0.0385 
(0.0290) 
-0.0375 
(0.0292) 
-0.0377 
(0.0292) 
-0.0561*** 
(0.0148) 
-0.0554*** 
(0.0148) 
-0.0549*** 
(0.0147) 
Life Expectancy 
0.0413 
(0.0287) 
0.0426 
(0.0285) 
0.0423 
(0.0284) 
0.0549* 
(0.0298) 
0.0560* 
(0.0296) 
0.0557* 
(0.0296) 
0.237** 
(0.105) 
0.255** 
(0.107) 
0.242** 
(0.106) 
0.172*** 
(0.0494) 
0.168*** 
(0.0500) 
0.160*** 
(0.0499) 
𝐸𝐹𝑃𝐼 
-0.0151* 
(0.00876) 
  
0.100 
(0.0764) 
  
0.572 
(1.133) 
  
0.978** 
(0.417) 
  
𝐸𝐹𝑃𝐼 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐸𝐹𝑃𝐼 < 𝑇  
0.823** 
(0.320) 
  
1.819*** 
(0.610) 
  
-0.310 
(1.237) 
  
2.397*** 
(0.550) 
 
𝐸𝐹𝑃𝐼 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐸𝐹𝑃𝐼 > 𝑇  
-0.0157* 
(0.00886) 
  
-0.103* 
(0.0595) 
  
112.0** 
(48.73) 
  
0.791* 
(0.424) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐸𝐹𝑃𝐼 − 𝑐∗)   
1.020*** 
(0.392) 
  
3.576** 
(1.718) 
  
1.066 
(1.022) 
  
3.125*** 
(0.562) 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐸𝐹𝑃𝐼 − 𝑐∗)   
-0.0153* 
(0.00879) 
  
0.0361 
(0.0452) 
  
44.77* 
(25.65) 
  
0.605 
(0.377) 
Constant  
-0.281 
(1.238) 
-0.363 
(1.231) 
-0.362 
(1.231) 
-2.571** 
(1.179) 
-0.877 
(1.235) 
-2.691** 
(1.177) 
-8.917 
(6.735) 
-10.60 
(7.230) 
-6.874 
(6.691) 
-3.508 
(3.065) 
-3.331 
(3.093) 
-3.003 
(3.077) 
Observations 1,066 1,066 1,066 714 714 714 118 118 118 145 145 145 
R2 0.181 0.183 0.184 0.212 0.219 0.217 0.419 0.424 0.423 0.465 0.470 0.476 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*)   0 0  1 0  2 2  0 0 
LSTR parameter (𝛾*)   15   1   1   1 
LM Test (GTD 2005) H0: 
Linear Model  
  27.76   23.63   22.824   21.23 
p-value nonlinearity    0.0338   0.0626   0.0631   0.0795 
LM Test for remaining 
nonlinearities  
  15.99   19.37   61.12   29.47 
p-value remaining 
nonlinearity  
  0.341   0.250   1.41e-08   0.0209 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors and the coefficients for time and country dummy variables are not displayed on the final results table.  
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Table 2.5: Non-Resident Bank Loans (% of GDP) on Growth 
Time Period: 1970-2013 (5-year non-overlapping averages) 
Income Groups: Developing, Transition, and Emerging Market Economies 
Estimation Methods: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), PTR (Threshold Regression), and LSTR (Logistic Smooth Transition Regression) 
 All Economies Developing Economies Transition Economies Emerging Market Economies 
 (1) 
Ordinary 
Least Squares 
(2) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(3) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(4) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(5) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(6) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(7) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(8) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(9) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(10) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(11) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(12) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
Variable             
Initial GDP per Capita 
1.56e-06 
(2.35e-05) 
1.47e-06 
(2.35e-05) 
5.24e-06 
(2.41e-05) 
3.42e-05 
(0.000110) 
1.66e-05 
(0.000112) 
3.90e-05 
(0.000112) 
-0.000106 
(0.000103) 
-0.000139 
(0.000111) 
-0.000153 
(0.000115) 
-0.000194* 
(0.000109) 
-0.000167 
(0.000105) 
-0.000170 
(0.000104) 
Trade to GDP 
0.0343** 
(0.0163) 
0.0349** 
(0.0162) 
0.0349** 
(0.0163) 
0.0427** 
(0.0205) 
0.0431** 
(0.0205) 
0.0437** 
(0.0205) 
-0.00170 
(0.0111) 
0.00189 
(0.0117) 
0.00210 
(0.0121) 
-0.000904 
(0.00621) 
0.00225 
(0.00630) 
0.00159 
(0.00596) 
Population Growth 
0.907*** 
(0.163) 
0.916*** 
(0.163) 
0.913*** 
(0.163) 
1.285*** 
(0.226) 
1.308*** 
(0.223) 
1.320*** 
(0.230) 
1.010* 
(0.600) 
1.198* 
(0.636) 
1.108* 
(0.604) 
0.318 
(0.340) 
0.385 
(0.341) 
0.334 
(0.338) 
Inflation 
-0.00332** 
(0.00147) 
-0.00318** 
(0.00138) 
-0.00326** 
(0.00143) 
-0.0038** 
(0.00137) 
-0.00329** 
(0.00129) 
-0.00331** 
(0.00132) 
-0.011*** 
(0.00162) 
-0.00877*** 
(0.00177) 
-0.00940*** 
(0.00174) 
-0.0099*** 
(0.00148) 
-0.0100*** 
(0.00147) 
-0.0099*** 
(0.00149) 
Literacy Rate 
-0.0192* 
(0.00983) 
-0.0194** 
(0.00980) 
-0.0192* 
(0.00981) 
-0.0172 
(0.0121) 
-0.0162 
(0.0119) 
-0.0165 
(0.0119) 
-0.0367 
(0.0294) 
-0.0288 
(0.0287) 
-0.0436 
(0.0293) 
-0.0400** 
(0.0181) 
-0.0339* 
(0.0183) 
-0.0367** 
(0.0177) 
Life Expectancy 
0.0415 
(0.0261) 
0.0413 
(0.0261) 
0.0385 
(0.0263) 
0.0554** 
(0.0279) 
0.0560** 
(0.0281) 
0.0523* 
(0.0283) 
0.220* 
(0.120) 
0.202* 
(0.110) 
0.198* 
(0.114) 
0.139** 
(0.0570) 
0.133** 
(0.0546) 
0.131** 
(0.0551) 
𝐶𝐵𝐿 
-0.0369** 
(0.0175) 
  
-0.0114* 
(0.00671) 
  
-0.0387* 
(0.0229) 
  
-0.0354 
(0.0436) 
  
𝐶𝐵𝐿 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝐵𝐿 < 𝑇  
3.664 
(2.231) 
  
3.287 
(2.181) 
  
8.394 
(5.632) 
  
-0.0795** 
(0.0396) 
 
𝐶𝐵𝐿 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝐵𝐿 > 𝑇  
-0.0416** 
(0.0177) 
  
-0.0127* 
(0.00684) 
  
-0.0475** 
(0.0198) 
  
0.337*** 
(0.0887) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐶𝐵𝐿 − 𝑐∗)   
0.791 
(0.572) 
  
0.981 
(0.635) 
  
0.576 
(0.514) 
  
-0.0447* 
(0.0270) 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐶𝐵𝐿 − 𝑐∗)   
-0.0360** 
(0.0173) 
  
-0.0112* 
(0.00662) 
  
-0.0528*** 
(0.0192) 
  
4.212*** 
(0.781) 
Constant  
-1.095 
(1.410) 
-1.010 
(1.410) 
-1.183 
(1.411) 
-3.752** 
(1.799) 
-3.764** 
(1.804) 
-3.918** 
(1.843) 
-7.606 
(7.659) 
-6.933 
(7.225) 
-5.146 
(7.227) 
-1.486 
(3.985) 
-4.624 
(4.130) 
-3.684 
(4.032) 
Observations 630 630 630 455 455 455 115 115 115 97 97 97 
R2 0.274 0.284 0.280 0.290 0.299 0.298 0.418 0.462 0.436 0.532 0.553 0.560 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*)   1 2  1 2  1 5  39 52 
LSTR parameter (𝛾*)   7   15   15   2 
LM Test (GTD 2005) 
H0: Linear Model  
  21.82   24.94   19.080   19.947 
p-value nonlinearity    0.0258   0.0185   0.0615   0.0535 
LM Test for remaining 
nonlinearities  
  12.82   8.442   8.985   25.88 
p-value remaining 
nonlinearity  
  0.305   0.673   0.623   0.00677 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors and the coefficients for time and country dummy variables are not displayed on the results table. CBL refers to cross-border lending which is non-resident bank loans as a percentage of GDP.  
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Table 2.6: Financial Account (% of GDP) on Growth  
Time Period: 1970-2013 (5-year non-overlapping averages) 
Income Groups: Developing, Transition, and Emerging Market Economies 
Estimation Methods: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), PTR (Threshold Regression), and LSTR (Logistic Smooth Transition Regression) 
 All Economies Developing Economies Transition Economies Emerging Market Economies 
 (1) 
Ordinary 
Least Squares 
(2) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(3) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(4) 
Ordinary 
Least Squares 
(5) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(6) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(7) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(8) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(9) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(10) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(11) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(12) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
Variable             
Initial GDP per Capita 
-3.97e-05** 
(8.97e-06) 
-4.04e-05*** 
(9.08e-06) 
-4.01e-05*** 
(9.10e-06) 
-1.37e-06** 
(2.35e-05) 
-1.47e-06** 
(2.35e-05) 
-1.47e-06 
(2.35e-05) 
-0.000167 
(0.000151) 
-0.000162 
(0.000158) 
-0.000167 
(0.000156) 
-0.00019* 
(0.000114) 
-0.000210* 
(0.000118) 
-0.000207* 
(0.000113) 
Trade to GDP 
-3.97e-05** 
(8.97e-06) 
-4.04e-05*** 
(9.08e-06) 
-4.01e-05*** 
(9.10e-06) 
-0.00238*** 
(7.83e-05) 
-0.00239*** 
(7.91e-05) 
-0.00239*** 
(7.90e-05) 
0.0888 
(0.0711) 
0.0938 
(0.0699)5 
0.101 
(0.0715) 
0.180*** 
(0.0390) 
0.178*** 
(0.0392) 
0.184*** 
(0.0400) 
Population Growth 
0.264** 
(0.122) 
0.258** 
(0.122) 
0.261** 
(0.122) 
0.367* 
(0.207) 
0.356* 
(0.208) 
0.357* 
(0.208) 
0.266 
(0.380) 
 
0.273 
(0.379) 
0.331 
(0.397) 
0.299 
(0.444) 
0.380 
(0.464) 
0.544 
(0.495) 
Inflation 
0.0461** 
(0.0193) 
0.0446** 
(0.0195) 
0.0449** 
(0.0196) 
0.0375* 
(0.0207) 
0.0346 
(0.0210) 
-0.0195 
(0.0348) 
-0.0758 
(0.0502) 
-0.0763 
(0.0481) 
-0.0820* 
(0.0485) 
-0.0195 
(0.0348) 
-0.0224 
(0.0347) 
-0.0252 
(0.0343) 
Literacy Rate 
-0.0139* 
(0.00720) 
-0.0139* 
(0.00718) 
-0.0138* 
(0.00721) 
-0.00247 
(0.0103) 
-0.00268 
(0.0103) 
-0.00261 
(0.0103) 
-0.0417** 
(0.0177) 
-0.0456** 
(0.0185) 
-0.0411** 
(0.0177) 
-0.00899 
(0.0147) 
-0.00663 
(0.0150) 
-0.00359 
(0.0147) 
Life Expectancy 
-0.0257 
(0.0226) 
-0.0255 
(0.0225) 
-0.0259 
(0.0227) 
0.00456 
(0.0252) 
0.00537 
(0.0250) 
0.00517 
(0.0251) 
-0.181 
(0.181) 
-0.188 
(0.185) 
-0.197 
(0.187) 
-0.00240 
(0.0350) 
0.000133 
(0.0370) 
-0.00177 
(0.0366) 
𝐹𝐴 
-0.0532*** 
(0.0149) 
  
-0.0607*** 
(0.0198) 
  
-0.0819 
(0.103) 
  
-0.0402 
(0.0517) 
  
𝐹𝐴 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝐴 < 𝑇  
-0.0555*** 
(0.0156) 
  
-0.0661*** 
(0.0212) 
  
-8.096* 
(4.702) 
  
-0.0924 
(0.0612) 
 
𝐹𝐴 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝐴 > 𝑇  
0.0547 
(0.102) 
  
0.100 
(0.113) 
  
-0.0411 
(0.118) 
  
0.0212 
(0.113) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐹𝐴 − 𝑐∗)   
-0.0545*** 
(0.0155) 
  
-0.0657*** 
(0.0211) 
  
-9.041 
(5.944) 
  
-0.117** 
(0.0550) 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐹𝐴 − 𝑐∗)   
0.0360 
(0.0938) 
  
0.0948 
(0.108) 
  
-0.0700 
(0.107) 
  
-5.006* 
(2.591) 
Constant  
3.822*** 
(1.382) 
2.223 
(1.454) 
2.191 
(1.466) 
1.938 
(1.623) 
0.0689 
(1.838) 
0.0822 
(1.842) 
21.09* 
(11.33) 
21.37* 
(11.54) 
21.73* 
(11.63) 
1.668 
(3.116) 
1.137 
(3.379) 
-1.322 
(3.230) 
Observations 388 388 388 253 253 253 50 50 50 58 58 58 
R2 0.368 0.369 0.369 0.270 0.273 0.273 0.363 0.387 0.383 0.547 0.554 0.575 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*)   30 31  30 30  1 1  0 16 
LSTR parameter (𝛾*)   6   11   13   2 
LM Test (GTD 2005) 
H0: Linear Model  
  15.04   16.17   16.249   24.38 
p-value nonlinearity    0.0900   0.0855   0.0715   0.0109 
LM Test for remaining 
nonlinearities  
  15.62   9.388   8.223   39.89 
p-value remaining 
nonlinearity  
  0.0752   0.402   0.512   7.96e-06 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note 1: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors and the coefficients for time and country dummy variables are not displayed on the results table. 
Note 2: FA refers to the financial account. The results presented above are for those of the Current Account Balance (% of GDP), this is used as a proxy for the financial account (refer to the theoretical intuition of FA=-CA).  
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2.8 Conclusion  
 
This research paper examines the effect of financial integration on growth for 
175 countries over the period 1970-2013. The econometric methodologies deployed 
for this research paper are the panel threshold regression (PTR) model and the logistic 
smooth transition regression (LSTR) model. The OLS estimations are also presented. 
Various other robustness checks are conducted to validate the findings.  
 
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the key findings of this research 
paper, it is important to understand that the transformed KAOPEN variable ranges 
from 0 to 53.2, where 0 indicates full regulation and 53.2 indicates a fully liberalized 
financial market. The mean of the KAOPEN variable is 26.2, indicating moderate 
levels of regulation (from the viewpoint of capital control) or a moderate level of 
financial openness (when viewing it from the perspective of capital account 
liberalization). For instance, for the country case of Bangladesh, the KAOPEN 
variable has a mean of 12.3, while the highest level of openness the countries 
financial market reaches according to the index is 25.3, which is still below the mean 
or the moderate level of financial openness. In the data available for the year 2013, 
Bangladesh has a KAOPEN level that shows a high level of regulation; KAOPEN 
equals 14.7, indicating a level of financial openness significantly below the mean. On 
the contrary, Brazil records high levels of financial openness, where KAOPEN rises 
up to 38.2 in the year 2006, however, after the global financial crisis, the financial 
markets are more regulated and the KAOPEN index falls to 25.2 indicating a 
moderate level of financial regulation. A similar trend can be observed for both 
Malaysia and Indonesia, where the financial markets are both lax on financial 
regulation, recording KAOPEN levels that both equate to 37.5 before the crisis but 
falls to 14.7 and 25.3 respectively after the crisis, implying higher levels of regulation 
in the form of enhanced capital controls. India for instance however, tends to 
consistently display a high level of financial regulation, which averages to 14.7 and 
does not increase after the global financial crisis. In the context of examining 
countries in the African continent, the example of Nigeria shows that the financial 
markets are liberalized towards the end of the late 1990s, increasing KAOPEN level 
from 7.7 to 22.5 but then falling to 20.7 by 2013. On average, the value of KAOPEN 
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over the stated time period for all the developing countries stands at 22.4, which 
shows fairly high level of regulation.   
 
The inferences deduced for the de jure measure of financial integration are the 
following: 
 
1. For all economies, threshold level of KAOPEN is at 2145, this indicates a 
moderately high level of financial regulation or a low level of financial 
openness. It is growth enhancing below this threshold and growth retarding 
above this threshold. For instance, while Bangladesh and India have a level of 
financial openness below this threshold, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brazil and 
Nigeria all have openness levels that are higher than this threshold.  
2. For developing economies, the threshold level of KAOPEN is at 47 (acquired 
from the robustness checks). This is indicative of a very high threshold level, 
indicating a very high level of financial openness, as the maximum value of 
KAOPEN is 53.2, which indicates full openness. The growth effect below this 
threshold is inconclusive, but it is negative above this threshold and the 
magnitude of the coefficient shows that it is severely damaging for growth. 
Amongst developing countries, the few countries that have had a level of 
financial openness above this threshold are the following: Argentina (in the 
year 1997 and 1998), Botswana, Chile (from 2004 to 2008), Costa Rica (2011 
to 2013), Cyprus (2007 to 2011), Ecuador (2006 to 2009), Honduras (1970 to 
1977), Kazakhstan (1991 to 1995), Lebanon (1970 to 1997), Egypt (2001 to 
2009), Gambia (1994 to 2013), Malaysia (1982 to 1992), Indonesia (1982 to 
1996), Jordan (2000 to 2013), Mexico (1970 to 1981), Nicaragua (1970 to 
2013), Peru (1997 to 2013), Romania (2006 to 2013), Uganda (2000 to 2013), 
Yemen (2002 to 2013) and Zambia (2000 to 2013).  
3. For transition economies, threshold level of KAOPEN is at 10 (acquired from 
the robustness checks in the appendix46), where the only deduction of 
relevance is that it is growth enhancing below this threshold. The threshold 
level is indicative of a high level of financial market regulation or low level of 
                                                 
45 The transformed KAOPEN variable ranges from 0 to 53.2, where 0 indicates full regulation and 53.2 
indicates a fully liberalized financial market. The mean of the KAOPEN variable is 26.2 
46 Refer to table 2.11. 
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financial openness. There are a few transition economies that have had a 
KAOPEN level below this threshold and this includes Belarus (1997 to 2001), 
China (1987 to 1992), Cambodia (1973 to 1974 and 1996 to 1999), Hungary 
(1986 to 1992), Poland (1986 to 1992), Romania (1976 to 1995), Russia (1999 
to 2001), Turkmenistan (1996 to 2007), Ukraine (2009 to 2013), Uzbekistan 
(2010 to 2013) and Vietnam (1980 to 1992). Our regression results suggest 
that below this threshold, the aforementioned countries would have increasing 
growth levels, this is largely consistent across all the countries.   
4. For emerging market economies, the threshold level of KAOPEN is at 15. The 
growth effects are positive below and above this threshold, but the growth rate 
increases after it crosses the threshold. While the threshold level for KAOPEN 
found for emerging market economies indicates a low level of financial 
openness or a high level of regulation, it is observed that more than 50% of 
emerging market economies in the dataset have a KAOPEN level that is 
higher than 15, averaging around 23.2, which is still lower than the average 
level of KAOPEN but it means, according to the regression results, that 50% 
of these emerging market economies record higher growth levels above this 
low threshold.    
 
For the global economy on the whole, the policy recommendation is to 
partially liberalize, or moderately regulate, then the rewards of financial integration 
can be fully realized, with increasing growth levels below this particular threshold, 
but growth retarding above this threshold. For developing economies, the threshold 
level of openness may well be high, but, the coefficient below the threshold is 
statistically insignificant and above the threshold the coefficient is negative. 
Therefore, it would be wrong to assume that it is perhaps to the benefit of developing 
economies if the financial markets are more open due to the high threshold, but 
because shows that it is negative above the threshold, and given the magnitude of the 
coefficient, it shows how harmful a highly liberalized financial market can be for 
developing economies, particularly due to the fragilities it will cause to the 
macroeconomic conditions. Interestingly, considerable importance should be given to 
the openness of financial markets of transition economies (despite the fact that 
numerous findings show that it is statistically insignificant) as the threshold level of 
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optimality is very low, which indicates that a highly regulated market optimizes 
growth.  
 
For emerging market economies however, the growth effects are higher with 
more financial openness (as it is growth enhancing both below and above the 
threshold). This is in stark contrast to the deductions made for the other country 
groups (as well as for the global economy – all the countries in the dataset), where the 
tendency is to increase up to a certain threshold, after which it is growth retarding. 
This goes to show the capacity of emerging markets and their financial institutions to 
absorb (net) capital inflows. However, it must also be noted that it is much better for 
emerging markets to moderately regulate rather than be fully open, because a drop in 
the growth rate is observed, even though it is not negative. 
 
2.8.1 Contribution to Field of Research  
 
The contributions that this research paper (chapter 2) makes to the existing 
literature in the associated field of research are the following: 
 
1. The traditionally used Panel Threshold Regression (PTR) model or the Panel 
Threshold Regression (PTR) model introduced by Hansen (1999) and/or the 
extension by Caner and Hansen (2004) are commonly used in the existing 
literature. This methodology uses the endogenous interaction variables as the 
threshold variables. While each paper makes an additional contribution to the 
literature by focusing on differing institutional factors, most of these papers 
often do not address the threshold value of the key variable of interest in the 
first place. This by no means discredits the researching prowess of the indirect 
researching channels, which is in fact a motivation for the author of this 
report, but this issue must first be addressed before addressing the threshold 
levels of the interaction terms. This is the prime agenda of this particular 
research paper. Instead of focusing on a wide variety of institutional factors or 
multiple channels of influence, the direct channel (for various IFI proxy 
measures), threshold values are calculated. This is probably a prelude to 
focusing on interaction terms for further research purposes. 
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2. The repercussions of EFPI on the macroeconomic scale was investigated by 
Durham (2004), along with the effects of FDI. The motivation or perhaps, one 
of the fundamental driving factors behind investigating the threshold measures 
stems from Durham’s paper on absorptive capacities. However, Durham 
(2004) used a cross-sectional OLS regression methodology, taking into 
account the absorptive capacities, without threshold measures. This paper 
addresses the issue of the direct threshold measure, but the interaction terms 
are not considered for this particular paper.  
3. The index developed by Chinn and Ito (2006), is academically recognized as 
the Chinn-Ito index. This is formally recognized as the de jure measure of 
capital account openness. The research papers that use threshold techniques 
have not thus far used a de jure measure of financial openness to determine a 
threshold level. This research paper uses the Chinn-Ito index as a direct 
threshold proxy variable for financial integration. The results acquired from 
this particular variable are in fact thought provoking and interesting for further 
research purposes e.g. using interaction terms endogenously.   
4. This research paper embodies a cross-comparative study effectively for 
developing, transition, and emerging market economies. The literature does 
not have sufficient focus on transition and emerging economies, in particular, 
and therefore, this is a focused and directed addition to the literature. 
Furthermore, it incorporates an analysis for all regression models for the 
global economy.  
5. Research papers that deploy Hansen’s (1999) and/or Caner and Hansen’s 
(2004) threshold techniques fail to address the problem of heteroscedasticity. 
For instance, Chen and Quang (2014) use excellent interaction variables to 
underpin and underline various channels of influence on growth. However, 
they do not discuss the problem of heteroscedasticity. This research paper tests 
for heteroscedasticity in the threshold models and addresses this problem 
altogether.  
6. Arguably, the most fundamental statistical or econometrical contribution that 
this research paper makes is that of using the logistic smooth transition 
regression (LSTR) methodology. This technique is identical to the one used by 
Raphael et al. (2012) where they investigate the threshold level of inflation. 
Hansen’s (1999) threshold methodology is the most commonly used 
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technique; however, LSTR provides a stern advancement, by looking at the 
transition speed from one regime to another, which determines the more 
appropriate estimator the PTR or the LSTR.    
7. Gonzalez, Terasvirta, and van Dijk (2005) test for nonlinearities firstly looks 
at whether the regression model is linear and secondly it tests whether or not 
there are any remaining thresholds i.e. whether or not the regression model has 
more than two regimes (note that the LSTR or the PTR only accounts for two 
regimes). This test is not used in the research papers that use threshold 
techniques in the IFI-growth literature. This is a fundamental flaw not to 
determine whether it is appropriate to examine the existence of a threshold in 
the first place. Furthermore, it is erroneous to come to a definitive conclusion 
that there is one particular threshold and deduce inferences that may in fact be 
misleading. For instance, the results are rather interesting for the FDI variable 
in this research paper. However, after close examination, when one notices 
that there are multiple thresholds in this regression model, one cannot take the 
coefficients of the two regimes seriously due to the existence of more than two 
regimes. This is a technical adjustment that must be made for the research 
papers that deploy the threshold technique.  
 
2.8.2 Suggestions for Further Work  
 
For further work, the definitive advancement that can be made from this 
particular research report is to use interaction terms in the threshold regressions. It 
would be interesting to explore to what extent the effect of financial integration is 
conditional on institutional capacity. For instance, the legal and political and other 
institutional factors (this is because relevant financial institutional factors are often 
interacted) of interest should be explored to definitively pinpoint the threshold levels 
to alert governments and policymakers alike. Furthermore, an interesting research 
trajectory would be to focus on the effects of financial integration on the tradable 
sector, thereby decomposing growth effects distinctively.  
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2.9 Appendix 1: Explorative Data Analysis 
 
2.9.1 Explorative Data Analysis 1: Historical Trends 
 
In this section, the historical background of financial integration with respect 
to proxy variables used to capture it in this research paper is illustrated for 
developing, transition, and emerging market economies. The time-period for these 
time series graphs will span from 1970-2013, however, it is important to note that not 
all the proxy variables have perfect data availability in the aforementioned period. 
The key points that can be taken from this section is that there is a tendency for the de 
facto measures of financial integration to be volatile, especially for EFPI and NRBL.  
 
Panel 1 illustrates the historical trends in series for all economies in the 
dataset. FDI and EFPI (EFPI only increases up to 2% of GDP) show a gradual 
increase over time and there is a sudden fall due to the global financial crisis in 2008-
09. For non-resident bank loans and the financial account, there is an unavailability of 
data – data starts after 1995 and 2000 respectively. The de jure measure of capital 
account openness shows a gradual increase from 1970, with a hiccup in the mid-80s 
and during the global financial crisis.  
 
Panel 2 illustrates the historical background for developing economies in the 
dataset. For developing economies (a large proportion of countries in the dataset is 
comprised of developing countries), FDI and EFPI (note that the increase in EFPI is 
only by 1-3%) steadily increase over time. There is a rapid increase noticed for non-
resident bank loans and net financial account over a short period. The de jure measure 
of capital account openness initially falls in the early 80s, but recovers in the 90s and 
there is a steady increase up until the hiccup of the global recession.  
 
Panel 3 illustrates the historical background for transition economies in the 
dataset. Initially, the level of FDI is very low for transition economies, but there is a 
sharp increase up until 2009. EFPI behaves erratically, where two clear peaks can be 
observed. Non-resident bank loans increase sharply but reaches levels far below than 
the world average or the average of developing economies. The financial account 
increases but there is a sharp decline in recent years (improvement in the performance 
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of the current account of transition economies). Capital account openness index 
shows highly regulated financial markets in the 80s, but sharp increase since.   
 
Panel 4 illustrates the historical background for emerging market economies. 
There is a gradual increase in the FDI over time. However, the EFPI levels are 
substantially low (lower than world average) for EMEs, even though there is a sharp 
increase followed by a sharp decrease in EFPI. Non-resident bank loans fluctuate 
erratically. Emerging markets regulate their financial markets up until 1990, and then 
there is a steady increase in the openness of the financial systems.   
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Panel 2.1: Historical Background for All Economies (1970-2013)  
 
Figure 2.1: FDI (% of |GDP) 
 
Figure 2.2: EFPI (% of GDP) 
  
 
Figure 2.3: Non-Resident Bank Loan (% of 
GDP) 
 
Figure 2.4: Net Financial Account (% of |GDP) 
  
 
Figure 2.5: Chinn-Ito Index (De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness) 
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Panel 2.2: Historical Background for Developing Economies (1970-2013) 
 
Figure 2.6: FDI (% of |GDP) 
 
Figure 2.7: EFPI (% of GDP) 
  
 
Figure 2.8: Non-Resident Bank Loan (% of 
GDP) 
 
Figure 2.9: Net Financial Account (% of |GDP) 
  
 
Figure 2.10: Chinn-Ito Index (De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness) 
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Panel 2.3: Historical Background for Transition Economies (1970-2013) 
 
Figure 2.11: FDI (% of |GDP) 
 
Figure 2.12: EFPI (% of GDP) 
  
 
Figure 2.13: Non-Resident Bank Loan (% of 
GDP) 
 
Figure 2.14: Net Financial Account (% of 
|GDP) 
  
 
Figure 2.15: Chinn-Ito Index (De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness) 
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Panel 2.4: Historical Background for Emerging Market Economies (1970-2013) 
 
Figure 2.16: FDI (% of |GDP) 
 
Figure 2.17: EFPI (% of GDP) 
  
 
Figure 2.18: Non-Resident Bank Loan (% of 
GDP) 
 
Figure 2.19: Net Financial Account (% of 
|GDP) 
  
 
Figure 2.20: Chinn-Ito Index (De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness) 
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2.9.2 Explorative Data Analysis 2: Scatter Graphs  
 
This section will look at the illustrative relationship (via the use of scatter 
graphs and regression i.e. the line of best fit) between the dependent variable of 
interest (Real GDP Growth) and the key independent variables of interest (the five 
proxy variables of international financial integration). Panel 5 illustrates the 
relationship between the dependent variable of interest used to measure 
macroeconomic performance and proxy variables for IFI for all economies in the 
dataset. Figures 2.21, 2.22, 2.23, 2.24, and 2.25 do not explicitly illustrate a precise 
and/or a definitive relationship for all the countries included in the dataset. Figure 
2.21 indicates a weak positive relationship between FDI and growth. Figure 2.23 
indicates a weak negative relationship between cross-border lending and growth.   
 
Panel 6 illustrates the relationship between the dependent variable of interest 
used to measure macroeconomic performance and proxy variables for IFI for the 
developing economies in the dataset. Figure 2.26 indicates a positive relationship 
between FDI and growth. Figure 2.27 illustrates a weak positive relationship between 
EFPI and growth in developing economies. Figures 2.28 and 2.29 do not illustrate a 
definitive relationship. Figure 2.30 shows that for developing countries, both the 
highest and the lowest growth rates are seen when the financial markets are highly 
regulated. However, it is important to note that there is more consistency in the 
growth rate (less volatility) as the developing economies liberalize their financial 
markets more. The fitted line on the other hand, does not show any distinctive 
relationship between the two variables of interest.  
 
Panel 7 illustrates the relationship between the dependent variable of interest 
used to measure macroeconomic performance and proxy variables for IFI for the 
transition economies in the dataset. Figure 2.31 illustrates a relatively strong positive 
relationship between FDI and growth for transition economies. Figure 2.32 illustrates 
a weak relationship between EFPI and growth. Figure 2.33 and 2.34 do not exhibit 
any noticeable relationships. Figure 2.35 exhibits a very weak negative relationship 
between capital account openness and growth. However, the highest growth rate for 
transition economies is observed when the financial markets are highly regulated.  
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Panel 8 illustrates the relationship between the dependent variable of interest 
used to measure macroeconomic performance and proxy variables for IFI for 
emerging market economies in the dataset. Figures 2.36 and 2.37 exhibit a positive 
relationship between FDI and growth and EFPI and growth respectively. There is a 
weak negative relationship between cross-border lending and growth and financial 
account measure and growth in figures 2.38 and 2.39 respectively.  
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Panel 2.5: Explorative Data Analysis of Real GDP per capita Growth (Annual %) and IFI (proxy 
variables) in All Economies (1970-2013) 
 
Figure 2.21: FDI (% of |GDP) 
 
Figure 2.22: EFPI (% of GDP) 
  
 
Figure 2.23: Non-Resident Bank Loan (% of 
GDP) 
 
Figure 2.24: Net Financial Account (% of 
|GDP) 
  
 
Figure 2.25: Chinn-Ito Index (De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness) 
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Panel 2.6: Explorative Data Analysis of Real GDP per capita Growth (Annual %) and IFI (proxy 
variables) in Developing Economies (1970-2013) 
 
Figure 2.26: FDI (% of |GDP) 
 
Figure 2.27: EFPI (% of GDP) 
  
 
Figure 2.28: Non-Resident Bank Loans (% of 
GDP) 
 
Figure 2.29: Net Financial Account (% of 
|GDP) 
  
 
Figure 2.30: Chinn-Ito Index (De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness) 
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Panel 2.7: Explorative Data Analysis of Real GDP per capita Growth (Annual %) and IFI (proxy 
variables) in Transition Economies (1970-2013) 
 
Figure 2.31: FDI (% of |GDP) 
 
Figure 2. 32: EFPI (% of GDP) 
  
 
Figure 2.33: Non-Resident Bank Loan (% of 
GDP) 
 
Figure 2.34: Net Financial Account (% of 
|GDP) 
  
 
Figure 2.35: Chinn-Ito Index (De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness) 
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Panel 2.8: Explorative Data Analysis of Real GDP per capita Growth (Annual %) and IFI (proxy 
variables) in Emerging Market Economies (1970-2013) 
 
Figure 2.36: FDI (% of |GDP) 
 
Figure 2.37: EFPI (% of GDP) 
  
 
Figure 2.38: Non-Resident Bank Loan (% of 
GDP) 
 
Figure 2.39: Net Financial Account (% of 
|GDP) 
  
 
Figure 2.40: Chinn-Ito Index (De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness) 
 
 
 
  
-5
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
R
e
a
l 
G
D
P
 G
ro
w
th
 (
A
n
n
u
a
l 
%
)
-10 0 10 20 30
Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP)
95% CI Fitted values
Real GDP Growth (Annual %)
Emerging Market Economies
FDI (% of GDP)
-1
0
-5
0
5
1
0
R
e
a
l 
G
D
P
 G
ro
w
th
 (
A
n
n
u
a
l 
%
)
-4 -2 0 2 4
Equity Foreign Portfolio Investment (% of GDP)
95% CI Fitted values
Real GDP Growth (Annual %)
Emerging Market Economies
EFPI (% of GDP)
-2
0
-1
0
0
1
0
2
0
R
e
a
l 
G
D
P
 G
ro
w
th
 (
A
n
n
u
a
l 
%
)
0 20 40 60
Non-Resident Bank Loans (% of GDP)
95% CI Fitted values
Real GDP Growth (Annual %)
Emerging Market Economies
Non-Resident Bank Loans (% of GDP)
-1
0
0
1
0
2
0
R
e
a
l 
G
D
P
 G
ro
w
th
 (
A
n
n
u
a
l 
%
)
-20 -10 0 10 20 30
Net Financial Account (% of GDP)
95% CI Fitted values
Real GDP Growth (Annual %)
Emerging Market Economies
Net Financial Account (% of GDP)
-3
0
-2
0
-1
0
0
1
0
2
0
R
e
a
l 
G
D
P
 G
ro
w
th
 (
A
n
n
u
a
l 
%
)
10 20 30 40 50
Chinn-Ito Index
95% CI Fitted values
Real GDP Growth (Annual %)
Emerging Market Economies
Capital Account Openness: Chinn-Ito Index
109 
 
2.9.3 Explorative Data Analysis 3: Quadratic Relationships 
 
This section looks at the quadratic (non-linear relationship in a quadratic line 
plot) relationship between the dependent variable of interest reflecting 
macroeconomic performance and the independent variables of interest (proxy 
variables of international financial integration). This is a backdrop for the threshold 
regression analysis in the latter sections of this chapter. This would ideally provide a 
graphic projection of the nonlinear association between the two variables of interest. 
These graphs are also referenced in the robustness test 4 section that investigates the 
quadratic relationship between capital account openness and growth (refer to 
‘Robustness Test 4: Quadratic Estimations’). Furthermore, and perhaps more 
importantly, these illustrations provide a rough estimate to the threshold estimations 
that are carried out in the ‘Results’ section (these are the final results table for this 
particular chapter and the LSTR method only assumes single thresholds). One of the 
limitations of the LSTR model is that it only assumes that there are two regimes, or, 
there is a single threshold in the regression model. However, this may not be the case 
at all times. Therefore, the quadratic illustration is in fact a good illustrative measure 
to understand the single threshold relationship between the key variables of interest.  
 
Panel 9 illustrates the nonlinear relationship between real GDP per capita 
growth and the proxy variables of IFI for all economies in the dataset. Figure 2.41 
illustrates the relationship between FDI and growth. The curvature has a maximum 
value at the level where FDI equals 220% of GDP (this is an illogical finding, but, 
justifiable given the existence of multiple thresholds), where the growth rate equals 
almost 20%. In the results section one will find that particularly for the FDI variable, 
there may be multiple thresholds, and thereby nullifying the importance of drawing 
inferences from graphic quadratic illustrations. No definitive inference can be drawn 
from the relationship between EFPI and growth. Figure 2.43 illustrates the 
relationship between non-resident bank loans and growth and shows that it is growth 
retarding until non-resident bank loans (% of GDP) equals 90% approximately, after 
which, growth increases. No definitive inference can be drawn for figure 2.44, there is 
a naturally decreasing relationship between FA and growth. From figure 2.45, the 
relationship between capital account openness and growth is analyzed. This level at 
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which real GDP per capita growth rate peaks is when KAOPEN47 (parameterized 
version of the Chinn-Ito index) equals approximately 27-28. If one looks at the 
econometric analysis in table 2.22, then the inflexion point is the same as the point 
found graphically. Furthermore, in table 2.2, the estimated threshold level of the PTR 
and the LSTR are close approximates to the one found graphically.  This thereby, 
reiterates the importance of these graphical illustrations for the reader.  
 
Panel 10 illustrates the quadratic plot between real per capita GDP growth and 
the proxy variables of IFI for developing economies in the dataset. For developing 
economies, there the minima is not definitive for the relationship between FDI and 
growth. There appears to be a gradual constant increase in growth rate with increasing 
FDI levels. However, EFPI has a maxima; it peaks at around 35% of GDP before 
falling. The relationship between non-resident bank loans and growth suggests that 
growth is at its lowest (and growth retarding) when cross-border lending equals 100% 
of GDP. No definitive deduction can be drawn from figure 2.49. Figure 2.50 shows 
the maxima of KAOPEN is approximately 32.  
 
Panel 11 illustrates the nonlinear relationship between real per capita GDP 
growth and the proxy variables of IFI for transition economies in the dataset. The 
maxima for FDI in figure 51, is at 25% of GDP. From a quick reference to table 2.3 
and the transition economies column, it can be seen that the threshold levels of the 
PTR and LSTR for FDI (in transition economies) are 16 and 19 respectively; 
therefore, there is not a large difference in the threshold and quadratic estimates. No 
definitive inference can be drawn from figures 2.52 and 2.53. There is a minima for 
the financial account, which equates to 3-5% of GDP. No definitive inference can be 
drawn from figure 2.55 as the maxima for capital account openness is not clear.   
 
Panel 12 illustrates the nonlinear relationship between real per capita GDP 
growth and the proxy variables of IFI for emerging market economies in the dataset. 
The maxima for FDI and EFPI are at 20% and 3% of GDP, respectively. The maxima 
for figure 2.58 (non-resident bank loans and growth) is unclear, however, the 
                                                 
47 Refer to table 2.1 in the ‘Variable Description’ to get a better understanding of the manner in which 
the original Chinn-Ito index has been parameterized.  Furthermore, a detailed threshold regression and 
consequent analysis is carried out in the ‘Results’ section of ‘Deduction 5: Capital Account Openness 
(Chinn-Ito Index).   
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relationship is definitely negative i.e. with increasing cross-border lending the growth 
rate reduces. The minima for figure 2.59 (financial account and growth) is 7-9% of 
GDP. The maxima for figure 2.60, shows that the relationship between capital 
account openness and growth approximates to 35. This deduction however, 
contradicts the threshold estimates found in table 2.2 for emerging market economies, 
as that is significantly lower. 
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Panel 2.9: Nonlinear Relationship between Real GDP per capita Growth (Annual %) and IFI 
(proxy variables) in All Economies (1970-2013) 
 
Figure 2.41: FDI (% of |GDP) 
 
Figure 2.42: EFPI (% of GDP) 
  
 
Figure 2.43: Non-Resident Bank Loan (% of 
GDP) 
 
Figure 2.44: Net Financial Account (% of 
|GDP) 
  
 
Figure 2.45: Chinn-Ito Index (De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness) 
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Panel 2.10: Nonlinear Relationship between Real GDP per capita Growth (Annual %) and IFI 
(proxy variables) in Developing Economies (1970-2013) 
 
Figure 2.46: FDI (% of |GDP) 
 
Figure 2.47: EFPI (% of GDP) 
  
 
Figure 2.48: Non-Resident Bank Loan (% of 
GDP) 
 
Figure 2.49: Net Financial Account (% of 
|GDP) 
  
 
Figure 2.50: Chinn-Ito Index (De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness) 
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Panel 2.11: Nonlinear Relationship between Real GDP per capita Growth (Annual %) and IFI 
(proxy variables) in Transition Economies (1970-2013) 
 
Figure 2.51: FDI (% of |GDP) 
 
Figure 2.52: EFPI (% of GDP) 
  
 
Figure 2.53: Non-Resident Bank Loan (% of 
GDP) 
 
Figure 2.54: Net Financial Account (% of 
|GDP) 
  
 
Figure 2.55: Chinn-Ito Index (De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness) 
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Panel 2.12: Nonlinear Relationship between Real GDP per capita Growth (Annual %) and IFI 
(proxy variables) in Emerging Market Economies (1970-2013) 
 
Figure 2.56: FDI (% of |GDP) 
 
Figure 2.57: EFPI (% of GDP) 
  
 
Figure 2.58: Non-Resident Bank Loan (% of 
GDP) 
 
Figure 2.59: Net Financial Account (% of 
|GDP) 
  
 
Figure 2.60: Chinn-Ito Index (De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness) 
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2.10 Appendix 2: Robustness Checks  
 
The robustness checks are used to validate the findings. The robustness tests 
are recorded accordingly and include the following: 
 
1. Robustness Test 1: 3-Year Non-Overlapping Averages 
2. Robustness Test 2: Lagged IFI Proxy Variables 
3. Robustness Test 3: Post-1990 Estimations 
4. Robustness Test 4: Quadratic Estimations  
 
Note that the robustness checks are done for all income groups (as well as for 
all relevant IFI proxy variables).   
 
2.10.1 Robustness Test 1: 3-Year Non-Overlapping Averages  
 
The first robustness check replicates the regression models illustrated in tables 
2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 using 3-year non-overlapping averages instead of 5-year 
non-overlapping averages. Table 2.7 looks at the relationship between FDI and 
growth with 3-year non-overlapping averages. There are notably more observations 
compared to table 2.3. The distinctive difference is the level of threshold, which 
appears to be significantly lower than that found in table 2.3. For instance, the 
threshold level of LSTR for all economies in table 2.3 was 55%, however, in table 2.7 
the threshold level is 6%. Table 2.7 also illustrates that the regression models are all 
linear and there is a single threshold apart from that of emerging market economies. 
Furthermore, the coefficients below the threshold and coefficients in the ‘low’ regime 
are not drastically different between the two tables. The gamma parameter is also low 
for almost all the regression models and therefore the LSTR is preferred over the PTR 
estimated coefficients for analysis. Table 2.8 looks at the relationship between EFPI 
and growth with 3-year non-overlapping averages. The threshold levels of the PTR 
and LSTR are roughly the same (except they are non-zero but vary by only 1-3%). 
The coefficients of interest are also similar i.e. coefficients for below and above the 
threshold and for the ‘low’ and ‘high’ regime. However, unfortunately, no definitive 
inference can be drawn for transition economies, as the coefficients are statistically 
insignificant in table 2.8 as it was erratic in table 2.3.  
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Table 2.9 looks at the relationship between non-resident bank loans and 
growth with 3-year non-overlapping averages. There is not a large increase in the 
number of observations, and the coefficients of interest do not differ significantly 
either, except for transition economies and especially the coefficient of the ‘high’ 
regime, which appears to be an anomaly. The threshold levels for PTR and LSTR are 
not dissimilar except for the case of transition economies, where the 3-year non-
overlapping average sees high threshold levels. Table 2.10 looks at the relationship 
between the financial account and growth with 3-year non-overlapping averages. 
There is a minimal difference in the number of observations. The coefficients of 
interest are not dissimilar for all economies and the developing economies columns. 
For emerging market economies, there appears to be an increase in growth above the 
threshold. This appears to be stark contrast to the results acquired in table 2.5.  
 
Table 2.11 looks at the relationship between capital account openness and 
growth with 3-year non-overlapping averages. The regression results are similar to 
that acquired in table 2.2 (5-year non-overlapping averages). Unfortunately, for 
developing economies, the coefficients of interest are all statistically insignificant 
(like table 2.2). The threshold levels are also similar along with the gamma 
parameters.  
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Table 2.7: FDI (% of GDP) on Growth using 3-year non-overlapping averages 
Robustness Check: 3-Year non-overlapping averages 
 All Economies Developing Economies Transition Economies Emerging Market Economies 
 (1) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(2) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(3) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(4) 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
(5) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(6) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(7) 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
(8) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(9) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(10) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(11) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(12) 
Logistic Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
Variable             
Initial GDP per Capita 
-2.78e-05*** 
(7.95e-06) 
-1.50e-05* 
(8.54e-06) 
-1.50e-05* 
(8.57e-06) 
-0.000149** 
(5.87e-05) 
-0.000123** 
(6.03e-05) 
-0.000122** 
(6.03e-05) 
-0.000217* 
(0.000111) 
-0.000176 
(0.000108) 
-0.000193* 
(0.000106) 
-0.000223** 
(9.90e-05) 
-0.000216** 
(1.00e-04) 
-0.000217** 
(9.99e-05) 
Investment to GDP 
0.131*** 
(0.0193) 
0.136*** 
(0.0199) 
0.136*** 
(0.0198) 
0.113*** 
(0.0223) 
0.123*** 
(0.0229) 
0.123*** 
(0.0229) 
0.0986 
(0.0666) 
0.0914 
(0.0658) 
0.0869 
(0.0671) 
0.134*** 
(0.0301) 
0.127*** 
(0.0301) 
0.127*** 
(0.0302) 
Population Growth 
0.560*** 
(0.0953) 
0.554*** 
(0.0872) 
0.554*** 
(0.0874) 
0.456*** 
(0.165) 
0.508*** 
(0.164) 
0.511*** 
(0.164) 
0.394 
(0.562) 
0.355 
(0.550) 
0.344 
(0.545) 
0.716* 
(0.375) 
0.727** 
(0.366) 
0.727** 
(0.366) 
Inflation 
-0.00540*** 
(0.00201) 
-0.00518*** 
(0.00200) 
-0.00517*** 
(0.00200) 
-0.00545*** 
(0.00203) 
-0.00523*** 
(0.00202) 
-0.00523*** 
(0.00202) 
-0.00903*** 
(0.00303) 
-0.00869*** 
(0.00304) 
-0.00901*** 
(0.00300) 
-0.00513** 
(0.00238) 
-0.00487** 
(0.00234) 
-0.00487** 
(0.00234) 
Literacy Rate 
-0.0112* 
(0.00575) 
-0.0161*** 
(0.00596) 
-0.0161*** 
(0.00596) 
-0.0160* 
(0.00834) 
-0.0190** 
(0.00850) 
-0.0190** 
(0.00850) 
-0.0508* 
(0.0271) 
-0.0559** 
(0.0263) 
-0.0558** 
(0.0257) 
-0.0292** 
(0.0127) 
-0.0339*** 
(0.0129) 
-0.0338*** 
(0.0129) 
Life Expectancy 
0.0370** 
(0.0181) 
0.0312* 
(0.0178) 
0.0313* 
(0.0178) 
0.0664*** 
(0.0212) 
0.0574*** 
(0.0208) 
0.0573*** 
(0.0208) 
0.171 
(0.204) 
0.155 
(0.200) 
0.169 
(0.206) 
0.0835* 
(0.0469) 
0.0473 
(0.0462) 
0.0479 
(0.0462) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼 
0.0946*** 
(0.0265) 
  
0.165*** 
(0.0479) 
  
0.369** 
(0.170) 
  
0.199** 
(0.0816) 
  
𝐹𝐷𝐼 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝐷𝐼 < 𝑇  
0.327*** 
(0.0516) 
  
0.384*** 
(0.0729) 
  
0.500** 
(0.196) 
  
0.470*** 
(0.158) 
 
𝐹𝐷𝐼 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝐷𝐼 > 𝑇  
-0.0157 
(0.0389) 
  
0.0338 
(0.0801) 
  
-5.497** 
(2.356) 
  
-0.0201 
(0.0595) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐹𝐷𝐼 − 𝑐∗)   
0.316*** 
(0.0491) 
  
0.376*** 
(0.0689) 
  
0.334** 
(0.136) 
  
0.464*** 
(0.155) 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐹𝐷𝐼 − 𝑐∗)   
-0.0106 
(0.0380) 
  
0.0388 
(0.0775) 
  
-11.29 
(7.378) 
  
-0.0178 
(0.0587) 
Constant  
-2.004** 
(0.975) 
-0.0262 
(0.996) 
-0.123 
(0.991) 
-2.899** 
(1.150) 
-0.707 
(1.183) 
-0.824 
(1.170) 
-6.739 
(12.94) 
5.735 
(11.79) 
2.105 
(12.18) 
-3.318 
(3.229) 
2.337 
(3.573) 
2.255 
(3.552) 
Observations 1,253 1,253 1,253 820 820 820 148 148 148 186 186 186 
R2 0.256 0.272 0.272 0.259 0.271 0.272 0.375 0.396 0.392 0.421 0.438 0.438 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*)   6 6  6 6  23 24  7 7 
LSTR parameter (𝛾*)   4   3   2   7 
LM Test (GTD 2005) H0: 
Linear Model  
  33.45   33.97   19.20   16.72 
p-value nonlinearity    0.0147   0.0156   0.0581   0.0742 
LM Test for remaining 
nonlinearities  
  23.92   22.15   12.95   13.67 
p-value remaining 
nonlinearity  
  0.158   0.225   0.451   0.981 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors and the coefficients for time and country dummy variables are not displayed on the final results table.  
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Table 2.8: EFPI  (% of GDP) on Growth using 3-year non-overlapping averages 
Robustness Check: 3-Year non-overlapping averages 
 All Economies Developing Economies Transition Economies Emerging Market Economies 
 (1) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(2) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(3) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(4) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(5) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(6) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(7) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(8) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(9) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(10) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(11) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(12) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
Variable             
Initial GDP per Capita 
-3.44e-05*** 
(8.45e-06) 
-3.86e-05*** 
(8.50e-06) 
-3.80e-05*** 
(8.47e-06) 
-4.46e-05 
(7.05e-05) 
-5.04e-05 
(6.90e-05) 
-4.93e-05 
(6.89e-05) 
-0.000243** 
(0.000103) 
-0.000246** 
(0.000102) 
-0.000249** 
(0.000102) 
-0.000266** 
(8.64e-05) 
-0.000250*** 
(8.79e-05) 
-0.000249*** 
(8.79e-05) 
Trade to GDP 
0.0120*** 
(0.00372) 
0.0125*** 
(0.00376) 
0.0125*** 
(0.00376) 
0.0200*** 
(0.00655) 
0.0209*** 
(0.00653) 
0.0209*** 
(0.00653) 
0.0112 
(0.0114) 
0.0109 
(0.0115) 
0.0106 
(0.0115) 
0.00381 
(0.00496) 
0.00510 
(0.00506) 
0.00516 
(0.00507) 
Population Growth 
0.648*** 
(0.103) 
0.645*** 
(0.107) 
0.643*** 
(0.106) 
0.631*** 
(0.169) 
0.637*** 
(0.168) 
0.638*** 
(0.168) 
0.591 
(0.650) 
0.599 
(0.652) 
0.616 
(0.654) 
0.259 
(0.330) 
0.321 
(0.330) 
0.324 
(0.330) 
Inflation 
-0.00243** 
(0.00104) 
-0.00242** 
(0.00103) 
-0.00242** 
(0.00103) 
-0.00235** 
(0.00102) 
-0.00232** 
(0.000999) 
-0.00232** 
(0.000999) 
-0.0101*** 
(0.00282) 
-0.0101*** 
(0.00283) 
-0.0101*** 
(0.00283) 
-0.00567** 
(0.00234) 
-0.00562** 
(0.00234) 
-0.00561** 
(0.00233) 
Literacy Rate 
-0.0143** 
(0.00596) 
-0.0158*** 
(0.00604) 
-0.0157*** 
(0.00603) 
-0.0216*** 
(0.00831) 
-0.0240*** 
(0.00833) 
-0.0239*** 
(0.00832) 
(0.0114) 
-0.0426 
(0.0115) 
-0.0429 
(0.0115) 
-0.0426 
-0.0576*** 
(0.0134) 
-0.0546*** 
(0.0131) 
-0.0545*** 
(0.0132) 
Life Expectancy 
0.0555*** 
(0.0194) 
0.0565*** 
(0.0194) 
0.0567*** 
(0.0194) 
0.0680*** 
(0.0220) 
0.0699*** 
(0.0218) 
0.0695*** 
(0.0218) 
0.181 
(0.116) 
0.187 
(0.117) 
0.190 
(0.117) 
0.169*** 
(0.0436) 
0.149*** 
(0.0423) 
0.147*** 
(0.0425) 
𝐸𝐹𝑃𝐼 
-0.00243 
(0.00408) 
  
0.116 
(0.0772) 
  
1.338 
(0.966) 
  
1.275*** 
(0.341) 
  
𝐸𝐹𝑃𝐼 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐸𝐹𝑃𝐼 < 𝑇  
0.769*** 
(0.200) 
  
2.333*** 
(0.457) 
  
1.055 
(1.523) 
  
2.043*** 
(0.517) 
 
𝐸𝐹𝑃𝐼 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐸𝐹𝑃𝐼 > 𝑇  
-0.00425 
(0.00463) 
  
-0.0895** 
(0.0354) 
  
2.408 
(2.270) 
  
0.175 
(0.536) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐸𝐹𝑃𝐼 − 𝑐∗)   
0.830*** 
(0.213) 
  
2.300*** 
(0.449) 
  
0.774 
(1.527) 
  
2.009*** 
(0.491) 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐸𝐹𝑃𝐼 − 𝑐∗)   
-0.00384 
(0.00451) 
  
-0.0809** 
(0.0339) 
  
-132.1 
(178.2) 
  
0.189 
(0.518) 
Constant  
-0.457 
(1.047) 
0.264 
(1.051) 
0.0583 
(1.048) 
-1.481 
(1.187) 
0.681 
(1.202) 
0.510 
(1.195) 
-5.073 
(7.233) 
-4.347 
(7.498) 
-2.580 
(9.725) 
-3.131 
(2.862) 
-0.244 
(2.720) 
-0.255 
(2.727) 
Observations 1,590 1,590 1,590 1,048 1,048 1,048 172 172 172 223 223 223 
R2 0.113 0.118 0.118 0.108 0.123 0.123 0.289 0.289 0.291 0.384 0.393 0.394 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*)   1 1  1 1  1 4  1 1 
LSTR parameter (𝛾*)   15   3   1   2 
LM Test (GTD 2005) H0: 
Linear Model  
  28.42   15.88   12.74   19.59 
p-value nonlinearity    0.1029   0.0776   0.0692   0.1547 
LM Test for remaining 
nonlinearities  
  31.02   17.69   16.11   52265 
p-value remaining 
nonlinearity  
  0.1733   0.669   0.446   0.341 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors and the coefficients for time and country dummy variables are not displayed on the final results table.  
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Table 2.9: Non-Resident Bank Loans (% of GDP) on Growth using 3-year non-overlapping averages 
Robustness Check: 3-Year non-overlapping averages 
 All Economies Developing Economies Transition Economies Emerging Market Economies 
 (1) 
Ordinary 
Least Squares 
(2) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(3) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(4) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(5) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(6) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(7) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(8) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(9) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(10) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(11) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(12) 
Logistic Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
Variable             
Initial GDP per Capita 
-1.99e-05 
(1.54e-05) 
-2.00e-05 
(1.53e-05) 
-1.89e-05 
(1.54e-05) 
-5.08e-05 
(8.38e-05) 
-4.32e-05 
(8.47e-05) 
-3.66e-05 
(8.56e-05) 
-0.000111 
(0.000107) 
-0.000174 
(0.000107) 
-0.000176 
(0.000107) 
-0.000217** 
(9.76e-05) 
-0.000192** 
(9.41e-05) 
-0.000192** 
(9.41e-05) 
Trade to GDP 
0.0201*** 
(0.00752) 
0.0200*** 
(0.00746) 
0.0203*** 
(0.00750) 
0.0226** 
(0.00997) 
0.0224** 
(0.00983) 
0.0236** 
(0.0101) 
0.000917 
(0.0114) 
-0.000225 
(0.0115) 
0.000476 
(0.0115) 
0.00587 
(0.00586) 
0.00904* 
(0.00542) 
0.00903* 
(0.00542) 
Population Growth 
0.837*** 
(0.119) 
0.837*** 
(0.119) 
0.837*** 
(0.119) 
0.824*** 
(0.221) 
0.821*** 
(0.221) 
0.837*** 
(0.223) 
0.540 
(0.627) 
0.509 
(0.625) 
0.553 
(0.624) 
-0.0735 
(0.295) 
0.00748 
(0.294) 
0.00769 
(0.294) 
Inflation 
-0.00201** 
(0.000960) 
-0.00202** 
(0.000963) 
-0.00200** 
(0.000954) 
-0.00209** 
(0.000931) 
-0.00209** 
(0.000944) 
-0.00203** 
(0.000922) 
-0.0104*** 
(0.00275) 
-0.0104*** 
(0.00276) 
-0.0103*** 
(0.00277) 
-0.0118*** 
(0.00107) 
-0.0119*** 
(0.00104) 
-0.0119*** 
(0.00104) 
Literacy Rate 
-0.00252 
(0.00761) 
-0.00250 
(0.00761) 
-0.00250 
(0.00762) 
-0.00961 
(0.0104) 
-0.0101 
(0.0105) 
-0.00988 
(0.0104) 
-0.0175 
(0.0320) 
-0.0178 
(0.0319) 
-0.0165 
(0.0319) 
-0.0346* 
(0.0179) 
-0.0264 
(0.0171) 
-0.0264 
(0.0171) 
Life Expectancy 
0.0215 
(0.0220) 
0.0227 
(0.0225) 
0.0206 
(0.0221) 
0.0410* 
(0.0239) 
0.0449* 
(0.0244) 
0.0410* 
(0.0240) 
0.0908 
(0.118) 
0.0883 
(0.118) 
0.0917 
(0.118) 
0.0850* 
(0.0471) 
0.0813* 
(0.0460) 
0.0813* 
(0.0460) 
𝐶𝐵𝐿 
-0.0304*** 
(0.0116) 
  
-0.00752* 
(0.00398) 
  
-0.0772* 
(0.0413) 
  
-0.0977** 
(0.0460) 
  
𝐶𝐵𝐿 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝐵𝐿 < 𝑇  
-0.0612 
(0.119) 
  
-0.109 
(0.126) 
  
-0.0296 
(0.0437) 
  
-0.144*** 
(0.0296) 
 
𝐶𝐵𝐿 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝐵𝐿 > 𝑇  
-0.0294*** 
(0.0112) 
  
-0.00678* 
(0.00380) 
  
-0.823*** 
(0.220) 
  
1.409*** 
(0.208) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐶𝐵𝐿 − 𝑐∗)   
0.105 
(0.330) 
  
0.506 
(0.429) 
  
-0.0282 
(0.0442) 
  
-0.144*** 
(0.0296) 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐶𝐵𝐿 − 𝑐∗)   
-0.0300** 
(0.0119) 
  
-0.00561 
(0.00413) 
  
74.51*** 
(19.16) 
  
-1.283e+09*** 
(1.923e+08) 
Constant  
0.575 
(1.309) 
0.315 
(1.377) 
0.510 
(1.313) 
-0.595 
(1.577) 
-0.969 
(1.650) 
-1.188 
(1.692) 
0.981 
(7.716) 
-0.363 
(8.325) 
-1.074 
(8.495) 
2.869 
(3.577) 
-4.340 
(3.914) 
-9.962** 
(4.527) 
Observations 829 829 829 592 592 592 160 160 160 132 132 132 
R2 0.179 0.180 0.180 0.139 0.140 0.141 0.331 0.350 0.352 0.481 0.518 0.518 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*)   5 2  5 0  52 65  48 87 
LSTR parameter (𝛾*)   5   8   8   6 
LM Test (GTD 2005) H0: 
Linear Model  
  32.28   24.56   22.67   19.33 
p-value nonlinearity    0.00218   0.0336   0.0474   0.0901 
LM Test for remaining 
nonlinearities  
  10.44   14.53   18.64   7.870 
p-value remaining 
nonlinearity  
  0.847   0.338   0.135   0.852 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10.  
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors and the coefficients for time and country dummy variables are not displayed on the results table. CBL refers to cross-border lending which is non-resident bank loans as a percentage of GDP.  
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Table 2.10: Financial Account (% of GDP) on Growth using 3-year non-overlapping averages 
Robustness Check: 3-Year non-overlapping averages 
 All Economies Developing Economies Transition Economies Emerging Market Economies 
 (1) 
Ordinary 
Least Squares 
(2) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(3) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(4) 
Ordinary 
Least Squares 
(5) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(6) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(7) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(8) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(9) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(10) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(11) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(12) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
Variable             
Initial GDP per Capita 
-4.35e-05*** 
(1.19e-05) 
-4.38e-05*** 
(1.20e-05) 
-4.37e-05*** 
(1.19e-05) 
-0.000239** 
(9.29e-05) 
-0.000247** 
(9.56e-05) 
-0.000247** 
(9.60e-05) 
7.75e-05 
(0.000202) 
6.07e-05 
(0.000198) 
4.94e-05 
(0.000207) 
-0.000186 
(0.000118) 
-0.000173 
(0.000118) 
-0.000173 
(0.000118) 
Trade to GDP 
0.170*** 
(0.0227) 
0.169*** 
(0.0235) 
0.168*** 
(0.0229) 
0.137*** 
(0.0234) 
0.128*** 
(0.0223) 
0.131*** 
(0.0226) 
0.404*** 
(0.122) 
0.410*** 
(0.120) 
0.394*** 
(0.122) 
0.219*** 
(0.0419) 
0.212*** 
(0.0398) 
0.212*** 
(0.0398) 
Population Growth 
0.409** 
(0.158) 
0.404** 
(0.160) 
0.396** 
(0.159) 
0.619** 
(0.252) 
0.579** 
(0.247) 
0.576** 
(0.250) 
1.186 
(0.737) 
0.863 
(0.686) 
1.339* 
(0.792) 
1.234** 
(0.537) 
1.308** 
(0.534) 
1.307** 
(0.533) 
Inflation 
-0.00220 
(0.0382) 
-0.00245 
(0.0381) 
-0.00202 
(0.0383) 
-0.0178 
(0.0362) 
-0.0179 
(0.0357) 
-0.0153 
(0.0369) 
-0.221** 
(0.0989) 
-0.218** 
(0.0927) 
-0.220** 
(0.101) 
-0.151** 
(0.0676) 
-0.151** 
(0.0665) 
-0.151** 
(0.0665) 
Literacy Rate 
-0.0160 
(0.0102) 
-0.0162 
(0.0101) 
-0.0167* 
(0.0101) 
0.00249 
(0.0143) 
-0.000293 
(0.0132) 
-0.000668 
(0.0132) 
-0.0580 
(0.0413) 
-0.0605 
(0.0409) 
-0.0524 
(0.0427) 
-0.00910 
(0.0184) 
-0.00687 
(0.0179) 
-0.00689 
(0.0179) 
Life Expectancy 
-0.0314 
(0.0290) 
-0.0310 
(0.0286) 
-0.0300 
(0.0283) 
0.000538 
(0.0308) 
0.00600 
(0.0291) 
0.00651 
(0.0284) 
-0.610** 
(0.241) 
-0.653*** 
(0.242) 
-0.572** 
(0.250) 
0.0144 
(0.0566) 
0.00427 
(0.0576) 
0.00435 
(0.0576) 
𝐹𝐴 
-0.0644*** 
(0.0214) 
  
-0.0751*** 
(0.0269) 
  
0.0315 
(0.148) 
  
0.0238 
(0.0590) 
  
𝐹𝐴 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝐴 < 𝑇  
-0.0666*** 
(0.0249) 
  
-0.111** 
(0.0505) 
  
12.64 
(12.62) 
  
-0.0190 
(0.0596) 
 
𝐹𝐴 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝐴 > 𝑇  
-0.0545 
(0.0587) 
  
-0.0463 
(0.0321) 
  
-0.0278 
(0.148) 
  
0.242* 
(0.123) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐹𝐴 − 𝑐∗)   
-0.0765** 
(0.0381) 
  
-0.124** 
(0.0607) 
  
0.0127 
(0.148) 
  
-0.0185 
(0.0596) 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐹𝐴 − 𝑐∗)   
-0.358 
(0.760) 
  
-1.140 
(1.066) 
  
-10.64* 
(5.626) 
  
0.241* 
(0.124) 
Constant  
3.378** 
(1.609) 
2.337 
(1.653) 
-0.820 
(2.708) 
1.303 
(1.851) 
0.828 
(1.877) 
-5.495 
(4.040) 
43.53** 
(19.27) 
47.37** 
(19.11) 
41.01* 
(21.29) 
-0.707 
(4.550) 
-0.283 
(4.478) 
-0.282 
(4.479) 
Observations 382 382 382 248 248 248 52 52 52 58 58 58 
R2 0.313 0.313 0.314 0.240 0.245 0.244 0.398 0.420 0.408 0.549 0.563 0.563 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*)   16 53  5 51  1 19  7 7 
LSTR parameter (𝛾*)   1   1   7   15 
LM Test (GTD 2005) 
H0: Linear Model  
  19.85   22.02   21.66   22.50 
p-value nonlinearity    0.022   0.0112   0.0233   0.0187 
LM Test for remaining 
nonlinearities  
  9.713   6.401   6.88   6.10 
p-value remaining 
nonlinearity  
  0.374   0.476   0.146   0.649 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors and the coefficients for time and country dummy variables are not displayed on the final results table.  
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Table 2.11: De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness (Chinn-Ito Index) on Growth using 3-year non-overlapping averages   
Robustness Check: 3-Year non-overlapping averages 
 All Economies Developing Economies Transition Economies Emerging Market Economies 
 (1) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(2) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(3) 
Logistic Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(4) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(5) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(6) 
Logistic Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(7) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(8) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(9) 
Logistic Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(10) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(11) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(12) 
Logistic Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
Variable             
Initial GDP per Capita 
-4.76e-05*** 
(9.24e-06) 
-4.43e-05*** 
(9.28e-06) 
-4.43e-05*** 
(9.29e-06) 
-0.000118* 
(6.32e-05) 
-0.000120* 
(6.34e-05) 
-0.000120* 
(6.34e-05) 
-0.000347* 
(0.000100) 
-0.000363*** 
(0.000103) 
-0.000335*** 
(9.93e-05) 
-0.00020** 
(8.09e-05) 
-0.000214** 
(7.88e-05) 
-0.000213*** 
(7.89e-05) 
Invest to GDP 
0.0375*** 
(0.00942) 
0.0367*** 
(0.00920) 
0.0365*** 
(0.00921) 
0.0384*** 
(0.0108) 
0.0385*** 
(0.0107) 
0.0386*** 
(0.0107) 
0.0509 
(0.0377) 
0.0531 
(0.0381) 
0.0534 
(0.0374) 
0.0268 
(0.0378) 
0.0296 
(0.0374) 
0.0298 
(0.0374) 
NFA to GDP 
0.498*** 
(0.162) 
0.509*** 
(0.159) 
0.509*** 
(0.159) 
0.503** 
(0.213) 
0.510** 
(0.209) 
0.510** 
(0.209) 
1.303 
(0.887) 
1.113 
(0.888) 
1.187 
(0.873) 
3.114** 
(1.208) 
3.031** 
(1.211) 
3.032** 
(1.211) 
FDI 
0.178*** 
(0.0408) 
0.181*** 
(0.0407) 
0.181*** 
(0.0407) 
0.252*** 
(0.0553) 
0.253*** 
(0.0552) 
0.253*** 
(0.0552) 
0.258* 
(0.136) 
0.257* 
(0.135) 
0.254* 
(0.134) 
0.187*** 
(0.0613) 
0.196*** 
(0.0598) 
0.195*** 
(0.0599) 
Population Growth 
0.436*** 
(0.108) 
0.455*** 
(0.107) 
0.457*** 
(0.107) 
0.311* 
(0.168) 
0.314* 
(0.167) 
0.314* 
(0.167) 
0.568 
(0.414) 
0.568 
(0.416) 
0.593 
(0.412) 
0.126 
(0.304) 
0.109 
(0.300) 
0.109 
(0.300) 
Inflation 
-0.00162*** 
(0.000509) 
-0.00161*** 
(0.000504) 
-0.00161*** 
(0.000504) 
-
0.00152*** 
(0.000466) 
-0.00151*** 
(0.000466) 
-0.00151*** 
(0.000466) 
-0.0205** 
(0.0102) 
-0.0194** 
(0.00980) 
-0.0175* 
(0.00901) 
-0.00275** 
(0.00122) 
-0.00263** 
(0.00101) 
-0.00262** 
(0.00102) 
Literacy Rate 
-0.00495 
(0.00540) 
-0.00459 
(0.00536) 
-0.00458 
(0.00536) 
-0.0109 
(0.00777) 
-0.0104 
(0.00777) 
-0.0104 
(0.00777) 
-0.0253 
(0.0203) 
-0.0234 
(0.0201) 
-0.0295 
(0.0192) 
-0.0362*** 
(0.0111) 
-0.0398*** 
(0.0110) 
-0.0398*** 
(0.0110) 
Trade to GDP 
0.00267 
(0.00639) 
0.00136 
(0.00637) 
0.00143 
(0.00637) 
0.0127 
(0.00890) 
0.0117 
(0.00894) 
0.0116 
(0.00894) 
0.0180 
(0.0222) 
0.0201 
(0.0225) 
0.0165 
(0.0221) 
0.00764 
(0.0115) 
0.00500 
(0.0115) 
0.00511 
(0.0115) 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 
-0.00879 
(0.00751) 
  
0.00440 
(0.00922) 
  
0.0178 
(0.0293) 
  
0.0507*** 
(0.0152) 
  
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 < 𝑇  
0.0766*** 
(0.0267) 
  
0.0381 
(0.0263) 
  
0.0603 
(0.0502) 
  
0.285*** 
(0.0785) 
 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 > 𝑇  
-0.0369*** 
(0.0106) 
  
-0.0140 
(0.0152) 
  
-0.0351 
(0.0689) 
  
0.0286* 
(0.0164) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑐∗)   
0.0656*** 
(0.0238) 
  
0.0412 
(0.0282) 
  
0.787* 
(0.400) 
  
0.281*** 
(0.0773) 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑐∗)   
-0.0371*** 
(0.0106) 
  
-0.0130 
(0.0146) 
  
0.0412 
(0.0306) 
  
0.0296* 
(0.0163) 
Constant  
3.208*** 
(0.417) 
3.549*** 
(0.441) 
3.515*** 
(0.441) 
2.997*** 
(0.611) 
3.397*** 
(0.681) 
3.387*** 
(0.675) 
5.896*** 
(2.026) 
6.794*** 
(2.253) 
5.150** 
(2.021) 
5.790*** 
(1.235) 
7.088*** 
(1.290) 
7.056*** 
(1.290) 
Observations 1,369 1,369 1,369 902 902 902 144 144 144 209 209 209 
R2 0.161 0.169 0.168 0.169 0.171 0.171 0.290 0.294 0.304 0.327 0.353 0.353 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*)   22 23  24 23  33 10  15 15 
LSTR parameter (𝛾*)   13   10   2   15 
LM Test (GTD 2005) H0: 
Linear Model  
  48.96   37.67   15.60   20.33 
p-value nonlinearity    0.00126   0.0276   0.0552   0.0342 
LM Test for remaining 
nonlinearities  
  20.52   11.80   14.35   17.12 
p-value remaining 
nonlinearity  
  0.610   0.973   0.991   0.541 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors and the coefficients for time and country dummy variables are not displayed on the final results table.  
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2.10.1 Robustness Test 2: Lagged IFI Proxy Variables 
 
Robustness test 2 looks at the relationship between the lagged IFI proxy 
variables on growth in order to check for endogeneity48 of IFI. The justification for 
selecting this as a robustness check is that there are some short-lived shocks in the de 
facto financial flows (refer to historical trends of EFPI and NRBL). However, despite 
the fact that FDI has been included, we cannot take the results for this seriously due to 
the problem of endogeneity. However, the selection of this robustness test is 
justifiable for EFPI and CBL. Table 2.12 looks at the relationship between lagged FDI 
and growth. The results in table 2.12 do not signify anything of notable importance. It 
reiterates the point that there are multiple thresholds that are unaccounted for by the 
LSTR. The coefficients for the ‘low’ and ‘high’ regime are different for all 
economies; in table 3, there is a large increment in the growth rate when the economy 
moves from low to high regime, but in table 2.12, it is in fact negative (statistically 
significant at 1%).  The threshold level also appears to be low for emerging market 
economies in table 2.12 compared to table 2.3.  
 
Table 2.13 looks at the relationship between lagged EFPI and growth. The 
threshold levels are similar; they are relatively low at around 0-2%. For all the 
country groups, the coefficients below the threshold tend to be positive (most are 
statistically significant) which implies that there is a definitive increase in the growth 
rate up until the threshold. However, one of the limitations of these regression models 
is that most of them, with the exception of the emerging market economies, are linear. 
Therefore, only the OLS estimations should be accounted for, but they are statistically 
insignificant except for the case of emerging market economies. Table 2.14 looks at 
the relationship between lagged values of non-resident bank loans and growth. The 
threshold values of the PTR and LSTR are drastically different between tables 2.14 
and 2.4 for transition and emerging market economies. However, this is not to be 
taken into consideration because the models are linear and interpreting the 
coefficients of PTR and LSTR is redundant. The coefficients of interest for all 
economies columns are similar to table 2.14 for the OLS, PTR, and LSTR 
estimations.  
                                                 
48 It is acceptable to use lagged values as robustness check for financial flows if they are not serially 
correlated.  
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Table 2.15 looks at the relationship between lagged financial account (% of GDP) 
values and growth. The regression models are all linear other than for emerging 
market economies; however, the coefficients of interest are all statistically 
insignificant for these country groups. For all economies and developing economies, 
increase in FA results in a decrease in growth levels. This inference is the same as that 
drawn in table 2.6. Table 2.16 looks at the relationship between lagged values of 
capital account openness and growth. The results are not drastically different from 
those obtained in table 6. The only additional component that can be taken from this 
table that was unavailable in the previous robustness tests or the final results table is 
the estimated PTR coefficients above the threshold for developing economies. The 
threshold level is 47 (this indicates a highly liberalized financial market). The 
coefficient above this threshold is -0.278 (statistically significant at 1%). This is an 
interesting result, signifying the impact of financially liberalized markets in 
developing economies and the risks associated to the macroeconomic conditions.  
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Table 2.12: FDI (% of GDP) on Growth using Lagged IFI Variable 
Robustness Check: Lagged IFI Proxy Variable 
 All Economies Developing Economies Transition Economies Emerging Market Economies 
 (1) 
Ordinary 
Least Squares 
(2) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(3) 
Logistic Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(4) 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
(5) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(6) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(7) 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
(8) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(9) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(10) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(11) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(12) 
Logistic Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
Variable             
Initial GDP per Capita 
-2.78e-05*** 
(7.77e-06) 
-2.06e-05** 
(8.62e-06) 
-3.34e-05*** 
(7.71e-06) 
-0.000158*** 
(5.61e-05) 
-0.000193*** 
(5.64e-05) 
-0.000192** 
(5.61e-05) 
-0.000203* 
(0.000111) 
-0.000211* 
(0.000113) 
-0.000212* 
(0.000113) 
-0.000181* 
(9.57e-05) 
-0.000146 
(9.65e-05) 
-0.000147 
(9.64e-05) 
Investment to GDP 
0.133*** 
(0.0178) 
0.135*** 
(0.0188) 
0.114*** 
(0.0123) 
0.114*** 
(0.0192) 
0.0936*** 
(0.0149) 
0.0933*** 
(0.0150) 
0.116* 
(0.0678) 
0.121* 
(0.0698) 
0.124* 
(0.0698) 
0.146*** 
(0.0306) 
0.140*** 
(0.0295) 
0.141*** 
(0.0295) 
Population Growth 
0.561*** 
(0.0956) 
0.556*** 
(0.0912) 
0.561*** 
(0.0993) 
0.461*** 
(0.166) 
0.417** 
(0.166) 
0.416** 
(0.166) 
0.306 
(0.559) 
0.297 
(0.558) 
0.292 
(0.557) 
0.606 
(0.382) 
0.466 
(0.359) 
0.468 
(0.360) 
Inflation 
-0.00536*** 
(0.00201) 
-0.00515*** 
(0.00198) 
-0.00540*** 
(0.00200) 
-0.00534*** 
(0.00201) 
-0.00549*** 
(0.00203) 
-0.00548*** 
(0.00203) 
-0.00932*** 
(0.00301) 
-0.00959*** 
(0.00304) 
-0.00960*** 
(0.00303) 
-0.00529** 
(0.00244) 
-0.00478* 
(0.00244) 
-0.00479* 
(0.00245) 
Literacy Rate 
-0.0109* 
(0.00568) 
-0.0143** 
(0.00603) 
-0.0103* 
(0.00570) 
-0.0166** 
(0.00832) 
-0.0148* 
(0.00827) 
-0.0151* 
(0.00823) 
-0.0518* 
(0.0264) 
-0.0518* 
(0.0264) 
-0.0518* 
(0.0264) 
-0.0284** 
(0.0127) 
-0.0379*** 
(0.0130) 
-0.0373*** 
(0.0129) 
Life Expectancy 
0.0363** 
(0.0177) 
0.0330* 
(0.0176) 
0.0450*** 
(0.0171) 
0.0674*** 
(0.0204) 
0.0808*** 
(0.0199) 
0.0807*** 
(0.0199) 
0.109 
(0.202) 
0.108 
(0.204) 
0.106 
(0.204) 
0.0963** 
(0.0482) 
0.0394 
(0.0428) 
0.0419 
(0.0428) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼 
0.0921*** 
(0.0333) 
  
0.184*** 
(0.0541) 
  
0.271 
(0.194) 
  
0.0427 
(0.0987) 
  
𝐹𝐷𝐼 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝐷𝐼 < 𝑇  
0.337*** 
(0.0765) 
  
0.0984** 
(0.0394) 
  
0.187 
(0.144) 
  
2.070*** 
(0.707) 
 
𝐹𝐷𝐼 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝐷𝐼 > 𝑇  
0.0276 
(0.0498) 
  
1.180*** 
(0.367) 
  
0.582 
(0.843) 
  
-0.0252 
(0.0751) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐹𝐷𝐼 − 𝑐∗)   
0.0702** 
(0.0326) 
  
0.108*** 
(0.0392) 
  
0.225 
(0.145) 
  
2.003*** 
(0.691) 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐹𝐷𝐼 − 𝑐∗)   
-5.57*** 
(9.924) 
  
1.080*** 
(0.335) 
  
1.685 
(2.474) 
  
-0.0190 
(0.0769) 
Constant  
-2.012** 
(0.974) 
-0.726 
(0.991) 
0.736 
(1.662) 
-2.992*** 
(1.154) 
-0.598 
(1.460) 
-0.451 
(1.435) 
-2.238 
(12.53) 
1.832 
(11.94) 
4.568 
(12.24) 
-4.119 
(3.325) 
1.243 
(3.329) 
0.952 
(3.306) 
Observations 1,253 1,253 1,253 820 820 820 148 148 148 186 186 186 
R2 0.256 0.265 0.271 0.268 0.294 0.295 0.354 0.359 0.362 0.402 0.438 0.437 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*)   4 40  25 24  20 28  1 1 
LSTR parameter (𝛾*)   5   2   1   15 
LM Test (GTD 2005) 
H0: Linear Model  
  34.49   28.85   18.19   14.50 
p-value nonlinearity    0.0110   0.0502   0.313   0.696 
LM Test for remaining 
nonlinearities  
  33.11   59.97   277.3   20.48 
p-value remaining 
nonlinearity  
  0.0162   2.07e-06   0   0.306 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors and the coefficients for time and country dummy variables are not displayed on the final results table.  
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Table 2.13: EFPI  (% of GDP) on Growth using Lagged IFI Variable 
Robustness Check: Lagged IFI Proxy Variable 
 All Economies Developing Economies Transition Economies Emerging Market Economies 
 (1) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(2) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(3) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(4) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(5) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(6) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(7) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(8) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(9) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(10) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(11) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(12) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
Variable             
Initial GDP per Capita 
-3.39e-05*** 
(8.43e-06) 
-3.29e-05*** 
(8.39e-06) 
-3.39e-05*** 
(8.39e-06) 
-4.21e-05 
(7.05e-05) 
-5.31e-05 
(7.06e-05) 
-5.31e-05 
(7.06e-05) 
-0.000244** 
(0.000103) 
-0.000248** 
(0.000103) 
-0.000248** 
(0.000103) 
-0.000264** 
(8.45e-05) 
-0.000248*** 
(8.41e-05) 
-0.000247*** 
(8.41e-05) 
Trade to GDP 
0.0121*** 
(0.00373) 
0.0123*** 
(0.00374) 
0.0126*** 
(0.00375) 
0.0202*** 
(0.00655) 
0.0206*** 
(0.00655) 
0.0206*** 
(0.00655) 
0.0109 
(0.0114) 
0.0101 
(0.0115) 
0.0101 
(0.0115) 
0.00349 
(0.00484) 
0.00446 
(0.00491) 
0.00441 
(0.00490) 
Population Growth 
0.648*** 
(0.103) 
0.646*** 
(0.103) 
0.648*** 
(0.104) 
0.631*** 
(0.169) 
0.641*** 
(0.169) 
0.642*** 
(0.169) 
0.592 
(0.650) 
0.623 
(0.655) 
0.623 
(0.655) 
0.281 
(0.332) 
0.351 
(0.334) 
0.353 
(0.334) 
Inflation 
-0.00243** 
(0.00104) 
-0.00243** 
(0.00104) 
-0.00242** 
(0.00103) 
-0.00236** 
(0.00102) 
-0.00233** 
(0.00101) 
-0.00233** 
(0.00101) 
-0.0101*** 
(0.00282) 
-0.0101*** 
(0.00283) 
-0.0101*** 
(0.00283) 
-0.00573** 
(0.00235) 
-0.00568** 
(0.00234) 
-0.00568** 
(0.00234) 
Literacy Rate 
-0.0145** 
(0.00596) 
-0.0143** 
(0.00596) 
-0.0149** 
(0.00596) 
-0.0214** 
(0.00832) 
-0.0227*** 
(0.00832) 
-0.0227*** 
(0.00832) 
-0.0421 
(0.0341) 
-0.0422 
(0.0341) 
-0.0422 
(0.0341) 
-0.0551*** 
(0.0135) 
-0.0511*** 
(0.0134) 
-0.0510*** 
(0.0134) 
Life Expectancy 
0.0557*** 
(0.0194) 
0.0560*** 
(0.0194) 
0.0557*** 
(0.0194) 
0.0679*** 
(0.0220) 
0.0688*** 
(0.0219) 
0.0687*** 
(0.0219) 
0.179 
(0.117) 
0.191 
(0.118) 
0.191 
(0.118) 
0.166*** 
(0.0460) 
0.140*** 
(0.0455) 
0.140*** 
(0.0455) 
𝐸𝐹𝑃𝐼 
-0.00410 
(0.00530) 
  
0.0370 
(0.0459) 
  
1.308 
(1.102) 
  
0.986*** 
(0.357) 
  
𝐸𝐹𝑃𝐼 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐸𝐹𝑃𝐼 < 𝑇  
0.793*** 
(0.296) 
  
1.739*** 
(0.477) 
  
0.844 
(1.398) 
  
1.860*** 
(0.473) 
 
𝐸𝐹𝑃𝐼 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐸𝐹𝑃𝐼 > 𝑇  
-0.00473 
(0.00548) 
  
-0.0453*** 
(0.0144) 
  
4.166** 
(1.850) 
  
-0.0131 
(0.422) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐸𝐹𝑃𝐼 − 𝑐∗)   
0.980*** 
(0.311) 
  
1.716*** 
(0.466) 
  
0.850 
(1.393) 
  
1.838*** 
(0.461) 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐸𝐹𝑃𝐼 − 𝑐∗)   
-0.00458 
(0.00546) 
  
-0.0448*** 
(0.0143) 
  
4.148** 
(1.833) 
  
-0.0168 
(0.421) 
Constant  
-0.469 
(1.048) 
-0.501 
(1.047) 
-0.499 
(1.048) 
-1.487 
(1.190) 
0.148 
(1.217) 
0.125 
(1.214) 
-4.940 
(7.275) 
-4.836 
(7.512) 
-4.830 
(7.509) 
-3.033 
(2.968) 
0.00101 
(2.855) 
-0.00799 
(2.851) 
Observations 1,589 1,589 1,589 1,047 1,047 1,047 172 172 172 223 223 223 
R2 0.113 0.115 0.116 0.108 0.115 0.116 0.287 0.289 0.289 0.369 0.380 0.380 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*)   0 0  1 1  1 1  1 1 
LSTR parameter (𝛾*)   15   10   15   4 
LM Test (GTD 2005) H0: 
Linear Model  
  31.85   15.55   17.88   17.58 
p-value nonlinearity    0.0606   0.795   0.331   0.675 
LM Test for remaining 
nonlinearities  
  32.85   26.83   17.97   10178 
p-value remaining 
nonlinearity  
  0.0479   0.177   0.326   0 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors and the coefficients for time and country dummy variables are not displayed on the final results table.  
127 
 
 
Table 2.14: Non-Resident Bank Loans (% of GDP) on Growth using Lagged IFI Variable 
Robustness Check: Lagged IFI Proxy Variable 
 All Economies Developing Economies Transition Economies Emerging Market Economies 
 (1) 
Ordinary 
Least Squares 
(2) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(3) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(4) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(5) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(6) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(7) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(8) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(9) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(10) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(11) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(12) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
Variable             
Initial GDP per Capita 
-5.48e-06 
(1.59e-05) 
-5.59e-06 
(1.60e-05) 
-4.74e-06 
(1.61e-05) 
-8.25e-05 
(8.82e-05) 
-1.19e-05 
(8.80e-05) 
-4.56e-05 
(9.23e-05) 
-5.08e-05 
(9.71e-05) 
-8.83e-05 
(9.60e-05) 
-9.36e-05 
(9.63e-05) 
-0.000184* 
(9.72e-05) 
-0.000187* 
(9.80e-05) 
-0.000185* 
(9.81e-05) 
Trade to GDP 
0.0225*** 
(0.00769) 
0.0224*** 
(0.00778) 
0.0226*** 
(0.00772) 
0.0223** 
(0.0113) 
0.0246** 
(0.0111) 
0.0241** 
(0.0114) 
0.00252 
(0.0101) 
0.00141 
(0.0101) 
0.00139 
(0.0101) 
0.00790 
(0.00478) 
0.00783 
(0.00487) 
0.00812* 
(0.00488) 
Population Growth 
0.719*** 
(0.119) 
0.718*** 
(0.119) 
0.720*** 
(0.119) 
0.581*** 
(0.199) 
0.569*** 
(0.194) 
0.618*** 
(0.203) 
0.592 
(0.482) 
0.555 
(0.483) 
0.578 
(0.481) 
-0.0182 
(0.291) 
-0.0659 
(0.306) 
-0.0423 
(0.300) 
Inflation 
0.00123 
(0.000991) 
0.00127 
(0.000996) 
0.00124 
(0.000992) 
0.000458 
(0.00130) 
0.00192* 
(0.00106) 
0.00107 
(0.00117) 
-0.0138** 
(0.00649) 
-0.0144** 
(0.00655) 
-0.0144** 
(0.00652) 
-0.0124** 
(0.00563) 
-0.0127** 
(0.00572) 
-0.0125** 
(0.00571) 
Literacy Rate 
0.00256 
(0.00741) 
0.00257 
(0.00741) 
0.00262 
(0.00744) 
-0.00248 
(0.0101) 
-0.00473 
(0.0100) 
-0.00286 
(0.0101) 
0.00552 
(0.0284) 
0.00509 
(0.0285) 
0.00552 
(0.0284) 
-0.0129 
(0.0160) 
-0.0194 
(0.0183) 
-0.0179 
(0.0185) 
Life Expectancy 
-0.00123 
(0.0225) 
-0.000144 
(0.0232) 
-0.00189 
(0.0228) 
0.0114 
(0.0236) 
0.0240 
(0.0234) 
0.0152 
(0.0232) 
-0.0381 
(0.111) 
-0.0471 
(0.112) 
-0.0460 
(0.112) 
0.0673 
(0.0439) 
0.0684 
(0.0436) 
0.0681 
(0.0437) 
𝐶𝐵𝐿 
-0.0521*** 
(0.0119) 
  
-0.00835* 
(0.00438) 
  
-0.123*** 
(0.0276) 
  
-0.145*** 
(0.0244) 
  
𝐶𝐵𝐿 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝐵𝐿 < 𝑇  
-0.152 
(0.244) 
  
-0.0953*** 
(0.0226) 
  
-0.0925*** 
(0.0313) 
  
0.112 
(0.246) 
 
𝐶𝐵𝐿 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝐵𝐿 > 𝑇  
-0.0510*** 
(0.0124) 
  
0.00453 
(0.00407) 
  
-0.661*** 
(0.191) 
  
-0.157*** 
(0.0250) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐶𝐵𝐿 − 𝑐∗)   
0.112 
(0.355) 
  
1.225** 
(0.558) 
  
-0.0865*** 
(0.0329) 
  
0.182 
(0.352) 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐶𝐵𝐿 − 𝑐∗)   
-0.0515*** 
(0.0118) 
  
-0.00454 
(0.00400) 
  
25.08*** 
(8.346) 
  
-0.148*** 
(0.0248) 
Constant  
2.030 
(1.330) 
1.772 
(1.369) 
1.903 
(1.329) 
1.583 
(1.594) 
-2.250 
(1.973) 
0.102 
(1.813) 
8.579 
(7.571) 
4.108 
(8.284) 
3.269 
(8.456) 
2.529 
(3.434) 
2.489 
(3.637) 
2.298 
(3.524) 
Observations 728 728 728 519 519 519 142 142 142 115 115 115 
R2 0.185 0.185 0.185 0.092 0.125 0.105 0.248 0.263 0.266 0.295 0.301 0.300 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*)   3 2  37 0  56 68  5 4 
LSTR parameter (𝛾*)   6   10   7   4 
LM Test (GTD 2005) 
H0: Linear Model  
  22.08   11.27   8.978   15.33 
p-value nonlinearity    0.0367   0.506   0.705   0.224 
LM Test for remaining 
nonlinearities  
  17.58   6.844   7.575   7.865 
p-value remaining 
nonlinearity  
  0.129   0.868   0.817   0.796 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors and the coefficients for time and country dummy variables are not displayed on the results table. CBL refers to cross-border lending which is non-resident bank loans as a percentage of GDP.  
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Table 2.15: Financial Account (% of GDP) on Growth using Lagged IFI Variable 
Robustness Check: Lagged IFI Proxy Variable 
 All Economies Developing Economies Transition Economies Emerging Market Economies 
 (1) 
Ordinary 
Least Squares 
(2) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(3) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(4) 
Ordinary 
Least Squares 
(5) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(6) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(7) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(8) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(9) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(10) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(11) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(12) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
Variable             
Initial GDP per Capita 
-4.30e-05*** 
(1.18e-05) 
-4.25e-05*** 
(1.18e-05) 
-4.26e-05*** 
(1.18e-05) 
-0.000237*** 
(9.10e-05) 
-0.000236** 
(9.26e-05) 
-0.000236** 
(9.25e-05) 
-3.45e-05 
(0.000172) 
-3.27e-05 
(0.000168) 
-4.70e-05 
(0.000165) 
-0.000176 
(0.000117) 
-0.000174 
(0.000120) 
-0.000166 
(0.000117) 
Trade to GDP 
0.171*** 
(0.0220) 
0.176*** 
(0.0224) 
0.176*** 
(0.0226) 
0.134*** 
(0.0222) 
0.135*** 
(0.0222) 
0.135*** 
(0.0227) 
0.483*** 
(0.105) 
0.493*** 
(0.0992) 
0.455*** 
(0.0953) 
0.215*** 
(0.0413) 
0.216*** 
(0.0406) 
0.209*** 
(0.0405) 
Population Growth 
0.394** 
(0.155) 
0.425*** 
(0.161) 
0.424*** 
(0.160) 
0.655*** 
(0.251) 
0.658*** 
(0.249) 
0.660*** 
(0.251) 
1.075 
(0.757) 
0.845 
(0.764) 
0.812 
(0.759) 
1.069* 
(0.561) 
1.052* 
(0.600) 
1.089* 
(0.575) 
Inflation 
-0.00261 
(0.0377) 
-0.00145 
(0.0380) 
-0.00329 
(0.0377) 
-0.0188 
(0.0357) 
-0.0188 
(0.0358) 
-0.0190 
(0.0361) 
-0.229** 
(0.0910) 
-0.205** 
(0.0947) 
-0.199** 
(0.0974) 
-0.147** 
(0.0664) 
-0.146** 
(0.0675) 
-0.148** 
(0.0666) 
Literacy Rate 
-0.0180* 
(0.0104) 
-0.0165 
(0.0106) 
-0.0161 
(0.0105) 
0.00174 
(0.0146) 
0.00194 
(0.0140) 
0.00215 
(0.0142) 
-0.0617 
(0.0388) 
-0.0654 
(0.0391) 
-0.0661* 
(0.0361) 
-0.00923 
(0.0181) 
-0.00986 
(0.0185) 
-0.00926 
(0.0185) 
Life Expectancy 
-0.0303 
(0.0297) 
-0.0337 
(0.0300) 
-0.0344 
(0.0298) 
0.00254 
(0.0318) 
0.00204 
(0.0305) 
0.00155 
(0.0298) 
-0.555** 
(0.258) 
-0.607** 
(0.262) 
-0.592** 
(0.262) 
-0.000364 
(0.0574) 
0.000230 
(0.0573) 
-0.00629 
(0.0578) 
𝐹𝐴 
-0.0735*** 
(0.0185) 
  
-0.0783*** 
(0.0228) 
  
-0.205 
(0.124) 
  
-0.0230 
(0.0615) 
  
𝐹𝐴 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝐴 < 𝑇  
-0.0518** 
(0.0251) 
  
-0.0756** 
(0.0355) 
  
-0.450** 
(0.221) 
  
-0.0170 
(0.0575) 
 
𝐹𝐴 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝐴 > 𝑇  
-0.0905*** 
(0.0268) 
  
-0.0806** 
(0.0331) 
  
0.163 
(0.289) 
  
-0.0358 
(0.160) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐹𝐴 − 𝑐∗)   
-0.0417 
(0.0308) 
  
-0.0716 
(0.0462) 
  
10.75 
(7.184) 
  
-0.0439 
(0.0642) 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐹𝐴 − 𝑐∗)   
0.708 
(0.754) 
  
0.0784 
(1.049) 
  
0.0882 
(0.196) 
  
-108.7 
(68.21) 
Constant  
3.428** 
(1.631) 
3.542** 
(1.654) 
1.719 
(2.372) 
1.205 
(1.872) 
0.828 
(1.915) 
-2.443 
(3.231) 
40.18** 
(19.76) 
40.52* 
(20.25) 
40.12** 
(19.86) 
0.589 
(4.714) 
0.550 
(4.735) 
0.236 
(4.466) 
Observations 382 382 382 247 247 247 53 53 53 58 58 58 
R2 0.331 0.333 0.334 0.251 0.251 0.251 0.461 0.485 0.492 0.549 0.549 0.558 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*)   0 52  5 52  10 0  3 19 
LSTR parameter (𝛾*)   1   1   3   7 
LM Test (GTD 2005) 
H0: Linear Model  
  14.51   8.440   5.327   15.69 
p-value nonlinearity    0.105   0.490   0.805   0.0737 
LM Test for remaining 
nonlinearities  
  64.25   247.2   10.83   13.19 
p-value remaining 
nonlinearity  
  2.02e-10   0   0.288   0.154 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors and the coefficients for time and country dummy variables are not displayed on the final results table.  
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Table 2.16: De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness (Chinn-Ito Index) on Growth using Lagged IFI Variable 
Robustness Check: Lagged IFI Proxy Variable 
 All Economies Developing Economies Transition Economies Emerging Market Economies 
 (1) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(2) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(3) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(4) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(5) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(6) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(7) 
Ordinary 
Least Squares 
(8) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(9) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(10) 
Ordinary 
Least Squares 
(11) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(12) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
Variable             
Initial GDP per Capita 
-4.58e-05** 
(9.26e-06) 
-4.33e-05*** 
(9.31e-06) 
-4.34e-05*** 
(9.31e-06) 
-0.000113* 
(6.31e-05) 
-0.000109* 
(6.25e-05) 
-0.000113* 
(6.31e-05) 
-0.000354*** 
(0.000101) 
-0.000366** 
(0.000103) 
-0.000366** 
(0.000102) 
-0.000248*** 
(8.16e-05) 
-0.000202** 
(7.96e-05) 
-0.000201** 
(7.98e-05) 
Invest to GDP 
0.0381*** 
(0.00941) 
0.0372*** 
(0.00927) 
0.0372*** 
(0.00927) 
0.0390*** 
(0.0108) 
0.0381*** 
(0.0108) 
0.0386*** 
(0.0107) 
0.0605 
(0.0373) 
0.0619 
(0.0378) 
0.0619 
(0.0378) 
0.0262 
(0.0382) 
0.0235 
(0.0378) 
0.0239 
(0.0378) 
NFA to GDP 
0.500*** 
(0.161) 
0.511*** 
(0.159) 
0.511*** 
(0.159) 
0.510** 
(0.213) 
0.528** 
(0.206) 
0.518** 
(0.208) 
1.046 
(0.875) 
0.790 
(0.881) 
0.788 
(0.881) 
3.026** 
(1.201) 
2.898** 
(1.182) 
2.901** 
(1.182) 
FDI 
0.181*** 
(0.0408) 
0.185*** 
(0.0408) 
0.185*** 
(0.0408) 
0.259*** 
(0.0553) 
0.262*** 
(0.0550) 
0.260*** 
(0.0552) 
0.256* 
(0.130) 
0.256* 
(0.131) 
0.256* 
(0.131) 
0.199*** 
(0.0620) 
0.204*** 
(0.0588) 
0.204*** 
(0.0589) 
Population Growth 
0.443*** 
(0.106) 
0.463*** 
(0.106) 
0.463*** 
(0.106) 
0.326** 
(0.164) 
0.330** 
(0.164) 
0.331** 
(0.164) 
0.639 
(0.419) 
0.658 
(0.424) 
0.658 
(0.423) 
0.115 
(0.304) 
0.0939 
(0.284) 
0.0939 
(0.285) 
Inflation 
-0.00163*** 
(0.000514) 
-0.00160*** 
(0.000497) 
-0.00160*** 
(0.000498) 
-0.00152*** 
(0.000467) 
-0.00150*** 
(0.000461) 
-0.00151*** 
(0.000461) 
-0.0217** 
(0.0105) 
-0.0190** 
(0.00895) 
-0.0190** 
(0.00897) 
-0.00264** 
(0.00128) 
-0.00211* 
(0.00116) 
-0.00212* 
(0.00116) 
Literacy Rate 
-0.00493 
(0.00537) 
-0.00457 
(0.00535) 
-0.00455 
(0.00535) 
-0.0111 
(0.00769) 
-0.0118 
(0.00771) 
-0.0111 
(0.00770) 
-0.0185 
(0.0200) 
-0.0171 
(0.0201) 
-0.0171 
(0.0201) 
-0.0367*** 
(0.0112) 
-0.0418*** 
(0.0112) 
-0.0418*** 
(0.0112) 
Trade to GDP 
0.00321 
(0.00641) 
0.00212 
(0.00640) 
0.00213 
(0.00640) 
0.0138 
(0.00892) 
0.0139 
(0.00890) 
0.0132 
(0.00893) 
0.0198 
(0.0223) 
0.0224 
(0.0225) 
0.0224 
(0.0225) 
0.00717 
(0.0115) 
0.00485 
(0.0115) 
0.00495 
(0.0115) 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 
-0.0124 
(0.00760) 
  
4.35e-05 
(0.00942) 
  
0.0105 
(0.0292) 
  
0.0477*** 
(0.0155) 
  
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 < 𝑇  
0.0443** 
(0.0221) 
  
0.0169 
(0.0116) 
  
0.142 
(0.0971) 
  
0.370*** 
(0.102) 
 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 > 𝑇  
-0.0372*** 
(0.0108) 
  
-0.278** 
(0.134) 
  
-0.0261 
(0.0410) 
  
0.0195 
(0.0175) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑐∗)   
0.0425* 
(0.0217) 
  
0.0230 
(0.0185) 
  
0.139 
(0.0955) 
  
0.364*** 
(0.101) 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑐∗)   
-0.0363*** 
(0.0106) 
  
-0.0332 
(0.0236) 
  
-0.0253 
(0.0406) 
  
0.0210 
(0.0172) 
Constant  
3.236*** 
(0.412) 
3.366*** 
(0.437) 
3.345*** 
(0.435) 
3.009*** 
(0.599) 
3.541*** 
(0.748) 
3.382*** 
(0.703) 
5.180** 
(1.987) 
5.807*** 
(2.108) 
5.782*** 
(2.104) 
5.889*** 
(1.240) 
7.445*** 
(1.243) 
7.399*** 
(1.245) 
Observations 1,366 1,366 1,366 898 898 898 143 143 143 209 209 209 
R2 0.166 0.171 0.171 0.176 0.179 0.178 0.300 0.309 0.309 0.322 0.368 0.368 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*)   24 24  47 32  22   15 15 
LSTR parameter (𝛾*)   14   14   15   15 
LM Test (GTD 2005) H0: 
Linear Model  
  47.77   34.32   22   20 
p-value nonlinearity    0.00179   0.0606   0.00232   0.642 
LM Test for remaining 
nonlinearities  
  13.35   7.817 
  18.234 
  23.57 
p-value remaining 
nonlinearity  
  0.944   0.999 
  0.918 
  0.428 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors and the coefficients for time and country dummy variables are not displayed on the final results table.  
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2.10.2 Robustness Test 3: Post-1990 Estimations  
 
Robustness test 3 uses 5-year non-overlapping averages after 1990. Therefore, 
there are 5 observations per country (assuming there were no missing values). The 
justification for using this as a robustness test is firstly to take a closer look at the 
regression findings using more recent dataset to check to see if these threshold effects 
differ. Secondly, monetary policies, post-1990 have been quite different, especially 
for emerging market economies. Finally, it makes sense to include it because over the 
past two decades the world economy has become increasingly more financially 
integrated than ever before e.g. increase in financial flows post-1990s, refer to the 
historical trends for de facto figures. The final comment that the reader should take 
into account for this section is that, despite the inclusion of transition economies, the 
results would not be drastically different due to these countries being under the 
communist regime of old. However, it has been included due to a few overlaps in the 
countries that are labeled as developing and/or emerging.  
 
Table 2.17 looks at the relationship between FDI and growth. The coefficients 
of interest are similar across all country groups in table 2.3 and table 2.17. The 
threshold levels are also close approximates of table 2.17. The results obtained in this 
table further signify the fact that for the FDI variable, there definitely must be 
multiple thresholds (that is unaccounted by LSTR). Table 2.18 looks at the 
relationship between EFPI and growth. The threshold levels of EFPI for PTR and 
LSTR are similar to those obtained in table 2.3; they vary between 0-2% of GDP. The 
coefficients of interest are also similar to those obtained in table 2.3. Even though the 
regression models in table 2.3 are nonlinear (referring to the tests of nonlinearity), the 
test that checks for remaining nonlinearities suggest that there may be multiple 
thresholds or more than two regimes. Table 2.19 looks at the relationship between 
non-resident bank loans and growth (we compare this to table 2.5). Due to the fact 
that the data for non-resident bank loans starts after 1995, the results obtained in table 
2.19 and table 2.5 are exactly the same. Therefore, no additional inferences are drawn 
from this table. This is the same for table 2.6 and table 2.20, both of which look at the 
relationship between the financial account and growth. However, the data is 
unavailable until the year 2000.  
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Table 2.21 looks at the relationship between capital account openness and 
growth (note that this table is compared to table 2.2). The coefficients of interest for 
all economies, developing economies and transition economies are all statistically 
insignificant in table 2.21. However, the results obtained for emerging market 
economies in regression models 10, 11, and 12 are not distinctively different from 
those obtained in table 2.2. The threshold levels are also not dissimilar.    
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Table 2.17: FDI (% of GDP) on Growth using post-1990 estimations 
Robustness Check: Post-1990 Estimations 
 All Economies Developing Economies Transition Economies Emerging Market Economies 
 (1) 
Ordinary 
Least Squares 
(2) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(3) 
Logistic Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(4) 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
(5) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(6) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(7) 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
(8) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(9) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(10) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(11) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(12) 
Logistic Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
Variable             
Initial GDP per Capita 
-2.19e-05** 
(1.09e-05) 
-2.80e-05*** 
(1.04e-05) 
-2.07e-05** 
(9.93e-06) 
-3.12e-05 
(7.18e-05) 
-5.29e-05 
(8.64e-05) 
-5.69e-05 
(8.37e-05) 
-0.000242** 
(9.49e-05) 
-0.000185** 
(9.13e-05) 
-0.000208** 
(9.09e-05) 
-1.92e-05 
(0.000111) 
-2.64e-06 
(0.000108) 
1.52e-05 
(0.000108) 
Investment to GDP 
0.165*** 
(0.0390) 
0.115*** 
(0.0264) 
0.117*** 
(0.0252) 
0.138*** 
(0.0359) 
0.0906*** 
(0.0323) 
0.0874*** 
(0.0305) 
-0.00611 
(0.104) 
-0.0140 
(0.101) 
-0.0144 
(0.105) 
0.186*** 
(0.0426) 
0.170*** 
(0.0432) 
0.170*** 
(0.0423) 
Population Growth 
0.759*** 
(0.136) 
0.761*** 
(0.138) 
0.760*** 
(0.136) 
1.164*** 
(0.198) 
1.103*** 
(0.192) 
1.102*** 
(0.192) 
1.144** 
(0.555) 
1.022* 
(0.516) 
1.049** 
(0.526) 
1.313*** 
(0.494) 
1.239*** 
(0.440) 
1.225*** 
(0.426) 
Inflation 
-0.00237* 
(0.00123) 
-0.00241** 
(0.00120) 
-0.00236** 
(0.00119) 
-0.00227** 
(0.00114) 
-0.00234** 
(0.00112) 
-0.00234** 
(0.00112) 
-0.00858*** 
(0.00175) 
-0.00793*** 
(0.00177) 
-0.00844*** 
(0.00172) 
-0.00156** 
(0.000634) 
-0.00143** 
(0.000582) 
-0.00139** 
(0.000569) 
Literacy Rate 
-0.0128 
(0.00829) 
-0.0129 
(0.00815) 
-0.0149* 
(0.00813) 
-0.00767 
(0.0112) 
-0.00786 
(0.0110) 
-0.00748 
(0.0110) 
-0.0417 
(0.0284) 
-0.0500* 
(0.0284) 
-0.0486* 
(0.0278) 
-0.0304* 
(0.0164) 
-0.0409** 
(0.0166) 
-0.0435** 
(0.0169) 
Life Expectancy 
0.0271 
(0.0247) 
0.0439* 
(0.0233) 
0.0408* 
(0.0227) 
0.0506* 
(0.0276) 
0.0699** 
(0.0291) 
0.0719** 
(0.0285) 
0.339 
(0.217) 
0.328 
(0.209) 
0.332 
(0.217) 
0.0479 
(0.0468) 
-0.0140 
(0.0386) 
-0.0271 
(0.0375) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼 
0.125*** 
(0.0410) 
  
0.255*** 
(0.0680) 
  
0.264 
(0.169) 
  
0.204 
(0.164) 
  
𝐹𝐷𝐼 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝐷𝐼 < 𝑇  
0.0896*** 
(0.0313) 
  
0.185*** 
(0.0603) 
  
0.513** 
(0.208) 
  
0.696*** 
(0.237) 
 
𝐹𝐷𝐼 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝐷𝐼 > 𝑇  
56.10*** 
(8.297) 
  
0.980*** 
(0.186) 
  
-3.010*** 
(1.008) 
  
-0.300*** 
(0.0835) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐹𝐷𝐼 − 𝑐∗)   
0.167*** 
(0.0296) 
  
0.217*** 
(0.0569) 
  
0.0714 
(0.113) 
  
0.758*** 
(0.244) 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐹𝐷𝐼 − 𝑐∗)   
15.42*** 
(2.100) 
  
0.939*** 
(0.153) 
  
-5.816* 
(2.994) 
  
-0.308*** 
(0.0775) 
Constant  
-2.529** 
(1.219) 
2.828 
(2.110) 
6.956*** 
(1.929) 
-4.843*** 
(1.367) 
0.0853 
(1.933) 
0.773 
(1.810) 
-16.45 
(12.96) 
-7.821 
(10.62) 
-14.47 
(11.88) 
-3.563 
(3.537) 
5.662 
(3.920) 
6.256 
(3.909) 
Observations 713 713 713 470 470 470 101 101 101 104 104 104 
R2 0.398 0.447 0.450 0.442 0.478 0.478 0.499 0.533 0.514 0.496 0.555 0.566 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*)   57 55  25 24  16 19  7 7 
LSTR parameter (𝛾*)   1   1   1   1 
LM Test (GTD 2005) 
H0: Linear Model  
  19.52   23.85   24.15   23.40 
p-value nonlinearity    0.0614   0.0213   0.0191   0.0241 
LM Test for remaining 
nonlinearities  
  95.80   60.60   10.53   59.22 
p-value remaining 
nonlinearity  
  0   1.76e-08   0.570   3.13e-08 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors and the coefficients for time and country dummy variables are not displayed on the final results table.  
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Table 2.18: EFPI (% of GDP) on Growth using post-1990 estimations 
Robustness Check: Post-1990 Estimations 
 All Economies Developing Economies Transition Economies Emerging Market Economies 
 (1) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(2) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(3) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(4) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(5) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(6) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(7) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(8) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(9) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(10) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(11) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(12) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
Variable             
Initial GDP per Capita 
-2.97e-05** 
(1.18e-05) 
-2.93e-05** 
(1.18e-05) 
-3.18e-05*** 
(1.16e-05) 
-8.46e-06 
(0.000102) 
-4.12e-05 
(0.000104) 
-1.36e-05 
(0.000102) 
-0.000160 
(0.000104) 
-0.000161 
(0.000104) 
-0.000151 
(0.000104) 
-0.000132 
(0.000127) 
-0.000123 
(0.000128) 
-0.000114 
(0.000128) 
Trade to GDP 
0.0220** 
(0.0111) 
0.0224** 
(0.0111) 
0.0230** 
(0.0113) 
0.0382** 
(0.0184) 
0.0397** 
(0.0184) 
0.0389** 
(0.0184) 
0.00221 
(0.0111) 
8.39e-05 
(0.0113) 
0.00102 
(0.0112) 
0.000633 
(0.00558) 
0.00198 
(0.00584) 
0.00304 
(0.00593) 
Population Growth 
0.886*** 
(0.145) 
0.880*** 
(0.146) 
0.881*** 
(0.148) 
1.262*** 
(0.216) 
1.263*** 
(0.216) 
1.272*** 
(0.217) 
1.303** 
(0.611) 
1.355** 
(0.616) 
1.334** 
(0.615) 
0.800* 
(0.450) 
0.812* 
(0.450) 
0.847* 
(0.449) 
Inflation 
-0.00229*** 
(0.000689) 
-0.00229*** 
(0.000690) 
-0.00228*** 
(0.000689) 
-0.00220*** 
(0.000679) 
-0.00216*** 
(0.000675) 
-0.00218*** 
(0.000678) 
-0.00968*** 
(0.00164) 
-0.00968*** 
(0.00165) 
-0.00968*** 
(0.00165) 
-0.00176*** 
(0.000638) 
-0.00178*** 
(0.000644) 
-0.00176*** 
(0.000640) 
Literacy Rate 
-0.0122 
(0.00854) 
-0.0124 
(0.00855) 
-0.0131 
(0.00856) 
-0.0116 
(0.0114) 
-0.0129 
(0.0114) 
-0.0116 
(0.0114) 
-0.0346 
(0.0294) 
-0.0336 
(0.0296) 
-0.0338 
(0.0296) 
-0.0572*** 
(0.0195) 
-0.0575*** 
(0.0194) 
-0.0564*** 
(0.0192) 
Life Expectancy 
0.0367 
(0.0340) 
0.0382 
(0.0337) 
0.0380 
(0.0335) 
0.0593* 
(0.0322) 
0.0617* 
(0.0318) 
0.0607* 
(0.0319) 
0.218* 
(0.111) 
0.234** 
(0.112) 
0.222** 
(0.111) 
0.206*** 
(0.0767) 
0.198** 
(0.0791) 
0.186** 
(0.0775) 
𝐸𝐹𝑃𝐼 
-0.0162 
(0.0105) 
  
0.0996 
(0.0796) 
  
0.760 
(1.144) 
  
1.039** 
(0.505) 
  
𝐸𝐹𝑃𝐼 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐸𝐹𝑃𝐼 < 𝑇  
0.702** 
(0.340) 
  
2.112*** 
(0.699) 
  
-0.0601 
(1.292) 
  
2.210*** 
(0.608) 
 
𝐸𝐹𝑃𝐼 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐸𝐹𝑃𝐼 > 𝑇  
-0.0168 
(0.0107) 
  
-0.128* 
(0.0707) 
  
104.4** 
(50.51) 
  
0.856 
(0.554) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐸𝐹𝑃𝐼 − 𝑐∗)   
1.123** 
(0.465) 
  
3.481* 
(2.050) 
  
1.238 
(1.047) 
  
3.456*** 
(0.785) 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐸𝐹𝑃𝐼 − 𝑐∗)   
-0.0165 
(0.0106) 
  
0.0522 
(0.0567) 
  
43.51* 
(25.43) 
  
0.562 
(0.468) 
Constant  
-0.721 
(1.513) 
-0.814 
(1.503) 
-0.848 
(1.501) 
-4.199*** 
(1.495) 
-2.366 
(1.499) 
-4.398*** 
(1.505) 
-8.410 
(7.074) 
-9.535 
(7.527) 
-6.019 
(6.967) 
-6.833 
(5.181) 
-6.263 
(5.362) 
-5.723 
(5.205) 
Observations 789 789 789 525 525 525 118 118 118 109 109 109 
R2 0.203 0.204 0.206 0.241 0.251 0.246 0.409 0.413 0.412 0.374 0.377 0.386 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*)   0 0  1 0  2 2  0 0 
LSTR parameter (𝛾*)   12   2   1   1 
LM Test (GTD 2005) H0: 
Linear Model  
  21.47   22.80   17.561   21.80 
p-value nonlinearity    0.0489   0.0384   0.0818   0.0461 
LM Test for remaining 
nonlinearities  
  24.82   20.19   4.894   55.98 
p-value remaining 
nonlinearity  
  0.0157   0.0637   0.961   1.21e-07 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors and the coefficients for time and country dummy variables are not displayed on the final results table.  
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Table 2.19: Non-Resident Bank Loans (% of GDP) on Growth using post-1990 estimations 
Robustness Check: Post 1990 Estimations 
 All Economies Developing Economies Transition Economies Emerging Market Economies 
 (1) 
Ordinary 
Least Squares 
(2) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(3) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(4) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(5) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(6) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(7) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(8) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(9) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(10) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(11) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(12) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
Variable             
Initial GDP per Capita 
1.56e-06 
(2.35e-05) 
1.47e-06 
(2.35e-05) 
5.24e-06 
(2.41e-05) 
3.42e-05 
(0.000110) 
1.66e-05 
(0.000112) 
3.90e-05 
(0.000112) 
-0.000106 
(0.000103) 
-0.000139 
(0.000111) 
-0.000153 
(0.000115) 
-0.000194* 
(0.000109) 
-0.000167 
(0.000105) 
-0.000170 
(0.000104) 
Trade to GDP 
0.0343** 
(0.0163) 
0.0349** 
(0.0162) 
0.0349** 
(0.0163) 
0.0427** 
(0.0205) 
0.0431** 
(0.0205) 
0.0437** 
(0.0205) 
-0.00170 
(0.0111) 
0.00189 
(0.0117) 
0.00210 
(0.0121) 
-0.000904 
(0.00621) 
0.00225 
(0.00630) 
0.00159 
(0.00596) 
Population Growth 
0.907*** 
(0.163) 
0.916*** 
(0.163) 
0.913*** 
(0.163) 
1.285*** 
(0.226) 
1.308*** 
(0.223) 
1.320*** 
(0.230) 
1.010* 
(0.600) 
1.198* 
(0.636) 
1.108* 
(0.604) 
0.318 
(0.340) 
0.385 
(0.341) 
0.334 
(0.338) 
Inflation 
-0.00332** 
(0.00147) 
-0.00318** 
(0.00138) 
-0.00326** 
(0.00143) 
-0.00338** 
(0.00137) 
-0.00329** 
(0.00129) 
-0.00331** 
(0.00132) 
-0.0101*** 
(0.00162) 
-0.00877*** 
(0.00177) 
-0.00940*** 
(0.00174) 
-0.00990*** 
(0.00148) 
-0.0100*** 
(0.00147) 
-0.00996*** 
(0.00149) 
Literacy Rate 
-0.0192* 
(0.00983) 
-0.0194** 
(0.00980) 
-0.0192* 
(0.00981) 
-0.0172 
(0.0121) 
-0.0162 
(0.0119) 
-0.0165 
(0.0119) 
-0.0367 
(0.0294) 
-0.0288 
(0.0287) 
-0.0436 
(0.0293) 
-0.0400** 
(0.0181) 
-0.0339* 
(0.0183) 
-0.0367** 
(0.0177) 
Life Expectancy 
0.0415 
(0.0261) 
0.0413 
(0.0261) 
0.0385 
(0.0263) 
0.0554** 
(0.0279) 
0.0560** 
(0.0281) 
0.0523* 
(0.0283) 
0.220* 
(0.120) 
0.202* 
(0.110) 
0.198* 
(0.114) 
0.139** 
(0.0570) 
0.133** 
(0.0546) 
0.131** 
(0.0551) 
𝐶𝐵𝐿 
-0.0369** 
(0.0175) 
  
-0.0114* 
(0.00671) 
  
-0.0387* 
(0.0229) 
  
-0.0354 
(0.0436) 
  
𝐶𝐵𝐿 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝐵𝐿 < 𝑇  
3.664 
(2.231) 
  
3.287 
(2.181) 
  
8.394 
(5.632) 
  
-0.0795** 
(0.0396) 
 
𝐶𝐵𝐿 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝐵𝐿 > 𝑇  
-0.0416** 
(0.0177) 
  
-0.0127* 
(0.00684) 
  
-0.0475** 
(0.0198) 
  
0.337*** 
(0.0887) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐶𝐵𝐿 − 𝑐∗)   
0.791 
(0.572) 
  
0.981 
(0.635) 
  
0.576 
(0.514) 
  
-0.0447 
(0.0270) 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐶𝐵𝐿 − 𝑐∗)   
-0.0360** 
(0.0173) 
  
-0.0112* 
(0.00662) 
  
-0.0528*** 
(0.0192) 
  
4.212*** 
(0.781) 
Constant  
-1.095 
(1.410) 
-1.010 
(1.410) 
-1.183 
(1.411) 
-3.752** 
(1.799) 
-3.764** 
(1.804) 
-3.918** 
(1.843) 
-7.606 
(7.659) 
-6.933 
(7.225) 
-5.146 
(7.227) 
-1.486 
(3.985) 
-4.624 
(4.130) 
-3.684 
(4.032) 
Observations 630 630 630 455 455 455 115 115 115 97 97 97 
R2 0.274 0.284 0.280 0.290 0.299 0.298 0.418 0.462 0.436 0.532 0.553 0.560 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*)   1 2  1 2  1 5  39 52 
LSTR parameter (𝛾*)   7   15   15   2 
LM Test (GTD 2005) 
H0: Linear Model  
  21.82   24.94   29.080   22.947 
p-value nonlinearity    0.0258   0.0185   0.00615   0.0535 
LM Test for remaining 
nonlinearities  
  12.82   8.442   8.985   25.88 
p-value remaining 
nonlinearity  
  0.305   0.673   0.623   0.00677 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors and the coefficients for time and country dummy variables are not displayed on the results table. CBL refers to cross-border lending which is non-resident bank loans as a percentage of GDP.  
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Table 2.20: Financial Account (% of GDP) on Growth using post-1990 estimations 
Robustness Check: Post-1990 Estimations 
 All Economies Developing Economies Transition Economies Emerging Market Economies 
 (1) 
Ordinary 
Least Squares 
(2) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(3) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(4) 
Ordinary 
Least Squares 
(5) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(6) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(7) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(8) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(9) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(10) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(11) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(12) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
Variable             
Initial GDP per Capita 
-3.97e-05*** 
(8.97e-06) 
-4.04e-05*** 
(9.08e-06) 
-4.01e-05*** 
(9.10e-06) 
-0.000238*** 
(7.83e-05) 
-0.000239*** 
(7.91e-05) 
-0.000239*** 
(7.90e-05) 
-0.000167 
(0.000151) 
-0.000162 
(0.000158) 
-0.000167 
(0.000156) 
-0.000193* 
(0.000114) 
-0.000210* 
(0.000118) 
-0.000207* 
(0.000113) 
Trade to GDP 
0.121*** 
(0.0169) 
0.119*** 
(0.0174) 
0.119*** 
(0.0173) 
0.108*** 
(0.0180) 
0.104*** 
(0.0185) 
0.104*** 
(0.0185) 
0.0888 
(0.0711) 
0.0938 
(0.0699)5 
0.101 
(0.0715) 
0.180*** 
(0.0390) 
0.178*** 
(0.0392) 
0.184*** 
(0.0400) 
Population Growth 
0.264** 
(0.122) 
0.258** 
(0.122) 
0.261** 
(0.122) 
0.367* 
(0.207) 
0.356* 
(0.208) 
0.357* 
(0.208) 
0.266 
(0.380) 
 
0.273 
(0.379) 
0.331 
(0.397) 
0.299 
(0.444) 
0.380 
(0.464) 
0.544 
(0.495) 
Inflation 
0.0461** 
(0.0193) 
0.0446** 
(0.0195) 
0.0449** 
(0.0196) 
0.0375* 
(0.0207) 
0.0346 
(0.0210) 
0.0347 
(0.0211) 
-0.0758 
(0.0502) 
-0.0763 
(0.0481) 
-0.0820* 
(0.0485) 
-0.0195 
(0.0348) 
-0.0224 
(0.0347) 
-0.0252 
(0.0343) 
Literacy Rate 
-0.0139* 
(0.00720) 
-0.0139* 
(0.00718) 
-0.0138* 
(0.00721) 
-0.00247 
(0.0103) 
-0.00268 
(0.0103) 
-0.00261 
(0.0103) 
-0.0417** 
(0.0177) 
-0.0456** 
(0.0185) 
-0.0411** 
(0.0177) 
-0.00899 
(0.0147) 
-0.00663 
(0.0150) 
-0.00359 
(0.0147) 
Life Expectancy 
-0.0257 
(0.0226) 
-0.0255 
(0.0225) 
-0.0259 
(0.0227) 
0.00456 
(0.0252) 
0.00537 
(0.0250) 
0.00517 
(0.0251) 
-0.181 
(0.181) 
-0.188 
(0.185) 
-0.197 
(0.187) 
-0.00240 
(0.0350) 
0.000133 
(0.0370) 
-0.00177 
(0.0366) 
𝐹𝐴 
-0.0532*** 
(0.0149) 
  
-0.0607*** 
(0.0198) 
  
-0.0321 
(0.0249) 
  
-0.0402 
(0.0517) 
  
𝐹𝐴 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝐴 < 𝑇  
-0.0555*** 
(0.0156) 
  
-0.0661*** 
(0.0212) 
  
-0.0451 
(0.0156) 
  
-0.0924 
(0.0612) 
 
𝐹𝐴 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝐴 > 𝑇  
0.0547 
(0.102) 
  
0.100 
(0.113) 
  
0.0147 
(0.102) 
  
0.0212 
(0.113) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐹𝐴 − 𝑐∗)   
-0.0545*** 
(0.0155) 
  
-0.0657*** 
(0.0211) 
  
-0.145** 
(0.0155) 
  
-0.117** 
(0.0550) 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐹𝐴 − 𝑐∗)   
0.0360 
(0.0938) 
  
0.0948 
(0.108) 
  
0.0160* 
(3.938) 
  
-5.006* 
(2.591) 
Constant  
3.822*** 
(1.382) 
2.223 
(1.454) 
2.191 
(1.466) 
1.938 
(1.623) 
0.0689 
(1.838) 
0.0822 
(1.842) 
2.221 
(4.382) 
3.413 
(1.454) 
1.132 
(1.466) 
1.668 
(3.116) 
1.137 
(3.379) 
-1.322 
(3.230) 
Observations 388 388 388 253 253 253 42 42 42 58 58 58 
R2 0.368 0.369 0.369 0.270 0.273 0.273 0.368 0.369 0.369 0.547 0.554 0.575 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*)   30 31  30 30  1 2  0 16 
LSTR parameter (𝛾*)   6   11   6   2 
LM Test (GTD 2005) 
H0: Linear Model  
  15.04   18.17   15.04   14.38 
p-value nonlinearity    0.0900   0.0755   0.0900   0.109 
LM Test for remaining 
nonlinearities  
  15.62   9.388   15.62   39.89 
p-value remaining 
nonlinearity  
  0.0752   0.402   0.0752   7.96e-06 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors and the coefficients for time and country dummy variables are not displayed on the final results table.  
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Table 2.21: De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness (Chinn-Ito Index) on Growth using post-1990 estimations 
Robustness Check: Post-1990 Estimations 
 All Economies Developing Economies Transition Economies Emerging Market Economies 
 (1) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(2) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(3) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(4) 
Ordinary 
Least 
Squares 
(5) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(6) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(7) 
Ordinary 
Least Squares 
(8) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(9) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
(10) 
Ordinary 
Least Squares 
(11) 
Panel 
Threshold 
Regression 
(PTR) 
(12) 
Logistic 
Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
(LSTR) 
Variable             
Initial GDP per Capita 
-3.99e-05** 
(1.49e-05) 
-3.69e-05** 
(1.60e-05) 
-3.80e-05** 
(1.59e-05) 
-0.000108 
(8.55e-05) 
-0.000106 
(8.56e-05) 
-0.000106 
(8.56e-05) 
-0.000305*** 
(0.000104) 
-0.000325** 
(0.000106) 
-0.000324** 
(0.000106) 
-0.000126 
(9.77e-05) 
-0.000129 
(9.23e-05) 
-0.000127 
(9.22e-05) 
Invest to GDP 
0.0281 
(0.0181) 
0.0276 
(0.0182) 
0.0279 
(0.0182) 
0.0378** 
(0.0177) 
0.0373** 
(0.0177) 
0.0373** 
(0.0177) 
0.0368 
(0.0264) 
0.0378 
(0.0266) 
0.0373 
(0.0264) 
0.111** 
(0.0449) 
0.0961** 
(0.0452) 
0.0971** 
(0.0452) 
NFA to GDP 
0.524** 
(0.226) 
0.531** 
(0.225) 
0.528** 
(0.226) 
0.555** 
(0.274) 
0.540** 
(0.271) 
0.539** 
(0.271) 
0.975 
(0.966) 
0.750 
(0.934) 
0.785 
(0.942) 
1.554 
(1.590) 
1.875 
(1.519) 
1.857 
(1.519) 
FDI 
0.310*** 
(0.115) 
0.313*** 
(0.116) 
0.313*** 
(0.116) 
0.431*** 
(0.131) 
0.431*** 
(0.132) 
0.431*** 
(0.132) 
0.0581 
(0.0957) 
0.0590 
(0.0936) 
0.0589 
(0.0932) 
0.133 
(0.108) 
0.142 
(0.0985) 
0.140 
(0.0992) 
Population Growth 
0.578*** 
(0.160) 
0.579*** 
(0.160) 
0.577*** 
(0.160) 
0.783*** 
(0.181) 
0.779*** 
(0.181) 
0.779*** 
(0.181) 
0.805** 
(0.385) 
0.791** 
(0.376) 
0.788** 
(0.375) 
0.252 
(0.328) 
0.200 
(0.302) 
0.199 
(0.303) 
Inflation 
-0.00141** 
(0.000211) 
-0.00139*** 
(0.000218) 
-0.00140*** 
(0.000216) 
-0.00134*** 
(0.000213) 
-0.00141*** 
(0.000175) 
-0.00141*** 
(0.000173) 
-0.0264*** 
(0.00937) 
-0.0246*** 
(0.00867) 
-0.0246*** 
(0.00854) 
-0.00106*** 
(0.000122) 
-0.000734*** 
(0.000172) 
-0.000735*** 
(0.000173) 
Literacy Rate 
-0.00729 
(0.00831) 
-0.00805 
(0.00847) 
-0.00779 
(0.00845) 
0.000119 
(0.00968) 
-0.000447 
(0.00970) 
-0.000463 
(0.00970) 
-0.0183 
(0.0162) 
-0.0150 
(0.0165) 
-0.0152 
(0.0164) 
-0.0395*** 
(0.0150) 
-0.0421*** 
(0.0151) 
-0.0421*** 
(0.0152) 
Trade to GDP 
0.00250 
(0.00856) 
0.00254 
(0.00858) 
0.00239 
(0.00852) 
0.00871 
(0.0129) 
0.00983 
(0.0129) 
0.00988 
(0.0129) 
0.00906 
(0.0202) 
0.0146 
(0.0208) 
0.0150 
(0.0207) 
-0.0240** 
(0.0113) 
-0.0225* 
(0.0114) 
-0.0225* 
(0.0114) 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 
-0.0125 
(0.0106) 
  
-0.00854 
(0.0140) 
  
0.0291 
(0.0261) 
  
0.0452** 
(0.0221) 
  
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 < 𝑇  
0.00102 
(0.0135) 
  
-0.356 
(0.248) 
  
0.155 
(0.104) 
  
0.401*** 
(0.133) 
 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 > 𝑇  
-0.0603 
(0.0462) 
  
-0.00293 
(0.0142) 
  
-0.00647 
(0.0380) 
  
0.0202 
(0.0223) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑐∗)   
-0.00322 
(0.0123) 
  
-0.373 
(0.250) 
  
0.177 
(0.115) 
  
0.391*** 
(0.131) 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑐∗)   
2.029 
(2.333) 
  
-0.00338 
(0.0141) 
  
-0.00580 
(0.0366) 
  
0.0228 
(0.0220) 
Constant  
2.782*** 
(0.677) 
2.606*** 
(0.764) 
2.470*** 
(0.815) 
1.270* 
(0.734) 
1.043 
(0.772) 
1.056 
(0.770) 
5.981*** 
(1.499) 
6.744*** 
(1.387) 
6.748*** 
(1.379) 
4.413** 
(1.711) 
6.355*** 
(1.906) 
6.249*** 
(1.906) 
Observations 678 678 678 451 451 451 98 98 98 100 100 100 
R2 0.289 0.290 0.290 0.366 0.369 0.370 0.374 0.387 0.389 0.468 0.514 0.513 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*)   41 51  11 11  22 21  16 16 
LSTR parameter (𝛾*)   15   15   14   15 
LM Test (GTD 2005) H0: 
Linear Model  
  35.32   23.71   23.49   25.49 
p-value nonlinearity    0.00132   0.0497   0.0411   0.0488 
LM Test for remaining 
nonlinearities  
  7.188   4.050   13.69   10.24 
p-value remaining 
nonlinearity  
  0.927   0.995   0.396   0.745 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors and the coefficients for time and country dummy variables are not displayed on the final results table.  
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2.10.3 Robustness Test 4: Quadratic Estimations   
 
For this particular robustness check, the threshold measures are tested with 
standard quadratic estimations. However, the quadratic estimations are only tested for 
the key independent variables (IFI proxy variables) of interest that have the high 
transition speed (from one regime to the other; denoted by gamma, 𝛾*) i.e. indicating 
that the PTR model is more appropriate for interpretation rather than the LSTR. The 
second choice of selection is whether there are two regimes (single threshold) or more 
than two regimes (multiple thresholds). These were the two criteria of selection. The 
justification for the second criteria of selection is simply because the quadratic 
estimation would only check for a single threshold and therefore it would be 
redundant to include the other variables as some of them have multiple thresholds 
according to the Gonzalez, Terasvirta, and van Djik (2005) test of nonlinearity and 
detection of multiple regimes. Therefore, only the Chinn-Ito index met both of these 
conditions and was selected for robustness checks via the quadratic estimations.  
 
The quadratic (nonlinear) relationship is investigated in tables 2.22, 2.23, 2.24, 
and 2.25 for all economies, developing economies, transition economies, and 
emerging market economies, respectively. For each of these country groups, the 
inflexion point49 was calculated and consequently the maxima or the minima were 
determined. For all economies (table 2.22), the inflexion point equals 28.25 and this is 
a maxima. On table 2.2, the PTR and LSTR threshold estimates are 21 and 22 
respectively.  Furthermore, below and above the threshold, they have negative and 
positive values respectively. This reiterates and validates our threshold findings. For 
developing economies (tables 2.23), the inflexion point equals 25.25 and this has a 
maxima. The threshold estimates of PTR and LSTR on table 2.2 are 22 and 23 
respectively. The inflexion point and the threshold estimates are again close 
approximates. However, in table 2.2, we do not know the coefficients below and 
above the threshold, but, the quadratic regression analysis suggests increasing growth 
                                                 
49 The inflexion point or the stationary point for the variable KAOPEN was calculated in the following 
manner: (1) the regression equation was first written out which took into account the coefficients that 
were statistically significant and if there were several then the coefficients were averaged in the 
following way e.g. 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡
2 . Then the (2) inflexion point was found 
in the following manner: 
𝜕𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ
𝜕𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃
= 0, and thereby the value of KAOPEN was found. Then in order to 
determine (3) the minima or the maxima we look at the following: 
𝜕2𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ
𝜕𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃2
< 0 is a maxima and if this 
is greater than zero then it is a minima.  
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levels followed by fall in growth rate after crossing the inflexion point. For transition 
economies (table 2.24), the inflexion point is equal to 3.5 and it is a maxima; the 
threshold estimates of PTR and LSTR are distinctively different, however, the 
coefficients for the PTR and LSTR are not statistically significant (except for the 
‘low’ regime of LSTR which is increasing). For emerging market economies (table 
2.25), the inflexion point equals 39.5 and it is a maxima; the threshold estimates of 
the PTR and LSTR are 15 and 14 respectively. This is in fact drastically different 
from the inflexion point estimated. These coefficients below and above the thresholds 
for both the PTR and LSTR are positive, but, after the threshold, the growth levels fall 
comparatively.  
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Table 2.22: De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness (Chinn-Ito Index) on Growth using Quadratic Estimations in All Economies 
Robustness Check: Quadratic Estimations 
Country Group: All Economies 
Time Period: 1970-2013 
 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Rate 
(1) 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Rate 
(2) 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Rate 
(3) 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Rate 
(4) 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Rate 
(5) 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Rate 
(6) 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Rate 
(7) 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Rate 
(8) 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 
-0.025* 
(0.007) 
0.065 
(0.041) 
0.099* 
(0.040) 
0.093* 
(0.040) 
0.093* 
(0.040) 
0.114** 
(0.040) 
0.107** 
(0.040) 
0.113** 
(0.040) 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃2  -0.001* 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.001* 
(0.001) 
-0.001* 
(0.001) 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
Initial GDP per Capita   
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000** 
(0.000) 
-0.000** 
(0.000) 
-0.000** 
(0.000) 
-0.000** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Population Growth   
0.605*** 
(0.128) 
0.588*** 
(0.138) 
0.583*** 
(0.138) 
0.632*** 
(0.126) 
0.645*** 
(0.126) 
0.515*** 
(0.146) 
Invest to GDP    
0.011 
(0.020) 
0.009 
(0.019) 
0.018 
(0.013) 
0.018 
(0.014) 
0.021 
(0.013) 
NFA to GDP     
0.240 
(0.156) 
0.599*** 
(0.225) 
0.575** 
(0.217) 
0.589** 
(0.220) 
FDI      
0.294** 
(0.112) 
0.289** 
(0.111) 
0.295** 
(0.112) 
Inflation       
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
Literacy Rate        
-0.013 
(0.007) 
Trade to GDP       
0.000 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
Constant 4.637*** 
(0.271) 
3.577*** 
(0.556) 
2.019*** 
(0.605) 
1.990** 
(0.614) 
2.159*** 
(0.615) 
1.174 
(0.694) 
1.289 
(0.709) 
1.917* 
(0.757) 
Observations 914 914 914 914 914 914 914 914 
R2 0.011 0.014 0.082 0.084 0.087 0.230 0.245 0.250 
F 11.277 8.349 22.669 20.950 23.661 15.378 33.769 35.708 
Level of Significance 
***1% 
**5%  
*10% 
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Table 2.23: De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness (Chinn-Ito Index) on Growth using Quadratic Estimations in Developing Economies 
Robustness Check: Quadratic Estimations 
Country Group: Developing Economies 
Time Period: 1970-2013 
 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Rate 
(1) 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Rate 
(2) 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Rate 
(3) 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Rate 
(4) 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Rate 
(5) 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Rate 
(6) 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Rate 
(7) 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Rate 
(8) 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 
0.010 
(0.010) 
0.071 
(0.051) 
0.091 
(0.051) 
0.089 
(0.051) 
0.090 
(0.051) 
0.101* 
(0.051) 
0.086 
(0.050) 
0.086 
(0.050) 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃2  -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Initial GDP per Capita   
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Population Growth   
0.630** 
(0.195) 
0.615** 
(0.220) 
0.620** 
(0.215) 
0.793*** 
(0.198) 
0.829*** 
(0.205) 
0.679*** 
(0.190) 
Invest to GDP    
0.008 
(0.025) 
0.008 
(0.024) 
0.029* 
(0.013) 
0.024 
(0.014) 
0.025 
(0.014) 
NFA to GDP     
0.098 
(0.158) 
0.647* 
(0.287) 
0.616* 
(0.278) 
0.622* 
(0.281) 
FDI      
0.416** 
(0.135) 
0.396** 
(0.129) 
0.400** 
(0.130) 
Inflation       
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
Literacy Rate        
-0.011 
(0.009) 
Trade to GDP       
0.010 
(0.009) 
0.012 
(0.010) 
Constant 4.085*** 
(0.317) 
3.388*** 
(0.645) 
1.868* 
(0.742) 
1.850* 
(0.740) 
1.888* 
(0.745) 
0.517 
(0.891) 
0.469 
(0.952) 
1.141 
(0.902) 
Observations 615 615 615 615 615 615 615 615 
R2 0.001 0.002 0.040 0.041 0.041 0.289 0.308 0.311 
F 1.005 1.218 8.038 7.574 6.398 9.036 47.094 51.073 
Level of Significance 
***1% 
**5%  
*10% 
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Table 2.24: De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness (Chinn-Ito Index) on Growth using Quadratic Estimations in Transition Economies 
Robustness Check: Quadratic Estimations 
Country Group: Transition Economies 
Time Period: 1970-2013 
 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Rate 
(1) 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Rate 
(2) 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Rate 
(3) 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Rate 
(4) 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Rate 
(5) 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Rate 
(6) 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Rate 
(7) 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Rate 
(8) 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 
0.014* 
(0.023) 
0.104 
(0.140) 
0.218 
(0.118) 
0.251 
(0.126) 
0.234 
(0.122) 
0.229 
(0.120) 
0.151 
(0.126) 
0.141 
(0.127) 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃2  -0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.002* 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
Initial GDP per Capita   
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Population Growth   
1.089*** 
(0.290) 
1.121*** 
(0.290) 
1.158*** 
(0.315) 
1.147*** 
(0.304) 
0.946** 
(0.301) 
0.796* 
(0.394) 
Invest to GDP    
0.048 
(0.035) 
0.043 
(0.032) 
0.037 
(0.030) 
0.037 
(0.028) 
0.038 
(0.028) 
NFA to GDP     
0.542 
(0.917) 
0.664 
(0.933) 
0.743 
(0.933) 
0.870 
(0.865) 
FDI      
0.107 
(0.098) 
0.056 
(0.092) 
0.063 
(0.093) 
Inflation       
-0.025** 
(0.009) 
-0.025** 
(0.009) 
Literacy Rate        
-0.016 
(0.016) 
Trade to GDP       
0.010 
(0.020) 
0.012 
(0.020) 
Constant 4.483*** 
(0.797) 
3.061 
(1.894) 
1.722 
(1.594) 
0.920 
(1.807) 
1.393 
(1.781) 
1.087 
(1.839) 
2.904 
(2.007) 
4.200 
(2.482) 
Observations 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 
R2 0.004 0.011 0.262 0.297 0.300 0.311 0.375 0.379 
F 0.389 0.583 10.890 9.569 8.448 7.396 7.142 9.052 
Level of Significance 
***1% 
**5%  
*10% 
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Table 2.25: De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness (Chinn-Ito Index) on Growth using Quadratic Estimations in Emerging Market Economies 
Robustness Check: Quadratic Estimations 
Country Group: Emerging Market Economies 
Time Period: 1970-2013 
 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Rate 
(1) 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Rate 
(2) 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Rate 
(3) 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Rate 
(4) 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Rate 
(5) 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Rate 
(6) 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Rate 
(7) 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
Rate 
(8) 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 
0.031 
(0.016) 
0.204* 
(0.083) 
0.237*** 
(0.068) 
0.216** 
(0.070) 
0.234*** 
(0.068) 
0.237*** 
(0.068) 
0.207** 
(0.061) 
0.210*** 
(0.058) 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃2  -0.003* 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
Initial GDP per Capita   
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Population Growth   
0.664** 
(0.231) 
0.656** 
(0.231) 
0.573* 
(0.231) 
0.705** 
(0.240) 
0.679** 
(0.233) 
0.201 
(0.289) 
Invest to GDP    
0.031 
(0.031) 
0.013 
(0.031) 
0.012 
(0.030) 
0.039 
(0.043) 
0.039 
(0.040) 
NFA to GDP     
2.846** 
(1.038) 
3.188** 
(1.080) 
2.588* 
(1.148) 
2.735* 
(1.107) 
FDI      
0.146 
(0.080) 
0.154 
(0.085) 
0.159 
(0.092) 
Inflation       
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
Literacy Rate        
-0.036** 
(0.011) 
Trade to GDP       
-0.011 
(0.012) 
-0.006 
(0.012) 
Constant 3.391*** 
(0.451) 
1.440 
(1.034) 
0.633 
(1.021) 
0.273 
(1.090) 
1.205 
(1.208) 
0.989 
(1.185) 
1.072 
(1.250) 
3.525* 
(1.446) 
Observations 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 
R2 0.029 0.061 0.288 0.297 0.348 0.362 0.404 0.447 
F 3.635 4.176 14.089 11.519 15.232 11.386 13.497 12.302 
Level of Significance 
***1% 
**5%  
*10% 
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2.11 Appendix 3: Country Group Classification  
 
For this research paper developing countries exclude high income countries (high 
income countries as per the classification of the World Bank).  
 
2.11.1 Developing Economies  
 
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Algeria 
Angola 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Belize 
Benin 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cabo Verde 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
China 
Colombia 
Comoros 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Congo, Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Cuba 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 
El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Gabon 
  
 
144 
 
Gambia, The 
Georgia 
Ghana 
Greece 
Greenland 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 
Iraq 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Kiribati 
Korea, Dem. Rep. 
Kosovo 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Lao PDR 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Libya 
Macedonia, FYR 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Maldives 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Montenegro 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Namibia 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
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Palau 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Rwanda 
Samoa 
Senegal 
Serbia 
Sierra Leone 
Somalia 
South Africa 
South Sudan 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Syrian Arab Republic 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Timor-Leste 
Togo 
Tonga 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
Tuvalu 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
Uzbekistan 
Vanuatu 
Venezuela, RB 
Vietnam 
West Bank and Gaza 
Yemen, Rep. 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
 
2.11.2 Transition Economies 
 
Albania 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Bulgaria 
Cambodia 
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China 
Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Estonia 
Georgia 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Laos 
Republic of Macedonia 
Moldova 
Poland 
Romania 
Russia 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
Tajikistan 
Turkmenistan 
Ukraine 
Uzbekistan 
Vietnam 
 
2.11.3 Emerging Market Economies 
 
Argentina 
Bangladesh 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Chile  
China 
Colombia 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Pakistan 
Peru 
Philippines  
Poland 
Romania 
Russia 
South Africa  
Thailand 
Turkey 
Ukraine  
Venezuela  
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Chapter 3: Impact of Financial Integration on Poverty and 
Inequality: Is there a trade-off between poverty and 
inequality with increasing liberalization?  
 
Abstract  
 
This research paper investigates the impact of financial integration on poverty and 
inequality in 79 developing countries over the time period 1980-2013. The 
econometric techniques deployed in this research paper include the Panel Threshold 
Regression (PTR) method, the Logistic Smooth Transition Regression (LSTR) 
method and the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation method. In assessing the 
impact of capital account openness on poverty, a low threshold level is observed, no 
obvious deductions can be made below the threshold, however, above this threshold 
level, poverty decreases. When measuring the impact of capital account openness on 
various income bands (this includes the poorest 10% and 20% and the richest 20% 
and 10%), it is observed that the threshold level approximates to 18. Below this 
threshold, it is observed that income share increases for the richest as well as the 
poorest, but a marginal increase is observed for the poorest 10% and 20% and an 
increase in income share is observed for the richest 10% and 20% with increasing 
openness. However, once it is above this threshold, it is observed that increasing 
openness results in a decline in the income share of the poorest 10% and 20%; on the 
contrary, an increase in income share is observed for the richest 10% and 20%. When 
assessing the regression results measuring the impact of capital account openness on 
income inequality, it is observed that the threshold levels of KAOPEN vary between 
16 and 19. Increased openness results in increased inequality above and below the 
threshold level. However, inequality increases faster below the threshold as opposed 
to when it is above the threshold. In order to validate the findings in this research 
paper, a series of robustness checks are carried out.  
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3.1 Introduction 
 
In an era of ever increasing financial integration and interdependency amongst 
nations, government officials and policymakers face the ominous task of deciding on 
the appropriate policymaking decision to fulfill economic and political objectives. 
The neoliberal camp and the leftists are strongly opposed to the rewards of financial 
integration concerning the reduction of poverty and minimization of inequality. The 
neoliberal argument states that increased financial integration has reduced global 
poverty and reduced inequality. However, critics of financial integration argue that 
the wealthy and powerful nations propel the notion of financial integration in order to 
ensure the aura of dominance, both on the economic frontier, as well as on the 
political frontier, in the world. They argue that inequality is far worse than it ever 
was, and that poverty and the livelihood of those at the bottom, have not increased to 
the levels that were expected. Determination of the optimal level of openness is a 
policy dilemma faced by policymakers all over the developing world. The existing 
literature examines these theories and many others through empirical studies, 
however, they fail to examine and give sound policymaking recommendations. For 
instance, it is conceivable statistically, that poverty has increased over time, however, 
how can we ensure that poverty declines but the rise in inequality does not worsen the 
socio-economic disparity? Is there such a level of openness at which both these 
conditions can be satisfied?   
 
In order to investigate the aforementioned research questions, this research 
paper investigates the impact of financial integration on poverty, income distribution 
and income inequality in 79 developing countries over the time period 1980-2013. 
The econometric techniques deployed in this research paper include the Panel 
Threshold Regression (PTR) method, the Logistic Smooth Transition Regression 
(LSTR) method and the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation method. The 
predominant focus of this research paper is to determine the threshold level of the 
capital account openness index (Chinn-Ito Index, denoted as the KAOPEN) when 
used to measure the impact of openness on poverty, income quintiles and income 
inequality distinctively. The KAOPEN is the proxy variable used to account for 
financial integration. In order to measure poverty, the poverty headcount ratio and the 
poverty gap variables are used in order to account for absolute and relative poverty 
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respectively. In order to find a true measure for the impact of openness on the income 
quintiles, the KAOPEN is regressed on the income share of the lowest 10% and 20% 
and the highest 20% and 10%. Finally, in order to account for income inequality 
directly, the proxy variables used are the GINI coefficient, the IQSR (Income Quintile 
Share Ratio) and the IDIR (Inter-Decile Income Ratio). In order to validate the 
findings in this research paper, a series of robustness checks are carried out. 
 
The key research questions that this research paper seeks to address and 
examine are the following: 
 
1. What is the effect of openness on poverty in developing economies?  
a. What is the optimal level of capital account openness that results in the 
lowest poverty levels? 
b. How does it affect absolute poverty and relative poverty? Is there a 
difference? 
c. What is the threshold level of capital account openness at which 
poverty can be minimized and what are the policy implications? 
2. What is the effect of capital account liberalization on inequality? 
a. What is the threshold level? How does the impact of openness fare on 
inequality below and above the threshold?  
b. What are the policy implications? 
3. What is the effect of financial openness on various income groups and how 
does it affect the income distribution? 
a. Which income band is best benefitted due to financial openness and 
which income group is negatively affected? 
b. How does capital account liberalization affect the poorest 20% 
compared to the highest 20%? 
c. What is the level of financial openness that is equitable for people of 
all income levels and what are the policy implications? 
 
The contribution of this research paper is the deployment of the Panel 
Threshold Regression (PTR) and the Logistic Smooth Transition Regression (LSTR) 
method in measuring the impact of openness on poverty and inequality. There are no 
existing research papers that execute the threshold exercises measuring the impact of 
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financial integration on poverty and inequality. Furthermore, this research paper also 
uses the tests for nonlinearity developed by Gonzalez, Terasvirta, and van Dijk 
(2005). These tests, even in the FI-growth literature, are overlooked. These tests 
determine the appropriateness of the tests, whether or not the model is nonlinear at all, 
and whether or not there are more than a single threshold, in which case the 
deductions of the PTR and the LSTR model are deemed invalid.   
 
The research paper is structured as follows; the first section illustrates the 
theoretical linkages tying financial integration with poverty and inequality. The 
second, third, and fourth sections include the methodology, the empirical framework, 
and the variable description respectively. Section 5 illustrates the results and section 6 
is the conclusion. The appendix50 includes the explorative data analysis (this looks at 
historical trends, scatter graphs, and quadratic relationships between the key variables 
of interest), and the robustness checks.   
  
                                                 
50 Refer to sections 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11.  
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3.2 Theoretical Framework 
 
The neoclassical view, linking financial integration or external financial 
liberalization to poverty is that financial integration helps mobilize savings, induces 
investments and allocates capital to productive investments, which thereby increases 
efficiency of physical capital and hence productivity. As a result, this means that 
financial liberalization stimulates growth, which results in higher income levels and 
therefore reduces poverty. Laeven (2003) states that financial repression and the 
resulting credit rationing worsens income distribution. In other words, this implies 
that financial liberalization and freeing of credit markets will improve income 
distributions and therefore reduce poverty. However, it would be naïve to presume 
that financial liberalization reduces poverty merely through this growth channel. 
There are two distinctive channels via which the effect of financial integration can be 
felt for the impoverished and on poverty and they are the growth channel, crises 
channel and the financial services channel (Arestis and Caner, 2004).  
 
The important factor that needs to be investigated here is the relationship 
between growth and poverty; this is the growth channel. The empirical evidence tends 
to depict the message that when growth increases, and as countries get richer, 
incidence of income poverty falls. Dollar and Kray (2002) uses 80 countries to 
empirically assess this relationship and they find that income of the poor (bottom 20% 
of the population) rises almost equal to one-for-one with overall growth in GDP per 
capita. Kray (2004) finds that most of the variations in poverty are accounted for 
mostly by growth. However, Ravallion (2001) states that there is always the need to 
go and look beyond averages, because, benefits are often not realized by the poor as it 
is realized by the rich and the growing inequality today is testament to this fact.  
 
The crises channel focuses on the effect of financial liberalization on financial 
fragilities and how this affects the poor, resultantly, in the context of this paper, 
poverty and inequality. There are various channels through which crises51 can affect 
poverty. Crises typically leads to fall in income levels of workers in both the formal 
and informal sectors firstly due to job losses in the formal sector and a decline in the 
                                                 
51 This is referring to an unforecasted crisis preceding financial liberalization and/or due to extensive 
financial liberalization.    
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demand of services from workers in the informal sector (e.g. household cleaning 
services). Changes in relative prices due to crises can have effects on the distribution 
of income. Agenor (2002) refers to the concept of “labor hoarding” which suggests 
that in times of economic downturns, the poor are the first to lose their jobs as firms 
tend to not hire due to existence of high costs. Furthermore, the poor tend to have 
their wealth in liquid form and during inflationary periods suffer more than the rich 
(Easterly and Fischer, 2001).    
 
It may well be undeniable that financial liberalization has profound effects on 
the availability of credit, and often it is argued that this credit is also more available 
for the poor when liberalized, as opposed to when it is highly regulated. Therefore, an 
important and rather interesting research question is to see the whether or not 
financial integration improves availability of financial services and credit52 for the 
bottom fifth of the population, and thereby ensuring a reduction in poverty. This 
consequently leads us to the theoretical argument assessing the impact of financial 
integration on income inequality.  
 
When assessing the theoretical linkage between financial integration and 
income inequality53, the arguments, as per usual, is polarized, contributing differing 
arguments and theories to the literature. The neoliberal argument states that income 
inequality, over the past two decades, has levelled off and that extreme poverty has 
drastically fallen. This, they state, is a testament to the rising density of increased 
financial integration, allowing for efficient use of resources internationally and 
specializing (region specific) based on comparative advantage. On the other hand, the 
leftists’ assumption is that the wealthy and powerful economies have little or no 
interest in promoting equality but only ensuring the improved welfare of their own 
nations. They argue that poverty and especially inequality has in fact been on the rise 
worldwide. The leftists also theorize that there is a political agenda of financial 
                                                 
52 This is not the what this research paper seeks to address. However, it is important to mention, albeit 
briefly, one of the fundamental channels via which financial integration is said to alleviate poverty – 
through improved availability of financial services and greater access to credit.  
53 There are variations in the determinants of the composition of inequality. Resultantly, the theoretical 
and empirical evidence differs based on this composition. Especially for theoretical studies that are 
tested empirically, selection of inequality determinants are not constrained to a select number of 
variables, rather, there is an increasing number of various empirical studies with differing measures 
accounting for inequality, thereby also producing contrasting results.  
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integration, as a means to enforce international dominance, branding it as neo-
imperialism. Those that oppose financial integration argue that not only does 
integration accentuate inequality within countries, but it also causes income disparity 
between countries (Firebaugh, 2003).  
 
To get into specifics, for LDCs, the theoretical expectation is that inequality 
will fall upon increased financial integration. The argument states that in the period of 
increased financial integration, developing countries will increase their exports of 
unskilled labor-intensive products (in reference to the comparative advantage in 
particular sectors) due to increased international demand. This will result in increased 
production with unskilled labor and hence increase the labor demand for unskilled 
labor thereby increasing wages and reducing inequality. In Latin America, the 
empirics do not support the theory. When the Latin American economies opened their 
economies in the 1980s, it was observed that there was an increase in the wage gap 
and in inequality rather than the expected decrease (Ahsan, 2002). On the contrary, 
the East Asian Tiger economies fare better in accordance with the theory. In the 1970s 
when these economies were more open, wage gaps for instance, declined. The 
theoretical explanation for this is that there was more unskilled labor in the Asian 
economies as opposed to the Latin American economies, furthermore, the wages in 
Latin America in that period was already high (Baten and Fraunholz, 2004).    
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3.3 Literature Review 
 
3.3.1 Financial Integration and Poverty  
 
The theoretical section discussed the fundamental elements of particular 
significance when looking at the relationship between financial integration and 
poverty. This section will look at the empirical studies that have looked into the 
nature of this relationship. The arguments are again polarized, there is a suggestion 
that the rewards of financial integration are only for the rich and that the trickle-down 
theory is only a reality in theory alone. However, there are papers that have found that 
financial integration does in fact promote growth which in turn alleviates poverty in 
the medium to long-run. Jeanneney and Kpodar (2008) finds that the standard effect 
of financial liberalization on poverty is directly effective in reducing poverty, as is the 
indirect effect through growth, but what is interesting is that the former is found to be 
empirically stronger than the latter. In terms of empirical studies, it must be noted that 
there are very few research papers that focus on the direct linkage between financial 
integration (using the predominantly used financial integration proxy variables rather 
than those used for globalization) and financial liberalization on poverty.   
 
Arestis and Caner (2010) look at the direct relationship between capital 
account liberalization and poverty54 by deploying the GMM technique using only 
developing economies for their sample over the period 1985-2005. They use five year 
non-overlapping averages. In their research, they attempt to find answers to two 
different questions the first investigating whether the countries with higher levels of 
capital account openness have lower poverty rates and the second examining whether 
the effect of capital account openness on poverty depends on the level of institutional 
                                                 
54 Arestis and Caner (2010) use headcount index, calculated based on a poverty line that is twice the 
extreme poverty line as the poverty measure e.g. poverty line is set at $2.15 per day. For the variable of 
capital account openness, they use Chinn and Ito’s (2002) KAOPEN index. This index is the first 
principle component of four binary variables in IMF’s AREAER. This is a de jure measure of financial 
openness and is different from de facto priced-based measure of financial integration. The control 
variables are the following: (1) per capita growth rate, (2) fertility rate, (3) inflation rate, (4) Gini 
coefficient, (5) general government final consumption expenditure as a share of GDP, and (6) primary 
rate of schooling. Lagged poverty is used as a repressor. To overcome the bias problem, the country-
specific fixed effect is eliminated by taking the first difference of the all the variables in the RHS and 
the LHS. For robustness checks, they use income share of the poorest 20% of the population as a proxy 
for poverty. The number of observations are less than or equal to 170. In order to treat for endogeneity, 
they use instruments two sets of instruments, the first set includes time dummies, and the second set 
includes GMM-style instruments, where each lag of the instrumented variable acts as an instrument.  
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quality in the country. In the regression, the de jure measure of financial integration 
was interacted with the KAOPEN index to measure the ‘existence of a threshold 
effect’. They conclude from their regression results that increase in capital account 
openness does not result in a significant decrease in the poverty rate or an increase in 
the income share of the poor. In fact, they find that liberalization of the capital 
account actually increases poverty according to their regression estimates. They do 
find that good institutions are associated with a decline in poverty however.    
 
A rather broader approach than Arestis and Caner (2010) would be to look at 
financial globalization or globalization and the effect it has on poverty. This is largely 
the case for the existing research papers in the associated field of research. Santarelli 
and Figini (2002)55 look at the effects of globalization on various measures of poverty 
(absolute and relative poverty) in developing countries over the period 1970-98. The 
only interesting inference drawn from this paper is that financial openness is 
associated with higher levels of relative poverty.  
 
3.3.2 Financial Integration and Inequality  
 
The literature, on the basis of theoretical expectations, is aligned with the 
theoretical notions, but also opposed to it based on empirical studies. In the theoretical 
section of this paper, the neoliberal and the ‘anti-neoliberal’ arguments have been 
outlined. This section will look at existing empirical studies that examine the 
theoretical expectations. Wade (2004) does not support the argument proposed by the 
neoliberal camp in which inequality is measured with population weighted countries’ 
per capita PPP-adjusted incomes, plus a measure of average of inequality. Baten and 
Fraunholz (2004) look at the impact of openness on inequality in developing countries 
and they use the coefficient of height variation as a measure of inequality, covering 
not only wage recipients but also those unemployed and out of the labor market 
altogether. They find that within-country inequality was higher in periods of greater 
financial openness. Furthermore, they also deduce that the economies that were closed 
had lower income inequality. However, they quite interestingly find that under full 
openness, inequality tends to fall. Lindert and Williamson (2001) do not oppose the 
                                                 
55 They use exports plus imports as a share of GDP as a proxy for openness of an economy. The other 
measure of globalization is an index of privatization over GDP. The final measure of globalization was 
FDI as a share of GDP. The observations are as low as 32, but it is not higher than 150.   
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notion that there is an evident correlation between increasing openness and increasing 
inequality. Even though countries that liberalize, this often immediately results in an 
increase in inequality, the causal inferences, they presume, are not definitive, 
especially for countries where liberalization has only been partial. Therefore, this 
makes for an unfair attack on the benefits of liberalization when it has not even been 
fully liberalized as is the case with China, India, Russia and Indonesia in their 
research.  
 
In terms of the growth channel56, contrary to popular belief, a panel of 
researchers have found a strong negative correlation when measuring the impact of 
inequality on growth (Alesina and Perott, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; 
Deininger and Squire, 1998). However, Barro (2000) for instance, deduces that 
increasing inequality only hinders growth in the poorest countries, whereas medium 
income countries in fact grow faster with increased inequality. Robinson (2001) 
examines the impact of increased integration on inequality in Latin America, and 
infers that the blame should be directed to the hostile elites.  When looking at 
distinctive income quintiles (income distribution), as is the focus of this research 
paper in one of the sections of inequality, according to the research carried out (using 
panel data for both developing and developed countries) by Lundberg and Squire 
(2003)57, they find that with increased openness, income share of the lowest two 
quintiles decreases. On the contrary, with increased openness, income share of the 
upper quintiles increase.   
                                                 
56 The growth channel is observed here again in order to draw the linkage between growth, inequality 
and poverty altogether based on the impact of financial integration. This was unavoidable and needed 
to be addressed in order to comprehend the linkages and have a better statistical intuition from the 
findings of this research paper.   
57 The inferences drawn from this research paper on the impact of inequality on the income share of the 
lowest quintiles and the highest quintiles are consistent with the findings in this research paper. 
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3.4 Methodology 
 
This research paper incorporates a dataset that includes 79 developing 
countries58 over the time-period 1980-2013. The econometric models deployed in this 
research paper are the (1) Panel Threshold Regression model (PTR) and the (2) 
Logistic Smooth Transition Regression (LSTR) method. The technical descriptions of 
these two statistical models are explained in the empirical framework section of this 
paper. In conducting the regression analysis, the research paper averages data over 
five-year59 periods to smooth business cycle fluctuations.  
 
The key independent variable of interest is the Chinn-Ito Index60. This is 
denoted as KAOPEN61 and is selected as the proxy variable of financial integration. 
For this research paper, the impact of financial integration on (a) poverty, (b) income 
distribution and (c) inequality is assessed; poverty, income distribution and income 
inequality each have various proxy variables to account effectively for the impact of 
financial integration. The key dependent variables of interest used as proxies for 
poverty are the following: (1) Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.90 a Day, (2) Poverty 
Headcount Ratio at $3.10 a Day, (3) Poverty Gap at $1.90 a Day, and (4) Poverty Gap 
at $3.10 a Day. The key dependent variables of interest used as proxies for income 
distribution are the following: (1) Income Share of Lowest 10%, (2) Income Share of 
Lowest 20%, (3) Income Share of Highest 20%, and (4) Income Share of Highest 
10%. The key dependent variables of interest used as proxies for income inequality 
are the following: (1) GINI Index, (2) Inter-Decile Income Ratio, and (3) Income 
Quintile Share Ratio62.  
 
Therefore, in total, there are 11 dependent variables of interest used as proxies 
for the impact on poverty, income distribution, and income inequality. The rationale 
for including more than one proxy variable is to provide unbiased inferences 
                                                 
58 Refer to appendix 3 in section 3.11 for the total country list in the dataset.  
59 Five-year averages are deployed for this panel dataset to account for business cycle fluctuations. The 
panel dataset spans from 1980-2013. There are 6 periods of non-overlapping five-year averages. 
60 Chinn and Ito (2006) developed the Chinn-Ito index which measures the de jure measure of capital 
account openness i.e. financial openness. This is the only independent variable of interest for this 
research paper and is used as a proxy for financial integration, depicting a measure of the extent of 
financial market openness.  
61 The description and descriptive statistics of KAOPEN is illustrated in table 3.1.  
62 Refer to the descriptions of the Inter-Decile Income Ratio (IDIR) and Income Quartile Share Ratio 
(IQSR) in table 3.1 for greater clarity.   
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concerning the impact of financial integration on poverty, income distribution and 
income inequality. The control variables used in the regressions to measure the impact 
of financial integration on poverty, income distribution and income inequality are not 
drastically indifferent; the selection of the control variables are coherent with the 
nature of past empirical practices.  
 
The regression results assessing the impact of financial integration on poverty, 
income distribution, and income inequality are presented in tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 
respectively. For each of the proxies for poverty, income distribution bands, and 
income inequality, the OLS, PTR, and the LSTR63 estimation methods are deployed 
and the results are recorded accordingly. Appendix 1 (refer to section 3.9) presents the 
explorative data analysis that looks at historical trends, scatter graphs, and quadratic 
relationships for the key variables of interest. Appendix 2 (refer to section 3.10) 
presents four robustness checks to validate the final results recorded in the body of the 
paper. These robustness checks are 3-year non-overlapping averages, lagged IFI 
proxy variable, first differences, and GMM estimations.  
 
  
                                                 
63 The technical mechanism of the PTR and the LSTR is explained in the “Empirical Framework” 
section.  
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3.5 Empirical Framework 
 
The empirical framework section presents the technical and theoretical 
mechanisms of the Panel Threshold Regression (PTR) and the Logistic Smooth 
Transition Regression (LSTR) methodology.  
 
3.5.1 Panel Threshold Regression (PTR) 
 
This section illustrates the underlying theoretical mechanisms of the Panel 
Threshold Regression (PTR)64 methodology. The technical model was introduced by 
Hansen (1999). The model’s main purpose is to provide an endogenous estimation of 
the threshold parameter in two distinctive regimes. The simple OLS regression for 
instance, does not account for the regression coefficient estimations of different 
regimes. The PTR model’s purpose for this case specific research paper would be to 
find the impact financial integration has on poverty or inequality, after a specified 
threshold. For instance, there may be the case that increased financial openness 
reduces poverty, until, it is in fact growth retarding. The PTR model will specify the 
exact threshold, thereby implying the appropriate level of openness for policymakers 
to ensure reduction of poverty and control of inequality. The PTR model assumes that 
there is an instantaneous change from one distinctive ‘regime’ to another; this is in 
stark contrast to the LSTR model (this will be discussed further in the subsequent 
subsection). The caveat or the assumption of the PTR model is that it assumes that 
financial integration has a nonlinear impact on poverty and inequality.  
 
The empirical formulation of the PTR model65 that will be used to determine 
the regression findings will be as follows:  
 
𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙1
′𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝐼(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝑇) + 𝜙2
′𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝐼(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 > 𝑇) + 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜃 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
 
                                                 
64 Hansen (1999) introduced this technical model for the calculation of the threshold. There have been 
more recent developments that have been incorporated for the statistical component of the researching 
study.  
65 The dependent variable will vary as mentioned in the previous sections. For instance, the same 
equation will be applied for, with different dependent variables, for income distribution and income 
inequality (this is illustrated in the results section). However, for the purposes of simplicity, these 
examples were not presented.  
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The subscript “i” refers to the individual countries and the subscript “t” refers 
to time period indexes. The dependent variable that accounts for poverty could also be 
replaced by income distribution and income inequality. Furthermore, it is important to 
note that poverty, income distribution, and income inequality, all have distinctive 
proxy variables for each in order to validate the results better. The constant term is 
denoted by ait. The specific threshold level is denoted by T. The threshold variable is 
defined by 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡, but note that this is within the indicator function. The indicator 
function is defined by the following: 𝐼(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝑇) and 𝐼(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 > 𝑇); this 
indicator function equals 0 when 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 is less than or equal to the threshold 
parameter T and 1 otherwise. The error term, 𝑒𝑖𝑡, is assumed to be independent and 
identically distributed with a mean of 0 and variance of 𝜎2. The observations in the 
regression are divided into two separate regimes. This is contingent on whether or not 
the threshold variable is greater than or less than the threshold level, denoted by T.   
 
When the regime is below the threshold level, this is represented by the 
coefficient 𝜙1
′ ; the regime after the threshold level is represented by the coefficient 
𝜙2
′ . The financial integration variable is represented by 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡; The 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′  variable 
represents the set of control variables, note that these control variables varies when 
measuring the impact of FI on poverty, income distribution and income inequality.  
 
3.5.2 Logistic Smooth Transition Regression (LSTR) 
 
This research paper deploys the logistic smooth transition regression (LSTR)66 
model. The logistic smooth transition regression (LSTR) model is estimated 
accordingly: 
 
{
 
 
 
 
𝑃𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽
𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 − 𝑐
∗) + 𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 − 𝑐
∗) + Θ𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤 = 1 −𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ =
1
1 + exp [−γ∗
(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 − 𝑐∗)
𝜎 ]
 
 
                                                 
66 The paper by Gonzalez, Terasvirta, and van Dijk (2005) is the benchmark paper for the empirical 
methodology used in this research paper. The tests of nonlinearity are also applied from this particular 
research paper.  
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The poverty variable (could be replaced by income inequality) is denoted by 
𝑃𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡; 𝛼𝑖𝑡 is the constant term or the intercept of the regression model; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector 
of control variables. The standard deviation of 𝑃𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 is denoted by 𝜎; 𝑐
∗ is the 
threshold parameter; t is the time series index; i refers to the countries; 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error 
term.  
 
There are two regressors via which the key explanatory variable67 of interest, 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡, enters the LSTR model, and they are the following: (1) 𝑊
𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 − 𝑐
∗) 
and (2) 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 − 𝑐
∗); in this case 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑤 and 𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ are coefficients of lower 
and higher regimes respectively. Therefore, this implies that when 𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑡 is above the 
threshold parameter, 𝑐∗, the impact of 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 on poverty is closer to 𝛽
ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ. 
Similarly, when 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 is below the threshold parameter, 𝑐
∗, the impact of 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 
on poverty is closer to 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑤. The weights are represented by 𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤and 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ, where 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤 = 1 −𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ. For instance, when 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 is equal to, 𝑐
∗, then 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ = 𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤. 
The speed of transition from the low regime to the high regime is represented by γ∗. 
Therefore, the higher the value of γ∗, the faster the speed of transition, and the lower 
the value of γ∗, the lower the speed of transition. It is important to comprehend 
effectively that when γ∗ is high68, the PTR is the more appropriate statistical 
technique. Whereas, when the γ∗ is low, the LSTR is the more applicable 
methodology due to the fact that the speed of transition is low from one regime to the 
other, this means that there is a rather ‘smooth’ transition, hence, the usage of the 
LSTR technique. The regression results provide the estimations of the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) method, the PTR model, and the LSTR model to validate these 
acquired results.   
 
The LSTR model assumes that there are precisely two regimes i.e. low and 
high regimes; if for instance, there are more than two regimes then the model is said 
to be misspecified and the relationship is assumed linear (linear model), resultantly 
the parameters defined in this model are not identified. The specification test used to 
                                                 
67 Note that the only explanatory variable used in this research paper is the KAOPEN index; this is the 
key proxy variable used for financial integration.  
68 The range for the γ∗ (gamma value) is set between 1 and 15, where 1 indicates slow transition from 
one regime to another and therefore would suggest that the LSTR is the appropriate methodology for 
the regression model. Conversely, if the value of γ∗ was to be 15, then this indicates fast transition 
from low to high regime and therefore this would indicate that the PTR methodology is more 
applicable for the purposes of this regression analysis.  
  
 
162 
 
determine the existence of nonlinearities and the number of regimes is presented by 
Gonzalez, Terasvirta, and van Dijk (2005). This specification test therefore, estimates 
two p-values, (a) for nonlinearities (otherwise it is a straightforward linear model) and 
(b) for remaining nonlinearities – if there were to be remaining nonlinearities then this 
would imply that there are more than two regimes for instance.  
 
3.6 Variable Description 
 
Table 3.1 presents the descriptions of the dependent variable, the key 
independent variables of interest and the control variables. For these variables, the 
name of the variable is appropriately defined, a brief description of the variable is 
provided, and the source from which the data for this indicator was collected from is 
also enlisted. Furthermore, it provides descriptive statistics of each of these 
aforementioned variables. The descriptive statistics includes the mean value, the 
maximum value, the minimum value, the standard deviation, and the total number of 
observations69 for all the indicators.  
 
The Chinn-Ito index (denoted as KAOPEN) or the de jure measure of capital 
account openness measures the degree of financial openness. The Chinn-Ito index 
ranges from +2.66 to -2.66, where +2.66 indicate a financial system that is fully 
liberalized and -2.66 indicates a fully regulated financial system. The index has a 
mean of zero. However, to simplify interpretation of the results this variable has been 
transformed in the following manner: KAOPEN = (Chinn-Ito Index+2.66)*10. This 
shows that the original version of the Chinn-Ito index is taken and every value is 
added by 2.66 (this is to take away all the negative values and it is multiplied with 10 
to have an easier statistical reading. The transformed index (KAOPEN) has a 
minimum value of 7.71, a maximum value of 50.49, mean of 26.76, and a standard 
deviation of 13.21 for the observations in this particular dataset. However, it is 
important to note that the financial market is fully regulated when KAOPEN equals 0 
and it is fully liberalized when KAOPEN equals 53.2. KAOPEN has a mean value 
that equals to 22.84. The original value or the original level of impact of a unit 
                                                 
69 Note that the descriptive statistics that have been recorded, they are averaged over 5-years as this is 
the dataset used to acquire the final regression results. 
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increase in the Chinn-Ito index can be found by dividing by 10 and then subtracting 
2.66.  
 
The proxy variables to account for poverty are the poverty head count ratios at 
$1.90 and $3.10 and the poverty gap levels at $1.90 and $3.10. The proxy variables to 
account for income distribution are share of income of the lowest 20% and 10% and 
the highest 20% and 10%. The proxy variables to account for income inequality are 
the GINI index, the IDIR, and the IQSR. IDIR (Inter-Decile Income Ratio) and IQSR 
(Income Quintile Share Ratio) are developed by the author. The IDIR is the share of 
income received by the top 10% divided by the share of the income received by the 
bottom 10%. The IQSR is a measure of the inequality of income distribution, 
measured by dividing the share of income received by the top 20% divided by the 
bottom 80%.   
 
The standard control variables when the key independent variables are poverty 
and income distribution (in reference to the proxy variables selected for poverty and 
income distribution) for this research paper are the following: GDP per Capita 
Growth (%), GINI index, fertility rate, government expenditure (% of GDP), Inflation 
(%), secondary school enrollment (% gross), and gross savings (% of GDP). The 
control variables70 used when assessing the impact of financial integration on income 
inequality (there are 3 proxy variables used to measure income inequality) are the 
following: GDP per capita growth (%), GINI index, fertility rate, government 
expenditure (% of GDP), Inflation (%), secondary school enrollment (% gross), and 
population growth (%).  
 
 
  
                                                 
70 The control variables used for assessing the relationship between the financial integration and 
poverty (the control variables are identical for when measuring the impact of financial integration on 
income distribution) and income inequality have differing control variables. For the effect on the 
former, the control variables are selected on the basis of the paper developed by Arestis and Caner 
(2010). The only difference being that the lagged value of poverty was not used as the estimation 
method deployed here is not the system GMM.  
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Table 3.1: Variable Description and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable/Parameter Description of Variable  Data Source 
Mean Minimum Maximum Standard 
Deviation 
Observations Variable Type 
Capital Account Openness: 
Chinn-Ito Index  
 
The index has a mean of 0 and ranges from -2.66 to +2.66, 
where -2.66 represents full capital control and +2.66 represents 
complete liberalization. However, for the purposes of technical 
simplicity, it has been parameterized by addition of 2.66 and 
multiplying with 10 e.g. KAOPEN=(chinnito+2.66)*10 
International 
Financial 
Statistics, IMF 
22.84317 7.71105 50.49669 13.20982 1052 
IFI Proxy Variable: 
Key Independent 
Variable of Interest 
Poverty Headcount Ratio at 
$1.90  a Day 
Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) is calculated 
as a % of the total population.  
World Bank Data 23.63655 0 99.9 25.0198 491 Independent Variable 
Poverty Headcount Ratio at 
$3.10  a Day 
Poverty headcount ratio at $3.10 a day (2011 PPP) is calculated 
as a % of the total population. 
World Bank Data 38.82716 0 99.9 31.06298 492 Independent Variable 
Poverty Gap at $1.90 a Day 
Poverty gap at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) is the mean shortfall in 
income from the poverty line $1.90 a day, expressed as a 
percentage of the poverty line.  
World Bank Data 9.55686 0 99.9 12.54377 491 Independent Variable 
Poverty Gap at $3.10 a Day 
Poverty gap at $3.10 a day (2011 PPP) is the mean shortfall in 
income from the poverty line $3.10 a day, expressed as a 
percentage of the poverty line. 
World Bank Data 18.09377 0 99.9 18.21815 492 Independent Variable 
Income Share of Lowest 10% 
Percentage share of income or consumption that is the share that 
accrues to the lowest 10% of population, indicated by quintiles.  
World Bank Data 2.413936 0.02 5.282 1.055769 493 Independent Variable 
Income Share of Lowest 20% 
Percentage share of income or consumption that is the share that 
accrues to the lowest 20% of population, indicated by quintiles. 
World Bank Data 6.097457 0.26 11.836 2.208546 493 Independent Variable 
Income Share of Highest 20% 
Percentage share of income or consumption that is the share that 
accrues to the highest 20% of population, indicated by quintiles. 
World Bank Data 47.8768 32.65 72.34 7.965467 493 Independent Variable 
Income Share of Highest 10% 
Percentage share of income or consumption that is the share that 
accrues to the highest 10% of population, indicated by quintiles. 
World Bank Data 32.4114 18.41 61.49 7.548577 493 Independent Variable 
GINI Index 
GINI index number ranges from 0 to 100 (based on resident’s 
net income) where 0 represents perfect equality, 100 
representing perfect inequality.  
World Bank Data 41.29198 21.098 99.91 10.02236 494 
Independent Variable 
and Control Variable 
Inter-Decile Income Ratio 
The IDIR is the share of income received by the top 10% divided 
by the share of the income received by the bottom 10%. 
Author 29.65292 4.196903 2143 129.1843 493 Independent Variable 
Income Quintile Share Ratio 
The IQSR is measured by dividing the share of income received 
by the top 20% divided by the bottom 80%.   
Author 10.72933 3.075771 278.2308 14.34473 493 Independent Variable 
GDP Per Capita Growth (%) Real GDP per capita growth is based on constant 2005 US$.  World Bank Data  1.985423 -21.62749 51.62336 4.249887 1226 Control Variable 
Fertility Rate 
Fertility rate is the average number of children that would be 
born to a woman in her lifetime if she were to survive from birth 
to the end of her reproductive life.   
World Bank Data 4.613816 1.154 9.185 1.936875 1570 Control Variable 
Government Expenditure (% 
of GDP) 
The overall public spending i.e. government consumption, 
government investment, and transfer payments as % of GDP.  
World Bank Data 28.93412 0 106.1834 13.1231 674 Control Variable 
Inflation, consumer prices 
(Annual %) 
 
Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the 
annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of 
acquiring a basket of goods and services. 
International 
Financial 
Statistics, IMF 
37.03518 -4.253442 6517.11 261.7474 1031 Control Variable 
Population growth (Annual %) 
 
Population growth (annual %) is the exponential rate of growth 
of midyear population. 
United National 
Statistics Data 
1.913292 -4.104643 9.415055 1.274532 1617 Control Variable 
School Enrollment, Secondary 
(% Gross) 
Secondary over primary school enrolment is a significantly 
better reflection of educational attainment.   
World Bank Data 50.79081 1.374602 164.5681 31.59239 1078 Control Variable 
Gross Savings (% of GDP) 
Gross savings is gross disposable income minus final income 
expenditure expressed as a share of the GDP.  
World Bank Data 13.07183 -120.6522 83.13451 17.80311 1171 Control Variable 
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3.7 Results 
 
In assessing the impact of financial integration on poverty, income 
distribution, and income inequality71 (presented in tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 
respectively), this section analyses the regression results estimated using the OLS 
method, PTR (Panel Threshold Regression) method, and the LSTR (Logistic Smooth 
Transition Regression) method. For the PTR model, 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 < 𝑇 
indicates the coefficient below the threshold and 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 > 𝑇 
indicates the coefficient above the threshold.  For the LSTR model, 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 − 𝑐∗) indicates the coefficient above the threshold 
and 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 − 𝑐∗) indicates the coefficient above the threshold. PTR (T) or 
LSTR (c*) indicate the threshold level of the PTR model and the LSTR model. The 
LSTR parameter, gamma, indicates the speed of transition from the ‘low’ regime to 
the ‘high’ regime (speed of transition from one regime to the other). This is followed 
by the tests of Gonzalez, Terasvirta, and van Djik (2005) that tests whether or not the 
regression model is linear or nonlinear72 which is denoted by the following notations 
in the table ‘LM Test (GTD 2005) H0: Linear Model’ and ‘p-value nonlinearity’. The 
second test of Gonzalez, Terasvirta, and van Djik (2005) tests for any remaining 
nonlinearities73 (denoted by ‘LM Test for remaining nonlinearities’ and ‘p-value for 
remaining nonlinearity’ on each of the tables). The results acquired in tables 3.2, 3.3, 
and 3.4 are validated by robustness checks executed in appendix 274 in section 3.10.  
 
3.7.1 Financial Integration on Poverty  
 
Table 3.2 illustrates the relationship between capital account openness75 and 
poverty, where poverty headcount ratio and poverty gap (at $1.90 and $3.10), are used 
                                                 
71 There are 8 proxy variables used to measure poverty and income distribution (each with 4). There are 
3 proxy variables used to account for income inequality. Note that for each proxy variable, the OLS, 
PTR, and LSTR estimation methods are deployed.   
72 The null hypothesis indicates that the model is linear and therefore this would mean the LSTR model 
is invalid for analytical purposes. The alternative hypothesis states that the model is nonlinear and 
therefore the LSTR model may be more appropriate. 
73 The null hypothesis for this test states is that there is a single threshold with two regimes. The 
alternative hypothesis for this test states that there are more than two regimes or there are multiple 
thresholds.  
74 The robustness checks include (1) 3-year non-overlapping averages, (2) lagged KAOPEN proxy 
variable, (3) first differences, and (4) GMM estimations. This is presented in section 3.10.  
75 Note that this is the key independent variable of interest, the (exogenous) proxy variable used for 
financial integration.  
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as proxy variables for poverty. Regression equations 1, 2, and 3 in table 3.2 present 
the estimated regression results for the OLS, PTR and the LSTR model respectively, 
quantifying the impact of capital account openness on poverty headcount ratio at 
$1.90. The estimated coefficient using the OLS method shows that increase in 
financial openness, measured by KAOPEN, reduces poverty. This is statistically 
significant at the 5% significance level. For the PTR and the LSTR model, the 
threshold level of KAOPEN stands at 16 and 1776 respectively. The estimated 
coefficient for KAOPEN for the PTR model below the threshold is statistically 
insignificant, but above the threshold, it can be seen that increased financial openness 
reduces poverty; the coefficient above the threshold is statistically significant at the 
10% significance level. For the LSTR model77, it can be seen that the coefficient for 
KAOPEN is statistically insignificant below the threshold but negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% significance level above the threshold. The test for 
nonlinearity illustrates that the model is nonlinear at the 5% significance level. 
Furthermore, the test for remaining nonlinearities confirms that there are no more than 
two regimes i.e. no more than one threshold. The gamma parameter is 15, therefore, 
the PTR method, indicating instantaneous change from one regime to another, is more 
appropriate to use for interpretation. Regression equations 4, 5, and 6 are carried out 
to measure the impact of KAOPEN on the headcount ratio at $3.10. The key results 
are almost identical, except, the coefficients for KAOPEN above the threshold, for 
both the PTR and LSTR estimation methods, are statistically significant at the 1% 
significance level. The other significant difference is that in this case the LSTR model 
may be preferable, because the gamma parameter equals 7. The OLS estimated 
coefficient is not considered for analysis as the model is nonlinear (refer to the test of 
nonlinearity).  
 
When the proxy variable for poverty is the poverty gap at $1.90, the tests of 
nonlinearity indicate that the model is nonlinear, therefore rules out the need for 
analysis of the OLS estimation, although there is a negative and statistically 
significant effect on the poverty gap with increasing capital account openness. 
                                                 
76 Note that the KAOPEN variable has been transformed for the purposes of simplicity in reading the 
statistical coefficients and making easier sense of the threshold measures. For instance, the real reading 
of the threshold level of 17 for the LSTR model in regression equation 3 of table 3.2 would be -0.96. 
This indicates a financial market that is tightly regulated.  
77 This is referring to regression equation 3 on table 3.2.  
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Furthermore, the low gamma parameter indicates the LSTR model is more 
appropriate for analysis than the PTR model. However, the coefficients for KAOPEN 
are statistically insignificant both above and below the threshold. However, the results 
for poverty gap at $3.10 have greater clarity. The LSTR model is the model that is 
considered for analytical purposes, the OLS estimated coefficient is discarded because 
the test of the model shows that it is nonlinear, furthermore, the gamma parameter is 
low indicating the LSTR being a better fit than the PTR method. The threshold level 
(refer to regression equation 12) is 15, indicating a highly regulated market. The 
KAOPEN coefficient is statistically insignificant above the threshold but negative 
statistically significant at the 5% significance level above the threshold. This indicates 
that, after this threshold, increasing financial openness will result in reduced poverty.  
 
The other variables, for instance, per capita growth and poverty, do not have 
statistically significant results across all proxies for poverty. However, in regression 
equations 4, 5, and 6, it can be seen that increase in the GINI coefficient leads to 
decreased poverty; all of these coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% 
significance level. This is indicative of the fact that increased inequality results in 
reduced poverty, although, this is not consistent across all other proxies for poverty. 
The fertility rate has an expected effect on poverty, increased fertility rates always 
increases poverty. Similarly, following the conventional hypothesis, increased literacy 
rate expectedly reduces poverty.   
 
3.7.2 Financial Integration and Income Distribution  
 
Table 3.3 presents the regression results measuring the impact of capital 
account openness on different income groups. KAOPEN has a negative and 
statistically effect on the lowest 10%. The test of nonlinearity shows that that the 
model is nonlinear. Furthermore, the high gamma parameter indicates that the 
transition from one regime to another is almost instantaneous. Therefore, the PTR 
column is taken into consideration for analysis. The KAOPEN coefficient is 
statistically insignificant below the threshold, however, it is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% significance level above the threshold. This indicates for the 
lowest income band, increasing financial openness results in lower income share for 
the poorest. Furthermore, because the threshold level deduced from the threshold 
regression results is at 14, this indicates that as soon as the financial markets loosen 
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their regulations from being heavily regulated to being moderately regulated, the 
existing income share of the poorest declines, worsening inequality.  For the effect on 
the income share of the lowest 20%, it can be seen that due to the gamma parameter 
being high and because the model tests to be nonlinear, the PTR column (regression 
equation 5) is taken into consideration for analysis. The threshold level here is 14. 
The result is almost identical to the effect greater financial openness has on the 
bottom 10%. In this case, increasing openness reduces the income share of the bottom 
20% (statistically significant at 1%) above the threshold, but the coefficient is 
statistically insignificant below the it.  
 
Contrasting inferences are drawn when measuring the effect of increased 
openness on the income share of the highest 20%. In this case, the LSTR column is 
considered for analytical purposes because primarily the gamma parameter is low and 
secondly because the model is nonlinear at the 10% significance level78. The 
threshold level is 22. The KAOPEN coefficient is statistically insignificant below the 
threshold, however, it is positive and statistically significant above this threshold. 
This shows that when the financial markets are liberalized, even at the early stages of 
liberalization, there is an obvious trend for the income share of top 20% to increase 
and for the bottom 20% and 10% to decrease. The model is linear when measuring the 
effect of openness on the top 10%. The OLS estimation in this case shows that 
increased openness increases the share of the income of the top 10%, this is 
statistically significant at the 5% significance level. Therefore, it can quite clearly be 
observed that increased openness does in fact decrease the income share of the poor 
and increase the income share of the rich, even if openness decreases poverty. The 
only other deduction that can be drawn from the coefficients of other variables is that 
increasing fertility rate increases the income share of the highest 20% and 10%, and 
these coefficients are statistically significant at the 10% significance level.  
 
The one notable observatory deduction that can be drawn from appendix 2 and 
both robustness checks 1 and 279 is that below the threshold, the estimated 
coefficients for KAOPEN have shown to be statistically insignificant. However, for 
                                                 
78 Refer to the p-value of “p-value nonlinearity,” which in this case is 0.0833 and therefore the null 
hypothesis can be rejected (null hypothesis being that the model is linear) at the 10% significance level.  
79 Robustness checks 1 and 2 are the tests for 3-year non-overlapping averages and the repeated test 
using lagged KAOPEN variable respectively. Refer to section 3.10.   
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both these robustness checks it can be seen that the estimated KAOPEN coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant below the threshold. Therefore, this indicates that 
below a certain level of financial openness, for all income bands, the richest and the 
poorest are both benefitted as their income shares increase (although the 40% or the 
middle class is not analyzed in this report). However, after passing this specific 
threshold level it becomes quite apparent that the income share of the poor decreases 
whereas the income share of the rich increases.   
    
3.7.3 Financial Integration and Income Inequality   
 
Table 3.4 looks presents the impact of capital account openness on income 
inequality. The proxy variables used to account for income inequality are the GINI 
index (regression equations 1-3), inter-decile income ratio (regression equations 4-6), 
and income quintile share ratio (regression equations 7-9). When measuring the effect 
on the GINI index, the OLS estimation shows that increase in KAOPEN results in rise 
in inequality. This is also statistically significant at the 1% significance level. The 
PTR methodology shows that the threshold level is 16. Below this threshold the 
KAOPEN coefficient is 0.675 and this is statistically significant at the 5% 
significance level. Above the threshold, the coefficient is still positive and statistically 
significant, however, the magnitude of the coefficient decreases to 0.0859, thereby 
indicating that after the initial burst of liberalization of the financial markets, while 
income inequality does increase, it will do so less than when it is only marginally 
liberalized. The LSTR method is not considered for analysis because the gamma 
parameter is high. Furthermore, the OLS is not considered as the model tests to be 
nonlinear and there are no remaining nonlinearities, thereby indicating the 
appropriateness of the PTR method.  
 
When looking at the effect on inter-decile income ratio, it can be seen that the 
PTR method is more appropriate for analysis due to the high gamma parameter and 
the model testing to be nonlinear and being without nonlinearities. The threshold level 
is 19. However, no added deductions are drawn as we only get a reading of the 
coefficient above the threshold which is positive and of a similar magnitude to the 
effect on the GINI coefficient, but this is statistically significant at the 1% 
significance level. For the effect on the income quintile share ratio, the results are 
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almost identical to the effect it had on the GINI index. The PTR method and the 
subsequent results are considered for analysis, because the gamma parameter is high, 
the model is nonlinear and there are no remaining nonlinearities. The threshold level 
in this case is also 16 (identical to the PTR column of the GINI index), below the 
threshold, inequality increases at a higher rate than when it is above the threshold, but 
income inequality does increase with rising openness nonetheless. These results are 
consistent across all three proxy variables.  
 
The other interesting deductions to draw from this analysis is the fact that it 
can be seen that per capita growth, quite interestingly and contrary to popular belief, 
tends to reduce income inequality. There is sufficient evidence to make this deduction 
as it is consistent for all the coefficients, and these are all statistically significant at the 
1% significance level. Fertility rate and population growth expectedly increases 
income inequality.  
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Table 3.2: De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness (Chinn-Ito Index) on Absolute and Relative Poverty  
Time Period: 1980-2013 (5-year non-overlapping averages) 
Income Group: Developing Economies 
Estimation Methods: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), PTR (Panel Threshold Regression), and LSTR (Logistic Smooth Transition Regression) 
 Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.90 Poverty Headcount Ratio at $3.10 Poverty Gap at $1.90 Poverty Gap at $3.10 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
PTR 
(3) 
 LSTR 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
PTR 
(6) 
LSTR 
(7) 
OLS 
(8) 
PTR 
(9) 
LSTR 
(10) 
OLS 
(11) 
PTR 
(12) 
LSTR 
Variable             
Per Capita Growth 
-0.521 
(0.302) 
-0.521 
(0.298) 
-0.521 
(0.298) 
0.854 
(0.359) 
0.858 
(0.358) 
0.853 
(0.360) 
-0.235 
(0.154) 
-0.235 
(0.153) 
-0.244 
(0.154) 
-0.419 
(0.208) 
-0.419 
(0.207) 
-0.423 
(0.209) 
GINI 
-0.0259 
(0.0962) 
-0.0131 
(0.0968) 
-0.0142 
(0.0968) 
-0.200*** 
(0.0123) 
-0.195*** 
(0.0124) 
-0.200*** 
(0.0124) 
0.144 
(0.490) 
0.150 
(0.492) 
0.143 
(0.487) 
0.0383 
(0.0681) 
0.0452 
(0.0686) 
0.0386 
(0.0683) 
Fertility Rate 
3.920*** 
(1.049) 
3.855*** 
(1.038) 
3.861*** 
(1.038) 
3.926*** 
(1.175) 
3.884*** 
(1.166) 
3.931*** 
(1.174) 
1.551*** 
(0.520) 
1.520*** 
(0.517) 
1.562*** 
(0.522) 
2.516*** 
(0.720) 
2.481*** 
(0.715) 
2.514*** 
(0.720) 
Inflation 
-0.00904 
(0.0210) 
-0.0158 
(0.0220) 
-0.0159 
(0.0219) 
-0.0206 
(0.0295) 
-0.0205 
(0.0295) 
-0.0204 
(0.0293) 
0.00884 
(0.0115) 
0.00560 
(0.0109) 
0.00843 
(0.0113) 
-0.00142 
(0.0143) 
-0.00507 
(0.0142) 
-0.00210 
(0.0140) 
Government Expenditure 
0.0273 
(0.0970) 
0.0366 
(0.0962) 
0.0366 
(0.0963) 
-0.285** 
(0.119) 
-0.285** 
(0.119) 
-0.285** 
(0.119) 
0.140*** 
(0.0474) 
0.145*** 
(0.0469) 
0.143*** 
(0.0473) 
0.0306 
(0.0671) 
0.0356 
(0.0668) 
0.0323 
(0.0672) 
Savings 
-0.236*** 
(0.0574) 
-0.238*** 
(0.0573) 
-0.238*** 
(0.0573) 
-0.291*** 
(0.0711) 
-0.291*** 
(0.0713) 
-0.291*** 
(0.0713) 
-0.148*** 
(0.0300) 
-0.149*** 
(0.0300) 
-0.149*** 
(0.0302) 
-0.193*** 
(0.0411) 
-0.194*** 
(0.0410) 
-0.193*** 
(0.0413) 
Literacy Rate 
-0.456*** 
(0.0689) 
-0.460*** 
(0.0683) 
-0.460*** 
(0.0683) 
-0.601*** 
(0.0759) 
-0.602*** 
(0.0758) 
-0.600*** 
(0.0762) 
-0.207*** 
(0.0343) 
-0.209*** 
(0.0341) 
-0.209*** 
(0.0344) 
-0.339*** 
(0.0472) 
-0.340*** 
(0.0470) 
-0.340*** 
(0.0474) 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 
-0.151** 
(0.0612) 
  
-0.239*** 
(0.0784) 
  
-0.0517* 
(0.0284) 
  
-0.111*** 
(0.0425) 
  
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 < 𝑇  
-1.174 
(0.716) 
  
-2.035 
(3.672) 
  
-0.540* 
(0.323) 
  
-0.662 
(0.474) 
 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 > 𝑇  
-0.124* 
(0.0632) 
  
-0.232*** 
(0.0804) 
  
-0.0389 
(0.0294) 
  
-0.0967** 
(0.0437) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑐∗)   
-1.115 
(0.696) 
  
0.100 
(3.883) 
  
-1.67 
(-3.893) 
  
-1.131 
(2.153) 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑐∗)   
-0.131** 
(0.0626) 
  
-0.237*** 
(0.0790) 
  
-0.103 
(0.0633) 
  
-0.133** 
(0.0595) 
Constant  
44.38*** 
(10.44) 
41.37*** 
(10.40) 
41.61*** 
(10.40) 
86.85*** 
(12.24) 
84.53*** 
(12.33) 
84.61*** 
(12.25) 
9.536** 
(4.842) 
8.382* 
(4.834) 
11.29** 
(5.146) 
32.18*** 
(7.080) 
30.14*** 
(7.091) 
32.13*** 
(7.166) 
Observations 292 292 292 292 292 292 292 292 292 292 292 292 
R2 0.704 0.707 0.707 0.737 0.738 0.737 0.641 0.644 0.642 0.717 0.719 0.717 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*)   16 17  18 19  14 16  14 15 
LSTR parameter (𝛾*)   15   7   3   4 
LM Test (GTD 2005) H0: 
Linear Model  
  
24.73 
  
28.93 
  
23.25 
  
25.67 
p-value nonlinearity    0.0397   0.0168   0.0507   0.0334 
LM Test for remaining 
nonlinearities  
  
8.461 
  
6.880 
  
6.808 
  
4.427 
p-value remaining 
nonlinearity  
  
0.864 
  
0.939 
  
0.942 
  
0.992 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors and the coefficients for time and country dummy variables are not displayed on the final results table.  
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Table 3.3: De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness (Chinn-Ito Index) on Income Distribution 
Time Period: 1980-2013 (5-year non-overlapping averages) 
Income Group: Developing Economies 
Estimation Methods: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), PTR (Panel Threshold Regression), and LSTR (Logistic Smooth Transition Regression) 
 Income Share of Lowest 10% Income Share of Lowest 20% Income Share of Highest 20% Income Share of Highest 10% 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
PTR 
(3) 
 LSTR 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
PTR 
(6) 
LSTR 
(7) 
OLS 
(8) 
PTR 
(9) 
LSTR 
(10) 
OLS 
(11) 
PTR 
(12) 
LSTR 
Variable             
Per Capita Growth  
0.00625 
(0.00863) 
0.00625 
(0.00866) 
0.00603 
(0.00864) 
0.00928 
(0.0133) 
0.00928 
(0.0134) 
0.00929 
(0.0134) 
0.00734 
(0.0175) 
0.00722 
(0.0177) 
0.00714 
(0.0176) 
0.0137 
(0.0338) 
0.0148 
(0.0339) 
0.0142 
(0.0339) 
GINI 
-0.101*** 
(0.00302) 
-0.101*** 
(0.00300) 
-0.101*** 
(0.00300) 
-0.219*** 
(0.00483) 
-0.220*** 
(0.00481) 
-0.220*** 
(0.00480) 
0.827*** 
(0.00738) 
0.827*** 
(0.00734) 
0.827*** 
(0.00741) 
0.774*** 
(0.0117) 
0.773*** 
(0.0118) 
0.774*** 
(0.0117) 
Fertility Rate 
0.0446 
(0.0240) 
0.0455 
(0.0240) 
0.0448 
(0.0240) 
0.0810 
(0.0372) 
0.0830 
(0.0372) 
0.0829 
(0.0372) 
0.0864* 
(0.0498) 
0.0891* 
(0.0499) 
0.0883* 
(0.0500) 
0.177* 
(0.0915) 
0.181* 
(0.0921) 
0.178* 
(0.0917) 
Inflation 
3.33e-05 
(0.00171) 
0.000130 
(0.00166) 
6.59e-05 
(0.00168) 
-0.000251 
(0.00244) 
-4.58e-05 
(0.00233) 
-3.27e-05 
(0.00232) 
-0.000465 
(0.00320) 
-0.000196 
(0.00303) 
-0.000363 
(0.00309) 
0.00160 
(0.00459) 
0.00168 
(0.00457) 
0.00160 
(0.00462) 
Government Expenditure 
-0.00396 
(0.00288) 
-0.00408 
(0.00292) 
-0.00409 
(0.00291) 
-0.00613 
(0.00435) 
-0.00639 
(0.00441) 
-0.00641 
(0.00442) 
-0.00813 
(0.00568) 
-0.00851 
(0.00575) 
-0.00835 
(0.00574) 
-0.00850 
(0.0105) 
-0.00821 
(0.0105) 
-0.00843 
(0.0105) 
Savings  
0.00134 
(0.00156) 
0.00137 
(0.00157) 
0.00139 
(0.00158) 
0.000635 
(0.00246) 
0.000695 
(0.00247) 
0.000690 
(0.00247) 
4.44e-05 
(0.00328) 
0.000155 
(0.00330) 
0.000137 
(0.00329) 
0.000479 
(0.00640) 
0.000381 
(0.00642) 
0.000416 
(0.00642) 
Literacy Rate 
-0.000302 
(0.00151) 
-0.000250 
(0.00151) 
-0.000256 
(0.00152) 
0.000454 
(0.00235) 
0.000563 
(0.00233) 
0.000576 
(0.00233) 
0.00123 
(0.00346) 
0.00136 
(0.00345) 
0.00128 
(0.00346) 
-0.000221 
(0.00564) 
-0.000275 
(0.00563) 
-0.000210 
(0.00564) 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 
-0.00730*** 
(0.00175) 
  
-0.0101*** 
(0.00271) 
  
0.0128*** 
(0.00401) 
  
0.0143** 
(0.00608) 
  
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 < 𝑇  
0.00771 
(0.0155) 
  
0.0216 
(0.0238) 
  
0.025 
(0.0268) 
  
-0.0103 
(0.00943) 
 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 > 𝑇  
-0.00768*** 
(0.00181) 
  
-0.0109*** 
(0.00281) 
  
0.0142*** 
(0.00421) 
  
-0.0292 
(0.0254) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑐∗)   
0.0366 
(0.0637) 
  
0.0215 
(0.0232) 
  
0.0425 
(0.0589) 
  
-0.0187 
(0.0134) 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑐∗)   
-0.00519 
(0.00342) 
  
-0.0107*** 
(0.00277) 
  
0.0111** 
(0.00437) 
  
-0.127 
(0.316) 
Constant  
6.687*** 
(0.258) 
6.598*** 
(0.263) 
6.553*** 
(0.303) 
15.23*** 
(0.404) 
15.12*** 
(0.410) 
15.11*** 
(0.410) 
14.07*** 
(0.563) 
13.93*** 
(0.582) 
13.87*** 
(0.584) 
0.619 
(0.912) 
0.120 
(1.002) 
-0.357 
(1.112) 
Observations 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 
R2 0.880 0.881 0.880 0.935 0.935 0.935 0.901 0.901 0.901 0.91 0.91 0.91 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*)   14 12  14 17  15 22  41 44 
LSTR parameter (𝛾*)   12   15   2   2 
LM Test (GTD 2005) H0: 
Linear Model  
  
27.47 
  
21.75 
  
18.974 
  
10.79 
p-value nonlinearity    0.0232   0.0627   0.0833   0.703 
LM Test for remaining 
nonlinearities  
  
8.220 
  
3.819 
  
9.329 
  
9.757 
p-value remaining 
nonlinearity  
  
0.878 
  
0.996 
  
0.809 
  
0.780 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors and the coefficients for time and country dummy variables are not displayed on the final results table.  
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Table 3.4: De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness (Chinn-Ito Index) on Income Inequality 
Time Period: 1980-2013 (5-year non-overlapping averages) 
Income Group: Developing Economies 
Estimation Methods: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), PTR (Panel Threshold Regression), and LSTR (Logistic Smooth Transition Regression) 
 GINI Index Inter-Decile Income Ratio  Income Quantile Share Ratio 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
PTR 
(3) 
 LSTR 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
PTR 
(6) 
LSTR 
(7) 
OLS 
(8) 
PTR 
(9) 
LSTR 
Variable          
Per Capita Growth  
-0.423*** 
(0.148) 
-0.418*** 
(0.147) 
-0.414*** 
(0.148) 
-0.581*** 
(0.209) 
-0.561*** 
(0.209) 
-0.565*** 
(0.209) 
-0.344*** 
(0.106) 
-0.340*** 
(0.106) 
-0.347*** 
(0.106) 
Fertility Rate 
1.921*** 
(0.698) 
1.859*** 
(0.704) 
1.900*** 
(0.702) 
-2.145 
(0.826) 
-1.958 
(0.846) 
-2.087 
(0.838) 
-1.506 
(0.491) 
-1.469 
(0.497) 
-1.486 
(0.492) 
Inflation 
-0.0387*** 
(0.0148) 
-0.0356** 
(0.0155) 
-0.0348** 
(0.0160) 
-0.0208 
(0.0225) 
-0.0176 
(0.0242) 
-0.0165 
(0.0245) 
-0.0112 
(0.00969) 
-0.00958 
(0.0107) 
-0.0124 
(0.00958) 
Government Expenditure 
-0.0261 
(0.0760) 
-0.0323 
(0.0751) 
-0.0328 
(0.0756) 
-0.0601 
(0.115) 
-0.0627 
(0.114) 
-0.0673 
(0.115) 
0.0342 
(0.0581) 
0.0309 
(0.0571) 
0.0373 
(0.0580) 
Population Growth  
4.793*** 
(0.755) 
4.733*** 
(0.766) 
4.735*** 
(0.766) 
4.200*** 
(1.067) 
4.049*** 
(1.088) 
4.102*** 
(1.085) 
2.493*** 
(0.552) 
2.463*** 
(0.561) 
2.505*** 
(0.556) 
Literacy Rate 
-0.0265 
(0.0419) 
-0.0253 
(0.0419) 
-0.0273 
(0.0418) 
0.00311 
(0.0589) 
0.00342 
(0.0592) 
0.00144 
(0.0592) 
-0.0275 
(0.0326) 
-0.0267 
(0.0325) 
-0.0264 
(0.0328) 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 
0.123*** 
(0.0366) 
  
0.144*** 
(0.0544) 
  
0.0953*** 
(0.0314) 
  
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 < 𝑇  
0.675** 
(0.285) 
  
0.793** 
(0.316) 
  
0.375** 
(0.164) 
 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 > 𝑇  
0.0859** 
(0.0419) 
  
0.0310 
(0.0824) 
  
0.0762** 
(0.0364) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑐∗)   
-9.259 
(7.708) 
  
-11.01 
(10.36) 
  
4.034 
(3.858) 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑐∗)   
0.0858* 
(0.0467) 
  
0.0790 
(0.0822) 
  
0.101*** 
(0.0316) 
Constant  
42.38*** 
(4.298) 
45.21*** 
(4.291) 
44.73*** 
(4.370) 
17.74*** 
(5.493) 
22.66*** 
(5.772) 
21.23*** 
(6.060) 
10.69*** 
(3.048) 
12.63*** 
(3.116) 
11.02*** 
(3.133) 
Observations 301 301 301 287 287 287 299 299 299 
R2 0.202 0.210 0.206 0.212 0.214 0.205 0.222 0.224 0.221 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*)   16 7  19 7  16 8 
LSTR parameter (𝛾*)   9   9   11 
LM Test (GTD 2005) H0: 
Linear Model  
  
20.45 
  
21.19 
  
25.25 
p-value nonlinearity    0.0657   0.0595   0.0292 
LM Test for remaining 
nonlinearities  
  
3.308 
  
4.116 
  
5.008 
p-value remaining 
nonlinearity  
  
0.997 
  
0.990 
  
0.975 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors and the coefficients for time and country dummy variables are not displayed on the final results table.  
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3.8 Conclusion 
 
This research paper investigates the impact of financial integration on poverty 
and inequality in 79 developing countries over the time period 1980-2013. The 
econometric techniques deployed in this research paper include the Panel Threshold 
Regression (PTR) method, the Logistic Smooth Transition Regression (LSTR) 
method and the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation method. In order to validate 
the findings in this research paper, a series of robustness checks are carried out in the 
appendix in section 3.10. In order to gain a deeper understanding of the key findings 
of this research paper, it is important to understand that the transformed KAOPEN 
variable ranges from 0 to 53.2, where 0 indicates full regulation and 53.2 indicates a 
fully liberalized financial market. The mean of the KAOPEN variable is 26.2, 
indicating moderate levels of regulation (from the viewpoint of capital control) or a 
moderate level of financial openness (when viewing it from the perspective of capital 
account liberalization).80 The key inferences deduced in this research paper are the 
following:  
 
1. When assessing the regression results measuring impact of capital account 
openness on poverty, it can be seen that the threshold level of KAOPEN 
approximates to 16, and above this threshold level, poverty decreases. The 
KAOPEN level of 16 indicates a highly regulated financial market; the 
regression results suggest that when the financial markets are less regulated or 
with increasing level of financial openness, poverty declines. For instance, 
more than half of the developing countries in the dataset have a higher 
KAOPEN level than the threshold determined in the regression findings 
(equates to KAOPEN level of 16), which is reflected in the subsequent 
reduction in poverty. For instance, Argentina, Brazil, Malaysia and Indonesia 
have all had a level of financial openness that is greater than the threshold 
level denoted here. On the contrary, India and Bangladesh for instance, have 
had a level of financial openness that is lower than the threshold denoted here. 
Furthermore, it is observed that increasing inequality is associated with 
                                                 
80 In order to get country case examples for the KAOPEN variable, refer to the conclusion section of 
chapter 2. In the dataset, the mean of the KAOPEN variable is 22.8, where the minimum value is 7.7 
and the maximum value is 50.5.  
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reduced poverty; this thereby indicates that despite financial integration 
playing an active role in reducing poverty by enhancing growth as evident in 
the last chapter, it, on the other hand, also increases income inequality in the 
process.    
2. When assessing the regression results measuring the impact of capital account 
openness on various income bands (this includes the poorest 10% and 20% 
and the richest 20% and 10%), it is observed that the threshold level varies 
between 14 and 22 (averages to 18); this KAOPEN level is indicative of high 
regulation or low levels of financial openness. Below this threshold (in 
reference to appendix 2), it is observed that income share increases for the 
richest as well as the poorest, however, once it is above this threshold, it is 
observed that increasing openness results in a decline in the income share of 
the poorest 10% and 20%, on the contrary, an increase in income share is 
observed for the richest 10% and 20%. For instance, Brazil, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Egypt, Botswana along with a host of other countries all have a 
level of KAOPEN that exceeds the threshold denoted here. Resultantly, it is 
observed that with increasing levels of financial openness, income share of the 
poorest declines while the income share of the richest increases for these 
countries. 
3. When assessing the regression results measuring the impact of capital account 
openness on income inequality, it is observed that the threshold levels of 
KAOPEN vary between 16 and 19; this is indicative of a high level of 
regulation or low level of financial openness. Increased openness results in 
increased inequality above and below the threshold level. However, inequality 
increases faster below the threshold as opposed to when it is above the 
threshold. The countries in the dataset that have a greater level of financial 
openness, exceeding the stated threshold, tends to show with increasing 
openness income inequality does in fact increase. This is consistent for the 
likes of Brazil, Bolivia, Honduras, Mexico, and Paraguay for which higher 
levels of financial openness is observed, this is subsequently reflected with 
higher levels of inequality.  
 
On the basis of the inferences deduced in this research paper, for developing 
economies, it is quite apparent that increased financial integration results in reduced 
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poverty. However, it is important to note that this is not uniform across all indicators 
of poverty81. It is also evident that increasing financial integration increases 
inequality. The policy dilemma for governments, economists, and policymakers alike, 
would be to acknowledge increasing liberalization results in a tradeoff, reduction in 
absolute and relative poverty, but an increase in inequality, and therefore, they must 
fixate on a working policy model for the developing world. On the evidence of the 
effect of increasing openness on different income bands, it is evident that in the early 
stages of financial liberalization, poverty decreases and income share for all income 
groups increase82. However, the conundrum is this, why does the income share fall for 
the poorest and increase for the richest after crossing this particular threshold level? If 
the institutional infrastructure was structured in a way so that it would facilitate the 
gains of financial integration not only for the rich but also for the poor, then, without 
question financial liberalization should be endorsed. However, in developing 
countries, an unequal society has the potential of causing severe economic damage 
due to the presence of class struggle, followed by constant political instability. The 
balancing act is not only a policymaking dilemma but a moral dilemma too. However, 
it must be clarified that this research paper does not promote inward looking policies 
as there is convincing evidence that they are detrimental to average income growth 
(Taylor, 1998). Developing countries are not easy to govern, however, governments 
must find a way to ensure a booming financial sector with motivated entrepreneurs 
and technepreneurs, without compromising the benefits to the poor.  
 
3.8.1 Contribution to the Literature  
 
The contributions that this research paper makes to the existing literature in the 
associated field of research are the following: 
 
1. The Panel Threshold Regression (PTR) model introduced by Hansen (1999) 
and/or the extension by Caner and Hansen (2004) does not feature at all in the 
literature assessing the impact of financial integration on poverty. This 
                                                 
81 For instance, increased openness results in decreased income share for the poorest 10% and 20% 
above a specific threshold. However, while income share is also an indicator used to account for 
poverty, especially the share of income of the poorest, a reduction in income share could still mean 
income has risen on the whole and poverty has decreased.   
82 While increase in openness results in increased income levels for all income bands, income share of 
the richest 10% and 20% are the highest beneficiaries as they have the highest amount of increase.  
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research paper uses the paper developed Arestis and Caner (2010) as a 
benchmark. However, this research paper assesses the impact of capital 
account liberalization on poverty using the threshold approach. This would 
allow policymakers to underpin the intensity of financial openness that is 
beneficial for poverty reduction and inequality minimization. The fundamental 
contribution that this research paper makes is the use of the Logistic Smooth 
Transition Regression (LSTR) methodology. Hansen’s (1999) PTR 
methodology only looks at the instantaneous change between one regime to 
the other. However, this research paper accounts for the ‘smooth’ transition 
from one regime to another and therefore this makes it economically and 
statistically more reasonable and advantageous for analytical purposes and to 
enforce validity in the findings. Furthermore, this research paper also looks at 
the impact of openness on various income bands and finds their respective 
threshold levels and the effects below and above the threshold. This provides a 
microscopic picture of the relationship between inequality and KAOPEN.  
2. The index developed by Chinn and Ito (2006), the capital account openness 
index, denoted as the KAOPEN variable has previously been used in the 
literature to account for financial integration. This research paper uses the 
Chinn-Ito index as a threshold variable to pinpoint threshold levels and the 
subsequent effects below and above the threshold on poverty and inequality.  
3. Hansen’s (1999) and/or Caner and Hansen’s (2004) threshold techniques are 
commonly used in the FI-growth literature; even though this is not directly 
related to this particular research paper, it must be noted that these research 
papers fail to address the problem of heteroscedasticity. This research paper 
on the other hand tests for heteroscedasticity in the threshold models and 
addresses this problem altogether.  
4. Gonzalez, Terasvirta, and van Dijk’s (2005) test for nonlinearities assesses 
whether or not the model is linear or nonlinear, this helps in analyzing the 
appropriateness of the model i.e. whether the OLS is more appropriate than 
the PTR or the LSTR. However, in the existing threshold literature, this is 
unaccounted for and normally research papers do not carry out a test to 
examine whether the model is truly nonlinear before executing the PTR 
methodology and drawing inferences from the results. Furthermore, the 
appropriateness of the PTR and the LSTR is also tested (this is not tested in 
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other papers). Furthermore, this test examines the existence of remaining 
nonlinearities i.e. if there are more than two regimes or more than a single 
threshold than the OLS, PTR, and the LSTR should not be considered for 
analysis. This test is a significant addition to the literature on the whole and is 
a benchmark for threshold tests in the associated field of research.  
 
3.8.2 Suggestions for Further Work  
 
For further work, it would be extremely interesting and applicable for 
policymaking purposes if interactions terms were used endogenously. For example, 
this could include institutional and political factors. Institutional factors could 
certainly provide an added impetus to this existing research paper, and it would go 
beyond simply noting the problem and finding solutions on the basis of analysis from 
looking at the larger picture, but this would in fact provide a microscopic view to 
particular issues that may need be addressed in developing countries. The researching 
potential, stemming from this research paper, for this particular area of research is 
endless. This would further help establish the key areas or institutions that the 
government can focus on in order to reduce poverty and control inequality 
simultaneously.  
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3.9 Appendix 1: Explorative Data Analysis 
 
3.9.1 Explorative Data Analysis 1: Historical Trends 
 
This section looks at the historical trends of all the proxy variables used for poverty, 
income distribution and income inequality. Furthermore, this section also graphically 
presents the historical trend for the key independent variable of interest, the capital 
account openness index developed by Chinn and Ito (2006), denoted as KAOPEN.  
 
Panel 3.1: Poverty Trends  
 
Figure 3.1: Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.90 
 
Figure 3.2: Poverty Headcount Ratio at $3.10 
  
 
Figure 3.3: Poverty Gap at $1.90 a Day 
 
Figure 3.4: Poverty Gap at $3.10 a Day 
  
 
Figures 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 look at the historical trends of the poverty 
headcount ratio at $1.90 and $3.10 and the poverty gap at $1.90 a day and $3.10 a 
day. This research paper specifically focuses on developing countries on the whole, 
however, graphically, there are additional region specific historical trends shown for 
the Latin American, MENA, and South Asian Economies. It can be observed that in 
the 1980s, poverty in the developing economies was higher than any time after that. It 
is also observed that South Asian Economies also had the highest level of poverty, 
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however, they have shown a gradual and consistent decrease in poverty levels over 
time. However, interestingly, it can be observed that in the late 1990s, there has a hike 
in poverty in developing countries on average and this was followed by an inevitable 
decline in poverty. The reason being could be that the ‘crisis channel.’ Due to all the 
developing countries liberalizing their financial markets there was an obvious 
increase in financial flows and resultantly this transcended to higher growth levels. 
However, there were a series of major crises in the late 90s, this was particularly 
calamitous for the Asian Economies (refer to the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997).    
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Panel 3.2: Income Distribution Historical Trends 
 
Figure 3.5: Income Share of Lowest 10% 
 
Figure 3.6: Income Share of Lowest 20% 
  
 
Figure 3.7: Income Share of Highest 20% 
 
Figure 3.8: Income Share of Highest 10%  
  
 
Figures 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 look at the historical trends for the income share 
of the lowest 10% and 20% and the highest 20% and 10% respectively, in developing 
economies. Furthermore, for cross-comparative purposes this is compared to Latin 
American, MENA, and South Asian Economies. For the lowest 10% and 20%, it can 
be observed that quite interestingly, despite having higher poverty levels, income 
share of the poorest in South Asian economies is higher than the rest. The conditions 
for the poor in Latin America is dire as the poor only have less 2% of total income. 
Even in recent times, this scenario has not changed. For South Asian economies, there 
is a large drop in the income share of the poor in the late 90s and the early 2000s. This 
could certainly be attributed, at the very least marginally, to the Asian Financial Crisis 
of 1997. Furthermore, this reiterates the fact that in the time of a crisis, the poor do in 
fact suffer more. For instance, in figures 3.7 and 3.8, it can be seen that at the time 
when the income of the poorest was eroded, the income of the rich in fact increased, 
coincidentally or not, this happened at exactly the same time. This also goes to the 
show the lack of presence of the middle class, especially in South Asian Economies at 
the time. Income share of the highest 20% and 10% shows that the richest, in 
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developing countries, almost have 50% of the total share of income. This scenario is 
worse for Latin American countries where the richest 20% have more than 50% of the 
total income.      
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Panel 3.3: KAOPEN and Income Inequality Trends  
 
Figure 3.9: KAOPEN 
 
Figure 3.10: GINI Index 
  
 
Figure 3.11: IQSR 
 
Figure 3.12: IDIR 
  
 
Figure 3.9 looks at the historical trends of the Chinn-Ito index. On average, it 
can certainly be noted that barring blip observed during the global financial crisis in 
2008/09, the financial markets are increasingly more liberalized over time. On 
average, the developing economies are partially open in recent times, however, it is 
quite evident that the MENA economies have been more financially liberalized than 
the other geographical regions presented on this graph. Furthermore, it is observed 
that the financial markets of the South Asian Economies are highly regulated. Figures 
3.10, 3.11, and 3.12 look at how inequality fares over time. For developing 
economies, as well as for all other geographical locations, there is not a definitive 
deduction to be made. There is not a gradual rise or a gradual decline in inequality. 
The only notable observation that be drawn from the GINI index is that for South 
Asian economies, there was a steep rise in inequality in the late 90s and in the early 
2000s. This is almost identical for the measure of IQSR and IDIR. The general 
comments to make here is that the Latin American Economies have the highest level 
of inequality on average and across all the measures of inequality used here. 
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Furthermore, the developing economies only observed a steep rise in inequality in the 
early 1990s.  
 
3.9.2 Explorative Data Analysis 2: Scatter Graphs 
 
This section presents the relationship between the key independent variable of interest 
(capital account openness or the KAOPEN) and all other proxy measures used for 
poverty, income distribution and income inequality. The relationships are graphically 
presented by the use of scatter graphs and this is reestablished via the use of the line 
of best fit. The purpose of these graphs is to replicate illustratively the regression 
analysis carried out in the main results section, and if possible and where possible, 
supplement and support the analytical findings.  
 
Panel 3.4: Illustrating the Relationship Between KAOPEN and Poverty 
 
Figure 3.13: Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.90 
 
Figure 3.14: Poverty Headcount Ratio at $3.10 
  
 
Figure 3.15: Poverty Gap at $1.90 
 
Figure 3.16: Poverty Gap at $3.10 
  
 
Figures 3.13, 3.14, 3.15, and 3.16 look at the relationship between KAOPEN 
and poverty (there are four proxy measures used to account for poverty) for 
developing economies, using scatter graphs. For all of these graphs, it is quite evident, 
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that increasing KAOPEN, results in decreased poverty. This is consistent across all 
measures. Therefore, it can be deduced, on the basis of the graphical evidence 
observed here, that there is a strong negative correlation between KAOPEN and 
poverty.  
 
 
Figures 3.17 and 3.18 look at the relationship between the income share of the 
lowest 10% and 20% on KAOPEN respectively for developing economies. It is 
evident that the relationship observed is not strong. Therefore, it can be said that there 
is a weak negative correlation between income share of the poor and financial 
openness. However, despite the lack of strength of the correlation, it reiterates the 
findings (this is consistent with the findings in the results section) that increased 
openness results in reduced income share for the poorest. On the contrary, the results 
are identical for the relationship between the income share of the rich and KAOPEN, 
except the sign is opposite. From figures 3.19 and 3.20, it can be observed that there 
is a weak positive relationship between income share of the highest 20% and 10% 
Panel 3.5: Illustrating the Relationship Between KAOPEN and Income Distribution 
 
Figure 3.17: Income Share of Lowest 10% 
 
Figure 3.18: Income Share of Lowest 20% 
  
 
Figure 3.19: Income Share of Highest 20% 
 
Figure 3.20: Income Share of Highest 10% 
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with KAOPEN, thereby implying that increased openness results in increased income 
share for the richest 20% and 10%.  
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Panel 3.6: Illustrating the Relationship Between KAOPEN and Income Inequality and Povery and 
Inequality 
 
Figure 3.21: GINI Index 
 
Figure 3.22: IQSR 
  
 
Figure 3.23: IDIR 
 
Figure 3.24: Inequality and Poverty 
  
 
The relationship between inequality and KAOPEN is illustrated in figures 
3.21, 3.22, and 3.23. There is no evidence of a correlation between any of the proxies 
of inequality and KAOPEN. Figure 3.24, looks at the effect of inequality and poverty. 
While this is not the main focus of this research paper, not illustrating and analyzing 
an important issue as such (albeit only on the surface) would not complete reasoning 
and justification for all other deductions for all other measures. There is an evident 
strong negative correlation between inequality83 and poverty. The literature is 
polarized in terms of arguments for and against the gains of financial liberalization. 
The conventional argument hypothesizes that while increased financial integration is 
likely to fuel increased growth, even though there is a cost of increased inequality, 
this does not mean that poverty decreases. In fact, the literature consists of various 
theoretical arguments and empirical evidence suggesting that poverty does in fact 
decrease in certain cases. However, this contradicts the results acquired in the results 
section as well as the regression findings in the robustness checks sections. This could 
                                                 
83 The inequality parameter, or the proxy variable used to account for inequality is the GINI coefficient.  
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however be that the relationship is in fact nonlinear, or, the impact of inequality on 
poverty is inconclusive (contradicts the regression findings).   
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3.9.3 Explorative Data Analysis 3: Quadratic Relationships 
 
This section looks at the quadratic (non-linear relationship in a quadratic line plot) 
relationship between capital account openness and all other proxy variables used to 
account for poverty, income distribution, and income inequality. The purpose of these 
graphical illustrations is to illustratively present the threshold levels that has been 
calculated by the PTR and the LSTR regression methods. However, it is important to 
note that while they are both nonlinear, the estimation methods are entirely different. 
The graphical representations are only meant to be a supplement to the inferences 
drawn via the threshold regressions.  
 
Panel 3.7: Quadratic Relationship between KAOPEN and Poverty 
 
Figure 3.25: Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.90 
 
Figure 3.26: Poverty Headcount Ratio at $3.10 
  
 
Figure 3.27: Poverty Gap at $1.90 a Day 
 
Figure 3.28: Poverty Gap at $3.10 a Day 
  
 
Figures 3.25, 3.26, 3.27, and 3.28 look at the quadratic relationship between 
KAOPEN and poverty. The threshold levels in table 3.2 (this is the table where the 
OLS, PTR, and the LSTR methods are applied and the subsequent regression findings 
are presented), fluctuate between 14 and 22. This is predominantly the case even for 
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the findings deduced in the robustness checks sections. However, these figures do not 
allow us to draw any inferences.  
 
Panel 3.8: Quadratic Relationship between KAOPEN and Income Distribution 
 
Figure 3.29: Income Share of Lowest 10%  
 
Figure 3.30: Income Share of Lowest 20%   
  
 
Figure 3.31: Income Share of Highest 20% 
 
Figure 3.32: Income Share of Highest 10% 
  
 
The threshold levels in table 3.3 (threshold regression findings for the impact 
of capital account openness on income share) vary between 14 and 22 (this includes 
the poorest 10% and 20% and the richest 20% and 10%). However, the threshold 
regression findings and the graphs illustrated in panel 8 stand in stark contrast. For the 
poorest as well as the richest 10% and 20%, the threshold regression findings imply 
that below the certain threshold increase in KAOPEN results in increase in income 
share. This is consistent for the richest 10% and 20%, but, the effect is opposite when 
seen graphically, for the poorest 10% and 20%. In figures 3.29 and 3.30, it can be 
seen that increasing openness below the threshold results in decreased income share 
of the poor. This contradicts the threshold regression findings. Above the threshold, 
the threshold regression findings and the graph are in stark contrast for all income 
bands. The threshold regression findings state that for the rich while the magnitude of 
the rise in income share diminishes above the threshold, it still increases nonetheless.  
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However, in figures 3.31 and 3.32, above the threshold income share actually 
declines. Furthermore, for the poorest, income share in fact increases. This completely 
contradicts the findings via the threshold regressions for both PTR and LSTR as well 
as the OLS. However, it is important to note that the threshold levels for the graphs 
are significantly larger than those observed in the regression findings and therefore 
could hold weight in terms of causing such a massive disparity in the findings.    
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Panel 3.9: Quadratic Relationship between KAOPEN and Income Distribution and Poverty and 
Income Inequality 
 
Figure 3.33: GINI Index  
 
Figure 3.34: IQSR 
  
 
Figure 3.35: IDIR 
 
Figure 3.36: Poverty and Inequality  
  
 
The results observed between KAOPEN and inequality in figures 3.33, 3.34 
and 3.35 are in stark contrast to the regression findings in table 3.4 as well as the 
robustness checks associated to this in appendix 2. When looking at the regression 
results measuring the impact of capital account openness on income inequality, it is 
seen that the threshold levels of KAOPEN vary between 16 and 19. Increased 
openness results in increased inequality above and below the threshold level. 
However, inequality increases faster below the threshold as opposed to when it is 
above the threshold, but inequality increases with increased liberalization regardless. 
In figure 3.33, while increased KAOPEN results in increased inequality below the 
threshold, above the threshold, the result is in complete contrast to that of the 
threshold findings. No obvious thresholds are observed in figures 3.34 and 3.35. 
Figure 3684 is supplementary; this is to provide a graphical illustration looking at the 
quadratic relationship between inequality and poverty. It is observed that increasing 
                                                 
84 There are no threshold regressions carried out to specifically look at the relationship between 
inequality (GINI index) and poverty. This graph is added for the comfortability of the reader and for 
added intuition.  
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inequality (not arguing if this is caused by growth and/or financial integration) 
decreases poverty up until a certain threshold, after which, poverty in fact increases. 
On the basis of economic intuition, this is consistent with the theoretical 
ramifications. However, this is merely a minor additional outlook on this relationship 
between two variables heavily examined in this research paper.  
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3.10 Appendix 2: Robustness Checks 
 
The robustness tests are recorded accordingly and include the following: 
1. Robustness Test 1: 3-Year Non-Overlapping Averages 
2. Robustness Test 2: Lagged IFI Proxy Variable 
3. Robustness Test 3: First Differences  
4. Robustness Test 4: GMM Estimations  
 
3.10.1 Robustness Test 1: 3-Year Non-Overlapping Averages 
 
This section replicates the threshold regression estimation methods carried out 
in the main results section with 3-year non-overlapping averages instead of 5-year 
non-overlapping averages. Deploying the 3-year averages is a common test carried 
out to validate inferences drawn from the main regression results. Table 3.5 looks at 
the impact of financial integration on poverty using 3-year non-overlapping averages. 
The KAOPEN coefficients are negative and statistically significant (at the 1% or the 
5% significance level above the threshold for 3 out of the 4 proxy variables selected 
to account for poverty. This is consistent with the results acquired for the main 
regression findings in the results section in table 3.2. Furthermore, the coefficient for 
savings rate and literacy rate are both statistically significant and negative and thereby 
consistent with the results obtained in table 3.2. The tests of nonlinearity show that 
the models are nonlinear and that there are no more than two regimes and therefore 
the PTR or the LSTR model are more appropriate for analysis. The obvious notable 
difference is the increase in the number of observations. No deterministic relationship 
can be drawn with the GINI index and the effect on poverty as it is statistically 
insignificant.  
 
Table 3.6 looks at the impact of financial openness on differing income 
groups. The results are considerably similar to that of table 3.3 (5-year non-
overlapping averages). It can be seen that above the threshold, income share reduces 
for the poor and income share increases for the rich. However, the additional 
inference that can be drawn from this regression finding is that below the threshold, 
for the poorest 10% and 20%, income share actually tends to increase. This is 
statistically significant at the 5% significance level. The other additional observatory 
  
 
195 
 
note that can be made is that for the highest 10% and 20%, below the threshold, the 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant and has a higher magnitude than the 
coefficient above the threshold. There is a clear suggestion that in the early days of 
financial liberalization, the income share of both the poor and the rich increases, 
before it starts to decrease for the poor and increase for the rich after a certain 
threshold. One additional finding that is evident is that increasing inflation reduces 
income share for all income groups. The threshold levels and estimates for the other 
control variables are not dissimilar to table 3.3. Table 3.7 looks at the impact of 
openness on inequality. The coefficient estimates for KAOPEN and all other control 
variables are not dissimilar to the findings in table 3.4, except for the IDIR, it can be 
seen that even above the threshold inequality increases and the magnitude is large. 
This result above the threshold was statistically insignificant in table 3.4.    
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Table 3.5: De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness (Chinn-Ito Index) on Absolute and Relative Poverty using 3-year non-overlapping averages  
Robustness Check 1: 3-Year Non-Overlapping Averages 
Time Period: 1980-2013 Income Group: Developing Economies 
Estimation Methods: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), PTR (Panel Threshold Regression), and LSTR (Logistic Smooth Transition Regression) 
 Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.90 Poverty Headcount Ratio at $3.10 Poverty Gap at $1.90 Poverty Gap at $3.10 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
PTR 
(3) 
 LSTR 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
PTR 
(6) 
LSTR 
(7) 
OLS 
(8) 
PTR 
(9) 
LSTR 
(10) 
OLS 
(11) 
PTR 
(12) 
LSTR 
Variable             
Per Capita Growth 
0.519 
(0.224) 
0.528 
(0.224) 
0.528 
(0.225) 
0.589 
(0.306) 
0.588 
(0.308) 
0.576 
(0.312) 
0.277 
(0.100) 
0.282 
(0.102) 
0.287 
(0.103) 
0.387 
(0.153) 
0.391 
(0.154) 
0.392 
(0.156) 
GINI 
-0.0495 
(0.0937) 
-0.0411 
(0.0942) 
-0.0422 
(0.0941) 
-0.234* 
(0.123) 
-0.236* 
(0.124) 
-0.237* 
(0.123) 
0.121 
(0.0452) 
0.126 
(0.0452) 
0.121 
(0.0451) 
0.0139 
(0.0662) 
0.0179 
(0.0667) 
0.0148 
(0.0665) 
Fertility Rate 
3.784*** 
(1.014) 
3.721*** 
(1.012) 
3.727*** 
(1.013) 
3.818*** 
(1.130) 
3.830*** 
(1.134) 
3.861*** 
(1.133) 
1.549*** 
(0.490) 
1.511*** 
(0.491) 
1.536*** 
(0.490) 
2.478*** 
(0.693) 
2.448*** 
(0.694) 
2.462*** 
(0.694) 
Inflation 
0.0241 
(0.0636) 
0.00747 
(0.0643) 
0.00852 
(0.0644) 
0.0595 
(0.0822) 
0.0624 
(0.0857) 
0.0716 
(0.0875) 
0.0374 
(0.0327) 
0.0275 
(0.0311) 
0.0327 
(0.0314) 
0.0380 
(0.0470) 
0.0300 
(0.0475) 
0.0336 
(0.0476) 
Government Expenditure 
0.00515 
(0.100) 
0.0148 
(0.100) 
0.0143 
(0.101) 
-0.304** 
(0.128) 
-0.306** 
(0.129) 
-0.312** 
(0.129) 
0.117** 
(0.0472) 
0.123*** 
(0.0469) 
0.121** 
(0.0473) 
0.00794 
(0.0699) 
0.0126 
(0.0702) 
0.0108 
(0.0705) 
Savings 
-0.184*** 
(0.0559) 
-0.187*** 
(0.0557) 
-0.187*** 
(0.0557) 
-0.247*** 
(0.0715) 
-0.247*** 
(0.0712) 
-0.244*** 
(0.0710) 
-0.123*** 
(0.0295) 
-0.124*** 
(0.0295) 
-0.124*** 
(0.0295) 
-0.158*** 
(0.0404) 
-0.159*** 
(0.0403) 
-0.159*** 
(0.0402) 
Literacy Rate 
-0.431*** 
(0.0658) 
-0.433*** 
(0.0654) 
-0.433*** 
(0.0655) 
-0.584*** 
(0.0740) 
-0.584*** 
(0.0743) 
-0.582*** 
(0.0746) 
-0.184*** 
(0.0306) 
-0.185*** 
(0.0304) 
-0.186*** 
(0.0308) 
-0.316*** 
(0.0447) 
-0.317*** 
(0.0446) 
-0.317*** 
(0.0449) 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 
-0.137** 
(0.0554) 
  
-0.225*** 
(0.0748) 
  
-0.0441* 
(0.0239) 
  
-0.101*** 
(0.0384) 
  
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 < 𝑇  
-0.815 
(0.772) 
  
-0.0315 
(1.323) 
  
-0.446 
(0.338) 
  
-0.427 
(0.524) 
 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 > 𝑇  
-0.118** 
(0.0564) 
  
-0.228*** 
(0.0763) 
  
-0.0323 
(0.0243) 
  
-0.0916** 
(0.0389) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑐∗)   
-0.748 
(0.751) 
  
1.074 
(2.200) 
  
-1.183 
(1.450) 
  
-0.579 
(1.307) 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑐∗)   
-0.123** 
(0.0557) 
  
-0.202** 
(0.0853) 
  
-0.0801 
(0.0528) 
  
-0.110** 
(0.0472) 
Constant  
43.06*** 
(9.777) 
40.48*** 
(9.661) 
40.66*** 
(9.660) 
86.94*** 
(11.47) 
84.34*** 
(11.58) 
83.71*** 
(11.63) 
8.446** 
(4.201) 
7.439* 
(4.109) 
9.679** 
(4.476) 
31.19*** 
(6.536) 
29.45*** 
(6.501) 
30.54*** 
(6.556) 
Observations 332 332 332 332 332 332 332 332 332 332 332 332 
R2 0.646 0.648 0.648 0.676 0.676 0.676 0.598 0.601 0.599 0.662 0.662 0.662 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*)   14 14  14 16  14 17  14 10 
LSTR parameter (𝛾*)   14   4   3   4 
LM Test (GTD 2005) H0: 
Linear Model  
  
25.39 
  
24.39 
  
14.80 
  
24.71 
p-value nonlinearity    0.0567   0.0639   0.610   0.0616 
LM Test for remaining 
nonlinearities  
  
5.711 
  
8.705 
  
6.365 
  
4.361 
p-value remaining 
nonlinearity  
  
0.995 
  
0.949 
  
0.990 
  
0.999 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors and the coefficients for time and country dummy variables are not displayed on the final results table.  
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Table 3.6: De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness (Chinn-Ito Index) on Income Distribution using 3-year non-overlapping averages   
Robustness Check 1: 3-Year Non-Overlapping Averages 
Time Period: 1980-2013  
Income Group: Developing Economies 
Estimation Methods: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), PTR (Panel Threshold Regression), and LSTR (Logistic Smooth Transition Regression) 
 Income Share of Lowest 10% Income Share of Lowest 20% Income Share of Highest 20% Income Share of Highest 10% 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
PTR 
(3) 
 LSTR 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
PTR 
(6) 
LSTR 
(7) 
OLS 
(8) 
PTR 
(9) 
LSTR 
(10) 
OLS 
(11) 
PTR 
(12) 
LSTR 
Variable             
Per Capita Growth  
0.00339 
(0.00890) 
0.00317 
(0.00879) 
0.00321 
(0.00885) 
0.00373 
(0.0138) 
0.00334 
(0.0136) 
0.00332 
(0.0137) 
0.00365 
(0.0186) 
0.00312 
(0.0183) 
0.00297 
(0.0183) 
0.00332 
(0.0314) 
0.00260 
(0.0311) 
0.00257 
(0.0311) 
GINI 
-0.103*** 
(0.00293) 
-0.104*** 
(0.00292) 
-0.104*** 
(0.00292) 
-0.224*** 
(0.00468) 
-0.224*** 
(0.00466) 
-0.224*** 
(0.00464) 
0.821*** 
(0.00724) 
0.820*** 
(0.00719) 
0.821*** 
(0.00715) 
0.764*** 
(0.0110) 
0.762*** 
(0.0109) 
0.762*** 
(0.0109) 
Fertility Rate 
0.0515 
(0.0214) 
0.0543 
(0.0214) 
0.0526 
(0.0214) 
0.0883 
(0.0330) 
0.0934 
(0.0329) 
0.0908 
(0.0328) 
0.110 
(0.0442) 
0.117*** 
(0.0441) 
0.117*** 
(0.0441) 
0.183** 
(0.0784) 
0.192** 
(0.0787) 
0.191** 
(0.0785) 
Inflation 
-0.00333** 
(0.00133) 
-0.00294** 
(0.00129) 
-0.00312** 
(0.00131) 
-0.00490** 
(0.00203) 
-0.00417** 
(0.00208) 
-0.00440** 
(0.00208) 
-0.00638*** 
(0.00246) 
-0.00540** 
(0.00249) 
-0.00534** 
(0.00251) 
-0.00482 
(0.00626) 
-0.00350 
(0.00666) 
-0.00349 
(0.00668) 
Government Expenditure 
-0.00543** 
(0.00269) 
-0.00570** 
(0.00273) 
-0.00561** 
(0.00271) 
-0.00737* 
(0.00409) 
-0.00787* 
(0.00415) 
-0.00778* 
(0.00414) 
-0.0103* 
(0.00528) 
-0.0109** 
(0.00537) 
-0.0111** 
(0.00538) 
-0.00957 
(0.00966) 
-0.0105 
(0.00977) 
-0.0105 
(0.00978) 
Savings  
0.00244 
(0.00155) 
0.00262* 
(0.00155) 
0.00255 
(0.00157) 
0.00233 
(0.00226) 
0.00265 
(0.00227) 
0.00257 
(0.00229) 
0.00212 
(0.00292) 
0.00255 
(0.00292) 
0.00254 
(0.00293) 
0.00330 
(0.00532) 
0.00388 
(0.00533) 
0.00387 
(0.00532) 
Literacy Rate 
-0.000149 
(0.00137) 
-7.67e-05 
(0.00136) 
-6.16e-05 
(0.00138) 
0.000717 
(0.00212) 
0.000849 
(0.00208) 
0.000916 
(0.00210) 
0.00264 
(0.00323) 
0.00281 
(0.00320) 
0.00287 
(0.00320) 
0.000958 
(0.00495) 
0.00120 
(0.00490) 
0.00124 
(0.00490) 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 
-0.0071*** 
(0.00162) 
  
-0.00976*** 
(0.00249) 
  
0.0123*** 
(0.00383) 
  
0.0136** 
(0.00549) 
  
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 < 𝑇  
0.0505** 
(0.0244) 
  
0.0962** 
(0.0387) 
  
0.130*** 
(0.0488) 
  
0.180** 
(0.0896) 
 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 > 𝑇  
-0.00787*** 
(0.00167) 
  
-0.0111*** 
(0.00258) 
  
0.0140*** 
(0.00394) 
  
0.0160*** 
(0.00569) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑐∗)   
0.0912 
(0.0649) 
  
0.215** 
(0.103) 
  
0.139*** 
(0.0504) 
  
0.186** 
(0.0916) 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑐∗)   
-0.00664*** 
(0.00158) 
  
-0.00855*** 
(0.00243) 
  
0.0130*** 
(0.00387) 
  
0.0151*** 
(0.00560) 
Constant  
6.830*** 
(0.231) 
6.776*** 
(0.233) 
6.740*** 
(0.235) 
15.43*** 
(0.365) 
15.37*** 
(0.368) 
15.29*** 
(0.370) 
14.22*** 
(0.527) 
14.14*** 
(0.538) 
14.11*** 
(0.538) 
0.975 
(0.817) 
0.910 
(0.824) 
0.876 
(0.825) 
Observations 337 337 337 337 337 337 337 337 337 337 337 337 
R2 0.889 0.890 0.889 0.941 0.942 0.941 0.902 0.902 0.902 0.902 0.902 0.902 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*)   16 19  14 16  14 13  16 14 
LSTR parameter (𝛾*)   7   7   10   12 
LM Test (GTD 2005) H0: 
Linear Model  
  
23.72 
  
26.5 
  
22.3 
  
14.04 
p-value nonlinearity    0.0687   0.0269   0.0782   0.664 
LM Test for remaining 
nonlinearities  
  
6.795 
  
4.813 
  
5.873 
  
5.307 
p-value remaining 
nonlinearity  
  
0.986 
  
0.998 
  
0.994 
  
0.997 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors and the coefficients for time and country dummy variables are not displayed on the final results table.  
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Table 3.7: De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness (Chinn-Ito Index) on Income Inequality using 3-year non-overlapping averages 
Robustness Check 1: 3-Year Non-Overlapping Averages 
Time Period: 1980-2013  
Income Group: Developing Economies 
Estimation Methods: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), PTR (Panel Threshold Regression), and LSTR (Logistic Smooth Transition Regression) 
 GINI Index Inter-Decile Income Ratio  Income Quantile Share Ratio 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
PTR 
(3) 
 LSTR 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
PTR 
(6) 
LSTR 
(7) 
OLS 
(8) 
PTR 
(9) 
LSTR 
Variable          
Per Capita Growth  
-0.512*** 
(0.138) 
-0.496*** 
(0.139) 
-0.516*** 
(0.138) 
-0.997* 
(0.543) 
-0.994* 
(0.542) 
-1.006* 
(0.544) 
-0.314*** 
(0.0803) 
-0.304*** 
(0.0819) 
-0.313*** 
(0.0806) 
Fertility Rate 
1.392** 
(0.584) 
1.308** 
(0.594) 
1.372** 
(0.587) 
-5.772 
(2.993) 
-5.748 
(3.013) 
-5.826 
(3.036) 
-1.162 
(0.450) 
-1.093 
(0.471) 
-1.166 
(0.451) 
Inflation 
-0.0201 
(0.0437) 
-0.0196 
(0.0440) 
-0.0210 
(0.0425) 
-0.108 
(0.0962) 
-0.104 
(0.0973) 
-0.101 
(0.0939) 
-0.0110 
(0.0246) 
-0.00966 
(0.0243) 
-0.0111 
(0.0247) 
Government Expenditure 
-0.0954 
(0.0712) 
-0.0917 
(0.0715) 
-0.0965 
(0.0712) 
0.0195 
(0.202) 
0.0166 
(0.202) 
0.0127 
(0.203) 
-0.00364 
(0.0543) 
-0.00248 
(0.0542) 
-0.00344 
(0.0544) 
Population Growth  
3.987*** 
(0.724) 
3.913*** 
(0.725) 
3.952*** 
(0.724) 
9.968*** 
(3.312) 
9.959*** 
(3.325) 
10.05*** 
(3.383) 
2.441*** 
(0.572) 
2.366*** 
(0.583) 
2.448*** 
(0.574) 
Literacy Rate 
0.00519 
(0.0379) 
0.00440 
(0.0379) 
0.00467 
(0.0379) 
-0.0805 
(0.131) 
-0.0798 
(0.132) 
-0.0769 
(0.130) 
-0.00576 
(0.0295) 
-0.00719 
(0.0297) 
-0.00565 
(0.0295) 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 
0.115*** 
(0.0349) 
  
0.486** 
(0.196) 
  
0.0858*** 
(0.0280) 
  
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 < 𝑇  
0.162*** 
(0.0600) 
  
1.584 
(1.467) 
  
0.214** 
(0.0998) 
 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 > 𝑇  
-0.126 
(0.218) 
  
0.477** 
(0.204) 
  
0.0419 
(0.0462) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑐∗)   
-5.405 
(9.700) 
  
6.163 
(7.621) 
  
1.480 
(5.902) 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑐∗)   
0.114*** 
(0.0350) 
  
0.538** 
(0.223) 
  
0.0858*** 
(0.0280) 
Constant  
41.29*** 
(3.766) 
47.11*** 
(4.008) 
42.31*** 
(3.755) 
23.10* 
(12.83) 
28.13** 
(13.22) 
25.04** 
(12.19) 
9.575*** 
(2.700) 
12.34*** 
(2.758) 
10.25*** 
(2.707) 
Observations 343 343 343 343 343 343 341 341 341 
R2 0.206 0.209 0.207 0.185 0.186 0.186 0.125 0.129 0.125 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*)   43 8  12 8  23 8 
LSTR parameter (𝛾*)   14   6   15 
LM Test (GTD 2005) H0: 
Linear Model  
  
23.29 
  
25.86 
  
26.73 
p-value nonlinearity    0.0652   0.0462   0.0152 
LM Test for remaining 
nonlinearities  
  
5.395 
  
3.327 
  
2.980 
p-value remaining 
nonlinearity  
  
0.993 
  
0.999 
  
1 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors and the coefficients for time and country dummy variables are not displayed on the final results table.  
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3.10.2 Robustness Test 2: Lagged IFI Proxy Variable 
 
This robustness test takes the lagged value of the KAOPEN variable, the key 
independent variable of interest. The purpose of this robustness check was to see if past 
values of KAOPEN affect current poverty and inequality levels. In other words, what 
bearing does the level of financial integration in the past have on current levels of both 
poverty and inequality. This is to examine a time inherent effect that financial 
integration may have on the key dependent variables of interests. This would also help 
us examine and probably better understand the importance of the continuity of financial 
integration. This in turn could allow us to understand how to best realize the gains of 
financial integration in reducing poverty and inequality. This robustness check is also 
frequently used to account for the issue of endogeneity. Table 3.8 looks at the impact of 
the lagged KAOPEN variable on poverty. The coefficient estimates for KAOPEN do not 
make any contribution due to the fact that barring two estimated coefficients, the rest are 
statistically insignificant. The KAOPEN coefficients that are statistically significant, are 
negative and of similar magnitude to that found in table 3.2. However, there is 
consistency found for all the other control variables that are statistically significant. The 
most notable finding is that of the savings level; this tends to show that increased savings 
in fact increases poverty. This goes to show the importance of savings in developing 
countries in reducing poverty, reiterating the fact that the spending should be smoothed 
out over time and thereby making savings an integral component of poverty reduction. 
However, this could also mean that reduction in poverty leads to increase in savings; the 
bidirectional relationship must be attested for as this research paper does not control for 
the effect of savings on poverty.  
 
Table 3.9 looks at the impact of lagged KAOPEN on different income bands. The 
results are interesting. In this case, attention must be drawn to the deduction made in 
table 3.6 where 3-year non-overlapping averages were used. It can be seen that the 
coefficients for KAOPEN above the threshold, in both sign, significance level and 
magnitude are similar to that acquired in table 3.3. However, like table 3.6, it can be seen 
that below the threshold, the KAOPEN coefficient is positive for all income bands. 
Therefore, this again reiterates the fact that up until a certain threshold, income share for 
the rich and the poor both increases, however after crossing this threshold, the income 
share of the poor declines and the income share of the rich increases (albeit the 
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magnitude of the increase declines compared to when it was below the threshold). The 
threshold levels are not high though, and thereby this gives us food for thought when 
thinking about policy measures. The other coefficient estimates and deductions are 
consistent with the results acquired in table 3.3 i.e. increased fertility rate results in 
increased income share of the richest 10%. Table 3.10 looks at the impact of lagged 
KAOPEN on income inequality. It can be seen that the KAOPEN coefficients along with 
the other control variables, all coefficients are similar in terms of statistical significance, 
magnitude and sign. However, the KAOPEN coefficients, for all three proxies of income 
inequality, above the threshold, are statistically insignificant in table 3.10. The other 
notable difference is that the threshold levels are significantly higher than they were in 
table 3.4. But, overall the results are consistent with those found in the results section.  
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Table 3.8: De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness (Chinn-Ito Index) on Absolute and Relative Poverty using Lagged IFI proxy variable  
Robustness Check 2: Lagged IFI Proxy Variable 
Time Period: 1980-2013  
Income Group: Developing Economies 
Estimation Methods: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), PTR (Panel Threshold Regression), and LSTR (Logistic Smooth Transition Regression) 
 Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.90 Poverty Headcount Ratio at $3.10 Poverty Gap at $1.90 Poverty Gap at $3.10 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
PTR 
(3) 
 LSTR 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
PTR 
(6) 
LSTR 
(7) 
OLS 
(8) 
PTR 
(9) 
LSTR 
(10) 
OLS 
(11) 
PTR 
(12) 
LSTR 
Variable             
Per Capita Growth 
0.595 
(0.319) 
0.606 
(0.320) 
0.577 
(0.321) 
1.091 
(0.359) 
1.094 
(0.360) 
1.099 
(0.360) 
0.238 
(0.165) 
0.253 
(0.164) 
0.252 
(0.165) 
0.483 
(0.220) 
0.495 
(0.221) 
0.474 
(0.221) 
GINI 
-0.0339 
(0.0994) 
-0.0432 
(0.101) 
-0.0238 
(0.101) 
-0.204* 
(0.128) 
-0.207* 
(0.130) 
-0.217* 
(0.132) 
0.139 
(0.0495) 
0.126 
(0.0495) 
0.130 
(0.0494) 
0.0330 
(0.0702) 
0.0230 
(0.0710) 
0.0381 
(0.0706) 
Fertility Rate 
4.205*** 
(1.067) 
4.202*** 
(1.073) 
4.174*** 
(1.068) 
4.427*** 
(1.172) 
4.426*** 
(1.176) 
4.410*** 
(1.177) 
1.640*** 
(0.537) 
1.634*** 
(0.539) 
1.656*** 
(0.542) 
2.731*** 
(0.734) 
2.727*** 
(0.739) 
2.715*** 
(0.737) 
Inflation 
-0.00664 
(0.0243) 
-0.00446 
(0.0246) 
-0.00670 
(0.0239) 
-0.0239 
(0.0253) 
-0.0230 
(0.0255) 
-0.0226 
(0.0255) 
0.00932 
(0.0125) 
0.0122 
(0.0128) 
0.0103 
(0.0128) 
-0.000838 
(0.0163) 
0.00150 
(0.0166) 
-0.000871 
(0.0162) 
Government Expenditure 
0.0384 
(0.104) 
0.0371 
(0.103) 
0.0349 
(0.104) 
-0.280** 
(0.124) 
-0.281** 
(0.124) 
-0.275** 
(0.124) 
0.150*** 
(0.0507) 
0.149*** 
(0.0507) 
0.152*** 
(0.0508) 
0.0394 
(0.0719) 
0.0379 
(0.0718) 
0.0376 
(0.0723) 
Savings 
-0.220*** 
(0.0584) 
-0.221*** 
(0.0586) 
-0.218*** 
(0.0590) 
-0.266*** 
(0.0708) 
-0.266*** 
(0.0708) 
-0.268*** 
(0.0709) 
-0.143*** 
(0.0309) 
-0.144*** 
(0.0306) 
-0.143*** 
(0.0306) 
-0.181*** 
(0.0420) 
-0.182*** 
(0.0420) 
-0.181*** 
(0.0424) 
Literacy Rate 
-0.469*** 
(0.0709) 
-0.471*** 
(0.0714) 
-0.468*** 
(0.0709) 
-0.609*** 
(0.0781) 
-0.610*** 
(0.0785) 
-0.613*** 
(0.0788) 
-0.216*** 
(0.0354) 
-0.219*** 
(0.0356) 
-0.218*** 
(0.0356) 
-0.348*** 
(0.0488) 
-0.351*** 
(0.0492) 
-0.347*** 
(0.0489) 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 
-0.0876 
(0.0684) 
  
-0.179** 
(0.0855) 
  
-0.0158 
(0.0324) 
  
-0.0651 
(0.0478) 
  
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 < 𝑇  
-0.00192 
(0.189) 
  
-0.124 
(0.354) 
  
0.0959 
(0.0948) 
  
0.0272 
(0.134) 
 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 > 𝑇  
-0.151 
(0.130) 
  
-0.195* 
(0.116) 
  
-0.109 
(0.0729) 
  
-0.133 
(0.0929) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑐∗)   
2.269 
(3.998) 
  
-0.121 
(0.129) 
  
-2.151 
(2.389) 
  
1.128 
(2.801) 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑐∗)   
-0.0181 
(0.133) 
  
10.90 
(14.38) 
  
-0.0769 
(0.0722) 
  
-0.0299 
(0.0935) 
Constant  
41.70*** 
(10.59) 
40.76*** 
(11.44) 
38.22*** 
(11.67) 
82.38*** 
(12.22) 
79.10*** 
(13.27) 
75.88*** 
(14.71) 
8.560* 
(4.963) 
10.22* 
(5.307) 
11.22** 
(5.664) 
30.14*** 
(7.184) 
29.94*** 
(7.809) 
28.25*** 
(7.905) 
Observations 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 
R2 0.703 0.703 0.704 0.743 0.744 0.744 0.638 0.641 0.639 0.716 0.717 0.717 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*)   28 6  21 51  29 5  28 6 
LSTR parameter (𝛾*)   3   10   13   13 
LM Test (GTD 2005) H0: 
Linear Model  
  
18.03 
  
19.28 
  
19.09 
  
18.52 
p-value nonlinearity    0.206   0.155   0.162   0.184 
LM Test for remaining 
nonlinearities  
  
4.285 
  
4.885 
  
10.69 
  
5.167 
p-value remaining 
nonlinearity  
  
0.993 
  
0.987 
  
0.710 
  
0.983 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors and the coefficients for time and country dummy variables are not displayed on the final results table.  
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Table 3.9: De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness (Chinn-Ito Index) on Income Distribution using Lagged IFI proxy variable   
Robustness Check 2: Lagged IFI Proxy Variable 
Time Period: 1980-2013  
Income Group: Developing Economies 
Estimation Methods: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), PTR (Panel Threshold Regression), and LSTR (Logistic Smooth Transition Regression) 
 Income Share of Lowest 10% Income Share of Lowest 20% Income Share of Highest 20% Income Share of Highest 10% 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
PTR 
(3) 
 LSTR 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
PTR 
(6) 
LSTR 
(7) 
OLS 
(8) 
PTR 
(9) 
LSTR 
(10) 
OLS 
(11) 
PTR 
(12) 
LSTR 
Variable             
Per Capita Growth  
0.00907 
(0.00897) 
0.00889 
(0.00902) 
0.00914 
(0.00897) 
0.0133 
(0.0138) 
0.0118 
(0.0138) 
0.0133 
(0.0138) 
0.0127 
(0.0180) 
0.0118 
(0.0180) 
0.0116 
(0.0180) 
0.0191 
(0.0353) 
0.0176 
(0.0355) 
0.0191 
(0.0353) 
GINI 
-0.101*** 
(0.00308) 
-0.101*** 
(0.00306) 
-0.101*** 
(0.00316) 
-0.220*** 
(0.00492) 
-0.221*** 
(0.00484) 
-0.220*** 
(0.00503) 
0.826*** 
(0.00747) 
0.825*** 
(0.00742) 
0.825*** 
(0.00740) 
0.772*** 
(0.0118) 
0.772*** 
(0.0117) 
0.772*** 
(0.0121) 
Fertility Rate 
0.0425 
(0.0243) 
0.0408 
(0.0243) 
0.0425 
(0.0244) 
0.0763 
(0.0373) 
0.0695 
(0.0372) 
0.0763 
(0.0374) 
0.0782 
(0.0496) 
0.0716 
(0.0496) 
0.0709 
(0.0495) 
0.169* 
(0.0925) 
0.164* 
(0.0927) 
0.168* 
(0.0928) 
Inflation 
0.000832 
(0.00168) 
0.000976 
(0.00156) 
0.000841 
(0.00168) 
0.00101 
(0.00226) 
0.00150 
(0.00185) 
0.00102 
(0.00226) 
0.00110 
(0.00298) 
0.00166 
(0.00257) 
0.00169 
(0.00254) 
0.00425 
(0.00385) 
0.00463 
(0.00348) 
0.00429 
(0.00385) 
Government Expenditure 
-0.00365 
(0.00290) 
-0.00403 
(0.00291) 
-0.00359 
(0.00295) 
-0.00537 
(0.00437) 
-0.00617 
(0.00436) 
-0.00530 
(0.00445) 
-0.00708 
(0.00563) 
-0.00770 
(0.00559) 
-0.00775 
(0.00559) 
-0.00732 
(0.0108) 
-0.00855 
(0.0108) 
-0.00716 
(0.0109) 
Savings  
0.000999 
(0.00154) 
0.00102 
(0.00155) 
0.000982 
(0.00153) 
0.000117 
(0.00243) 
0.000279 
(0.00245) 
0.000101 
(0.00242) 
-0.000747 
(0.00324) 
-0.000468 
(0.00326) 
-0.000446 
(0.00326) 
-0.000567 
(0.00647) 
-0.000492 
(0.00649) 
-0.000635 
(0.00647) 
Literacy Rate 
-0.000746 
(0.00152) 
-0.000802 
(0.00151) 
-0.000767 
(0.00153) 
-0.000292 
(0.00234) 
-0.000543 
(0.00232) 
-0.000312 
(0.00237) 
0.000314 
(0.00342) 
-4.26e-05 
(0.00342) 
-6.31e-05 
(0.00341) 
-0.00115 
(0.00572) 
-0.00126 
(0.00572) 
-0.00126 
(0.00580) 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 
-0.0059*** 
(0.00183) 
  
-0.00795*** 
(0.00277) 
  
0.0105** 
(0.00404) 
  
0.0118* 
(0.00625) 
  
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 < 𝑇  
0.0718** 
(0.0355) 
  
0.0457*** 
(0.0164) 
  
0.0363** 
(0.0182) 
  
0.529*** 
(0.177) 
 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 > 𝑇  
-0.00666*** 
(0.00189) 
  
-0.00992*** 
(0.00294) 
  
0.0142*** 
(0.00441) 
  
0.0144** 
(0.00646) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑐∗)   
-0.00550* 
(0.00281) 
  
-0.00753* 
(0.00420) 
  
0.0369** 
(0.0177) 
  
-0.0102 
(0.00964) 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑐∗)   
0.0604 
(0.284) 
  
0.0564 
(0.392) 
  
0.0139*** 
(0.00439) 
  
0.293 
(1.083) 
Constant  
6.689*** 
(0.261) 
6.672*** 
(0.266) 
6.405*** 
(0.313) 
15.24*** 
(0.407) 
15.25*** 
(0.415) 
14.86*** 
(0.485) 
14.11*** 
(0.567) 
14.11*** 
(0.594) 
14.11*** 
(0.592) 
0.651 
(0.923) 
0.691 
(0.938) 
0.122 
(1.108) 
Observations 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 
R2 0.884 0.885 0.884 0.918 0.919 0.918 0.902 0.902 0.902 0.9 0.9 0.9 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*)   11 51  14 51  16 16  15 51 
LSTR parameter (𝛾*)   8   8   15   10 
LM Test (GTD 2005) H0: 
Linear Model  
  
27.51 
  
26.07 
  
27.53 
  
23.36 
p-value nonlinearity    0.023   0.0309   0.0229   0.0499 
LM Test for remaining 
nonlinearities  
  
6.024 
  
3.681 
  
4.483 
  
4.968 
p-value remaining 
nonlinearity  
  
0.966 
  
0.997 
  
0.992 
  
0.986 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors and the coefficients for time and country dummy variables are not displayed on the final results table.  
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Table 3.10: De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness (Chinn-Ito Index) on Income Inequality using Lagged IFI proxy variable   
Robustness Check 2: Lagged IFI Proxy Variable 
Time Period: 1980-2013  
Income Group: Developing Economies 
Estimation Methods: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), PTR (Panel Threshold Regression), and LSTR (Logistic Smooth Transition Regression) 
 GINI Index Inter-Decile Income Ratio  Income Quantile Share Ratio 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
PTR 
(3) 
 LSTR 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
PTR 
(6) 
LSTR 
(7) 
OLS 
(8) 
PTR 
(9) 
LSTR 
Variable          
Per Capita Growth  
-0.475*** 
(0.160) 
-0.431*** 
(0.158) 
-0.431*** 
(0.158) 
-0.636*** 
(0.224) 
-0.579*** 
(0.214) 
-0.596*** 
(0.217) 
-0.379*** 
(0.113) 
-0.361*** 
(0.111) 
-0.360*** 
(0.111) 
Fertility Rate 
1.991*** 
(0.701) 
1.889*** 
(0.709) 
1.887*** 
(0.709) 
2.209 
(0.844) 
2.008 
(0.842) 
2.116 
(0.843) 
-1.549 
(0.496) 
-1.496 
(0.508) 
-1.494 
(0.508) 
Inflation 
-0.0375** 
(0.0176) 
-0.0297* 
(0.0172) 
-0.0298* 
(0.0172) 
-0.00926 
(0.0306) 
0.00147 
(0.0330) 
0.00450 
(0.0350) 
-0.00974 
(0.0112) 
-0.00601 
(0.0118) 
-0.00595 
(0.0119) 
Government Expenditure 
-0.0276 
(0.0798) 
-0.0291 
(0.0784) 
-0.0291 
(0.0784) 
-0.0645 
(0.122) 
-0.0653 
(0.121) 
-0.0600 
(0.121) 
0.0327 
(0.0611) 
0.0295 
(0.0594) 
0.0295 
(0.0594) 
Population Growth  
4.341*** 
(0.789) 
4.185*** 
(0.803) 
4.183*** 
(0.802) 
4.166*** 
(1.115) 
3.889*** 
(1.086) 
3.885*** 
(1.116) 
2.452*** 
(0.569) 
2.371*** 
(0.585) 
2.371*** 
(0.585) 
Literacy Rate 
-0.0226 
(0.0422) 
-0.0267 
(0.0417) 
-0.0268 
(0.0417) 
0.00854 
(0.0598) 
0.00473 
(0.0599) 
-0.000423 
(0.0600) 
-0.0257 
(0.0330) 
-0.0266 
(0.0328) 
-0.0264 
(0.0328) 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 
0.110*** 
(0.0399) 
  
0.129** 
(0.0582) 
  
0.0873** 
(0.0352) 
  
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 < 𝑇  
0.418*** 
(0.117) 
  
0.574*** 
(0.213) 
  
0.276** 
(0.116) 
 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 > 𝑇  
-0.0478 
(0.0660) 
  
-0.0743 
(0.101) 
  
0.0241 
(0.0568) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑐∗)   
0.412*** 
(0.115) 
  
20.23*** 
(6.967) 
  
0.271** 
(0.112) 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑐∗)   
-0.0447 
(0.0650) 
  
-0.0391 
(0.0814) 
  
0.0269 
(0.0551) 
Constant  
43.15*** 
(4.377) 
48.56*** 
(4.339) 
48.49*** 
(4.339) 
18.52*** 
(5.685) 
24.90*** 
(5.946) 
25.51*** 
(6.146) 
11.31*** 
(3.097) 
14.45*** 
(3.206) 
14.35*** 
(3.209) 
Observations 292 292 292 278 278 278 290 290 290 
R2 0.183 0.205 0.206 0.091 0.112 0.115 0.108 0.117 0.117 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*)   25 27  24 7  22 23 
LSTR parameter (𝛾*)   10   16   8 
LM Test (GTD 2005) H0: 
Linear Model  
  
26.99 
  
25.06 
  
26.63 
p-value nonlinearity    0.02   0.0303   0.0105 
LM Test for remaining 
nonlinearities  
  
2.677 
  
5.176 
  
5.688 
p-value remaining 
nonlinearity  
  
0.999 
  
0.999 
  
0.957 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors and the coefficients for time and country dummy variables are not displayed on the final results table.  
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3.10.3 Robustness Test 3: First Difference 
 
Tables 3.11, 3.12, and 3.13 look at the impact of capital account openness on 
poverty, income distribution, and income inequality where the first difference 
transformation is exercised for all independent and dependent variables. This is a 
robustness test that is frequently used in the literature to validate results. The purpose 
of this test was to firstly address the potentiality of the omitted variable bias and 
remove unobserved effects. More importantly, this overcomes the problem of the 
variable being nonstationary and thereby removing the deterministic time trend would 
give us a different perception and solidify these results. In table 3.11, it can be seen 
that for poverty head count ratio at $1.90 and for poverty gap at $3.10, the KAOPEN 
coefficient above the threshold is negative, statistically significant at the 5% and 10% 
significance levels respectively. However, the disparity with table 3.2 is that the 
magnitude is significantly higher for that observed in table 3.11. Regardless, these 
results cannot be taken for analysis or serious consideration as the test of nonlinearity 
suggests that the model is linear and therefore the OLS estimation is appropriate for 
analysis in this case and thereby nullifying the need to observe and deduce from the 
threshold regression findings. In this case only for poverty headcount ratio at $1.90, 
the OLS estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% significance level. 
However, it seemingly increases poverty. This contradicts the findings in the main 
regression results section as well as robustness test 1 and 2. The other coefficient 
estimates for the control variables are either consistent or statistically insignificant 
barring the impact of government expenditure. Increased government expenditure is 
seen to reduce poverty, when the coefficient estimates are taken for the threshold 
regressions, however we cannot take them seriously due to the test of nonlinearity.  
 
For table 3.12, it can be seen that no deductions can be made when looking at 
the impact of financial openness on income distribution using first differences for all 
income bands other than that for the income share of the highest 10%. Due to the test 
of nonlinearity and the test of remaining nonlinearities, for all other income groups, 
the model is either nonlinear and the KAOPEN estimated coefficients are statistically 
insignificant or the coefficient is statistically significant (for the income share of 
highest 20% where above the threshold the KAOPEN coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 1% significance level) but there are remaining nonlinearities. This 
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means there are more than 2 regimes and more than a single threshold. However, for 
the income share of the highest 10%, it can be seen that the coefficient estimate 
(similar to other robustness checks in 1 and 2, but not table 3) for KAOPEN, above 
the threshold is positive and statistically significant at the 1% significance level. 
There are no other notable inferences that can be drawn from this table with regards to 
the other control variables as the GINI coefficient is consistent with the findings in 
table 3.3, but for the others the readings cannot be taken seriously due to the faults of 
the regression models in terms of the tests of nonlinearities. For table 3.13, no 
KAOPEN coefficients are statistically significant or readable due to failure to the 
fulfill the tests of nonlinearities. Only the coefficient estimates for inflation are 
negative and statistically significant at the 5% and 10% significance levels when 
regressed on the GINI index. 
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Table 3.11: De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness (Chinn-Ito Index) on Absolute and Relative Poverty using First Difference 
Robustness Check 3: First Difference 
Time Period: 1980-2013  
Income Group: Developing Economies 
Estimation Methods: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), PTR (Panel Threshold Regression), and LSTR (Logistic Smooth Transition Regression) 
 Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.90 Poverty Headcount Ratio at $3.10 Poverty Gap at $1.90 Poverty Gap at $3.10 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
PTR 
(3) 
 LSTR 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
PTR 
(6) 
LSTR 
(7) 
OLS 
(8) 
PTR 
(9) 
LSTR 
(10) 
OLS 
(11) 
PTR 
(12) 
LSTR 
Variable             
Per Capita Growth 
-0.113 
(0.177) 
-0.0918 
(0.178) 
-0.101 
(0.178) 
-0.0926 
(0.257) 
-0.0957 
(0.259) 
-0.0976 
(0.259) 
-0.0491 
(0.101) 
-0.0396 
(0.0985) 
-0.0433 
(0.101) 
-0.0690 
(0.127) 
-0.0591 
(0.126) 
-0.0707 
(0.127) 
GINI 
0.507*** 
(0.136) 
0.515*** 
(0.136) 
0.524*** 
(0.139) 
0.0715 
(0.152) 
0.0712 
(0.153) 
0.0711 
(0.153) 
0.502*** 
(0.0806) 
0.505*** 
(0.0792) 
0.510*** 
(0.0791) 
0.409*** 
(0.0949) 
0.413*** 
(0.0944) 
0.419*** 
(0.0958) 
Fertility Rate 
2.501 
(2.515) 
2.611 
(2.487) 
2.923 
(2.462) 
-2.754 
(2.624) 
-2.765 
(2.616) 
-2.774 
(2.616) 
2.174 
(1.856) 
2.222 
(1.830) 
2.377 
(1.789) 
1.266 
(1.978) 
1.316 
(1.957) 
1.511 
(1.939) 
Inflation 
-0.0245 
(0.0216) 
-0.0212 
(0.0189) 
-0.0168 
(0.0160) 
-0.0365 
(0.0249) 
-0.0368 
(0.0243) 
-0.0369 
(0.0244) 
-0.00581 
(0.0121) 
-0.00437 
(0.0107) 
-0.00212 
(0.00911) 
-0.0167 
(0.0160) 
-0.0152 
(0.0145) 
-0.0125 
(0.0130) 
Government Expenditure 
-0.200 
(0.129) 
-0.216* 
(0.129) 
-0.233* 
(0.130) 
-0.167 
(0.159) 
-0.166 
(0.160) 
-0.165 
(0.159) 
-0.111 
(0.0739) 
-0.118 
(0.0721) 
-0.127* 
(0.0724) 
-0.137 
(0.0923) 
-0.144 
(0.0916) 
-0.154* 
(0.0920) 
Savings 
0.0938 
(0.110) 
0.0882 
(0.108) 
0.0946 
(0.108) 
0.144 
(0.144) 
0.145 
(0.144) 
0.145 
(0.144) 
0.0310 
(0.0516) 
0.0286 
(0.0513) 
0.0314 
(0.0506) 
0.0717 
(0.0740) 
0.0691 
(0.0733) 
0.0745 
(0.0734) 
Literacy Rate 
-0.0595 
(0.107) 
-0.0552 
(0.105) 
-0.0690 
(0.106) 
-0.174 
(0.127) 
-0.176 
(0.126) 
-0.177 
(0.126) 
0.00118 
(0.0748) 
0.00305 
(0.0736) 
-0.00342 
(0.0758) 
-0.0480 
(0.0860) 
-0.0461 
(0.0850) 
-0.0579 
(0.0869) 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 
0.105* 
(0.0630) 
  
0.0902 
(0.0733) 
  
0.0626 
(0.0470) 
  
0.0738 
(0.0514) 
  
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 < 𝑇  
-0.0396 
(0.123) 
  
0.101 
(0.0972) 
  
-0.00130 
(0.104) 
  
0.00776 
(0.104) 
 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 > 𝑇  
0.255** 
(0.110) 
  
0.0558 
(0.235) 
  
0.128* 
(0.0700) 
  
0.142* 
(0.0858) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑐∗)   
-0.195 
(0.143) 
  
0.106 
(0.0921) 
  
-0.0818 
(0.119) 
  
-0.0707 
(0.0873) 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑐∗)   
-6.675** 
(2.938) 
  
0.0368 
(0.230) 
  
-3.198 
(2.149) 
  
-3.097* 
(1.613) 
Constant  
-2.970*** 
(0.776) 
-3.362*** 
(1.029) 
-11.77** 
(5.818) 
-4.895*** 
(0.951) 
-3.663** 
(1.587) 
-3.606** 
(1.501) 
-1.100** 
(0.435) 
-1.192* 
(0.645) 
-4.918 
(4.658) 
-2.253*** 
(0.553) 
-2.302*** 
(0.769) 
-5.677* 
(3.329) 
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
R2 0.157 0.166 0.175 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.268 0.272 0.278 0.174 0.178 0.185 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*)   5 35  12 12  5 35  5 33 
LSTR parameter (𝛾*)   1   3   1   1 
LM Test (GTD 2005) H0: 
Linear Model  
  
13.78 
  
15.58 
  
15.49 
  
16.22 
p-value nonlinearity    0.315   0.211   0.216   0.182 
LM Test for remaining 
nonlinearities  
  
327.1 
  
19.79 
  
274.6 
  
129.8 
p-value remaining 
nonlinearity  
  
0.999 
  
0.0712 
  
0.999 
  
0.999 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors and the coefficients for time and country dummy variables are not displayed on the final results table.  
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Table 3.12: De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness (Chinn-Ito Index) on Income Distribution using First Difference    
Robustness Check 3: First Difference 
Time Period: 1980-2013  
Income Group: Developing Economies 
Estimation Methods: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), PTR (Panel Threshold Regression), and LSTR (Logistic Smooth Transition Regression) 
 Income Share of Lowest 10% Income Share of Lowest 20% Income Share of Highest 20% Income Share of Highest 10% 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
PTR 
(3) 
 LSTR 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
PTR 
(6) 
LSTR 
(7) 
OLS 
(8) 
PTR 
(9) 
LSTR 
(10) 
OLS 
(11) 
PTR 
(12) 
LSTR 
Variable             
Per Capita Growth  
0.00893 
(0.00662) 
0.00874 
(0.00659) 
0.00872 
(0.00658) 
0.0133 
(0.0107) 
0.0130 
(0.0106) 
0.0130 
(0.0106) 
0.0145 
(0.0155) 
0.0132 
(0.0154) 
0.0145 
(0.0153) 
0.0233 
(0.0231) 
0.0214 
(0.0232) 
0.0215 
(0.0231) 
GINI 
-0.0885*** 
(0.00344) 
-0.0885*** 
(0.00347) 
-0.0886*** 
(0.00347) 
-0.199*** 
(0.00534) 
-0.199*** 
(0.00537) 
-0.199*** 
(0.00537) 
0.854*** 
(0.00897) 
0.854*** 
(0.00889) 
0.854*** 
(0.00894) 
0.845*** 
(0.0162) 
0.846*** 
(0.0162) 
0.846*** 
(0.0162) 
Fertility Rate 
0.0360 
(0.0749) 
0.0346 
(0.0748) 
0.0344 
(0.0748) 
0.0859 
(0.123) 
0.0837 
(0.123) 
0.0833 
(0.123) 
0.125 
(0.197) 
0.147 
(0.200) 
0.125 
(0.194) 
0.259 
(0.269) 
0.293 
(0.269) 
0.296 
(0.269) 
Inflation 
0.00362*** 
(0.00107) 
0.00359*** 
(0.00110) 
0.00359*** 
(0.00111) 
0.00435*** 
(0.00144) 
0.00430*** 
(0.00149) 
0.00430*** 
(0.00149) 
0.00478** 
(0.00189) 
0.00503*** 
(0.00176) 
0.00479** 
(0.00189) 
0.00693** 
(0.00325) 
0.00730** 
(0.00305) 
0.00733** 
(0.00303) 
Government Expenditure 
-0.00297 
(0.00456) 
-0.00282 
(0.00454) 
-0.00281 
(0.00453) 
-0.00682 
(0.00709) 
-0.00659 
(0.00698) 
-0.00657 
(0.00697) 
-0.0108 
(0.00956) 
-0.0116 
(0.00951) 
-0.0109 
(0.00942) 
-0.00757 
(0.0184) 
-0.00874 
(0.0184) 
-0.00888 
(0.0183) 
Savings  
-0.00245** 
(0.00106) 
-0.00245** 
(0.00107) 
-0.00245** 
(0.00107) 
-0.00413*** 
(0.00158) 
-0.00413** 
(0.00159) 
-0.00413** 
(0.00159) 
-0.00649*** 
(0.00219) 
-0.00659*** 
(0.00221) 
-0.00649*** 
(0.00219) 
-0.00679 
(0.00529) 
-0.00694 
(0.00532) 
-0.00693 
(0.00532) 
Literacy Rate 
0.00339 
(0.00346) 
0.00335 
(0.00344) 
0.00334 
(0.00344) 
0.00585 
(0.00585) 
0.00578 
(0.00584) 
0.00577 
(0.00584) 
0.00344 
(0.00885) 
0.00260 
(0.00869) 
0.00345 
(0.00881) 
0.00171 
(0.0142) 
0.000451 
(0.0140) 
0.000306 
(0.0140) 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 
-0.000999 
(0.00207) 
  
-0.00200 
(0.00325) 
  
0.00297 
(0.00478) 
  
0.00846 
(0.00881) 
  
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 < 𝑇  
0.000476 
(0.00289) 
  
0.000351 
(0.00476) 
  
0.000362 
(0.00489) 
  
-0.00346 
(0.00939) 
 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 > 𝑇  
-0.00252 
(0.00441) 
  
-0.00444 
(0.00671) 
  
0.0865*** 
(0.0187) 
  
0.134*** 
(0.0369) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑐∗)   
0.000590 
(0.00285) 
  
0.000581 
(0.00469) 
  
0.00331 
(0.00795) 
  
-0.00360 
(0.00925) 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑐∗)   
-0.00265 
(0.00434) 
  
-0.00469 
(0.00661) 
  
0.00262 
(0.00952) 
  
0.141*** 
(0.0390) 
Constant  
0.0260 
(0.0325) 
0.0303 
(0.0395) 
0.0307 
(0.0392) 
0.0680 
(0.0500) 
0.0728 
(0.0616) 
0.0739 
(0.0610) 
0.142* 
(0.0731) 
0.165 
(0.126) 
0.125 
(0.0875) 
0.191 
(0.147) 
0.133 
(0.250) 
0.131 
(0.247) 
Observations 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 
R2 0.781 0.781 0.781 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.984 0.984 0.984 0.948 0.948 0.948 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*)   5 5  15 17  23 5  23 25 
LSTR parameter (𝛾*)   6   6   6   6 
LM Test (GTD 2005) H0: 
Linear Model  
  
4.845 
  
8.585 
  
28.582 
  
25.28 
p-value nonlinearity    0.963   0.738   0.0238   0.0227 
LM Test for remaining 
nonlinearities  
  
19.42 
  
22.21 
  
22.93 
  
13.35 
p-value remaining 
nonlinearity  
  
0.0789 
  
0.0353 
  
0.0983 
  
0.344 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors and the coefficients for time and country dummy variables are not displayed on the final results table.  
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Table 3.13: De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness (Chinn-Ito Index) on Income Inequality using First Difference   
Robustness Check 3: First Difference 
Time Period: 1980-2013  
 Income Group: Developing Economies 
Estimation Methods: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), PTR (Panel Threshold Regression), and LSTR (Logistic Smooth Transition Regression) 
 GINI Index Inter-Decile Income Ratio  Income Quantile Share Ratio 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
PTR 
(3) 
 LSTR 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
PTR 
(6) 
LSTR 
(7) 
OLS 
(8) 
PTR 
(9) 
LSTR 
Variable          
Per Capita Growth  
-0.0404 
(0.128) 
-0.0459 
(0.127) 
-0.0448 
(0.128) 
-0.0559 
(0.126) 
-0.0555 
(0.128) 
-0.0558 
(0.126) 
-0.664 
(0.512) 
-0.658 
(0.505) 
-0.659 
(0.507) 
Fertility Rate 
-0.107 
(1.198) 
-0.128 
(1.184) 
-0.206 
(1.169) 
2.247 
(2.630) 
2.238 
(2.608) 
2.196 
(2.563) 
0.268 
(2.470) 
0.290 
(2.483) 
0.506 
(2.612) 
Inflation 
-0.0235** 
(0.0104) 
-0.0242** 
(0.00989) 
-0.0257*** 
(0.00926) 
-0.0516 
(0.0402) 
-0.0513 
(0.0410) 
-0.0518 
(0.0403) 
-0.0579 
(0.0491) 
-0.0571 
(0.0481) 
-0.0528 
(0.0425) 
Government Expenditure 
0.0258 
(0.0936) 
0.0291 
(0.0938) 
0.0359 
(0.0933) 
-0.0545 
(0.110) 
-0.0504 
(0.109) 
-0.0443 
(0.111) 
0.510 
(0.426) 
0.507 
(0.423) 
0.487 
(0.401) 
Population Growth  
0.971 
(1.021) 
0.945 
(1.015) 
0.892 
(1.007) 
-0.0799 
(1.334) 
-0.0647 
(1.338) 
-0.0568 
(1.339) 
3.562 
(3.782) 
3.588 
(3.833) 
3.730 
(4.012) 
Literacy Rate 
0.0129 
(0.0823) 
0.0116 
(0.0818) 
0.0154 
(0.0824) 
0.113 
(0.110) 
0.113 
(0.109) 
0.114 
(0.110) 
-0.546 
(0.579) 
-0.544 
(0.579) 
-0.554 
(0.591) 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 
0.0544 
(0.0380) 
  
0.0959 
(0.0604) 
  
0.136 
(0.106) 
  
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 < 𝑇  
0.0917 
(0.0677) 
  
0.115 
(0.159) 
  
0.0977 
(0.117) 
 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 > 𝑇  
0.0152 
(0.0662) 
  
0.0756 
(0.0702) 
  
0.177 
(0.191) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑐∗)   
0.149* 
(0.0836) 
  
0.157 
(0.201) 
  
-0.0628 
(0.206) 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 − 𝑐∗)   
2.233 
(1.886) 
  
1.658 
(3.870) 
  
-4.349 
(6.090) 
Constant  
-0.872** 
(0.428) 
-0.359 
(0.621) 
4.995 
(3.443) 
-1.781*** 
(0.600) 
-1.172 
(0.841) 
4.583 
(8.338) 
0.733 
(1.991) 
1.167 
(2.160) 
-2.803 
(7.384) 
Observations 184 184 184 131 131 131 185 185 185 
R2 0.132 0.133 0.136 0.116 0.116 0.118 0.053 0.053 0.054 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*)   5 35  5 38  5 34 
LSTR parameter (𝛾*)   1   1   1 
LM Test (GTD 2005) H0: 
Linear Model  
  
11.79 
  
15.69 
  
3.233 
p-value nonlinearity    0.380   0.153   0.987 
LM Test for remaining 
nonlinearities  
  
78.68 
  
19.44 
  
21.03 
p-value remaining 
nonlinearity  
  
0.00346 
  
0.0537 
  
0.0331 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors and the coefficients for time and country dummy variables are not displayed on the final results table.  
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3.10.4 Robustness Test 4: GMM Estimations  
 
Table 3.14: De Jure Measure of Capital Account Openness (Chinn-Ito Index) on Poverty, Income 
Distribution using GMM estimations  
Robustness Check 3: GMM Estimations  
Time Period: 1980-2013 (5-Year Non-Overlapping Averages) 
Income Group: Developing Economies 
 Poverty Income Distribution Inequality 
 (1) 
Poverty 
Headcount Ratio 
at $1.90 
(2) 
Income Share of 
Lowest 20% 
(3) 
Income Share of 
Highest 20% 
(4) 
GINI Index 
Lagged DV85 0.686*** 
(6.971] 
-0.00205 
[-0.0620] 
0.00502 
[0.387] 
-0.0994 
[-1.097] 
KAOP -0.106** 
[-1.980] 
-0.00511 
[-0.830] 
-0.00838 
[-1.030] 
0.193*** 
[2.754] 
Per Capita Growth 0.102 
[0.465] 
-0.0262 
[-1.369] 
-0.0368 
[-1.329] 
-0.142 
[-0.644] 
GINI 
0.138 
[0.656] 
-0.233*** 
[13.83] 
0.813*** 
[30.16] 
 
Fertility Rate 
4.300 
[1.526] 
0.0808 
[0.519] 
-0.00743 
[-0.0354] 
-2.923 
[-1.371] 
Inflation 
0.0125 
[0.312] 
0.00136 
[0.425] 
0.00180 
[0.391] 
-0.0419*** 
[-3.011] 
Government 
Expenditure 
0.000217 
[0.00137] 
0.000919 
[0.0867] 
-0.00698 
[-0.605] 
-0.189 
[-1.203] 
Savings 
-0.270 
[-1.612] 
0.00482 
[0.639] 
-0.00107 
[-0.0872] 
 
Population Growth  
 
 
  3.644** 
[2.382] 
Literacy Rate 
0.182 
[1.406] 
-0.00773 
[-0.751] 
-0.00788 
[-0.599] 
-0.0794 
[-0.576] 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 222 225 225 223 
Number of Countries 78 79 79 79 
Number of Instruments 43 43 43 41 
AR(1) Test P-Value 0.0282 0.880 0.391 0.0192 
AR(2) Test P-Value 0.462 0.881 0.375 0.252 
Hansen Test of Over-
Ridden Restrictions P-
Value 
0.357 0.265 0.117 0.192 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are the values of the t-statistics and the coefficients for time variables are 
not displayed on the final results table. 
 
Table 3.14 illustrates the GMM estimations86 that measure the impact of 
financial integration on poverty, income distribution and inequality. However, not all 
proxy variables are used for regression analysis. To account purely for poverty, the 
poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 is included, to account for income distribution, 
                                                 
85 ‘Lagged DV’ represents the lagged dependent variables. Therefore, for each column, it would 
individually signify different lagged variables for each regression equation. For instance, column 4 
would take the lagged value of the GINI coefficient.  
86 The GMM estimations are carried out using the ‘xtabond2’ command on Stata. The paper developed 
by Roodman (2006) is used as a benchmark for executing the technical commands on the software.  
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income share of the lowest and highest 20% are included and to account for income 
inequality the GINI coefficient is selected as the proxy variable for regression 
analysis. In this table, the p-values of the Arellano-Bond second-order autocorrelation 
tests are applied to the residuals in differences i.e. this test examines the existence of 
first-order autocorrelation. If for instance, there is first-order serial correlation then 
the supposition that one needs to use is that there is a need to use deeper lags for the 
dependent variable of interest as instrumental variables. This is represented in AR (2) 
test p-value in the results columns in table 3.14. On table 3.14, it is evident that the p-
values are high, therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis which indicates the 
existence of serial correlation. Thus, no deeper lags are required. The Hansen test of 
over-ridden restrictions are also included in this table. All of these p-values are also 
high and therefore the null hypothesis is rejected, and this indicates that the 
instruments selected are valid. Furthermore, in terms of the selection of the number of 
instruments, Roodman (2006) states that the number of instruments must be below the 
number of countries. This is the case across all four regression equations.  
  
From regression equation 1, it is observed that increasing financial openness 
results in decreased poverty and this is statistically significant at the 5% significance 
level. This finding is consistent with that deduced in the final results section. 
Furthermore, it can be seen that initial level of poverty is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% significance level, thereby indicating the existence of a ‘poverty 
trap.’ However, for the remainder of the coefficients, for all the other control 
variables, it can be seen that the coefficients are statistically insignificant at all 
significance levels. All the coefficients, including the lagged dependent variables, the 
coefficient for the KAOPEN variable as well as all the control variables are all 
statistically insignificant for regression equations 2 and 3. For regression equation 4, 
the lagged dependent variable has a statistically insignificant coefficient. However, in 
accordance with the results acquired in the main results section, the key independent 
variable of interest has a positive coefficient and is statistically significant at the 1% 
significance level. This indicates increasing inequality with increased openness. The 
lagged dependent variable is statistically insignificant. Rise in inflation is associated 
with reduction in inequality in developing countries. This result is statistically 
significant at the 1% significance level. Furthermore, consistent with the findings in 
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the results section, population growth increases inequality and this is statistically 
significant at the 5% significance level.  
 
Regression equation 1 and regression equation 4 can be considered for 
analysis due to the simple nature of the fact that the key variables of interest are 
statistically significant. However, we are forced to completely discard the results 
deduced from regression equations 2 and 3, as well as the coefficients for the control 
variables in regression equation 1. The proposition as to why lagged dependent 
variables should not be used for the purposes of this regression analysis are the 
following: (1) The regression results are distorted when the lagged dependent variable 
is included as it loses the statistical significance of the coefficients of interest; (2) 
Lagged dependent variables do not have any causal interpretation, therefore it can be 
omitted; (3) If a lagged dependent variable is used as a control variable then the 
coefficient of this lagged dependent variable is always of high magnitude and 
statistically significant – however this distorts the true magnitude and statistical 
significance of the coefficients of the other independent variables of interest, 
especially the key independent variable of interest which is the KAOPEN. Moreover, 
researchers state that autoregressive terms “dominate the regression” (Rao and Miller, 
1971) or “swamp the other variables”, thereby “distorting the findings.” We must ask 
why lagged dependent variables are included. The answer is to avoid bias. However, 
this is causing bias. The LDV can dominate the regression though it has little, none or 
high explanatory power. If there is heavy trending of exogenous variable (with 
KAOPEN there is evidence of trending), then the addition of the lagged dependent 
variable (strong or weak LDV) will dominate the regression and furthermore, destroy 
the effect of other variables. If the exogenous variables are stationary, then there may 
be a better case, but that is not the case for my research paper and my variables. The 
lagged dependent variable does therefore bias the substantive coefficients toward 
negligible values and artificially inflates the effect of the lagged dependent variable; 
(4) for panel datasets, especially when the number of time periods (5-year averages) 
are small, lagged dependent variables can especially be distortive, as it again 
suppresses the legitimate effects of other variables.  
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3.11 Appendix 3: Country Group Classification 
 
3.11.1 Developing Economies  
 
These are the 79 developing countries (excludes high income countries as determined 
by the World Bank) used for regression analysis: 
 
Albania 
Angola 
Armenia 
Bangladesh 
Belarus 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
China 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Croatia 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Estonia 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Georgia 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Honduras 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Lao PDR 
Latvia 
Lesotho 
Lithuania 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Mali 
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Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Romania 
Rwanda 
Samoa 
Slovenia 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Swaziland 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
Tonga 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
Uruguay 
Venezuela, RB 
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Chapter 4: The Impact of Financial Integration on Crises: 
How does the intensity of financial liberalization affect the 
likelihood of inducing a banking, currency, and twin crisis?  
 
Abstract  
 
This research paper investigates the impact of the intensity of financial liberalization 
on the likelihood of a banking, currency and twin crisis using a dataset that includes 
93 developing economies over the time period 1980-2013. It also explores the impact 
of political institutions and political polarization both independently and jointly with 
financial liberalization and estimates the resulting impact on the likelihood of a 
banking, currency and twin crisis. The econometric technique deployed in this 
research paper includes the multivariate probit regression model. The conditional 
fixed effects logit model and the random effects probit model are used to validate the 
findings of the probit regression. For developing countries, it is observed that 
increasing the intensity of financial liberalization reduces macroeconomic 
vulnerabilities as the likelihood of a banking, currency and twin crisis decreases. 
Improved conditions of political institutions lower the risk of financial fragilities, but, 
increased political polarization increases the likelihood of a banking, currency and 
twin crisis.         
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4.1 Introduction 
 
Economists, policymakers and government officials have systematically 
disputed the benefits and drawbacks of financial integration87. A fundamental 
criticism attributed to financial integration is the subsequent macroeconomic 
vulnerabilities or fragilities in the financial markets that follow financial 
liberalization. The tendency for developing countries is to attempt to replicate the 
economic success of the advanced or high-income economies. The debate is fueled 
not in the end goal, but in the pathway to the end goal. In the context of developing 
and emerging countries, the most prominent example would be the Asian Financial 
Crisis of 1997 that was preceded by the Asian growth “miracle.” The neoliberal camp 
or the pro-reformists that argue in support of financial liberalization state that 
financial liberalization reduces financing constraints, facilitates risk sharing, 
facilitates the inflow of technology and technological assistance particularly in the 
case of FDI, and this in turn would induce investment, which would promote 
innovation and thereby boost total factor productivity (Dooley, 1995). Their argument 
heavily emphasizes that in order to achieve or realize the financial capacity or the 
economic potential of an economy, the financial markets must be liberalized.  
 
On the contrary, the school of thought that opposes financial liberalization 
state that financial liberalization, in the form of financial inflow, or rather ‘financial 
overflow’ from foreign countries results in dependency on foreign capital, this 
encourages domestic firms to undertake credit risks, this induces domestic and foreign 
investors to invest in the non-tradable sector88 as opposed to the tradable sector. The 
misallocation and misuse of domestic and foreign funds and investments often cause 
fragilities in the banking sector, which thereby propagates distress in the entirety of 
the financial market. In some cases, this gives speculators the ideal opportunity to 
attack the currency, resulting in a dual banking and currency crisis, otherwise labelled 
as the twin crisis. The punchline motivation for this thesis altogether was centered 
around developing and emerging nations ‘bite more than they can chew’. The 
preceding chapters examined the impact of financial integration on (1) growth and on 
                                                 
87 For this research paper, the financial integration has been proxied by financial liberalization. The 
variable used to proxy financial liberalization is the Chinn-Ito Index developed by Chinn and Ito 
(2006).  
88 In the context of developing and/or emerging nations, this would be indicative of real estate.  
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(2) poverty and inequality. The analysis would be incomplete without addressing the 
impact of financial integration on financial fragilities or macroeconomic 
vulnerabilities. Furthermore, an under addressed researching avenue that is evident in 
the financial integration and crisis literature is the focus on key political factors or 
drivers and their subsequent impact on crises.89 There is a tendency for economists 
particularly in academic studies to downplay the macroeconomic repercussions of 
political factors. They are often included to serve as controls to run regressions. 
However, these political factors are particularly significant in the context of 
developing nations. Therefore, a motivating element of this research paper stems from 
the lack of existing empirical studies that look at the impact of key political factors 
and their subsequent impact on the likelihood of crises, both independently and 
conjoined with financial integration.   
 
This research paper investigates the impact of the intensity of financial 
liberalization on the likelihood of a banking, currency and twin crisis using a dataset 
that includes 93 developing economies over the time period 1980-2013. An integral 
component of the researching study examines the impact of political institutions and 
political polarization both independently and jointly with financial liberalization and 
estimates the resulting impact on the likelihood of a banking, currency and twin crisis. 
The econometric technique deployed in this research paper includes the multivariate 
probit regression model. The conditional fixed effects logit model and the random 
effects probit model are used to validate the findings of the probit regression.  
 
The key research questions that this research paper seeks to address and 
investigate are the following:  
 
1. What is the impact of the intensity of financial liberalization on the likelihood 
of a banking, currency and twin crisis? 
                                                 
89 The latter section of the research paper discusses the negligence of or the lack of consideration of 
key political factors in the context of macroeconomic vulnerabilities or financial fragilities. This is 
predominantly criticized in literature review section, specifically outlining the lack of empirical studies 
focusing on key political factors and their effect on the likelihood of a crisis both jointly (with financial 
liberalization and independently.  
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2. What is the impact of political institutions and political polarization 
independently and in association with financial liberalization on the likelihood 
of a banking, currency and twin crisis? 
 
The key contribution of this research paper stems from the inferences deduced 
using the KAOPEN variable, which measures the intensity of financial liberalization 
rather than the conventionally used dummy variable for financial market liberalization 
usually proxied by equity market liberalization or other binary variables. Furthermore, 
this research paper examines the impact of political polarization and its resulting 
effect both jointly (with financial liberalization) and independently on the likelihood 
of crises.  
 
The research paper is structured as follows; the first section introduces 
theoretical framework and the linkages between financial liberalization and banking, 
currency and twin crises. Within the first section, a sub-section is designated to the 
analysis of the existing theoretical linkages between the key political factors and its 
resulting impact on crises. The second section examines the existing empirical 
literature and the associated researching papers associated to the research arena. The 
third, fourth and fifth section includes the methodology, variable description and the 
empirical framework respectively. Section 6 illustrates the key results of the paper. 
Section 7 concludes. Appendix 1 (refer to section 4.9) explores the historical trends, 
uses scatter and quadratic graphs to graphically examine the relationships between the 
key independent and dependent variables of interest. Appendix 2 (refer to section 
4.10) illustrates the predictive margins. Appendix 3 (refer to section 4.11) presents the 
robustness checks.    
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4.2 Theoretical Framework 
 
4.2.1 Banking Crises: Theoretical Linkages with Financial Liberalization 
 
If loan losses exceed a bank’s compulsory and voluntary reserves as well as its 
equity buffer, the bank is then said to be insolvent. When a significant portion of the 
banking system experiences loan losses in excess of its capital, a systemic banking 
crisis occurs (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). Theory hypothesizes that 
external shocks, particularly shocks that adversely affect the performance of 
borrowers, must have a positive association with systemic banking crises as the 
impact of this cannot be reduced by risk diversification. There is a tendency to 
attribute banking sector vulnerabilities directly to the increase in NPLs (non-
performing loans), but it must be noted that the balance sheets can deteriorate if the 
rate of return of bank assets is lower than the rate that must be paid for that of bank 
liabilities. A prominent case of a mismatch or an imbalance of the balance sheet could 
be when countries borrow in foreign currencies and lend in domestic currency. In the 
case of an unexpected depreciation of the local currency, it could severely threaten the 
condition of the bank, as the profits would erode. Hence, it is observed that many 
countries enforce strict regulations on open foreign currency inflow into the economy 
(Garber, 1996). Loans in foreign currencies caused banking distress in Chile in 1982, 
Mexico in 1995 (Mishkin, 1996), the Nordic economies in 1990s, and in Turkey in 
1994.  
 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) have shown that banking crisis could be self-
fulfilling as it theorizes that depositors may be subject to speculation, fearing that 
other depositors are withdrawing their funds they withdraw their own funds, causing a 
contagion effect, even when the balance sheet of the bank was initially stable. This 
unfortunate possibility can spread from one bank to a banking sector panic, causing 
all banks to come to the risk of insolvency. Deposit insurance, in this case, if banks 
were to purchase full or partial insurance on behalf of depositors from government 
agencies or private insurers, may reduce this risk, as the government may provide 
bailout packages, however, there is also the chance that there may be excessive risk-
taking (Kane, 1989). Therefore, for economies that are financially liberalized with 
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deposit insurance, and if there is prudential regulation or strict supervision, then there 
is always the risk of a moral hazard problem, that may eventually lead to a crisis.  
 
The dynamic theoretical model developed by Daniel and Jones (2006)90 looks 
at how financial liberalization can, by itself, contribute to the possibility of a banking 
crisis. The dynamic model shows that there is an initial period of rapid growth for 
emerging markets, where there will be a transitional period with an increased risk of a 
banking crisis i.e. a banking crisis is not expected immediately after liberalization but 
after a short period of time. The reason why this transition period (the transition from 
repression to liberalization) is likely to be risky for the banking sector is because 
immediately after liberalization, the stock of capital is low and therefore marginal 
product of capital is high even if productivity is low. Domestic banks’ foreign 
competitors do not have the experience or expertise to function in emerging markets 
and will only offer loans at high interest rates. Newly liberalized domestic banks 
derive high profits and bank stature grows rapidly. This results in an increased capital 
for domestic banks. However, if the domestic banks fail to effectively utilize this 
capital through dispersion of good loans, which includes an effective management 
system, then this stock of capital will become less and less productive with time. 
Finally, as foreign lenders have more experience, foreign debt becomes increasingly 
cheaper which causes loan interest rates to fall and this is when the competitive 
advantage of domestic banks tend to fall and this promotes risky tendencies of 
domestic banks and this is when the banking sector is susceptible to a crisis. The 
model adds further value, as following, for example, because Gaytan and Ranciere’s 
(2004) paper, “middle-income” economies are found to be most vulnerable to banking 
crises that is in line with Daniel and Jones’ model assumption, showing that, this is 
the case even for countries that have well-designed banking systems.    
 
In the case of economic downturns, expansion of cross-border lending should 
ideally stabilize this volatility. This is particularly beneficial for developing nations 
that are comparatively smaller in size. Foreign entrance into the local economy can 
also mobilize and improve the institutional framework for banking activities. For 
                                                 
90 Daniel and Jones’ (2006) model is comprehensive and detailed. However, for the purposes of this 
research paper, a brief description has been provided that explains the gist of the model. Although, 
there are components of the model that are both interesting and noteworthy, that were not included in 
this discussion.  
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countries that have a fixed exchange rate, especially for the case of developing 
countries, problems in the banking sector may be fueled by a speculative attack on the 
domestic currency. If depositors expect devaluation then both foreign and local 
depositors will rush to withdraw their funds in order to convert them in foreign 
currency abroad causing banking insolvency. Post-liberalization, the portfolios that 
were performing poorly in the pre-liberalization era, are usually exposed after 
liberalization as these domestic banks are not accustomed to the new banking 
environment, especially when having to cohabit and compete with foreign banks and 
foreign financial institutions.  
 
Governments implement capital controls in order to stabilize boom-bust cycles 
in cases when there are excessive capital inflows and to also increase the effectiveness 
of their monetary policies. From the perspective of ‘behavioral liberalization91,’ 
which refers to removal of interest rate and credit controls, it is theorized that 
speculative behavior would cause crises, and this can only be restricted and reduced if 
there are restrictions on financial investment opportunities and bank lending. On the 
part of competitive liberalization, which refers to expansion of cross-border financial 
lending, is said to have a profound effect on the probability of a banking crisis 
(Angkinand, Sawangngoenyuang and Wihlborg, 2010). Barth, Caprio, and Levine 
(2004) find that entrance of foreign banks and restrictions on banking activity results 
in increased likelihood of a banking crisis. McKinnon and Pill (1998) underline the 
risk of capital flow reversal when there is a surge of capital inflows which creates an 
asset price bubble.  
 
Banks fail when they are unable to deliver funds that depositors demand. 
When the growth rate of bank deposits is lower than the deposit interest rate then 
banks are forced to make a net transfer of funds to the depositors and in this case, they 
would have to run down their stock of liquidity. However, when domestic interest 
rates are high or rate of growth of deposits is low or negative then banks cannot 
extract these funds to give to the depositors (Gavin and Hausmann, 1999). Gavin and 
Hausmann (1996) define two components of a banking crisis. The first they define to 
                                                 
91 Angikand, Sawangngoenyuang and Wihlborg (1998) categorize different types of financial 
liberalization, where ‘behavioural liberalization’ refers to the removal of interest rates and credit 
controls.  
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be the magnitude of the net resource transfers that the banking system is required to 
fulfill the demands of the depositors. The second they enlist as the threshold of 
resource transfers above which the banking system will crumble. The first component 
is associated to the potential of shocks and the second component defines the 
vulnerability of the banking system, both shocks and vulnerabilities cause a banking 
crisis.  
 
There is a common presumption in the literature that opposes the notion of 
financial liberalization and labels it as the ‘rope for their own hanging’ as it argues 
that bankers will engage in businesses that they are unaccustomed with and 
unprepared for post-liberalization and they could make errors that are detrimental to 
the banking sector on the whole. Sudden relaxation of the regulatory authorities can 
cause banks to give these excessively risky loans and incur enormous losses. An 
important aspect of financial liberalization is the deregulation of deposit interest rates 
which causes banking interdependency for the determination of the banks deposit 
interest rate. These aggressive strategies for the aggressive bidding for deposits are 
often destructive in nature and therefore liberalization is said to destabilize the natural 
functionality of the banking sector adding to its fragility. Gavin and Hausmann (1996) 
stress the importance of prudential banking regulations. They stress that depositors 
are exposed to the abusive behavior and are exposed to the consequences of banking 
mismanagement and they underline the fact that resorting to deposit insurance does 
not solve this problem but exacerbates it as it eliminates the efficacy of corporate 
governance by taking away the incentive of depositors to monitor the functionality of 
their banks. Englund (1999) states that the majority of banking crises are initiated by 
deregulatory measures which lead to overly rapid credit expansions – which is 
defined as a ‘bubble’ according to the author. When the bubble bursts, there is a 
dramatic fall in real prices and the asset market along with widespread bankruptcies. 
This occurs alongside increase in non-performing loans, credit losses and severe 
liquidity crisis in the banking system.  
 
In Giannetti’s (2006) model, it is suggested that liberalization of capital flows 
will generate boom-bust cycles in emerging market economies. Due to asymmetric 
information, after liberalization, investors will provide large amounts of funds at a 
very low cost. This will cause banks to accumulate bad loans and when the amount of 
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bad loans is substantially high, the solvent banks will no longer sanction loans that 
would put investors at risk. Investors will anticipate this and will not hold bank debts 
and when the market for bank liabilities break down, then the insolvent banks will 
default.   
 
4.2.2 Currency Crises: Theoretical Linkages with Financial Liberalization  
 
A currency crisis is defined as the situation in which an attack on the currency 
leads to a sharp depreciation of the currency and/or a large decline in international 
reserves (Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart, 1998). This definition is broad enough to 
incorporate not only currency crisis in exchange rates with the fixed effect regime but 
also for other exchange rate regimes. The literature initially attributed the cause of 
currency crises to weak “economic fundamentals.” Krugman’s (1979) 92model 
illustrates that when economies have a fixed exchange rate, if there is domestic credit 
expansion that exceeds that of the demand for money growth then this leads to a 
gradual loss of international reserves, which leaves the currency susceptible to a 
speculative attack because agents anticipate that the currency will collapse and if they 
are not to attack then they incur capital loss on their holdings of the local currency. 
Along the same lines, the balance of payments crisis therefore results from a scenario 
in which there is uncertainty regarding the ability of the central bank to use, if there is 
enough of, the foreign exchange reserves to ensure the fixed exchange rate of the 
country is maintained. Currency crises, often stems from a severe balance of 
payments deficit, resulting in the devaluation of the currency.  
 
Obstfeld (1994) states that expectation of a currency collapse leads to higher 
wages and higher unemployment, ultimately resulting in governments abandoning the 
parity. In another of Obstfeld’s (1994) models, expectation of a collapse results in 
higher interest rates which causes government to abandon the parity because public 
debt servicing increases. Recent models have shown that crisis may erupt if there is 
evolution of other key economic variable and even if there are no variations in the 
‘fundamentals.’ For example, Gerlach and Smets (1994), in their model, illustrate that 
devaluation of one country’s currency can cause its trading partners to devalue as well 
                                                 
92 A detailed discussion of Krugman’s (1979) model is not provided here due to the fact that it is 
widely discussed and the reader is expected to read the paper for a comprehensive understanding of the 
model.  
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in order to avoid losing competitive advantage. The assumption of contagion suggests 
that if there is a crisis in a neighboring country or a trading country, then this may 
signal a future domestic crisis. 
 
Montiel and Reinhart (1997) summarize that capital inflows and the 
retrospective problems associated with capital inflow are major factors why these 
crises in Latin America in 1982, the Mexican crisis and the Asian crisis in 1997 took 
place. They state that if and/or capital inflow comes to a halt, then capital inflow can 
turn to capital outflow which typically happens due to changes in the interest rates of 
industrialized and developed economies. They also state that it is not long-term 
investments i.e. foreign direct investments that are causes for concern but short-term 
capital flows and the liberalization of the capital account allows these short-term 
capital flows which in turn destabilizes the reserves and the hinders the ability of an 
economy to peg the domestic currency. Gross capital outflow was at the epicenter of 
the Mexican crisis of 1982 as government deficit was financed by foreign lenders.    
 
4.2.3 Twin Crises: Theoretical Linkages with Financial Liberalization  
 
The twin crisis that stemmed from 1997-1998 in the Asian Financial Crisis 
dubbed an extensive researching study that examined the interlinkages between these 
crises. The financial crises that erupted in the Nordic economies in 1992 and the 
Tequila Crisis in Mexico in 1994 raised an array of questions regarding the impact of 
banking sector fragilities on the currency crisis. Velasco (1997) in his model showed 
that banking sector difficulties can result in a rise in a currency crisis. The argument 
states that if central banks bailout the institutions that are vulnerable to bankruptcy by 
printing money then there would be the classical case of a currency crisis occurring 
due to excessive money injection. Calvo (2012) also argues that a bank run can cause 
an attack on the currency if increased liquidity is associated with a government 
bailout of the banking system.  
 
McKinnon and Phil (1994) study the impact of capital flows in an economy 
that has an unregulated banking sector. They infer that in cases like these, capital 
inflows can cause a boom in lending, which usually causes excessive borrowing, 
which in turn causes consumption booms and as a result of that this worsens current 
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account deficit. This excessive lending cycle also leads to an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate, resulting in a loss of competitiveness and this slows down growth. 
Finally, when the economy is faced with a recession, banks are more vulnerable to a 
crisis. The case for banks is significantly worse when real estate and asset price 
bubbles burst. Furthermore, when the banking system is fragile, the prospect of 
defending the domestic currency is all the more difficult and this may cause an 
unprecedented devaluation of the domestic currency. This in effect, is a currency 
crisis, preceded by banking sector difficulties. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) state 
that the reason why banking and currency crises can both occur at the same time is 
because the “seeds of the problem are sown at the same time and which event occurs 
first is a matter of circumstance.” They also attribute financial liberalization to be a 
decisive factor in the buildup to a twin crisis.  
 
Similarly, in the context of the discussion of the linkages between currency 
and banking crisis, in the twin crisis literature, there is also the theoretical argument 
that a currency crisis may trigger a banking crisis. Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod (1995) 
argue that a currency crisis may cause vulnerabilities in the banking sector if the 
central bank responds to the pressure on the exchange rate by increasing the interest 
rates sharply. The argument also states that often or the common feature is that banks 
are already vulnerable because there is a large amount of unhedged liabilities that are 
foreign and if there is a shock on the currency then it propagates a collapse of the 
banking system (Glick and Hutchinson, 1999).  
 
4.2.4 Political Instability and Political Institutions: Theoretical Linkages with 
Macroeconomic Vulnerabilities  
 
A component of this research paper focuses on the impact of political 
instability and political institutions on the likelihood of a crisis independently and in 
conjunction with the financial liberalization. In the existing literature, economists use 
political variables only to serve as controls and therefore there is a scarcity of papers 
that investigates these linkages empirically. The impact of political conditions and the 
economic repercussions is like an ‘elephant in the room’ that is acknowledged but the 
severity and the magnitude of the influence is perhaps damagingly underemphasized. 
Berg and Pattillo (1998) find that the research of Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart 
 225 
 
(1998), Frankel and Rose (1996) and Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) do not 
forecast crises accurately when they are tested out of sample. Thus, it is essential to 
critically examine other potential sources of influence and thereby incorporating 
political variables in empirical research papers is significant, particularly in the case 
of developing countries where political stability or lack of political stability are 
drivers for smooth economic functionality.  
 
When economies illustrate signs of financial fragility, often, the reaction of the 
financial markets is contingent on the expectation of how the government will react. 
When the economy is in a crisis situation, then external actors, such as international 
lending agencies or financial institutions and banks are heavily involved in the in the 
macroeconomic adjustment process. However, even their decisions are also heavily 
influenced by political expectations (Haggard, 2000). The Asian financial crisis of 
1997 is a reference point in analyzing the impact of political factors on the economic 
horizon. Haggard’s (2000) analysis suggests that prior to the Asian financial crisis, 
Thailand’s democratically elected coalition governments were ‘shaky’ and ‘weak’. 
Prime Ministers along with the entire cabinet ministers, were vulnerable to policy 
level blackmails by other coalition party leaders, as they would systematically 
threaten to defect and join other coalition forces. These ‘shaky’ parties in the 
coalition, relied on businessmen with strong foothold in the financial markets, thereby 
effectively taking advantage of government’s policy changes to serve their personal 
interests. These are textbook examples of corruption intertwined with crony 
capitalism93. The presidential system in South Korea, came under scrutiny in the onset 
of the crisis. There was a no-reelection rule implemented, which increased economic 
concerns further. Subsequently, one faction of the ruling party separated and ran in 
the elections against the incumbent government, and ultimately the ruling party was 
defeated. The political disharmony was detrimental to the South Korean economy, 
particularly for crisis management and thereby raises the question of political changes 
at a time of economic uncertainty. However, Haggard (2000) for instance, argues that 
democratic systems have a decisive advantage over autocracies, in the sense that the 
incumbent governments were in fact voted out of office in both Thailand and South 
                                                 
93 In the Western account of the reason why the Asian crisis took place, corruption and cronyism were 
at the centre piece of earlier discussions. For example, the Hanbo case, which involved direct bribery 
of the government along with the bank officials in Korea is one heavily discussed example amongst 
many.  
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Korea. Thailand’s laissez-faire approach and the economic repercussions that 
followed, contradicts the policymaking benefits of that of a democratic regime.  
 
In the age of economic sanctions, incentivized by political motives, economic 
theory must incorporate these key political factors, capturing both internal and 
external domestic political affairs. Dr. Mahathir Mohammad, the longest serving 
Prime Minister of Malaysia, in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997, 
stated that they would oppose IMF’s policy that suggested that the crisis hit 
economies should raise their interest rates. He said that these policies were tailored to 
favor Western investors and ensuring their interests and it would also compromise the 
sovereignty of the nation; he even went against the policies set by the Governor of the 
Central Bank of Malaysia. On the contrary, it could also be very well argued that he 
galvanized his support base domestically from the political viewpoint by upholding 
the notion of sovereignty; after all he did serve 5 terms in office and oversaw the 
recovery of the Malaysian economy. In Indonesia, President Suharto, in the onset of 
the crisis launched several investment projects that were severely costly while it also 
increased liquidity support to a number of banks that supported his regime which 
resulted in the closure of these banks in November of 1997. Haggard (2000) states 
that the reason for the region’s vulnerability stems from not only policy failures, but 
deep rooted political problems.  
 
An examination of the Tequila Crisis or the Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994 is of 
fundamental importance due to the impact of the political precursors of the crisis. It is 
important to remember that at the time, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari and the 
administration was in its final year, serving the sixth year. In that year, the 
administration went on an unprecedented spending spree due to the fact that it was 
election year; the current account deficit rose to 7% of GDP (Hufbauer and Jeffrey, 
2005). The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed and came 
into effect on January 1, 1994, resulting in increased investor confidence. However, 
that same year, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation declared war on the 
Mexican government and caused violent riots in Chiapas. This caused a total shift in 
confidence of the international community towards Mexico, due to the political 
uncertainties that were associated to the economy. Investors were further thrown into 
doubt when the Institutional Revolutionary Party’s (the ruling party) presidential 
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candidate Luis Donaldo Colonsio was assassinated while campaigning in Tijuana in 
March of 1994. As a result, investors, in accordance with the political uncertainty that 
persisted in Mexico, began to set higher risk premia on Mexican financial assets. 
Initially, this had no effect on the value of the peso as it was functioning under a fixed 
exchange rate regime as it was pegged to the U.S. dollar94. In order to ensure this peg 
remained in place, the Central Bank of Mexico ensured the Peso appreciated and 
depreciated against the dollar. The Banco de Mexico would also frequently intervene 
to buy or sell pesos in open markets to maintain the fixed exchange rate regime. 
However, when the peso appreciated95, domestic consumers and businesses began 
importing, as imports were cheaper due to the appreciation of the currency, resulting 
in a serious current account deficit. In this case, speculators observed that the peso 
had been artificially overvalued and therefore this caused speculative capital flight. 
The Mexican Central Bank did not deviate from breaching the fixed exchange rate, 
and instead of raising interest rates and contracting the monetary base, they prevented 
interest rates from rising, which resulted in depletion of reserves. Furthermore, 
servicing the tesobonos with U.S. dollar repayments caused the foreign exchange 
reserves to wear down. Finally, in December 1994, the Central Bank’s foreign 
exchange reserve completely ran out of U.S. dollars. In January 1995, President Bill 
Clinton sanctioned the bailout but the Mexican economy suffered tremendously in 
that period. Therefore, it is quite evident that political factors can be instrumental, in 
ensuring smooth economic progress but also triggering a series of events that lead to a 
crisis. In this case, the fallacies in the conditions of the political institutions along 
with political polarization in the form of the riots in Chiapas both contributed heavily 
in the buildup to and of the crisis.   
 
Democracies have the advantage of lower borrowing costs and this is due to 
the fact that democratically elected leaders have greater constraints than an autocratic 
leader and resultantly they are better equipped to commit to repayment. Hence, 
democratic nations receive favorable borrowing rates from international lenders 
(Shultz and Weingast, 2003). It is often argued that democracies or democratic 
regimes are more prone to self-fulfilling panics in the context of crises, due to 
                                                 
94 The Mexican peso was pegged to the U.S. dollar in 1988.  
95 The peso appreciated at the time because the Banco de Mexico had an intervention strategy that 
involved issuing short-term public debt instruments denominated in U.S. dollars. Then this borrowed 
capital would be used to purchase pesos in the forex market, which caused the currency to appreciate. 
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information transparency and freedom (Lipscy, 2017). From the viewpoint of 
liberalization, democracies are often associated with citizens’ freedom to invest freely 
without restrictions and thereby inducing and enhancing the degree of financial 
liberalization. On the contrary, in autocratic or authoritarian regimes, financial 
markets are regulated extensively. The empirical literature finds that there is a strong 
correlation between democracies or democratic scores and capital account 
liberalization (Quinn, 2000). Democratic regimes are also susceptible to contagion 
effects due to their tendency to lean towards greater levels of financial openness and 
this is not only due to financial liberalization with induces greater interaction with 
foreign financial institution but democracies are also prone to greater levels of 
international trade (Lipscy, 2017).  
 
Higgot (1998) states that market turmoil and their impacts are every bit 
political as it is economic. For instance, governments are expected to take the right 
measures in the presence of economic vulnerabilities. However, governments are 
unable to implement their intended policies or economic reforms due to political 
constraints (Bussiere and Mulder, 1999). For instance, in the political economy 
literature, the parliamentary system is often criticized primarily for the ‘curse of the 
two-thirds’ which indicates a two-thirds majority in parliament. This would allow the 
ruling party to pass any bills in parliament as is the case in Bangladesh after 201496. 
Moreira (1984) states that there is an argument, that focuses on the direction of 
causality, economic crisis due to political liberalization or political liberalization due 
to economic crisis. The author infers that that there is mutual influence, referring to 
bi-directional causality, but also insisting that both arguments are up for scrutiny as 
there is variation from country to country. Therefore, this is an avenue that needed to 
be explored in this research paper, because not only is the examination of this 
researching question scarce, but it is also significant.   
                                                 
96 In the January 5, 2014, polls, in the national parliamentary elections, the ruling party gained 2/3 
majority of the parliament as 153 seats were uncontested out of 300 seats. The former opposition party 
did not participate in the elections as they deemed the elections were not impartial or independent or 
fair. Resultantly, it was observed that the parliament was capable of passing any bills due to having the 
overwhelming majority of seats in parliament. There were bills that seemed controversial by the former 
opposition party along with other political parties and the general public, but they were passed 
nonetheless raising questions of democratic practices in a parliamentary system, particularly when the 
ruling party has a two-thirds majority in parliament.   
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4.3 Literature Review: Empirical Evidence 
 
The literature review section examines critically the causes of a banking, 
currency and twin crisis and extensively analyses and evaluates the role of financial 
liberalization in the cause of these crises. The first sub-section looks at the empirical 
studies that have examined the fundamental causes of a banking crisis and it also 
looks at how financial liberalization can affect the likelihood of a crisis. The second 
sub-section examines the empirical research papers that look at the determinants of a 
currency crisis along with the effect of liberalization on the likelihood of a currency 
crisis. The third sub-section looks at interlinkages between a currency crisis and a 
banking crisis and then focuses on the impact of liberalization on both the banking 
and currency crisis and how one can stipulate the other. Finally, in the fourth sub-
section, the literature review section also reports existing research papers that have 
studied the impact of the key political variables on the likelihood of crises.  
 
The vast array of literature criticizing the merits of financial integration stems 
from financial fragilities and macroeconomic vulnerabilities experienced by emerging 
economies. There is a pressing need to analyze the literature that focuses on financial 
fragilities, a fundamental channel being the crisis channel and the other being the 
channel of macroeconomic volatility. The crises experienced for instance, in Mexico 
and South East Asia demands our attention to examine this closely. In the theoretical 
arguments section, there is mention of the one crucial criticism of financial integration 
being the incentive for investors, foreign and domestic, to form herding that may be 
of detriment to the domestic economy. Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999) examine the 
impact of foreign investors on stock returns in Korea. They find strong evidence 
suggesting trading and herding behavior of foreign investors prior to the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997.  
 
4.3.1 Financial Liberalization and the Likelihood of a Banking Crisis 
 
The banking sector is of fundamental importance for macroeconomic stability 
in developing economies. It is of fundamental importance to explore and understand 
the causes of banking crisis and how much of an influence financial integration 
potentially has on it. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) examine the 
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determinants of banking crises in both developing and developed countries over the 
time period 1980-1994 using a multivariate logit model. It is observed that growth has 
a negative effect on the likelihood of a banking crisis, increase in the (change in) 
terms of trade reduces the likelihood of a crisis; increases in the real interest rate, 
inflation, budget surplus, M2/reserves, domestic credit, and credit growth increase the 
likelihood of a crisis. Increase in the GDP per capita and law and order i.e. prudential 
supervision, reduces the likelihood of a crisis. Generally, it is therefore observed that 
a banking crisis erupts especially when there are vulnerabilities in the macroeconomic 
conditions, particularly when growth is low and the inflation rate along with the real 
interest rate, are both high. The research paper explores the impact of financial 
liberalization on the likelihood of a crisis but while they find their result to be positive 
and statistically significant, they specify that this is an area that they would like to 
examine in their future works. They use countries in the dataset, in the given time 
period, in which there aren’t any episodes of crises, therefore, this serves as controls. 
Evidence also suggests that moral hazard plays a deterministic role in causing 
systemic banking sector problems in the presence of deposit insurance schemes. They 
also find that there is a negative association between the efficacy of legal systems and 
the emergence of banking sector problems, this is in line with theory as it is without 
our expectation as a prudent legal body is likely to reduce banking sector 
vulnerabilities.  
 
Angkinand, Sawangngoenyuang, and Wihlborg (2008) uses a dataset using 48 
countries, 21 developed and 27 emerging markets, for the time period 1973-2005 to 
examine the effect of financial liberalization on the likelihood of a banking crisis. 
They classify liberalization into three categories, ‘behavioral liberalization,’ 
‘competitive liberalization’ and privatization. They find that the prevalent view that 
financial liberalization leads to an increase in the likelihood of a banking crisis is not 
robust. Note that they use the lagged financial liberalization to look at the effect on 
the likelihood of a banking crisis. They use the squared term of the lagged financial 
liberalization variable as well as interaction terms to look at the effect of 
nonlinearities. They deduce that there is an inverted U-shaped feature that can be used 
to best describe the relationship between liberalization and probability of banking 
crisis using these nonlinearities in the regression. They find that liberalization 
increases likelihood of a crises until a certain point, after which it reduces the 
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likelihood of a crisis. They use the database of Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel 
(2008). In their empirical methods, they discuss that they opt to not include the 
conditional fixed-effects logit model as this can eliminate countries without a banking 
crisis episode, out of the sample. Furthermore, the possibility of using an instrumental 
logit regression, which would be to account for endogeneity bias, is also ruled out 
because there is no ideal instrument for financial liberalization. In order to account for 
endogeneity bias, they run regressions with banking crisis dummy variable as an 
independent variable along with all other macroeconomic control variables on the 
financial liberalization index. They find the reverse effect of the banking crisis 
dummy to be statistically insignificant and they make the inference that the logit 
model is not driven by endogeneity.  
 
Eichengreen and Arteta (2002) build on the analysis carried out by Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache (1998) by distinguishing between the effects of internal and 
external financial liberalization on a banking crisis. They deduce that capital account 
liberalization does not contribute to a banking crisis but they find that internal 
financial liberalization does. They also find that when countries are liberalized 
internally, capital account liberalization increases the likelihood of a banking crisis. 
Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss (2008) use data for 8,235 banks in 23 developed 
countries. The traditional and conservative approach to financial liberalization 
theorizes that bank competition erodes market power, reduces profit margins and 
bank risk taking and this is classified as “competition-fragility.” In their research, they 
deduce that this “competition-fragility” theory does in fact hold, which would 
undermine the benefits of financial liberalization as it induces a greater level of 
competition, especially from abroad, however, it results in increased competition 
results in banks holding more equity capital and deploy risk-mitigating policies.  
 
Boyd, Nicolo and Loukoianova (2010) use the random effect Logit regressions 
using both country-level and firm-level datasets to disentangle the determinants of a 
systemic banking shocks (SBS). They find that banking crisis indicators represent 
lagged government responses to adverse banking shocks. They do not find any 
indication that the presence of explicit deposit insurance has any effect on the 
likelihood of a banking crisis which is in stark contrast to the findings available in the 
literature. They reiterate that the moral hazard problem associated to the availability 
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of the deposit insurance is negligible in the context of causing banking distress. 
Furthermore, this research paper makes a strong case for the side that supports the 
notion of liberalization as they find that greater competition in fact reduces the 
likelihood of a banking crisis rather than increases it. This finding generally 
contradicts the literature. Finally, they find evidence that the impact of financial 
openness does not necessarily adversely affect the solvency of banking systems. In 
some cases, they find that this reduces the likelihood of a crisis. This research is 
however based on disaggregated data using firm-level datasets.   
 
Klomp (2009) uses a random coefficient Logit model in order to examine the 
extent to which heterogeneity exists in causing a banking crisis. The dataset includes 
110 countries over the time period 1970-2007. Klomp classifies the causes of banking 
crises in two distinctive categories, microeconomic causes of a banking crisis, 
concerning internal problems within the banking system and macroeconomic causes 
of a banking crisis, which refers to the external developments of the banking system. 
They find that banking crises are not homogenous and in the 130 banking crises 
episodes they study, there is a substantial amount of heterogeneity. However, in 
general they find that high credit growth, negative growth and high real interest rate 
increase the likelihood of a banking crisis. They also find that determinants of 
banking crisis differ at different levels of economic development. Shehzad and De 
Haan (2009) use the multivariate probit model to examine the impact of financial 
liberalization on the likelihood of a systemic and non-systemic banking crisis over the 
time period 1981 to 2002 for 33 countries. They find that liberalization in fact reduces 
the likelihood of systemic crises, which contradicts the commonly held view. Mehrez 
and Kaufmann (2000) examine how transparency or the absence of corruption affects 
the likelihood of a crisis using a multivariate probit model for the time period 1977-
1997 for 56 countries. They find that there is an increase in the likelihood of a crisis 
post-liberalization and they also find that probability of crisis increases when there is 
poor transparency as opposed to when there is transparency in countries.  
 
Noy (2004) uses the probit model to examine the linkage between financial 
liberalization and systemic banking crisis for the 61 non-OECD countries over the 
time period 1975-1997. They also examine the role of prudential supervision and the 
subsequent effect on the likelihood of a crisis. For the financial liberalization 
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indicator, they use binary variables to account for liberalization of the capital account, 
current account and removal of export proceeds requirements. The macroeconomic 
and financial control variables that they use are all lagged in order to see what effect it 
has on the future likelihood of a crisis, although domestic financial liberalization is 
not lagged. They report in their findings that insufficient prudential supervision 
aligned with financial liberalization does carry a threat, but this is only a medium run 
threat to the banking system. They find that liberalization affects the banking system 
by making the few domestic banks lose monopoly power.   
 
In order to shed light on other macroeconomic and financial factors causing a 
banking crisis as well as causing banking sector fragility and banking system distress, 
Hardy and Pazabasioglu (1999)97 extend the empirical framework set up by 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998). They use a multinomial logit model 
estimated by the maximum likelihood estimator. The dependent dummy variable 
takes the value of 2 in the period when the banking sector faces difficulties, takes the 
value of 1 in the preceding period and zero otherwise. Their full sample of the dataset 
includes 50 countries of which 38 countries suffered a total of 43 episodes of banking 
system crises or severe functional problems. The empirical findings suggest that 
banking distress is associated with fall in the real GDP growth rates, boom-bust 
cycles in inflation, rapid credit expansions, heavy capital inflows, high levels of real 
interest rates, decreasing capital to output ratio, decline in the real exchange rate, and 
adverse trade shocks. However, they also underline that banking sector conditions can 
be poor without reaching the level of a full-fledged crisis and they specify the 
extensive reliance on external funding to be one of the major culprits of the 
malfunctions within the financial system, which transcends to the banking system. 
Furthermore, banking sector distress is often preceded by rapid credit expansion and 
fast growth in consumption.  
 
4.3.2 Financial Liberalization and the Likelihood of a Currency Crisis 
 
The collapse of the Asian currencies in 1997 is one of the motivating factors 
in exploring the causes of crises and the affiliations and linkages it has with financial 
integration. This also caused a wide array of research publications, assessing the 
                                                 
97 Hardy and Pazabasioglu (1999) include both crisis and non-crisis affected countries in their dataset.  
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causes of the currency crises. From the policy viewpoint, it was to understand the 
signals and develop remedies to neutralize the prospect of a currency crisis early on 
i.e. to understand if these symptoms can be effectively detected so that the 
governments of crises inflicted countries are able to take preemptive measures. 
According to the empirical literature, the variables that are best signal indicators are 
output, exports, deviations in the real exchange rate from the generic trend, equity 
prices, and the ratio of broad money to gross international reserves (Kaminsky, 
Lizondo, and Reinhart, 199898). The empirical evidence is incoherent with the 
theoretical predictions and results are inconclusive for the other signal indicators e.g. 
imports, the differential between foreign and domestic real deposit interest rates, the 
ratio of lending to deposit rates, and bank deposits. Furthermore, there are suggestions 
in the empirical literature that show that banking sector problems are indicative and 
rather helpful in predicting a currency crisis, as was the case for the Asian currency 
crisis for instance (the weak domestic financial sector).  
 
There numerous papers that investigate empirically the cause of the Asian 
crisis. The renowned or the benchmark papers look at the causes of these crises from 
a broader perspective and not individual examination of the effect of financial 
liberalization on the effect of a currency crisis. It must also be said that there are not 
many researching studies that look at the direct effect of financial liberalization on the 
likelihood of a currency crisis, while there is a lot of literature on the impact of 
financial liberalization on the likelihood of a banking crisis. Miyakoshi (2000) states 
that one of the five causes of the Asian currency crisis was due to the extensive 
financial liberalization. Kawai (1998) deduces that financial deregulation and capital 
account liberalization preceded the speculative currency attacks in Thailand. The 
rapid outflow of capital resulted in the consequent depreciation of the exchange rate. 
Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999) deduce that financial ‘over-lending’ was one of 
the main reasons for the cause of the currency crisis. However, However, Mishkin 
                                                 
98 Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998) examine the leading indicators of currency crises 
empirically in order to develop an early warning system (monitoring evolution of key macroeconomic 
indicators of interest). From their research they find that the macroeconomic indicators that seem to 
signal crises are the following: international reserves, real exchange rate fluctuations, domestic credit, 
credit for the public sector and inflation. The other variables that are supposed to be signals do not 
indicate or have substantive evidence for inference purposes. An extension of this particular research 
paper would be to for instance use this ‘signals’ approach but also estimate the probability of a 
currency crisis contingent on various signals.  
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(1999) stresses that even though capital flows did contribute to the crisis, it was only a 
symptom rather than an underlying cause of the Asian crisis. Athukorala and Warr 
(2002) give support to Mishkin’s (1999) analysis and ask the question whether 
accumulation of mobile capital made these countries vulnerable to a currency crisis 
and whether this implies that the fundamental culprit was opening the capital 
account? They state that there is no doubt that openness of the capital account 
facilitated foreign borrowing and it did contribute to financial vulnerabilities but they 
disagree that liberalization of the capital account was the cause of the central problem. 
 
In terms of international capital flows, the crises that occurred in Asia was 
attributed to the ‘sudden stops’99 and the foreign capital reversal. Calvo, Leiderman, 
and Reinhart (1994) claim that capital inflow (flowing from industrial countries to 
developing countries) is associated with inflationary pressure, a real exchange rate 
appreciation, a deterioration of the current account and a boom in bank lending. 
Subsequent to the Asian currency and financial crisis in 1997, economists and 
policymakers sided with the argument that excessive capital mobility may be 
disruptive for the economy. Furthermore, there were even claims that the degree of 
capital mobility is dependent on the level of financial openness of the economy e.g. 
reducing financial openness is likely to reduce the probability that a country faces an 
external crisis in the form of a sudden stop or a current account reversal (Stiglitz, 
2002). Edwards (2004) investigates the mechanics of sudden stops of capital inflows 
and current account reversals100 using a panel data of 157 countries over the period 
1970-2001. The author finds that restricting the financial openness or capital mobility 
does not reduce the probability of experiencing a current account reversal. This 
contradicts the claim that financial openness tends to reduce the likelihood of crises in 
the form of current account reversal. However, this research paper could perhaps use 
different unobserved latent variables to take into account institutional qualities. The 
following sub-sections will investigate and examine the existing literature for the 
causes of banking, currency, and twin crises in affiliation with financial integration. 
                                                 
99 A ‘sudden stop’ refers to an abrupt and major reduction in capital inflows to a recipient country 
receiving large amounts of foreign capital, this occurs when net capital inflows have declined by at 
least 5% of GDP (Edwards, 2004).  
100 Edwards (2004) defines current account reversal as a reduction in the current account deficit of at 
least 4% of GDP in one year. The variable used to take into account financial openness is Quinn’s 
(2003) index of capital mobility. This index goes from 1 to 100, where higher values denote a higher 
degree of financial integration.   
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Jomo (1998) investigates the repercussions of financial liberalization in 
Malaysia in the build up to the financial crises of 1997. Jomo infers that the financial 
crises that befell Malaysia, was due to financial liberalization rather than financial 
regulation. The fact that the Malaysian ringgit was pegged to the US dollar and the 
stock/equity markets had been liberalized prior to the crises caused an influx of 
foreign savings. This caused a rise in inflation and massive increase in property 
prices. Moreover, short termed unhedged borrowing from abroad gave speculators the 
incentive to attack the currency due to the fact that currency appreciated. The eventual 
collapse of the Ringgit was inevitable but this was preceded by excessive 
liberalization as opposed to regulation.  
 
4.3.3 Financial Liberalization and the Likelihood of a Twin Crisis 
 
For the literature examination of twin crises, it is essential to study the 
linkages between a banking crisis and a currency crisis first, before looking at the 
standalone impact of financial liberalization on the probability of a twin crisis. There 
are only a few selective number of research papers that study the impact of financial 
liberalization on a twin crisis as a standalone avenue. In terms of the literature 
available on twin crisis, the Asian crisis must be mentioned because it was heavily 
linked with financial openness and there not a large number of papers that focus on 
both without crisis of 1997. Glick and Hutchinson (1999) use 90 industrial and 
developing countries for the time period 1975 to 1997. They measure the causes of 
the individual crisis i.e. currency and banking crisis separately as well as the twin 
crisis using a multivariate probit model. They find that the phenomenon of the joint 
occurrence of the banking and currency crisis (twin crisis) is predominantly seen in 
liberalized emerging markets. They find that policies taken to reduce the probability 
of a banking crisis lowers the likelihood of a currency crisis occurring, and vice versa. 
While they do look at the impact of financial liberalization on the probability of a 
banking crisis they do not see the direct impact on the currency crisis.  
 
The fundamentals of the linkages between a banking sector crisis and a 
currency collapse is investigated by Kamnisky and Reinhart (1999). They explore 
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16101 macroeconomic and financial variables around the time of crises, using monthly 
data. For each of these variables, they develop a threshold, above or below which the 
likelihood of a crisis is calculated. The generic results that they find are that banking 
and currency crises are often preceded by financial liberalization. More often than 
not, a banking crisis precedes a currency crisis. However, they do find evidence that a 
currency crisis worsens the banking crisis. Furthermore, the causes of twin crises do 
in fact stem from weak and decaying macroeconomic fundamentals, as is the case of 
other papers that looked at banking crisis and currency crisis separately. Glick and 
Hutchinson (2000) investigate the causes of banking and currency crises using 90 
industrial and developing economies over the period 1975-97. Their deductions are 
consistent with the findings of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), as they reiterate that 
banking crisis precede currency crisis but not the other way around. Moreover, they 
find that the twin crisis phenomenon is mainly concentrated in around a set of 
countries that are financially liberalized and are emerging market economies. They 
find that in emerging economies, banking crises has been associated with currency 
crises almost 30% of the time. They reiterate the causal link of this particular 
deduction. They do not find a strong causal link between currency crisis triggering a 
banking crisis.   
 
There is also the pressing need to examine the joint causality of twin crises. 
The role of international illiquidity is one of these factors that can add to the banking 
sector woes and currency collapse simultaneously (Chang and Velasco, 1999). The 
other common fundamental factor is financial liberalization that is intertwined with 
moral hazard problem which induces domestic banks (as well as foreign affiliated 
banks in some country specific cases) to take onboard risky portfolios, which could 
include foreign currency liabilities that are not hedged. For example, McKinnon and 
Pill (1998) emphasize the role of financial liberalization in instigating the dynamics of 
a twin crisis. They suggest that financial liberalization and deposit insurance may 
result in a superficial lending boom, which involves both domestic and international 
                                                 
101 The macroeconomic and financial variables used by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and associated 
to financial liberalization include M2 multiplier, ratio of domestic credit to the share of GDP, real 
interest rate on deposits, and ratio of lending to deposit interest rates. Furthermore, the other financial 
indicators are excess M1, real commercial bank deposits, ratio of M2 divided by foreign exchange 
reserves (this is in US$), percentage deviation of real exchange rate from the average trend, value of 
exports and imports, terms of trade, foreign reserves, domestic-foreign interest rate differential, and 
budget deficit as a share of GDP.  
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credit expansion, which leads to a banking and currency crisis. Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999) famously state that “the seeds of the problems are sown at the same 
time, which event occurs first is a matter of circumstance.” 
 
4.3.4 Political Instability and Political Institutions on Financial Fragilities 
 
An avenue that is not extensively explored from the empirical or even from 
the theoretical perspective, and that is the critical examination of the impact of key 
political factors (this would ideally include for instance, political instability and 
political institutions) on the likelihood of crises. Economists tend to state that political 
factors may be causes and in most cases, these political variables are only taken for 
measures of controls in regression analysis. It is quite evident from the examination of 
the existing literature that the direct linkages are not effectively examined. On the 
other hand, political theorists tend to comment on these issues without testing or 
validating these theories via an empirical investigation. In this sub-section, the 
relevant researching papers in the associated field of research will be analyzed. 
However, it must be noted that to the best of my knowledge there are no existing 
scholarly papers that look at the interlinkages between the intensity of financial 
liberalization, political instability and political institutions, jointly, on the likelihood 
of crises. 
  
This research paper examines the impact of political institutions and political 
polarization on the likelihood of crises; the polity score is used to measure the 
efficacy of democratic values. Lipscy (2017) examines the impact of democracy102 on 
the likelihood of banking crises. The author finds that democracies are more capable 
of credible repayment, they are more transparent, have fewer restrictions citizens’ 
willingness to invest freely and they are more liberalized. The author finds that 
increased democratic scores results in increase likelihood of banking crises. Remmer 
(1993) examines the impact of democracy on crises in the Latin American economies. 
The author does not find a causal relation but states that it is laudable the manner in 
which the democratic regimes in Latin America, oversaw crises in the 1980s. A 
                                                 
102 According to Lipscy (2017), democracy is a multifaceted variable that embodies attributes such as 
the rule of law, free and fair elections, freedom of expression and freedom of speech. In order to 
measure democracy, the author uses the polity IV score.   
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criticism of this paper is that the author does not examine these hypotheses through 
empirical analysis.       
Bussiere and Mulder (1999) examine the impact of political instability on the 
effect on economic vulnerability by using 4 proxies for political instability and using 
currency crisis as a proxy for vulnerability. Their paper centers around the Tequila 
Crisis in Mexico in 1994 and the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. They use a total of 
23 countries. They use four variables to measure political instability. They proxy 
political polarization using the effective number of political parties, they use a 
coalition index that measures the strength of a coalition in parliament to account for 
political cohesion, they use the volatility index to account for electoral indecision and 
finally they use election dates to see if this has any effect on the likelihood of crises. 
The crisis indicator is a weighted average of the drop-in reserves and the increase of 
the real exchange rate, this synonymous to the model developed by Tornell (1998). 
The conclusion of significance that they draw from this research paper is that more 
than pre-electoral periods it is the post-electoral periods that leave economies more 
vulnerable to a crisis. Moreover, higher reserves reduce uncertainties created by 
elections. A fundamental criticism of this research paper would be that the 
macroeconomic determinants of a currency or banking crises were almost completely 
ignored and therefore the true measure of the coefficients of the political variables 
cannot be taken with explicit certainty.  
 
4.4 Methodology 
 
This research paper uses a dataset that comprises 93 developing economies 
over the time period of 1980-2013. The econometric model deployed in the body of 
this research paper is the Probit Regression Model. The key independent variable in 
this research paper is the KAOPEN or the de jure measure of capital openness index. 
The key dependent variables are binary, each depending the on the occurrence of the 
respective crisis, i.e. banking, currency and twin crises. For further robustness 
checks103, the Conditional Fixed Effects Logit Regression model is deployed as well 
as the Probit Random Effects Regression model. Furthermore, in the robustness 
checks, lagged variables for the controls as well as the key independent variable, the 
KAOPEN, is also lagged to see what this effect may have on the likelihood of crises. 
                                                 
103 Refer to Appendix 3 in section 4.11 for robustness checks.  
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Moreover, the robustness checks conclude with robustness test 4 in section 4.11.4; 
this includes the usage of the HP filter for domestic credit in order to account for 
‘credit booms’ and this is modelled similar to way in which Caballero (2014) 
calculates booms and bonanzas. This robustness check also includes the approach 
introduced by Mundlak (1978) in which the time variant variables are detrended by 
incorporating the average of the time variant control variables and using them as 
regressors in the regression analysis. In order to account for the dynamic nature of the 
crises, the lagged variables of the dependent variable is also incorporated.   
 
Following the probit regression, in the body of the research paper, there is also 
a focus on the average marginal effects on the likelihood of crises. This is only 
concentrated on the KAOPEN and the other macroeconomic control variables. 
Political institutions and political polarization are integral researching questions that 
this paper seeks to answer and therefore they are independently and jointly (with 
KAOPEN) regressed on banking, currency and twin crises. In Appendix 2 (refer to 
section 4.10), the predictive margins for the key independent variable of interest, 
KAOPEN, along with all the other political variables are illustrated for all the crises 
models.  
 
4.5 Variable Description 
 
The detailed descriptions of the variables used in this research paper are 
provided in table 4.1. The key independent variable of interest is the intensity of 
financial liberalization (proxies for financial integration in previous chapters) is the de 
jure measure of capital openness index which is the Chinn-Ito Index104. Contrary to 
previous chapters, the index has not been transformed for the purposes of simplicity 
in reading the coefficients. The key dependent variables of interest are banking crisis, 
currency crisis and twin crisis, all of which are binary variables, taking the value of 1 
in the onset of a crisis and the value 0 when there is no crisis. The data for the 
banking crisis, currency crisis and twin crisis dummy variables were constructed 
using the database provided by Carmen Reinhart105 and Kenneth Rogoff. 
                                                 
104 The Chinn-Ito Index, referred to as the KAOPEN index in this research paper, was developed by 
Chinn and Ito (2006).  
105 Refer to the following website: www.carmenreinhart.com  
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Furthermore, for both the banking and the currency crisis, this was cross-checked 
with the database developed by Laeven and Valencia which incorporates both 
systemic banking crises as well as currency crises from which the twin crises were 
constructed by the author. There are three classified empirical models in this research 
paper that is specified in the empirical framework section and they are the banking 
crisis model, the currency crisis model and the twin crisis model, all of which are used 
to represent or (extreme) financial fragility or macroeconomic vulnerabilities.  
 
The key determinants of a banking crisis and the subsequent variables that are 
used are fairly consistent amongst the renowned papers. For this research paper, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache’s (1998) control variables have been used as the 
primary benchmark. The control variables that have been selected in this research 
paper incorporate the control variables that are predominantly used in the crises 
literature. The control variables that are used for the banking crises model are the 
following: (1) Explicit Deposit Insurance106, (2) Real GDP Growth, (3) Real Interest 
Rate, (4) Exchange Rate Depreciation, (5) Change in Terms of Trade, (6) Inflation, 
(7) Budget Surplus (% of GDP), (8) M2/Reserves, (9) Domestic Credit to Private 
Sector (% of GDP), (10) Broad Money Growth, (11) Real GDP per Capita, and (12) 
External Debt (% of GDP)107. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and Boyd, 
Nicolo and Loukoianova (2010) find that in the presence of an explicit deposit 
insurance scheme, there is a greater likelihood of banking crises. Real GDP growth 
reduces the likelihood of banking crises. This finding is consistent in the crisis 
literature. Real interest rates and inflation tend to increase the likelihood of banking 
crises (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). Depreciation tends to increase the 
likelihood of crises, however, the results are often statistically insignificant as 
observed in the research studies carried out by Glick and Hutchinson (2000), 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and Tanveer and De Haan (2008). The 
impact of changes in terms of trade on the likelihood of banking crises is statistically 
insignificant in the literature. This result is evident in the empirical studies carried out 
                                                 
106 Explicit Deposit Insurance is a control variable that Demirguc-Kunt (1998) uses in his research 
paper in determining the macroeconomic fundamentals of banking crises. Furthermore, the dataset is 
constructed using the database developed by Demirguc-Kunt, Kane and Laeven (2014),  
107 External Debt (% of GDP) was included as a control variable because of the fact that since this 
paper covers developing economies, which includes the Latin American economies, and they faced 
severe problems in their banking sector due to debt, it systematically distorted the results without 
including this control variable.  
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by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), Garcia Herrerro and Del Rio (2003) and 
Domac and Peria (2003). Impact of budget surplus, m2/reserves and domestic 
credit108 on the likelihood of banking crises is generally statistically insignificant in 
the literature (Klomp, 2009). Money growth tends to increase the likelihood of 
banking crises; however, it is seldom statistically significant and real GDP per capita 
increases the likelihood of banking crises, results for which are statistically significant 
across various empirical studies.       
 
The control variables used for the currency crisis include all the control 
variables included for the banking crisis model with the exception of (1) Explicit 
Deposit Insurance and (12) External Debt. However, (13) Banking Crisis dummy 
variable is included as a control variable for the currency crisis model. Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999) infer in their research that currency crises are usually preceded by 
banking crises. For the twin crisis model, all the control variables for the banking 
crisis model are included, with the exception of (1) Explicit Deposit Insurance and 
(12) External Debt. The leading determinants of a currency crisis were critically 
examined in the crisis literature before the selection of the control variables. For 
instance, Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) examine the leading indicators of a 
currency crisis by monitoring these indicators before a crisis in order to formulate an 
effective warning system. They find that the leading variables that are useful in 
anticipating a crisis, which for the purposes of this research paper can assist in the 
selection of controls, are, change in international reserves, change in the exchange 
rate, domestic credit, inflation, current account balance, export performance, money 
growth, real GDP growth and fiscal deficit. Bilson (1979) find that international 
reserves are important in the buildup to a currency crisis and infer that countries with 
higher international reserves are less likely to increase the likelihood of devaluation. 
Collins (1995) finds that international reserves, real GDP growth and inflation are key 
indicators of currency crisis. Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995) find that 
inflation, employment growth, current account balance, capital controls, and 
government deficit. Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1995) find that change in real 
exchange rate, domestic credit as a proportion of the GDP, international reserves, 
short-term capital flows and government consumption are all statistically significant 
                                                 
108 This refers to private credit as a percentage of GDP.  
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indicators of a currency crisis. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) find that banking crises 
help predict the probability of a currency crisis and also underline the bearing banking 
crises may have on a currency crisis. For the papers that look at the determinants of a 
currency crisis, they use the banking crises variable as a control variable.  
 
An integral component of this research paper is to examine the impact of 
political institutions and political polarization, both independently and jointly (with 
the intensity of financial liberalization) on the likelihood of a banking, currency and 
twin crisis. In the literature review section as well as in the theoretical framework 
section, it was duly noted that there are not enough empirical studies that examine the 
political factors and the role they play in the likelihood of a crises or for 
macroeconomic vulnerability per se. According to the extensive examination of the 
existing empirical research papers that investigate the impact of political factors on 
the likelihood of crises109, the paper by Bussiere and Mulder (1999), albeit 
partially110, addresses a researching element that this research paper seeks to shed 
further light on. The paper by Bussiere and Mulder (1999) paper looks at the impact 
of political instability on the likelihood of macroeconomic vulnerabilities – this is 
proxied by currency crisis. They use four variables to proxy for political instability, 
however, their regressions do not incorporate the key macroeconomic determinants 
that may influence crises. For this particular research paper, while there is motivation 
from the aforementioned paper, the impact is considered from the angle of political 
institutions and political polarization, where the inclusion of political polarization is 
meant to also represent political instability as they argue in their paper.  
 
The data for the political variables used in this research paper is collected from 
the Quality of Government Institute Database, Database of Political Institutions 
2015111 and the World Governance Indicators. The condition and format of political 
institutions are proxied by the following: (1) Political System, (2) Control of 
Corruption, (3) Rule of Law, and (4) Political Globalization. Political polarization is 
                                                 
109 Refer to the criticism addressed in the literature review section that outlines the lack of empirical 
studies that specifically focus on political issues and the repercussions of variations in key political 
variables and their likely effect on the likelihood of crises.  
110 They do not take into account the joint effect of the key political variables and financial 
liberalization on the likelihood of crises.  
111 This dataset was originally developed by Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer and Walsh (2001). However, 
it was later revamped and updated (and is readily available in the World Bank Database)  
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proxied by the following: (1) Winning Coalition Size, (2) Number of Seats of Largest 
Opposition Party, (3) Vote Share of Largest Government Party, and (4) Polity 
Score112. There is a total of eight political variables that are regressed on banking, 
currency and twin crisis both independently and jointly with KAOPEN. It must be 
noted and reiterated again that empirical studies have not incorporated these variables 
because they have not investigated this channel specifically. They have only used a 
set of control variables that predominantly encircle that of law and order. This is a 
novel addition to the literature in the sense that, particularly for that of political 
polarization, these variables have not been used in the crisis literature in the past. 
Therefore, it cannot be justified which variable is more effective than the other as it 
has been done for macroeconomic control variables or the other key independent 
variable of interest. The descriptions along with the descriptive statistics for each of 
these variables are provided in table 4.1(b).  
 
Table 4.2 illustrates the correlation coefficient of the key macroeconomic 
control variables in order to avoid the multicollinearity problem. The two variables 
that are highly correlated are that of the association between inflation and 
depreciation and money growth and inflation. The multicollinearity problem has been 
addressed by carrying out the regression analysis without these two variables that 
have the problem being highly collinear. However, in this particular case the results 
were rather indifferent with and without inclusion of the variables. Due to the fact that 
they were only marginally different these results were not reported.   
  
                                                 
112 This is the combined polity score that ranges from -10 to 10 (refer to table 4.1). 
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Table 4.1: Variable Description and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable/Parameter Description of Variable  Data Source Mean Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 
Observations Variable Type 
Banking Crisis 
Dummy 
The banking crisis dummy variable takes a 
value of 1 or 0, 1 indicating a systemic 
banking crisis and 0 otherwise.  Refer to the 
definition of a banking crisis in the theoretical 
section of the research paper.   
Reinhart and 
Rogoff Crisis 
Database and 
Laeven and 
Valencia 
Systemic 
Banking Crisis 
Database 
0.061 0 1 0.2399827 1582 
Dependent 
Variable  
Currency Crisis 
Dummy 
The currency crisis dummy variable takes a 
value of 1 or 0, 1 indicates a crisis episode 
and 0 indicates no crisis. Refer to the 
definition of a currency crisis in the 
theoretical section of the research paper.   
Reinhart and 
Rogoff Crisis 
Database 
0.072 0 1 0.2599284 1538 
Dependent 
Variable 
Twin Crisis Dummy 
A twin crisis refers to the situation in which a 
banking crisis and currency crisis occur at the 
same time. The twin crisis dummy variable 
takes the value of 1 or 0, where 1 indicates a 
crisis episode and 0 indicates no crisis. 
Reinhart and 
Rogoff Crisis 
Database 
0.020 0 1 0.1429182 1535 
Dependent 
Variable 
Capital Account 
Openness: Chinn-
Ito Index  
 
The index has a mean of 0 and ranges from -
2.66 to +2.66, where -2.66 represents full 
capital control and +2.66 represents complete 
liberalization.  
International 
Financial 
Statistics, IMF 
0.027 
 
-1.888895 
2.389668 1.460879 1590   
Independent 
Variable  
Table 4.1(a): Macroeconomic Control Variables  
Explicit Deposit 
Insurance 
The explicit deposit insurance database 
developed by Demirguc-King, Kane and 
Laeven (2014) is a binary variable. The 
deposit insurance scheme works as a buffer 
against domestic banks in the case that they 
are insolvent the government is obligated to 
bail them out. Numerous papers have used 
this and Demirguc-Kunt particularly argues 
that this variable must be included to capture 
the moral hazard problem. 
Demirguc-
Kunt, Kane 
and Laeven 
(2014) 
0.403 0 1 0.4908075 1590 Control Variable 
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Real GDP Growth 
(Annual %) 
Real GDP growth is based on constant 2005 
US$. This is the dependent variable of interest 
and is the proxy measure for macroeconomic 
performance.  
World Bank 
Data  
4.882 -30.14523 149.973 6.475219 1590 Control Variable 
Real Interest Rate 
(%) 
Real interest rate is the interest rate minus the 
inflation rate.  
World Bank 
Data 
7.680 -97.81207 93.91508 12.54129 1590 Control Variable 
Exchange Rate 
Depreciation  
This variable was constructed by depreciating 
the official exchange rate. An exchange rate 
depreciation is when a country’s exchange 
rate falls in value in comparison to another 
currency. 
Author’s 
Calculation 
0.242 -.2823327 139.3194 4.684498 1590 Control Variable 
Change in Terms of 
Trade 
The terms of trade is the price relationship 
between a country’s export and imports. The 
calculation was done using the prominently 
used change in terms of trade formula.  
Author’s 
Calculation 
1.359 -88.30111 110.053  14.09896 1590 Control Variable 
Inflation, consumer 
prices (Annual %) 
 
Inflation as measured by the consumer price 
index reflects the annual percentage change in 
the cost to the average consumer of acquiring 
a basket of goods and services. 
International 
Financial 
Statistics, IMF 
19.42 -31.56591 12338.66 311.9908 1590 Control Variable 
Budget Surplus 
Budget surplus refers to the government 
budget surplus in which case government 
spending is less than government revenue.  
International 
Financial 
Statistics, IMF 
-2.501 -42.373 32.832 6.033267 1590 Control Variable 
M2/Reserves 
Money and quasi money (M2) to total reserves 
ratio. 
World Bank 
Data 
4.457 .1908626 567.4617 16.43091 1590 Control Variable 
Domestic Credit to 
Private Sector (% of 
GDP) 
This variable captures the credit that is 
available, the domestic credit, to the private 
sector and is represented as a proportion of 
the GDP.  
World Bank 
Data 
32.61 1.542268 165.7191 28.97898 1590 Control Variable 
Broad Money 
Growth (Annual %) 
The growth rate of money is frequently used 
as a control variable in the crisis literature. 
World Bank 
Data 
24.45 -51.98528 6987.877 179.4824 1590 Control Variable 
Real GDP per 
Capita 
The real GDP per capita is based on constant 
2005 US$.  
World Bank 
Data 
2502 113.7064 
13289.89 
2379.278 1590 Control Variable 
External Debt (% of 
GDP) 
External debt as a percentage of GDP is the 
ratio between the debt a country owes to non-
resident creditors and the GDP.  
World Bank 
Data 
57.83 2.888377 750.2755 57.28593 1458 Control Variable 
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Table 4.1(b): Political Polarization and Political Institutional Variables 
Winning Coalition 
Size 
The winning coalition size varies between 0 
and 1 where 0 indicates the smallest winning 
coalition and 1 indicates the largest winning 
coalition. This index is applicable whether it 
is civil or military.  
Quality of 
Government 
Institute 
Database 
0.539 0 1 0.2848644 490 
Independent 
Variable 
Number of Seats of 
Largest Opposition 
Party  
This is the total number of seats held by the 
largest opposition party and this includes both 
in parliamentary and presidential systems.  
Database for 
Political 
Institution 
33.16 0 237 40.70376 1481 
Independent 
Variable 
Vote Share of 
Largest Government 
Party  
This is the total vote share that the largest 
government party has received in the election. 
This is applicable both in parliamentary and 
presidential systems.   
Database for 
Political 
Institution 
40.30 0 100 27.37522 1025 
Independent 
Variable 
Polity Score 
This combined polity score is computed by 
substracting the autocracy score from the 
democracy score. This is more applicable for 
developing countries due to the association 
with autocratic governments. The values 
range from -10 to 10, where 10 indicates 
strongly democratic.  
(Marhsall, 
Jaggers, 2016) 
3.018 -10 10 6.03127 1427 
Independent 
Variable 
Political 
Globalization 
Political globalization has been used to 
measure the condition of foreign relations 
along with economic relations in the form of 
de jure or de facto economic policies. This 
variable measure political globalization by the 
number of embassies, number of high 
commissions, number of domestically present 
international organizations, UN peace 
mission’s participation and number of 
international treaties signed since 1945. As 
this is not a weighted index, it varies from 
country to country.    
Quality of 
Government 
Institute 
Database 
57.54 15.55509 
94.72778 
20.72022 1366 
Independent 
Variable 
Political System  
The political system variable is a binary 
variable. The value 1 indicates that there is a 
parliamentary system and that the Prime 
Database for 
Political 
Institution 
0.260 0 1 .438851 1265 
Independent 
Variable 
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Minister has higher executive power than the 
President. On the contrary, the value 0 
indicates that this is a presidential system.  
Control of 
Corruption  
Control of corruption refers to the 
measurement of the perceptions of corruption 
in the form where public power is exercised 
for private gain. The values range from -2.5 
where it is weak and 2.5 where it is strong. 
World Bank 
Governance 
Indicators, 
Kaufmann et 
al. (2016) 
-0.443 -1.82 
1.36 
 
.5679444 1123 
Independent 
Variable 
Rule of Law 
Rule of law includes several indicators which 
measure the extent to which people have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of the 
society. The values range from -2.5 where 
governance is weakest to 2.5 where it is 
strong.  
World Bank 
Governance 
Indicators, 
Kaufmann et 
al. (2016) 
-0.468 -2.11 1.16 .5899197 1124 
Independent 
Variable 
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Table 4.2: Correlation Coefficient  
 KAOPEN Explicit 
Deposit 
Insurance 
Real 
Growth 
Rate 
Real 
Interest 
Rate 
Depreciation Terms 
of 
Trade 
Inflation Budget 
Surplus 
M2/Reserves Domestic 
Credit 
Money 
Growth 
GDP 
per 
Capita 
Debt 
KAOPEN 1.0000             
Explicit 
Deposit 
Insurance 
0.0347 1.0000            
Real Growth 
Rate 
-0.1443 0.2120 1.0000           
Real Interest 
Rate 
0.0970 0.0579 -0.0366 1.0000          
Depreciation -0.4047 0.2293 -0.0523 -0.3426 1.0000         
Change in 
Terms of 
Trade 
-0.0217 -0.0969 -0.1757 -0.1873 
 
0.2234 1.0000        
Inflation -0.2838 0.1244 0.0877 -0.4808 0.7017 0.2056 1.0000       
Budget 
Surplus 
0.0525 -0.0246 0.1334 0.1640 -0.0667 0.0105 0.0223 1.0000      
M2/Reserves 0.0614 0.3823 0.0035 0.0906 0.1439 0.2150 0.1184 0.0359 1.0000     
Domestic 
Credit 
0.4532 0.0267 -0.1420 0.0686 
 
-0.2393 0.0370 
 
-0.2245 -0.0121 0.3587 1.0000    
Money 
Growth 
-0.2375 0.2370 0.3360 -0.3817 
 
0.6181 0.0081 0.8445 0.0117 
 
0.1854 -0.1562 1.0000   
GDP per 
Capita 
0.2295 0.5349 0.1686 0.0076 -0.0048 0.0592 -0.0023 -0.4368 0.2495 -0.1356 0.0225 1.0000  
Debt 0.0662 -0.0127 0.0717 0.0684 -0.2014 0.1232 -0.2537 0.1912 -0.0414 0.4065 -0.2161 -0.3296 1.0000 
4.6 Empirical Framework 
 
The empirical framework section presents the empirical models that will be 
used in the probit regression analysis113. There are three empirical models, the 
banking crisis model, the currency crisis model and the twin crisis model, all of which 
are meant to account for macroeconomic crises. Furthermore, the sub-empirical 
models, which include 1(b), 2(b) and 2(c), are designated to examine the impact of 
political institution and political polarization114 independently and jointly, with the 
intensity of financial liberalization on the likelihood of crises.   
 
Empirical Model 1(a): Banking Crisis Model 
 
𝑃𝑟 (𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 = 1) =  𝜙 (𝑧)
= 𝜙 (𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿1𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑀2/𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡) 
 
Empirical Model 1(b): Banking Crisis Model with Political Variables 
 
𝑃𝑟 (𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 = 1) =  𝜙 (𝑧)
= 𝜙 (𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿1𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑀2/𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑃𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽13𝑃𝑉 ∗ 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡) 
 
Empirical Model 2(a): Currency Crisis Model 
 
𝑃𝑟 (𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 = 1) =  𝜙 (𝑧)
= 𝜙 (𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑀2/𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿1𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑃𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝑃𝑉 ∗ 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡) 
 
                                                 
113 It is important to note that the regression models here are validated via robustness checks, results for 
which are presented in appendix 3 in section 4.11. The robustness checks include the usage of the 
conditional fixed effects logit model and the random effects probit model. Furthermore, lagged 
variables are used.  
114 Note that there are several proxy variables that are used in this dataset and subsequently in the 
regressions in order to account for political institutions and political polarization. 
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Empirical Model 2(b): Currency Crisis Model with Political Variables 
 
𝑃𝑟 (𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 = 1) =  𝜙 (𝑧)
= 𝜙 (𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑀2/𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿1𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑃𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝑃𝑉 ∗ 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡) 
 
Empirical Model 3(a): Twin Crisis Model 
 
𝑃𝑟 (𝑇𝑤𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 = 1) =  𝜙 (𝑧)
= 𝜙 (𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑀2/𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑃𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑃𝑉 ∗ 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡) 
 
Empirical Model 3(b): Twin Crisis Model with Political Variables 
 
𝑃𝑟 (𝑇𝑤𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 = 1) =  𝜙 (𝑧) = 𝜙 (𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽6𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑀2/𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽9𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑃𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑃𝑉 ∗ 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡)  
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4.7 Results 
 
The results section115 predominantly reports the results found in tables 4.3, 
4.4, 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 examine the impact of the impact of financial 
liberalization on the likelihood of a banking, currency and twin crises. Furthermore, 
table 4 looks at the average marginal effects of the intensity of financial liberalization 
on the likelihood of crises. Tables 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7 looks at the impact of financial 
liberalization, political institutions and political polarization both jointly and 
independently on the likelihood of a banking, currency and twin crisis respectively.  
 
4.7.1 Impact of the Intensity of Financial Liberalization on the Likelihood of 
Crises 
 
Table 4.3116 looks at the impact of the intensity of financial liberalization on 
the likelihood of crises using a pooled multivariate probit model. Regression model 1 
shows that KAOPEN decreases the likelihood of a banking crisis and this result is 
statistically significant at the 10% significance level. This finding is in stark contrast 
to the results reported in earlier research with the use of the financial liberalization 
dummy variable as inferred by Noy (2004) and Shehzad and De Haan (2008). 
However, it must also be noted that while the research papers in the past dealt with a 
binary or a dummy variable for financial liberalization117, the KAOPEN, is a 
continuous variable measuring the intensity of financial liberalization. The explicit 
deposit insurance variable shows that when there is a deposit insurance scheme in 
place, the likelihood of a banking crisis increases. This result is statistically 
significant at the 5% significance level and is also consistent with the findings in the 
literature along with the theoretical notion that explicit deposit insurance induces a 
moral hazard problem, encouraging banks to undertake greater risks, leaving it 
susceptible to a crisis. Increase in growth results in a decreased likelihood of a 
banking crisis and this result is statistically significant at the 1% significance level. 
                                                 
115 The results section only discusses the results of the findings presented in tables 4.3-4.7, however, 
appendix 2 (in section 4.10), re-examines these results and therefore these results will also be 
considered before giving definitive and final conclusive deductions.  
116 The control variables for which the coefficients are statistically insignificant are not discussed in the 
results section. 
117 While this is not included in the body of the paper, the author has tested the regression results with 
the financial liberalization dummy variable using this dataset. The result is consistent with the findings 
found in the literature that the economy is more susceptible to a banking, currency and twin crisis post-
liberalization than pre-liberalization.  
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This finding is also consistent with the findings in the literature. The coefficient for 
the real interest rate is statistically insignificant and therefore the coefficient is not 
discussed in this section. It is observed that if there is depreciation in the exchange 
rate or deviation of the exchange rate then this causes an increase in the likelihood of 
a banking crisis. This finding is statistically significant at the 1% significance level.     
 
Regression model 2 in table 4.3 looks at the impact of KAOPEN on the 
likelihood of a currency crisis. Similar to the association with banking crisis, increase 
in KAOPEN is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of a currency crisis. 
While, traditionally, the liberalization dummy variable would prove otherwise, which 
is also the case for this researching study (although the liberalization dummy variable 
and the regression results associated with it have not been presented in this research 
paper but has been examined behind the scenes), this proves to show that the intensity 
of financial liberalization paints a different picture. This result is also statistically 
significant at the 5% significance level. There are arguably two key reasons why the 
sign of the coefficient for the liberalization dummy variable is different to that for the 
intensity of financial liberalization. The first reason could broadly be due to the fact 
that the dummy variable of financial liberalization is a de jure measure that only takes 
into account the date upon which liberalization takes place. For example, there are 
numerous studies that use equity market liberalization as a proxy for financial 
liberalization. However, this does not take into account the influx of foreign portfolio 
investments in domestic financial markets. In some cases, countries that declare the 
equity market to be liberalized are in fact highly regulated. The intensity of financial 
liberalization deepens the scope for analytical deductions. The second possible reason 
could be that on average, intensity of financial liberalization reduces the likelihood of 
a banking, currency and twin crisis. However, there is the possibility that there are 
thresholds at various levels of financial openness which is unaddressed in this 
research paper118, however, for further research this is a trajectory that certainly needs 
to be explored for comprehensive policymaking purposes.   
                                                 
118 The empirical chapters that focus on the impact of financial integration on growth and the other that 
focuses on the impact of financial integration on poverty and inequality deploy the use of the threshold 
regression methodology. However, for this empirical chapter, it would not only be extensive to 
incorporate regression methodologies but it would also distort addressing a key research question that 
needs urgent attention which is to look at the possible of the intensity of financial liberalization on the 
likelihood of crises rather than using a dummy variable for financial liberalization. Furthermore, this 
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Growth is associated with a reduction in the likelihood of a currency crisis, the 
coefficient for which is statistically significant at the 1% significance level. Real 
interest rate is associated with an increase in the likelihood of a crisis the coefficient 
for which is statistically significant at the 1% significance level as is the case for 
depreciation, for which, there is an associated increase in likelihood of a currency 
crisis, this is also significant at the 1% significance level. Increases in inflation also 
causes an increase in the likelihood of a currency crisis, the coefficient being 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level. Interestingly, increase in GDP per 
capita is associated with an increase in the likelihood of a currency crisis, although the 
magnitude of the coefficient is not high, the coefficient is still statistically significant 
at the 1% significance level. The banking crisis dummy variable, that is used as a 
control variable for currency crisis, shows that when there is a banking crisis, the 
likelihood of a currency crisis occurring is positive and statistically significant at the 
1% significance level. This reiterates the theoretical notion that a banking crisis 
precedes a currency crisis or that banking sector fragilities can cause currency 
crashes. 119Regression model 3 in table 4.3 looks at the impact of the intensity of 
financial liberalization on the likelihood of a twin crisis. Increase in KAOPEN is 
associated with a decrease in the likelihood of a twin crisis and this finding is 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level. The other notable mentions are 
that an increase in the growth rate results in a decreased likelihood of a twin crisis, 
this is statistically significant at the 1% significance level. Furthermore, increases in 
the M2/Reserves and domestic credit results in an increase in the likelihood of a twin 
crisis, coefficients for both are statistically significant at the 10% significance level.  
 
Table 4.4120 looks at the average marginal effects for KAOPEN along with the 
other macroeconomic control variables for the banking crisis model, currency crisis 
model and the twin crisis model. These values present the probability of a banking, 
currency and twin crisis occurring when the control variables are at their average 
                                                                                                                                           
research paper also uses key political variables and interacts it with financial liberalization to see the 
joint and independent effects on the likelihood of crises.  
119 The crises literature, both from the theoretical perspective and from empirical studies infer and 
deduce that banking crises precede currency crises. Refer to the theoretical framework and literature 
review sections.  
120 Note that table 4.4 is constructed using the regressions from table 4.3 and only reports the average 
marginal effects or the dy/dx values at the averages for each of the variables. Therefore, the number of 
observations, the pseudo R2 are all equivalent to that of table 4.3.  
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levels. The values represented when multiplied with 100, give the probability in 
percentage terms. For instance, observing the banking crisis model, it can be seen that 
a unit increase in KAOPEN results in a reduction in the likelihood of a banking crisis 
by 0.7%. If there is a deposit insurance in place, then the economy is 2.4% more 
susceptible to a banking crisis in developing crisis as opposed to when there is no 
explicit deposit insurance scheme. Interestingly, in developing countries, depreciation 
results in an increase in the likelihood of a banking crisis by 7.8%. Growth increase 
results in a 0.6% decrease in the likelihood of a banking crisis. For the currency crisis 
model, a unit increase in KAOPEN results in a 1.4% decrease in the likelihood of a 
currency crisis. A unit increase in growth reduces currency crises by 0.4%. On the 
contrary, a unit increase in the real interest rate, depreciation and inflation result in an 
increase in the likelihood of a currency crisis by 0.33%, 0.76% and 0.29% 
respectively. Furthermore, and rather interestingly, if there is a banking crisis, the 
probability of having a currency crisis 20.6% more than without a banking crisis. For 
the twin crisis model, increase in KAOPEN reduces the likelihood of a twin crisis by 
0.37% and the other control variables have significantly low probabilities and hence 
not mentioned in the analysis.  
 
4.7.2 Impact of Political Institutions and Political Polarization on the 
Likelihood of Crises 
 
Table 4.5 looks at the impact of the intensity of financial liberalization, 
political institutions and political polarization on the likelihood of a banking, currency 
and twin crisis. In this section of the analysis, the key independent variable, the 
KAOPEN or the intensity of financial liberalization tends to be consistent with the 
findings in table 4.3. There is also a clear trend that shows that deposit insurance, 
depreciation, domestic credit, M2/Reserves increases the likelihood of a banking 
crisis. On the contrary, it can be seen that money growth in fact reduces the likelihood 
of a banking crisis in regression models 7 and 8. However, the focus of this 
subsection will be on the proxies for political institution and political polarization and 
accordingly to its interaction with KAOPEN. Winning coalition size tends to decrease 
the likelihood of a banking crisis. The subsequent interaction term with KAOPEN is 
however statistically insignificant. Interestingly, for developing economies, increasing 
opposition seats of the largest party results in an increase in the likelihood of a crisis. 
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This is statistically significant at the 1% significance level. This is a striking result in 
the context of the interlinkage between politics and economic performance or 
macroeconomic vulnerability as is the case here. This brings up an interesting 
question, particularly for countries in parliamentary systems, whether or not a two 
thirds majority may actually be beneficial to mitigate financial risks as it would allow 
the ruling party to pass bills without the opposition party opposing it. This could open 
up a series of serious political questions regarding the viability and effectiveness of 
democracies in mitigating financial risks. This is reiterated by the fact that the next 
variable which is government vote share, illustrating that increasing vote share of the 
ruling government party results in a decrease in the likelihood of a crisis. As we tend 
towards a two thirds majority in parliamentary systems, is that a democracy at all 
when ruling parties can pass bills without any effective veto power in parliament? 
Furthermore, it also brings into focus, the political system that must be used to govern 
a developing nation for the economic benefits of the nation.  
 
A finding that is interesting also, is the fact that political globalization 
increases the likelihood of crises. One would expect enhanced political relations to 
facilitate and help mitigate financial risks. The political systems variable shows that a 
parliamentary system has less chance of inducing a banking crisis than a presidential 
system would. This could be attributed to the fact that developing countries that have 
presidential systems, tend to take the precedence of autocratic rulers and thereby 
failing to circumvent and tailor to the needs of the financial market rather focusing on 
short-term goals in order to satisfy the masses. Control of corruption, rather 
expectedly, reduces the likelihood of a banking crisis. Finally, rule of law, again, 
rather expectedly, reduces the likelihood of a banking crisis, however, rule of law, 
interacted with KAOPEN shows that increasing KAOPEN with enforced rule of law 
in fact increases the likelihood of a banking crisis. This is statistically significant at 
the 5% significance level. This result could also be a juncture between institutional 
functionality and political polarization, that greater presence of rule of law in a 
developing nation means there is great freedom and higher polarization, in which 
case, increasing liberalization may mean that the governing body is not able to 
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effectively exercise their power through their autonomous decision making, resulting 
in a higher chance of a banking crisis121.   
 
Table 4.6 looks at the impact of KAOPEN, political institutions and political 
polarization on the likelihood of a currency crisis. On the whole, it is observed that 
the results found here are consistent with that found in table 4.4, KAOPEN decreases 
the likelihood of a currency crisis and this is statistically significant in regression 
models 1, 2, 3 and 6. Furthermore, it is observed that growth reduces the likelihood of 
a currency crisis. This is statistically significant in regression models 2, 4, 5, and 6. 
Real interest rate and depreciation both increase the likelihood of a currency crisis and 
for both these variables this is statistically significant in regression models 1 through 
to 8. Inflation also increases the likelihood of a currency crisis along with and rather 
interestingly, GDP per capita, although for the latter the magnitude of the impact is 
rather miniscule. As observed in table 4.4, banking crisis increases the likelihood of a 
currency crisis occurring. The key independent variable of interest along with the base 
control variables and their retrospective results are not indifferent from those found in 
table 4.4 despite including a wide range of institutional variables. In regression model 
1, we observe that the winning coalition size in fact increases the likelihood of a 
currency crisis, which is in stark contrast to the impact it has on the likelihood of a 
banking crisis. In regression model 2, the result found here is consistent with the 
effect it has on the likelihood of a banking crisis, it is observed that increasing 
opposition party seats causes an increase in the likelihood of a currency crisis. In 
regression model 4, while the combined polity score variable is statistically 
insignificant, when it is interacted with KAOPEN, we find that increasing KAOPEN 
with an increasing democratic score reduces the likelihood of a currency crisis. This is 
statistically significant at the 10% significance level.  
 
In regression model 5, it can be seen that political globalization increases the 
likelihood of a currency crisis, however, when it is interacted with KAOPEN, it 
reduces the likelihood of a currency crisis. Intuitively, this could indicate that political 
bridges do not mitigate the risk of financial crashes, they must also transcend to the 
                                                 
121 This analytical deduction by the author would be supported by existing research papers; however, 
there are no research papers that have interacted these variables in the context of the crises literature. 
Thus, an opinionated justification has been proposed as to why the direction of impact suggests 
increased liberalization with greater rule of law increases the likelihood of crises.  
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economic hemisphere in order to preserve and protect the macroeconomic stability. In 
regression model 7, it can be seen rather expectedly that increase in control of 
corruption results in reduced chances of a currency crisis occurring and this is also the 
case for when it is interacted with KAOPEN. They are statistically significant at the 
5% and 1% significance level respectively. In regression model 8, enforcement of rule 
of law along with increasing KAOPEN results in decreased likelihood of a currency 
crisis. This is in line with theoretical and logical expectation contrary to what has 
been found in table 4.5 when looking at the impact of rule of law and KAOPEN on 
the likelihood of a banking crisis.   
 
Table 4.7 looks at the impact of KAOPEN, political institutions and political 
polarization on the likelihood of a twin crisis. KAOPEN follows the trend in terms of 
the sign as per tables 4.3, 4.5, and 4.6 by indicating that it reduces the likelihood of 
inducing a twin crisis in regression models 2, and 6. The rest of the control variables 
have similar influences on the likelihood of a twin crisis as they did for a banking and 
currency crisis. In regression model 2, it is again observed that increase in opposition 
party seats results in increased likelihood of a twin crisis. Another sign that is 
coherent with the other regression results is that of political globalization which tends 
to increase the likelihood of a twin crisis, however, the interacted term is statistically 
insignificant. Furthermore, parliamentary system is less likely to induce a twin crisis 
than a presidential system as illustrated in regression model 6. An argument could be 
proposed that particularly in the case of developing nations, in a presidential-
congressional system, there are lower democratic scores as indicated by the polity 
scores, compared to that of parliamentary systems where polity scores are higher for 
developing nations122.  
 
Regression model 7 and 8 both provide striking results that defy conventional 
theory. Regression model 7 shows that increase in control of corruption, as expected, 
decreases the likelihood of a twin crisis. However, when interacted with KAOPEN, it 
increases the likelihood of a twin crisis. Similarly, regression model 8 shows that 
                                                 
122 If the descriptive statistics are explored, based on the dataset that is used for this research paper, for 
developing countries in particular, the polity score with parliamentary systems averages to 6.53 (note: 
the values range from -10 to 10 where -10 represents perfect autocracy and 10 represents perfect 
democracy) and for presidential systems the score is significantly lower at 2.24. Therefore, this 
argument is an interesting argument that should be taken seriously.  
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greater enforcement of the rule of law reduces the likelihood of a twin crisis, 
however, when this is interacted with KAOPEN, similar to tables 4.5 and 4.6 (when 
examining the impact on the likelihood of a banking and currency crisis), it increases 
the likelihood of a twin crisis. There are some noteworthy aspects to consider given 
that this research paper observes developing countries only. It could potentially be 
that both control of corruption and greater enforcement of rule of law mean that the 
developing economies in question could be both liberal and democratic, akin to liberal 
Western democracies. However, for a democratic country this means that the 
governing body, as mentioned in the previous analysis for tables 4.5 and 4.6, could be 
restricted in terms of enforcing their economic policies due to greater veto power both 
in parliament and at the administrative level and this could in turn destabilize the 
efficacy of their policies. Often, opposition parties, particularly in democratic 
societies of developing countries, forsake the economic welfare of the state in order to 
garner a greater foothold on power and this could shake up the financial system, 
leading to vulnerabilities.    
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Table 4.3: Intensity of Financial Liberalization on Likelihood of Crises 
Time Period: 1980-2013  
Income Group: Developing Economies 
Estimation Methods: Multivariate Probit Method 
 (1) 
Banking Crisis 
(2) 
Currency Crisis 
(3) 
Twin Crisis 
KAOPEN -0.069* 
(0.037) 
-0.102** 
(0.041) 
-0.133**   
(0.058) 
Deposit Insurance  0.224**  
(0.105) 
  
Growth  -0.060***  
(0.014) 
-0.033*** 
(0.011) 
-0.094*** 
(0.016) 
Real Interest Rate -0.003  
(0.006) 
0.024*** 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
Depreciation 0.755***  
(0.276) 
0.056*** 
(0.019) 
0.007 
(0.008) 
Change in Terms of Trade 0.001  
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
Inflation  -0.005  
(0.004) 
0.021*** 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Budget Surplus -0.001  
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
0.009 
(0.012) 
M2/Reserves 0.003  
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
Domestic Credit 0.003  
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
Money Growth  -0.006  
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
GDP per Capita -0.000  
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Debt/GDP -0.000  
(0.001) 
  
Banking Crisis Dummy  0.903***   
(0.161) 
 
Constant -1.317***  
(0.161) 
  
Observations  1450 1536 1535 
Pseudo R2 0.188 0.205 0.146 
χ2 46.527 90.620 49.018 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors.  
 
Table 4.4: Average Marginal Effects using Probit Regression 
Time Period: 1980-2013  
Income Group: Developing Economies 
Estimation Methods: Average Marginal Effects using Multivariate Probit Method 
 (1) 
Banking Crisis 
(2) 
Currency Crisis 
(3) 
Twin Crisis 
KAOPEN -0.0071994* -0.014109** -0.0037455**  
Deposit Insurance  0.0243534**   
Growth  -0.006252*** -0.0045212*** -0.0026416 
Real Interest Rate -0.0002877 0.0033514*** 0.0000617 
Depreciation 0.0788111*** 0.0076863*** 0.0001945 
Change in Terms of Trade 0.0000565 0.0001809 -0.0001688 
Inflation  -0.0005717 0.0029242*** -0.000015 
Budget Surplus -0.0000719 -0.000389 0.0002506 
M2/Reserves 0.000336 0.0002235 0.0000938* 
Domestic Credit 0.000307 0.0000621 0.0001394 
Money Growth  -0.0005747 0.0002902 0.000022 
GDP per Capita -0.000000365 0.00000616** 0.0000024 
Debt/GDP -.0000522   
Banking Crisis Dummy  0.2060868**  
Constant -1.317***    
Observations  1450 1536 1535 
Pseudo R2 0.188 0.205 0.146 
χ2 46.527 90.620 49.018 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors. 
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Table 4.5: Financial Liberalization, Political Polarization and Political Institutions on the Likelihood of Banking Crises 
Time Period: 1980-2013 
Income Group: Developing Economies 
Estimation Methods: Multivariate Probit Method 
 (1) 
Banking 
Crisis 
(2) 
Banking 
Crisis 
(3) 
Banking 
Crisis 
(4) 
Banking 
Crisis 
(5) 
Banking 
Crisis 
(6) 
Banking 
Crisis 
(7) 
Banking 
Crisis 
(8) 
Banking 
Crisis 
KAOPEN -0.014 
(0.138) 
-0.083** 
(0.045) 
-0.166** 
(0.083) 
-0.14** 
(0.056) 
-0.000 
(0.127) 
-0.155*** 
(0.047) 
-0.053 
(0.066) 
0.021 
(0.048) 
Deposit Insurance  0.679*** 
(0.181) 
0.118 
(0.115) 
0.161 
(0.136) 
0.169 
(0.105) 
0.062 
(0.138) 
0.196 
(0.121) 
0.100 
(0.158) 
0.144 
(0.159) 
Growth  -0.094** 
(0.019) 
-0.056*** 
(0.014) 
-0.068** 
(0.016) 
-0.060** 
(0.014) 
-0.073** 
(0.013) 
-0.060*** 
(0.016) 
-0.010 
(0.020) 
-0.011 
(0.020) 
Real Interest Rate 0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
0.015 
(0.009) 
0.016* 
(0.008) 
Depreciation 0.615** 
(0.304) 
0.823*** 
(0.279) 
0.739** 
(0.290) 
0.744*** 
(0.276) 
0.771*** 
(0.290) 
0.604** 
(0.275) 
1.817** 
(0.609) 
1.766** 
(0.630) 
Terms of Trade 0.001 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
0.000 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.000 
(0.005) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
Inflation  -0.007 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
0.026** 
(0.009) 
0.026** 
(0.010) 
Budget Surplus -0.001 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
0.000 
(0.008) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.009) 
-0.014 
(0.010) 
-0.004 
(0.013) 
-0.005 
(0.014) 
M2/Reserves -0.032 
(0.023) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
0.012** 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.007) 
Domestic Credit 0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
Money Growth  0.000 
(0.004) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.023* 
(0.010) 
-0.023* 
(0.010) 
GDP per Capita 0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Debt/GDP   -0.002 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Coalition -0.812** 
(0.365) 
       
KAOPEN*Coalition 
Size 
-0.017 
(0.208) 
       
Opposition Party 
Seats 
 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
      
KAOPEN*Opposition 
Party Seats 
 0.000 
(0.001) 
      
Government Party 
Vote Share 
  -0.005* 
(0.003) 
     
KAOPEN* 
Government Party 
Vote Share 
  0.002 
(0.002) 
     
Polity    0.009 
(0.012) 
    
KAOPEN*Polity    0.007 
(0.008) 
    
Political 
Globalization 
    0.011*** 
(0.004) 
   
KAOPEN*Political 
Globalization 
    -0.001 
(0.002) 
   
Political System      -1.013*** 
(0.201) 
  
KAOPEN*Political 
System 
     0.042 
(0.093) 
  
Corruption Control       -0.59*** 
(0.188) 
 
KAOPEN*Corruption 
Control 
      0.033 
(0.086) 
 
Rule of Law        -0.4*** 
(0.163) 
KAOPEN*Rule of 
Law 
       0.131** 
(0.061) 
Constant -0.783** 
(0.299) 
-1.452*** 
(0.162) 
-0.872** 
(0.224) 
-1.390** 
(0.169) 
-1.744** 
(0.260) 
-1.494*** 
(0.187) 
-2.736** 
(0.354) 
-2.703** 
(0.333) 
Observations  450 1352 913 1294 1246 1189 1019 1020 
Pseudo R2 0.159 0.110 0.132 0.096 0.124 0.140 0.238 0.237 
χ2 51.493 60.702 68.330 53.369 68.357 86.829 58.687 52.853 
***Significant at p<0.01; **significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors. 
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Table 4.6: Financial Liberalization, Political Polarization and Political Institutions on the Likelihood of Currency Crises 
Time Period: 1980-2013 
Income Group: Developing Economies 
Estimation Methods: Multivariate Probit Method 
 (1) 
Currency 
Crisis 
(2) 
Currency 
Crisis 
(3) 
Currency 
Crisis 
(4) 
Currency 
Crisis 
(5) 
Currency 
Crisis 
(6) 
Currency 
Crisis 
(7) 
Currency 
Crisis 
(8) 
Currency 
Crisis 
KAOPEN -0.581** 
(0.285) 
-0.130** 
(0.055) 
-0.237* 
(0.119) 
-0.066 
(0.058) 
0.176 
(0.152) 
-0.117** 
(0.049) 
-0.139 
(0.090) 
-0.086 
(0.084) 
Growth  -0.027 
(0.017) 
-0.035** 
(0.012) 
-0.014 
(0.012) 
-0.035** 
(0.011) 
-0.035** 
(0.013) 
-0.029* 
(0.013) 
-0.007 
(0.015) 
-0.009 
(0.016) 
Real Interest Rate 0.013* 
(0.007) 
0.024*** 
(0.006) 
0.015* 
(0.007) 
0.021*** 
(0.006) 
0.021*** 
(0.006) 
0.022*** 
(0.006) 
0.022** 
(0.008) 
0.021** 
(0.008) 
Depreciation 0.043* 
(0.018) 
0.055** 
(0.020) 
2.427*** 
(0.684) 
0.051** 
(0.018) 
0.049*** 
(0.019) 
0.050*** 
(0.018) 
1.752** 
(0.659) 
1.599* 
(0.689) 
Terms of Trade -0.003 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.010 
(0.006) 
0.008 
(0.006) 
Inflation  0.013** 
(0.006) 
0.021** 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.008) 
0.019** 
(0.006) 
0.019*** 
(0.006) 
0.020*** 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.009) 
0.010 
(0.009) 
Budget Surplus 0.013 
(0.009) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.008 
(0.010) 
-0.008 
(0.009) 
-0.006 
(0.013) 
-0.006 
(0.013) 
M2/Reserves -0.005 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
Domestic Credit -0.002 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
Money Growth  0.003 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
GDP per Capita 0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
Banking Crisis 0.610*** 
(0.207) 
0.819*** 
(0.164) 
0.561** 
(0.237) 
0.863*** 
(0.162) 
0.778*** 
(0.169) 
0.739*** 
(0.166) 
1.232*** 
(0.278) 
1.203*** 
(0.283) 
Coalition 1.117** 
(0.469) 
       
KAOPEN*Coalition 
Size 
0.549 
(0.354) 
       
Opposition Party 
Seats 
 0.003*** 
(0.001) 
      
KAOPEN*Opposition 
Party Seats 
 0.001 
(0.001) 
      
Government Party 
Vote Share 
  0.004 
(0.003) 
     
KAOPEN* 
Government Party 
Vote Share 
  0.003 
(0.002) 
     
Polity    0.010 
(0.011) 
    
KAOPEN*Polity    -0.016* 
(0.009) 
    
Political 
Globalization 
    0.012*** 
(0.003) 
   
KAOPEN*Political 
Globalization 
    -0.005* 
(0.002) 
   
Political System      -0.280 
(0.183) 
  
KAOPEN*Political 
System 
     0.052 
(0.113) 
  
Corruption Control       -0.420** 
(0.166) 
 
KAOPEN*Corruption 
Control 
      -0.34*** 
(0.103) 
 
Rule of Law        -0.271 
(0.185) 
KAOPEN*Rule of 
Law 
       -0.209** 
(0.094) 
Constant -2.37*** 
(0.387) 
-0.18*** 
(0.183) 
-2.07*** 
(0.246) 
-2.03*** 
(0.168) 
-2.61*** 
(0.251) 
-2.01*** 
(0.175) 
-2.89*** 
(0.304) 
-2.77*** 
(0.307) 
Observations  481 1432 1008 1390 1328 1217 1078 1078 
Pseudo R2 0.201 0.212 0.269 0.212 0.231 0.194 0.307 0.290 
χ2 42.312 92.186 55.866 90.241 95.709 79.643 76.109 69.351 
***Significant at p<0.01; **significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors. 
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Table 4.7: Financial Liberalization, Political Polarization and Political Institutions on the Likelihood of Twin Crises 
Time Period: 1980-2013 
Income Group: Developing Economies 
Estimation Methods: Multivariate Probit Method 
 (1) 
Twin 
Crisis 
(2) 
Twin 
Crisis 
(3) 
Twin 
Crisis 
(4) 
Twin 
Crisis 
(5) 
Twin 
Crisis 
(6) 
Twin 
Crisis 
(7) 
Twin 
Crisis 
(8) 
Twin 
Crisis 
KAOPEN -0.058 
(0.140) 
-0.174** 
(0.074) 
-0.071 
(0.128) 
-0.122 
(0.111) 
-0.024 
(0.225) 
-0.268** 
(0.072) 
-0.010 
(0.107) 
-0.025 
(0.070) 
Growth  -0.104*** 
(0.026) 
-0.09*** 
(0.016) 
-0.07*** 
(0.019) 
-0.09*** 
(0.016) 
-0.10*** 
(0.017) 
-0.092** 
(0.018) 
-0.045* 
(0.021) 
-0.048* 
(0.021) 
Real Interest Rate 0.001 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
0.018 
(0.009) 
0.016 
(0.009) 
Depreciation -0.002 
(0.007) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
1.498*** 
(0.381) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
0.012 
(0.008) 
0.014 
(0.009) 
2.200*** 
(0.625) 
2.186** 
(0.696) 
Terms of Trade -0.014 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.012 
(0.009) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.010 
(0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
Inflation  0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.016** 
(0.006) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.018 
(0.012) 
0.015 
(0.013) 
Budget Surplus 0.023 
(0.015) 
0.016 
(0.015) 
0.003 
(0.010) 
0.009 
(0.011) 
0.012 
(0.017) 
0.001 
(0.022) 
-0.012 
(0.015) 
-0.007 
(0.017) 
M2/Reserves 0.001 
(0.002) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.015** 
(0.006) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.013* 
(0.006) 
0.014* 
(0.006) 
0.016** 
(0.006) 
Domestic Credit 0.005 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.016*** 
(0.005) 
0.011** 
(0.004) 
0.010** 
(0.003) 
Money Growth  -0.002 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.022 
(0.011) 
-0.021 
(0.012) 
GDP per Capita 0.000* 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Coalition 0.581 
(0.451) 
       
KAOPEN*Coalition 
Size 
-0.080 
(0.411) 
       
Opposition Party 
Seats 
 0.007*** 
(0.001) 
      
KAOPEN*Opposition 
Party Seats 
 0.001 
(0.001) 
      
Government Party 
Vote Share 
  -0.004 
(0.003) 
     
KAOPEN* 
Government Party 
Vote Share 
  0.000 
(0.003) 
     
Polity    0.015 
(0.020) 
    
KAOPEN*Polity    -0.012 
(0.016) 
    
Political 
Globalization 
    0.025*** 
(0.005) 
   
KAOPEN*Political 
Globalization 
    -0.002 
(0.003) 
   
Political System      -1.186** 
(0.512) 
  
KAOPEN*Political 
System 
     0.035 
(0.176) 
  
Corruption Control       -0.82*** 
(0.288) 
 
KAOPEN*Corruption 
Control 
      0.243** 
(0.107) 
 
Rule of Law        -0.445* 
(0.260) 
KAOPEN*Rule of 
Law 
       0.236*** 
(0.079) 
Constant -2.215*** 
(0.372) 
-2.230*** 
(0.167) 
-2.006*** 
(0.269) 
-2.03*** 
(0.167) 
-3.40*** 
(0.339) 
-2.418*** 
(0.219) 
-3.418*** 
(0.481) 
-3.04*** 
(0.428) 
Observations  478 1430 1004 1388 1322 1214 1080 1080 
Pseudo R2 0.179 0.199 0.300 0.170 0.229 0.235 0.422 0.400 
χ2 37.887 73.377 71.578 69.277 78.645 74.711 87.449 76.663 
***Significant at p<0.01; **significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors. 
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4.8 Conclusion 
 
This research paper investigates the impact of the intensity of financial 
liberalization on the likelihood of a banking, currency and twin crisis using a dataset 
that includes 93 developing countries over the time period 1980-2013. An integral 
component of this researching study also examines the impact of political institutions 
and political polarization independently, and jointly with the intensity of financial 
liberalization on the likelihood of a banking, currency and twin crisis. The 
econometric technique deployed in this research paper includes the multivariate probit 
regression model.  Appendix 3 (refer to section 4.11) validates these findings through 
robustness checks with different econometric methods. The key inferences deduced in 
this research paper are the following:  
 
1. For developing countries, it is observed that increasing intensity of financial 
liberalization (or the variable KAOPEN) decreases the likelihood of a 
banking, currency and twin crisis. The robustness checks in appendix 3 of 
section 4.11, which includes the usage of the lagged variables, the deployment 
of the conditional fixed effects logit model and the random effects probit 
model, confirm the uniformity of the findings.  
2. In assessing the impact of the key macroeconomic determinants that affect the 
likelihood of banking crises, it is evident that in the presence of an explicit 
deposit insurance scheme, there is a greater chance of a banking crisis 
occurring. This confirms the moral hazard problem associated with deposit 
insurance schemes. Growth and money growth reduce the likelihood of a 
banking crisis on the other hand increase in the depreciation of the exchange 
rate, m2/reserves and domestic credit increase the likelihood of a banking 
crisis. Depreciation, real interest rate, inflation, and a banking crisis increase 
the likelihood of a currency crisis but growth reduces the likelihood of a 
currency crisis. For the case of twin crises, depreciation, m2/reserves and 
domestic credit increase the likelihood of a twin crisis but growth reduces the 
likelihood of a twin crisis.  
3. On the basis of the proxies used to measure political institutions and political 
polarization and their retrospective impact on the likelihood of crises it can be 
inferred that improvements in the conditions of political institutions, in 
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general, decrease the likelihood of a banking, currency and twin crisis. 
Interestingly, parliamentary systems as opposed to presidential systems, have 
a lower likelihood of inducing a banking and a twin crisis. Political 
polarization generally tends to increase the likelihood of a banking, currency 
and twin crisis.    
 
The key inference deduced in this research paper contradicts the findings in 
the empirical literature in the associated field of research. The literature tends to 
examine pre-and post-liberalization impacts on the likelihood of a banking crisis123 
and find that post-liberalization, there is a greater likelihood of a banking crisis. 
However, a dummy variable is predominantly used to specify financial liberalization. 
In this research paper however, the KAOPEN variable is used which measures the 
intensity of financial liberalization. The inference shows that in general, for 
developing countries, it could be argued that increase in the intensity of financial 
liberalization is not necessarily associated with increase in the likelihood of a 
banking, currency and/or a twin crisis. However, this finding does not reject the 
argument that the economy is more susceptible to a banking, currency and twin crisis, 
post-liberalization, given the liberalization variable is binary. For developing 
countries, despite being common knowledge that institutional improvements mitigates 
the risk of financial crashes, this research paper confirms these theories with various 
proxies. One of the most interesting findings of the research paper stems from the 
impact of political polarization and its effect on the likelihood of crises. In developing 
economies, it is observed that higher polarization results in increased likelihood of 
crises. Therefore, from the perspective of the preservation and the welfare of the state, 
both in the short and the long term, there are numerous socio-political decisions 
policymakers must make. Should policymakers compromise their stance on endorsing 
democracy even if polarization (which can increase with democracy) can leave the 
financial system susceptible to a crisis? This question certainly opens an avenue that 
is beyond the researching scope of the thesis. However, these factors must be taken 
into serious considerations by policymakers, government officials and most 
importantly economists, particularly when making a case for developing countries.       
                                                 
123 The literature tends to usually examine the impact on the likelihood of a banking crisis. Research 
papers examining the impact of financial liberalization on the likelihood of a currency crisis is usually 
conjoined with the impact on a banking crisis. Individual examination, as noted in the empirical and 
theoretical review is limited for the impact on currency crisis alone.  
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4.8.1 Contribution to the Literature  
 
Contrary to the predominantly used variable for financial liberalization in the 
existing researching arena, this research paper uses the Chinn-Ito index as opposed to 
the binary financial liberalization variable that takes the value of 1 or 0. There are no 
existing research paper that has looked at the likelihood of a crisis at different levels 
of financial openness, especially with the Chinn-Ito index that measures the intensity 
of financial liberalization. This research paper also divulges into the impact of 
political polarization, independently and jointly with financial liberalization on the 
likelihood of a banking, currency and twin crisis. While, there is a common tendency 
for economists to only use a political variable to serve as a control for ‘law and order’ 
for example, these research papers however, do not explore and definitely do not 
sufficiently examine the impact of key political variables and their resulting impact on 
the likelihood of crisis. This certainly was and still continues to be an ‘elephant in the 
room’ due to the severity in which these political theories have been untested 
empirically. This research paper addresses these problems and considers political 
factors to be a fundamental component of the economic manifestations of developing 
countries and thereby makes a significant contribution to the literature. Furthermore, 
even when political variables have been used in the past, the coefficients for these 
political variables systematically tended to be statistically insignificant.   
 
4.8.2 Suggestions for Further Work 
 
An unavoidable extension of this researching work would be to explore and 
determine the threshold of the intensity of financial liberalization on the likelihood of 
minimizing a banking, currency and twin crisis using a probit or logit regression 
method. The novelty of this research would not only be stimulating in the realms of 
academia but policymakers could certainly benefit if they were able pinpoint 
threshold levels after which economies are susceptible to a currency crisis for 
instance. This could then be explored for other key macroeconomic determinants as 
well. Another avenue that should also be heavily explored, particularly in the context 
of developing economies, is the impact of political factors and how governments can 
redesign institutional setups in order to accommodate growth while mitigating the risk 
of a financial collapse.   
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4.9 Appendix 1: Explorative Data Analysis  
 
4.9.1 Explorative Data Analysis 1: Historical Trends 
 
Panel 4.1: Historical Trends of KAOPEN and Episodes of Banking, Currency and Twin Crises 
 
Figure 4.1: Crises Episodes 
 
Figure 4.2: KAOPEN 
  
 
Panel 1 looks at the historical trends of KAOPEN and the number of episodes 
of banking, currency and twin crises in the dataset. Figure 4.1 shows the episodes of 
banking, currency and twin crises that have occurred each year from 1980-2013. In 
general it can be observed that historically developing countries have undergone more 
currency crises than banking crises. Figure 4.2 illustrates the historical trend of 
KAOPEN, there was a steady increase from the 90s, but there is a slow decline after 
the global financial crash of 2008/09.  
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4.9.2 Explorative Data Analysis 2: Scatter Graphs 
 
Panel 4.2: Scatter Plots of KAOPEN on Episodes of Banking, Currency and Twin Crises 
 
Figure 4.3: KAOPEN on Banking Crisis 
 
Figure 4.4: KAOPEN on Currency Crisis 
  
  
Figure 4.5: KAOPEN on Twin Crisis 
 
 
Panel 2 illustrates the relationship between KAOPEN and the episodes of 
crises. Figures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 resonate with the same picture that the probit 
regression results gave, that increasing KAOPEN results in decreased episodes of 
banking, currency and twin crisis.   
 
  
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
E
p
is
o
d
e
s
 o
f 
B
a
n
k
in
g
 C
ri
s
e
s
-1 -.5 0 .5
KAOPEN
95% CI Fitted values
Banking Crisis Episodes
Developing Economies
Episodes of Banking Crises and KAOPEN
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
E
p
is
o
d
e
s
 o
f 
C
u
rr
e
n
c
y
 C
ri
s
e
s
-1 -.5 0 .5
KAOPEN
95% CI Fitted values
Currency Crisis Episodes
Developing Economies
Episodes of Currency Crises and KAOPEN
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
E
p
is
o
d
e
s
 o
f 
T
w
in
 C
ri
s
e
s
-1 -.5 0 .5
KAOPEN
95% CI Fitted values
Currency Crisis Episodes
Developing Economies
Episodes of Twin Crises and KAOPEN
 269 
 
4.9.2 Explorative Data Analysis 3: Quadratic Relationships  
 
Panel 4.3: Quadratic Relationships of KAOPEN and Episodes of Banking, Currency and Twin 
Crises 
 
Figure 4.6: KAOPEN on Banking Crisis 
 
Figure 4.7: KAOPEN on Currency Crisis 
  
  
Figure 4.8: KAOPEN on Twin Crisis 
 
 
In this research paper, in the probit regression analysis, along with the various 
robustness tests executed, the squared term and its subsequent regression results have 
not been examined. This is because Angkinand, Sawangngoenyuang, and Wihlborg 
(1998) in their research paper concluded from their study that there is an inverted U-
shaped relationship between financial openness and likelihood of a twin crisis. This 
goes to show that if the technicality of the threshold models could be applied in the 
probit regression model, the point after which KAOPEN causes a decline in the 
likelihood of a crisis can be determined. However, this is beyond the scope of this 
particular research paper.  
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4.10 Appendix 2: Predictive Margins 
 
The predictive margins section graphically illustrates the relationship between 
the key independent variable of interest, KAOPEN, along with the proxies for 
political institutions and political polarization on the likelihood of a banking, currency 
and twin crisis.  
 
4.10.1 Predictive Margins: Intensity of Financial Liberalization on Likelihood of 
Crises 
 
From figures 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11, it is evident that increasing KAOPEN, or 
increasing intensity of financial liberalization results in a decreased likelihood of a 
banking, currency and twin crisis respectively.  
 
Panel 4.4: Predictive Margins of Intensity of Financial Liberalization 
 
Figure 4.9: KAOPEN on Banking Crisis 
 
Figure 4.10: KAOPEN on Currency Crisis 
  
  
Figure 4.11: KAOPEN on Twin Crisis 
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4.10.2 Predictive Margins: Political Factors on Likelihood of Crises 
 
There are four proxy variables used to account for political institutions and 
four to account for political polarization and their subsequent impact on the likelihood 
of crises. The probit regression results for these are presented in tables 4.5, 4.6 and 
4.7. However, the graphical representation is presented in this subsection. Panel 5 
looks at the predictive margins of political factors on the likelihood of a banking 
crisis. In figure 4.12 it is evident that increase in the winning coalition size decreases 
the likelihood of a banking crisis. This is consistent with the sign of the regression 
coefficient in table 4.5. Increase in opposition party increases the likelihood of a 
banking crisis according to figure 4.13. Similarly, increase in government party vote 
share decreases the likelihood of a crisis as illustrated in figure 4.14. Figure 4.15 does 
not paint a definitive picture as to whether or not increase in polity score increases the 
likelihood of a banking crisis. The coefficient for combined polity score is statistically 
insignificant in table 4.5. In figure 4.16 it is seen that political globalization increases 
the likelihood of a banking crisis and in figure 4.17 it is evident that parliamentary 
systems reduce the likelihood of a banking crisis. Control of corruption and 
enforcement of rule of law both reduce the likelihood of a banking crisis as shown in 
figures 4.18 and 4.19 respectively.  
 
Panel 6 looks at the predictive margins of political institutions and political 
polarization on the likelihood of a currency crisis. Winning coalition size, opposition 
party seats, government vote share, polity score and political globalization increase 
the likelihood of a currency crisis as illustrated in figures 4.20, 4.21, 4.22, 4.23, and 
4.24 respectively. The regression coefficients in table are not statistically significant 
for a few of these variables therefore the findings from these illustrations cannot be 
taken for definitive deductive purposes. A parliamentary system reduces the chances 
of a currency crisis and controlled corruption and enhancement of rule of law reduces 
the likelihood of a currency crisis as illustrated in figures 4.25, 4.26 and 4.27 
respectively. Panel 7 looks at the predictive margins of political factors on the 
likelihood of twin crisis. Winning coalition size, opposition party seats, combined 
polity score and political globalization increase the likelihood of a twin crisis as 
shown in figures 4.27, 4.29, 4.31 and figure 4.32 respectively. Increase in government 
vote share, control of corruption and rule of law as presented in figures 4.30, 4.34 and 
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4.35 respectively, all reduce the likelihood of a twin crisis. However, for figure 4.35, 
it must be noted that that the results are only significant for a limited number of 
observations, especially when the rule of law ranges from -1 to 0. A parliamentary 
system reduces the chances of a twin crisis occurring than a presidential system in a 
developing country as presented in figure 4.33. For the regression coefficients that are 
statistically significant in table 4.7, the direction of impact on the likelihood of crisis, 
is consistent with the figures presented in panel 7.   
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Panel 4.5: Predictive Margins of Political Factors on Likelihood of Banking Crisis 
 
Figure 4.12: Winning Coalition Size 
 
Figure 4.13: Opposition Party Seats 
  
 
Figure 4.14: Government Party Seats 
 
Figure 4.15: Polity Score 
  
 
Figure 4.16: Political Globalizaiton 
 
 
Figure 4.17: Political System 
 
 
Figure 4.18: Control of Corruption 
 
 
Figure 4.19: Rule of Law 
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Panel 4.6: Predictive Margins of Political Factors on Likelihood of Currency Crisis 
 
Figure 4.20: Winning Coalition Size 
 
Figure 4.21: Opposition Party Seats 
  
 
Figure 4.22: Government Party Seats 
 
Figure 4.23: Polity Score 
  
 
Figure 4.24: Political Globalizaiton 
 
 
Figure 4.25: Political System 
 
 
Figure 4.26: Control of Corruption 
 
 
Figure 4.27: Rule of Law 
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Panel 4.7: Predictive Margins of Political Factors on Likelihood of Twin Crisis 
 
Figure 4.28: Winning Coalition Size 
 
Figure 4.29: Opposition Party Seats 
  
 
Figure 4.30: Government Party Seats 
 
Figure 4.31: Polity Score 
  
 
Figure 4.32: Political Globalizaiton 
 
 
Figure 4.33: Political System 
 
 
Figure 4.34: Control of Corruption 
 
 
Figure 4.35: Rule of Law 
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4.11 Appendix 3: Robustness Checks  
 
These robustness checks are used to validate the findings in the body of the research 
paper, they are presented accordingly and they are the following: 
 
1. Robustness Test 1: Lagged Variables  
2. Robustness Test 2: Conditional Fixed Effects Logit Model  
3. Robustness Test 3: Random Effects Probit Model 
4. Robustness Test 4: Credit Boom and the Mundlak Approach   
 
4.11.1 Robustness Test 1: Lagged Variables  
 
Table 4.8: Intensity of Financial Liberalization on Likelihood of Crises using Lagged Variables  
Time Period: 1980-2013  
Income Group: Developing Economies 
Estimation Methods: Multivariate Probit Method 
 (1) 
Banking Crisis 
(2) 
Currency Crisis 
(3) 
Twin Crisis 
KAOPENt-1 -0.064* 
(0.038) 
-0.092** 
(0.039) 
-0.136** 
(0.061) 
Deposit Insurancet-1  0.202* 
(0.112) 
  
Growtht-1  -0.068*** 
(0.013) 
-0.047*** 
(0.011) 
-0.060*** 
(0.015) 
Real Interest Ratet-1 0.004 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
0.016*** 
(0.006) 
Depreciationt-1 0.409 
(0.252) 
0.341 
(0.271) 
0.218 
(0.445) 
Change in Terms of Tradet-1 0.002 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
Inflationt-1  -0.001 
(0.005) 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
Budget Surplust-1 0.014 
(0.010) 
-0.013* 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.008) 
M2/Reservest-1 0.009 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
Domestic Creditt-1 0.005*** 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
Money Growtht-1  -0.002 
(0.004) 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
GDP per Capitat-1 -0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Debt/GDPt-1 0.002* 
(0.001) 
  
Banking Crisist-1  0.673*** 
(0.167) 
 
Constant -1.420*** 
(0.158) 
-1.721*** 
(0.127) 
-2.303*** 
(0.136) 
Observations  1357 1438 1438 
Pseudo R2 0.096 0.112 0.106 
χ2 48.156 67.462 41.872 
***Significant at p<0.01; **significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors.  
 
The usage of lagged variables for both the financial liberalization variable as 
well as the macroeconomic control variables is of common practice in the associated 
field of research. Often, it is attributed to the fact that past occurrences, usually in the 
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form of the de jure financial liberalization (dummy variable) that takes precedence 
and eventually has a bearing on growth and/or fragility. This also goes for all the 
other control variables. In order to avoid the conflict of argument, despite the 
financial liberalization variable being used here as being continuous and measuring 
the intensity rather than the date of liberalization, it could potentially discard all 
claims of delegitimizing the results acquired in the body of the research paper.  
 
Table 4.8 looks at the impact of the lagged effect of the intensity of financial 
liberalization, along with lagged effects of other macroeconomic controls on the 
likelihood of a banking, currency and twin crisis. The results found in regression 
model 1 (the banking crisis model) are fairly consistent with that of table 4.3. Lagged 
KAOPEN reduces the likelihood of a banking crisis and the result is statistically 
significant at the 10% significance level. Deposit insurance increases the likelihood of 
a banking crisis and the result is also statistically significant at the 10% significance 
level. Growth reduces the likelihood of a banking crisis, the coefficient for which is 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level. Domestic credit increases the 
likelihood of a banking crisis and the result is statistically significant at the 1% 
significance level. An additional finding that was not statistically significant in the 
previously reported regressions is that external debt tends to increase the likelihood of 
a crisis when it is lagged. Therefore, this goes to show accumulated external debt in 
the past, can propagate a banking crisis in the present. Regression model 2 shows that 
lagged KAOPEN, growth and budget surplus reduce the likelihood of a currency 
crisis and inflation, GDP per capita and banking crisis increases the likelihood of a 
currency crisis. The results are consistent with those found in table 4.3. For the twin 
crisis model, the impact on the likelihood of a twin crisis with those without lags are 
not dissimilar except real interest rate tends to increase the likelihood of a twin crisis, 
for which the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% significance level.  
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4.11.2 Robustness Test 2: Conditional Fixed Effects Logit Model  
 
Table 4.9: Intensity of Financial Liberalization on Likelihood of Crises using Fixed Effects Logit Model 
Time Period: 1980-2013  
Income Group: Developing Economies 
Estimation Methods: Conditional Fixed Effects Logit Model  
 (1) 
Banking Crisis 
(2) 
Currency Crisis 
(3) 
Twin Crisis 
KAOPEN -0.647*** 
(0.224) 
-0.289** 
(0.165) 
-0.283 
(0.518) 
Deposit Insurance  0.994* 
(0.541) 
  
Growth  -0.146*** 
(0.039) 
-0.057* 
(0.032)  
0.107 
(0.089) 
Real Interest Rate -0.015 
(0.012) 
0.009 
(0.009) 
0.030 
(0.034) 
Depreciation 0.826 
(0.555) 
0.029 
(0.028) 
4.850*** 
(1.583) 
Change in Terms of Trade -0.006 
(0.011) 
-0.009 
(0.009) 
-0.024 
(0.027) 
Inflation  0.005 
(0.008) 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
0.069** 
(0.033) 
Budget Surplus -0.036 
(0.049) 
-0.025 
(0.040) 
-0.132 
(0.096) 
M2/Reserves 0.119** 
(0.048) 
0.024 
(0.018) 
0.214*** 
(0.069) 
Domestic Credit 0.022 
(0.013) 
0.032*** 
(0.012) 
0.041** 
(0.018) 
Money Growth  -0.026** 
(0.010) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.043* 
(0.024) 
GDP per Capita -0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Debt/GDP 0.009* 
(0.005) 
  
Banking Crisis Dummy  0.951*** 
(0.363) 
 
Constant    
Observations  609 736 323 
Pseudo R2 0.275 0.222 0.504 
χ2 104.243 100.468 80.365 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors.  
 
The conditional fixed effects logit model was used as a robustness check in 
order to account for endogeneity bias and to also account for unobserved 
heterogeneity. Furthermore, it erodes the problem of omitted variable bias. The 
coefficients of the variables are fairly consistent with that in table 4.3, however, for 
regression model 1, it is observed that M2/Reserves increases the likelihood of a 
banking crisis and money growth reduces the likelihood of a crisis along with GDP 
per capita. Furthermore, as observed in table 4.8, it is also observed that debt 
increases the likelihood of a banking crisis. For regression model 2, the noteworthy 
and the variables that shed light or give a new perspective is that of domestic credit, 
which while acceptable in theory was not statistically significant in table 4.3, 
however, it is observed here that domestic credit increases the likelihood of a 
currency crisis. However, this result is in contrast to the one found in table 4.3, and 
that is the fact that GDP per capita was seen to induce a currency crisis, however, 
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according to this result, it reduces the likelihood of a currency crisis. For the twin 
crisis model, it can be seen that depreciation, inflation, M2/Reserves, and domestic 
credit increase the likelihood of a twin crisis whereas money growth reduces it. 
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4.11.3 Robustness Test 3: Random Effects Probit Model   
 
Table 4.10: Intensity of Financial Liberalization on Likelihood of Crises using Random Effects Probit Model 
Time Period: 1980-2013  
Income Group: Developing Economies 
Estimation Methods: Random Effects Probit Model   
 (1) 
Banking Crisis 
(2) 
Currency Crisis 
(3) 
Twin Crisis 
KAOPEN -0.230*** 
(0.087) 
-0.146** 
(0.064) 
-0.203* 
(0.109) 
Deposit Insurance  0.364 
(0.247) 
  
Growth  -0.084*** 
(0.018) 
-0.035** 
(0.015) 
-0.115*** 
(0.023) 
Real Interest Rate -0.004 
(0.006) 
0.026*** 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
Depreciation 0.670** 
(0.299) 
0.049** 
(0.019) 
0.012 
(0.023) 
Change in Terms of Trade -0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.009 
(0.008) 
Inflation  -0.001 
(0.004) 
0.020*** 
(0.005) 
-0.000 
(0.004) 
Budget Surplus -0.019 
(0.021) 
-0.007 
(0.014) 
0.014 
(0.027) 
M2/Reserves 0.021** 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
Domestic Credit 0.009* 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
Money Growth  -0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
GDP per Capita -0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Debt/GDP 0.001 
(0.002) 
  
Banking Crisis Dummy  0.812*** 
(0.189) 
 
Constant -1.755*** 
(0.348) 
-2.514*** 
(0.243) 
-2.835*** 
(0.419) 
Observations  1450 1536 1535 
χ2 49.329 88.612 30.482 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors.  
 
The reason why random effects probit model was included as a robustness 
checks were to validate the results found using the multivariate probit model 
illustrated in table 4.3. The reason for using the random effects probit model are the 
following: (a) accounts for variables that are time invariant; (b) often, there is the 
possibility particularly for cases of financial liberalization where the variable, despite 
being continuous and measuring intensity and not being a binary variable, is often 
persistent over time for a specific country and this may give a biased result as this is a 
criticism directed towards the usage of fixed effects (Richey and Brown, 2016); (c) 
another criticism directed towards using fixed effects is that it excludes the non-crisis 
nations, but the random effects probit model includes both the crisis and non-crisis 
nations. The results observed in table 4.10 are not indifferent to that observed in table 
4.3 and therefore there is no need for repetition. 
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4.11.4 Robustness Test 4: Credit Boom and the Mundlak Approach    
 
This sub-section addresses three key facets to validate the findings reported in 
the main findings and they include (1) the usage of the HP filter in order to account 
for ‘credit boom,’ (2) the Mundlak approach to address endogeneity, and (3) the usage 
of the lagged dependent variable to model dynamics.  
 
The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter has been used to decompose the time series 
into a trend for the case of the annual data used in this panel dataset for the ‘domestic 
credit’ variable. After determining the ‘HP trend’ using λ=100124, the residual is 
extracted and then this is denoted as ‘credit boom.’ Note, that the lagged value for the 
‘credit boom’ variable has been used. This approach is similar to the approach taken 
by Caballero (2014), however, while Caballero (2014) looks at bonanzas and lending 
booms, focusing on FDI and EFPI, for this robustness check the domestic credit 
variable has been used. Furthermore, in accordance with the approach taken by 
Caballero (2014), a dummy variable for ‘credit boom’ has been developed, where a 
positive residual equates to one (boom) and a negative residual equates to zero. The 
Mundlak approach has also been adopted in this research paper to validate the main 
findings of this chapter. The Mundlak approach averages the time variant variables 
and thereby is a means to address the problem of endogeneity. Furthermore, the 
lagged dependent variables are included as regressors to model dynamics for the 
banking, currency and twin crisis models.     
 
Table 4.11 uses the credit boom variable (continuous), deploys the Mundlak 
approach to average the time variant variables and models dynamics by using lagged 
dependent variables. The results for the control variables are fairly consistent with 
those reported in the main findings section. Rather expectedly, inclusion of the lagged 
dependent variable illustrates that a banking crisis in the previous time period is 
highly likely to cause a banking crisis in the present. This is also true for when the 
lagged variables are taken for the currency crisis and the twin crisis, both of which 
show positive and statistically significant results. However, it is observed that the 
results for the key independent variable of interest, the KAOPEN variable, are 
                                                 
124 The lambda or λ=100 is commonly used when filtering annual data. This is supported by Backus 
and Kehoe (1992), the European Central Bank (2000) and Apel (1996).  
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statistically insignificant despite having a negative association with the likelihood of 
crisis. However, the ‘credit boom’ variable displays a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient which suggests that credit booms are in fact more likely to 
cause a crisis. Table 4.12 reports similar findings to that of table 4.11. However, for 
this table, as per the method deployed by Caballero (2014), a dummy variable is used 
to account for ‘credit boom.’ It is observed that when there is a credit boom there is a 
greater likelihood of a banking crisis occurring as opposed to when there is not a 
credit boom. This goes to show that perhaps developing countries in particular, do not 
have the necessary institutional prerequisites to sustain credit booms.    
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Table 4.11: Intensity of Financial Liberalization on Likelihood of Crises using Credit Boom and Mundlak Approach 
Time Period: 1980-2013; Income Group: Developing Economies; Estimation Method: Multivariate Probit Regression 
 (1) 
Banking Crisis 
(2) 
Currency Crisis 
(3) 
Twin Crisis 
KAOPEN 
-0.112 
(0.081) 
-0.068 
(0.072) 
-0.174 
(0.100) 
Deposit Insurance  
0.001 
(0.156) 
  
Growth  
-0.054** 
(0.017) 
-0.023 
(0.016) 
-0.063** 
(0.024) 
Real Interest Rate 
0.001 
(0.008) 
0.012 
(0.009) 
-0.009 
(0.010) 
Depreciation 
0.338 
(0.336) 
2.142*** 
(0.565) 
1.279*** 
(0.364) 
Change in Terms of Trade 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.000 
(0.004) 
-0.016* 
(0.007) 
Inflation  
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.010 
(0.008) 
-0.013* 
(0.014) 
Budget Surplus 
0.008 
(0.012) 
-0.005 
(0.012) 
0.014 
(0.014) 
M2/Reserves 
0.019* 
(0.008) 
0.012 
(0.008) 
0.018 
(0.009) 
Credit Boomt-1 
0.050*** 
(0.011) 
0.004 
(0.009) 
0.014 
(0.015) 
Money Growth  
-0.002 
(0.005) 
0.000 
(0.009) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
GDP per Capita 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Debt/GDP 
0.002 
(0.003) 
  
Banking Crisist-1 
2.114*** 
(0.156) 
  
Banking Crisis Dummy 
 0.559** 
(0.213) 
 
𝑲𝑨𝑶𝑷𝑬𝑵̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
0.126 
(0.117) 
0.095 
(0.098) 
0.328** 
(0.155) 
𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
-0.015 
(0.011) 
-0.022 
(0.009) 
-0.012 
(0.012) 
𝑹𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒆̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
-0.001 
(0.012) 
-0.010 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.010) 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
-0.012 
(0.018) 
-0.574 
(0.381) 
-2.434 
(0.989) 
𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝑻𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
0.044 
(0.034)) 
0.010 
(0.006) 
-0.012 
(0.054) 
𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
𝑩𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆𝒕 𝑺𝒖𝒓𝒑𝒍𝒖𝒔̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
-0.005 
(0.023) 
-0.0034 
(0.019) 
-0.026 
(0.020) 
𝑴𝟐/𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒆𝒔̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
0.0314*** 
(0.010) 
0.024* 
(0.007) 
-0.029 
(0.017) 
𝑪𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒕 𝑩𝒐𝒐𝒎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
-0.120 
(0.081) 
-0.0055 
(0.055) 
-0.081 
(0.072) 
𝑴𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
0.005 
(0.003) 
0.010* 
(0.004) 
0.023** 
(0.009) 
𝑮𝑫𝑷 𝒑𝒆𝒓 𝑪𝒂𝒑𝒊𝒕𝒂̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
𝑫𝒆𝒃𝒕/𝑮𝑫𝑷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.009* 
(0.003) 
-0.018** 
(0.006) 
Currency Crisist-1 
 0.0496** 
(0.178) 
 
Twin Crisist-1 
  0.980** 
(0.312) 
Constant 
-1.238*** 
(0.287) 
-1.354 
(0.237) 
-1.133 
(0.294) 
Observations  1436 1390 1392 
χ2 271.161 152.357 125.712 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors.  
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Table 4.12: Intensity of Financial Liberalization on Likelihood of Crises using Credit Boom Dummy and Mundlak Approach 
Time Period: 1980-2013; Income Group: Developing Economies; Estimation Method: Multivariate Probit Regression 
 (1) 
Banking Crisis 
(2) 
Currency Crisis 
(3) 
Twin Crisis 
KAOPEN 
-0.082 
(0.089) 
-0.141 
(0.076) 
-0.157 
(0.114) 
Growth  
-0.062** 
(0.021) 
-0.031 
(0.019) 
-0.080* 
(0.036) 
Real Interest Rate 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
0.010 
(0.009) 
-0.013 
(0.010) 
Depreciation 
0.388 
(0.360) 
3.086*** 
(0.895) 
1.936*** 
(0.470) 
Change in Terms of Trade 
0.003 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.022* 
(0.010) 
Inflation  
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.025** 
(0.008) 
-0.019** 
(0.007) 
Budget Surplus 
0.003 
(0.012) 
-0.006 
(0.014) 
0.020 
(0.015) 
M2/Reserves 
0.019* 
(0.009) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
0.023* 
(0.010) 
Credit Boom Dummyt-1 
0.123* 
(0.161) 
0.001 
(0.158) 
-0.461* 
(0.228) 
Money Growth  
-0.005 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.008) 
GDP per Capita 
-0.000* 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Debt/GDP 
0.004 
(0.003) 
  
Banking Crisist-1 
1.968*** 
(0.182) 
  
Banking Crisis Dummy 
 0.453 
(0.265) 
 
𝑲𝑨𝑶𝑷𝑬𝑵̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
0.175 
(0.130) 
0.242* 
(0.119) 
0.429 
(0.238) 
𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
-0.0126 
(0.017) 
-0.012 
(0.013) 
-0.012 
(0.011) 
𝑹𝒆𝒂𝒍 𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒆̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
-0.000 
(0.016) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
0.023 
(0.018) 
𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
-0.008 
(0.021) 
-0.569 
(0.392) 
0.055 
(0.308) 
𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆 𝒊𝒏 𝑻𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
-0.063 
(0.036) 
0.045 
(0.031) 
0.036 
(0.072) 
𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
𝑩𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆𝒕 𝑺𝒖𝒓𝒑𝒍𝒖𝒔̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
0.013 
(0.022) 
0.035 
(0.019) 
0.046* 
(0.022) 
𝑴𝟐/𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒆𝒔̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
-0.050 
(0.026) 
-0.021 
(0.014) 
-0.080* 
(0.037) 
𝑪𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒕 𝑩𝒐𝒐𝒎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
-0.150 
(0.107) 
-0.192* 
(0.081) 
-0.016 
(0.102) 
𝑴𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒚 𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
0.008 
(0.005) 
0.010* 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
𝑮𝑫𝑷 𝒑𝒆𝒓 𝑪𝒂𝒑𝒊𝒕𝒂̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
𝑫𝒆𝒃𝒕/𝑮𝑫𝑷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.016** 
(0.005) 
-0.043 
(0.016) 
Currency Crisist-1 
 0.560** 
(0.196) 
 
Twin Crisist-1 
  0.649 
(0.417) 
Constant 
-0.803* 
(0.393) 
-0.817** 
(0.300) 
0.591 
(0.672) 
Observations  1158 1133 1135 
χ2 187.583 140.008 116.999 
***Significant at p<0.01;**significant at p<0.05, *significant at p<0.10 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors.  
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4.12 Appendix 4: Country Group Classification 
 
4.12.1 Developing Economies  
 
These are the 93 developing countries (excludes high income countries as determined 
by the World Bank) used for regression analysis: 
 
Albania 
Algeria 
Angola 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Bangladesh 
Belarus 
Belize 
Benin 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Chad 
China 
Colombia 
Comoros 
Costa Rica 
Croatia 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Estonia 
Ethiopia 
Gabon 
Georgia 
Ghana 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
India 
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Indonesia 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Lao PDR 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Lithuania 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Maldives 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Nicaragua 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Romania 
Rwanda 
Sierra Leone 
Solomon Islands 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
Uruguay 
Venezuela, RB 
Vietnam 
Yemen, Rep. 
Zambia 
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Conclusion  
 
The objective of this thesis was to analyze, critically evaluate and understand 
the impact of financial integration on macroeconomic performance, poverty and 
inequality and crises, in developing countries. The thesis is structured as a coherent 
piece of work. This concluding section of the thesis will provide a concise summary 
of the key findings, then it gives an account of the contribution this thesis makes to 
the literature, then discussing the limitations of the thesis, subsequently exploring 
possibilities for further work and finally it provides prospective policy 
recommendations for developing countries.  
 
5.1 Summary of Key Findings 
 
Chapter 1 examines the theoretical linkages between financial integration and 
macroeconomic performance, poverty and inequality and financial fragilities. 
Furthermore, it provides a comprehensive evaluation of the existing empirical 
literature, identifying researching avenues that has not been explored. In the thorough 
examination of the theoretical and empirical literature, it is observed that the standard 
econometric procedures have been deployed to gain an understanding of the 
relationship between financial integration and growth. However, there was a scarcity 
in the researching base for threshold analysis. A fundamental reason why threshold 
analysis is important, is due in part to the fact that while it is possible to understand 
the direction of causality, or the magnitude of the impact, on a generic level, it must 
be dissected at understood at various stages of financial integration or at various 
levels of financial openness. Therefore, concerning the prospect of an empirical 
research paper that would be novel and enhance the literature would be to explore the 
research routes through threshold techniques. Furthermore, it was evident that the 
researching axiom that investigated the impact of financial integration on poverty and 
inequality was not explored as intensively as that for the relationship between 
financial integration and growth. This research paper focuses on developing countries 
and therefore it would undermine the researching prowess if one of the palpable 
criticisms of financial integration were to be avoided. Thus, there was a clear 
researching necessity to examine the linkages of financial integration and poverty and 
inequality further. Additionally, it was evident that it would also be value enhancing 
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to the literature to deploy threshold measures to gain a deeper understanding of the 
scale of impact at various stages of financial integration and the retrospective impact 
on poverty and inequality, and thereby allowing for the empirical research executed to 
be insightful for policymaking purposes.  
 
In relation to the financial integration and crises literature, it was observed in 
chapter 1 that there was a clear tendency for empirical researchers to use the financial 
liberalization dummy variable (discrete variable) when examining the impact of 
financial liberalization on crises. However, the de jure measure of financial 
integration, particularly the de jure measure of capital account openness or the Chinn-
Ito index, the key independent variable of interest in this thesis, had not been used. 
Therefore, it was an intriguing and non-negligible researching avenue to re-examine 
the crisis literature using the de jure measure of capital account openness. 
Furthermore, a noticeable loophole in the literature was the lack of empirical research 
examining the linkages of key political factors in the context of the crises literature. 
Particularly for developing countries, political stability or lack thereof, is one of the 
key determining factors in ensuring macroeconomic stability. While political 
scientists have theoretically examined the possible channels of influence of political 
factors influencing crises, there is an observable lacking in empirical research in this 
discipline. Therefore, one of the key researching components of this thesis, in the 
final empirical chapter, was to focus on the impact of the key political factors on 
crises, independently and interactively with financial liberalization.  
 
Chapter 2 examines the impact of financial integration on growth for 
developing, emerging and transition economies, using 175 countries, over the time 
period 1970-2013. The key independent variable of interest was the de jure measure 
of financial integration or the KAOPEN. The dependent variable was growth. The 
research paper uses the Panel Threshold Regression (PTR) and the Logistic Smooth 
Transition Regression (LSTR) models, along with OLS estimations. There is a clear 
and observable variation in the threshold levels along with the coefficients below and 
above the thresholds for developing, transition and emerging economies. When 
regressions are executed for all countries, it is observed that for all the countries in the 
dataset, it is growth enhancing below the threshold but growth retarding above the 
threshold. For the case of the developing economies, the focused income group of this 
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thesis, it is observed that while it has a considerably high threshold level, above this 
threshold, it is quite evident that when financial markets are highly liberalized, for 
developing countries it is severely damaging to growth. In the case of emerging 
economies, there appears to be a low threshold level, interestingly, growth levels 
appear to increase both below and above the threshold. In contrast, for transition 
economies, there is a low threshold level, below this threshold level, it is growth 
retarding. Thus, it was generally observed that there is a tendency for countries to 
experience higher growth rates up until a certain threshold level, after which it is 
growth retarding; the only exception being the case of the emerging markets, in which 
case, it was observed that growth rates increase both below and above the threshold.     
 
Chapter 3 investigates the impact of financial integration on poverty and 
inequality using 79 developing economies over the time period 1980-2013. The key 
independent variable of interest was the de jure measure of financial integration or 
capital account openness, the KAOPEN index. The key dependent variables of 
interest for this research paper were the four proxies used to measure poverty, four 
proxies used to measure income distribution and finally four proxies used to measure 
income inequality. This research paper used the Panel Threshold Regression (PTR) 
and the Logistic Smooth Transition Regression (LSTR) models, along with OLS 
estimations akin to chapter 2. In this researching chapter, it is observed that there is a 
low threshold level when looking at the impact of KAOPEN on poverty, however, 
while the estimation below the threshold is inconclusive, it is found that above this 
low threshold, increase in openness results in reduction of poverty. When empirically 
examining the impact of KAOPEN on various income bands, it is observed that below 
these relatively low thresholds, increase in openness results in increased income share 
for the poorest and richest 10% and 20%. However, above the threshold, increase in 
openness is associated with a decline in income share for the poorest 10% and 20% 
but an increase in income share is observed for the richest 10% and 20%. In 
measuring the impact of KAOPEN on income inequality, it was observed rather 
interestingly that inequality increased both below and above the threshold, but 
inequality increased faster below the threshold as opposed to when it was above the 
threshold. This reiterates the notion that the initial shock of financial influx can 
potentially increase inequality, but over time the rate at which inequality was 
increasing, eventually decreases.  
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Chapter 4 empirically examines the impact of the intensity of financial 
liberalization on the likelihood of banking, currency and twin crises using 93 
developing countries over the time period 1980-2013. This research paper also 
empirically investigates the impact of political institutions and political polarization 
on the likelihood of banking, currency and twin crises, both independently and jointly 
with the intensity of financial liberalization. The research paper uses the multivariate 
probit regression method in order to measure the impact of the intensity of financial 
liberalization on the likelihood of crises. For developing countries, increase in the 
intensity of financial liberalization reduces the likelihood of crises. This finding 
contradicts the traditional finding that post-liberalization, there is a greater likelihood 
of a crises. However, this chapter does not challenge that finding due to the fact that 
the research papers examining the crises linkages tend to use the binary dummy 
variable but for this research paper a continuous financial liberalization variable has 
been used. For the case of political institutions and political polarization125 it is found 
that improvement in the conditions of political institutions results in the reduced 
likelihood of crises. On the contrary, increased political polarization increase the 
likelihood of crises.  
 
Table 5.1 summarizes the key findings of the three empirical chapters reported 
in this thesis which includes chapters 2, 3 and 4. In this table, there is a general 
summary of the key findings and then a detailed analytical overview of the key 
variables of interest and their subsequent impact on growth, poverty and inequality 
and crises. In reference to the summary provided for chapter 2, table 5.1 only gives 
the findings for developing countries.  
 
  
                                                 
125 Refer to the proxies used to measure the conditions of political institutions and the level of political 
polarization in chapter 4 for a detailed synopsis and to gain a deeper understanding of the details of the 
variables used.  
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Table 5.1: Summary of Key Findings 
Chapter 2: Impact of Financial Integration on Growth 
 Growth 
Summary of Key Results After examining the main findings presented in the body of the 
chapter and after validating it with the results deduced from the 
robustness checks in the appendix, it is observed that for 
developing countries, there appears to be a high threshold level 
for capital account openness (KAOPEN). The growth effects 
below this high threshold level is generally inconclusive, 
however, above this high threshold, or when the financial markets 
have a high degree of capital account openness, it is observed that 
it is severely damaging to growth.  
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 < 𝑇 
or 𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 − 𝑐∗) 
The results below the threshold are observed to be inconclusive as 
the results are statistically insignificant.  
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 > 𝑇 
or 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 − 𝑐∗) 
Above the threshold, it is generally observed that increase in 
capital account openness is damaging to growth for developing 
countries. These results are negative and statistically significant. 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*) The threshold level appears to be significantly high; however, the 
reader is only aware about the impact on growth above this 
threshold as the coefficient below the threshold is statistically 
insignificant. There are instances in which the LSTR is a better 
estimator than the PTR, and vice versa, but, generally, a high 
threshold level for capital account openness is observed.  
Chapter 3: Impact of Financial Integration on Poverty and Inequality 
 Poverty Income Distribution Income Inequality 
Summary of Key Results In examining the main findings and after validating these findings 
with the robustness checks, it is observed that financial 
integration, above a certain threshold level of capital account 
openness reduces both absolute and relative poverty. However, it 
is observed that above this threshold, while income share 
increases for the highest 20% and 10%, income share of the 
lowest 10% and 20% declines. This is validated by observing an 
increase in income inequality due to increase in capital account 
openness where it is important to note that income inequality 
increases faster below the threshold as opposed to when it is 
above the threshold.  
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 < 𝑇 
or 𝑊𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 − 𝑐∗) 
The impact of 
capital account 
openness on 
absolute and 
relative poverty 
below the (low) 
threshold is 
inconclusive.  
Below a low 
threshold for capital 
account openness it is 
observed that income 
share of the richest 
10% and 20% along 
with the poorest 10% 
and 20%, all increase. 
The coefficients are 
positive and 
statistically 
significant.  
It is observed that 
both below and 
above the threshold 
income inequality 
increases with 
increasing capital 
account openness. 
The coefficients are 
positive and 
statistically 
significant. 
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 − 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 > 𝑇 
or 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 − 𝑐∗) 
Above this (low) 
threshold it is 
observed that 
increasing capital 
account openness 
results in reduced 
absolute and 
relative poverty. 
The coefficients 
are negative and 
statistically 
significant at all 
Above this low 
threshold, it is 
observed that 
increase in capital 
account openness 
results in an increase 
in income share of 
the highest 10% and 
20% and decline in 
the income share of 
the poorest 10% and 
20%. The coefficients 
Income inequality 
rises above the 
threshold but it is 
important to note 
that income 
inequality rises 
faster below the 
threshold as 
opposed to when it 
is below the 
threshold. This 
evidence supports 
 292 
 
significance 
levels. 
are positive for 
income share of the 
highest 10% and 20% 
and negative for the 
poorest 10% and 
20%. Note that the 
coefficients are 
statistically 
significant.  
the idea that initial 
levels of financial 
integration can give 
rise to inequality, 
however, with time, 
the distribution of 
income is fairer. 
The coefficients are 
positive and 
statistically 
significant. 
PTR (T) or LSTR (c*) There is a low 
threshold level 
observed for 
capital account 
openness.  
A low threshold level 
for capital account 
openness is observed. 
A low threshold 
level is observed 
for capital account 
openness. 
Chapter 4: Impact of Financial Integration on Crises 
 Banking Crisis Currency Crisis Twin Crisis 
Summary of Key Results  It is generally observed that increase in the intensity of capital 
account openness results in a reduction in the likelihood of a 
banking, currency and twin crisis. Improvements in the conditions 
of political institutions are seen to reduce the likelihood of 
banking, currency and twin crisis. On the contrary, increase in 
political polarization increases the likelihood of banking, 
currency and twin crisis.  
𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 Increase in capital 
account openness 
results in a 
reduced 
likelihood of a 
banking crisis as 
the coefficient 
appears to be 
negative and 
statistically 
significant.  
Increase in the 
intensity of capital 
account openness 
appears to reduce the 
likelihood of a 
currency crisis. This 
result is negative and 
statistically 
significant. 
Increase in the 
intensity of capital 
account openness 
reduces the 
likelihood of a twin 
crisis; the result is 
negative and 
statistically 
significant.  
Political Institutions Improvement in 
the condition of 
political 
institutions 
reduces the 
likelihood of a 
banking crisis. 
The result is 
negative and 
statistically 
significant. 
Improvements in the 
condition of political 
institutions reduce the 
likelihood of a 
currency crisis. The 
result is negative and 
statistically 
significant. 
Improvements in 
the condition of 
political institutions 
reduce the 
likelihood of a twin 
crisis. The result is 
negative and 
statistically 
significant. 
Political Polarization Increased political 
polarization 
increases the 
likelihood of a 
banking crisis. 
The result is 
positive and 
statistically 
significant.  
Increased political 
polarization increases 
the likelihood of a 
currency crisis. The 
result is positive and 
statistically 
significant. 
Increased political 
polarization 
increases the 
likelihood of a twin 
crisis. The result is 
positive and 
statistically 
significant. 
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5.2 Contribution to the Literature  
 
This thesis makes significant contributions to the literature by addressing key 
researching questions and exploring researching avenues that have not been examined 
thoroughly, or at least to the extent deemed sufficient by the author. In the quest to 
explore these unexploited researching routes there are numerous researching 
questions that seemed thought provoking and sufficiently interesting to execute 
independent researching studies. However, within the limitations of the academic 
guidelines, the first chapter (chapter 1) explored the theoretical and empirical 
literature to bring to the fray the underlying and the unanswered as well as the 
prospective research questions that could be value enhancing to the literature. 
Subsequently, these research questions were theoretically and empirically explored in 
separate research papers in chapters 2, 3 and 4. Each of these chapters make 
distinctive contributions to the literature.  
 
In chapter 2, the focus of the thesis is on the impact of financial integration on 
growth and the key contribution that this chapter makes is through the usage of the 
LSTR methodology. This is in part due to the fact that the PTR methodology has 
often been used in the FI-growth literature. Furthermore, it is important to note that 
the usage of the de jure measure of financial integration, the KAOPEN index is also 
novel in the sense that the literature has not executed a threshold examination using 
this particular variable as they have normally tended to use de facto measures of 
financial integration instead. Additionally, this chapter specifically pinpoints the exact 
threshold level as opposed to other papers where the threshold level is either not 
clearly identified or there is obscurity in the findings. From the purely technical 
viewpoint, the commonly used PTR methodology does not incorporate the problem of 
heteroscedasticity that the LSTR methodology does take into account. Furthermore, 
this researching chapter also tests the validity of the thresholds. For instance, simply 
identifying the threshold level is insufficient, the threshold denotation itself must be 
validated through tests that determine the accuracy of nonlinearities. The LSTR 
methodology also takes into account the possibility of the regression model having 
more than a single threshold. This is a factor that is unaccounted for in other research 
papers as they typically tend to assume that there could only be two regimes with one 
threshold, but this is not the case for all regression models as observed in chapter 2. 
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Therefore, not only does this chapter provide inferences that are value enhancing, but 
it also underlines the fallacies in the theoretical and empirical deductions in research 
papers that have deployed threshold regression methods.  
 
In chapter 3, an empirical examination is carried out measuring the impact of 
financial integration on poverty and inequality using both the PTR and LSTR 
methodologies akin to the econometric methods deployed chapter 2. Thus, from the 
technical viewpoint, the contribution to the literature is similar to the contributions 
made in chapter 2, particularly in the form of the usage of the LSTR methodology that 
incorporates ‘smooth’ transition from one regime to the other as opposed to the 
instantaneous change in regimes via the PTR methodology. Furthermore, validity of 
the thresholds is tested for along with remaining nonlinearities. From the overall 
researching viewpoint, there is a scarcity of research papers that focus on the impact 
of financial integration and poverty and there are no papers that deploy threshold 
techniques to examine the impact of capital account openness on poverty and 
inequality. Therefore, the researching avenue that has been explored in this chapter is 
an insightful source of contribution to the associated field of research.  
 
In chapter 4, through the empirical examination of the impact of the intensity 
of financial liberalization on the likelihood of crises, several insightful deductions are 
inferred. The key contribution that this research paper makes to the literature is the 
usage of the de jure measure of capital account openness (KAOPEN) or the intensity 
of financial liberalization. Conventionally, the literature tends to use a binary variable 
to account for financial liberalization and then the subsequent regression would report 
the likelihood of crises pre and post-liberalization. However, this research paper uses 
a continuous variable to account for financial liberalization and thereby allows the 
researchers to have the ability to examine the likelihood of crises at various levels of 
financial openness using the regression model. Furthermore, this research paper 
critically examines the impact of key political factors and their retrospective impact 
on the likelihood of crises. Numerous research papers have included political 
variables but they are often included as controlled and are often left to the periphery 
in the discussion of macroeconomic vulnerabilities or financial fragilities. Therefore, 
this research paper gives serious consideration and importance to political factors that 
are often undermined due to the inability of researchers to effectively quantify these 
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political variables and use them appropriately to address key research questions that 
are beneficial for policymaking purposes. For developing countries, it is undeniable 
that that political stability plays a significant role in ensuring macroeconomic stability 
and thereby mitigating crises. 
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5.3 Policy Recommendations 
 
On the basis of the inferences deduced from the empirical investigations, the 
policy recommendations for developing countries are outlined in this subsection. 
Within this subsection, the first section discusses policies that would allow 
developing countries to maximize their growth levels. The second section focuses on 
inclusive growth, addressing poverty and inequality. The third section focuses on 
policy recommendations that would help mitigate crises.  
 
5.3.1 Fostering Growth 
 
 The macroeconomic policies that would ensure maximization of growth in 
developing countries would mean that macroeconomic stability has been ensured. In 
order to foster high growth levels, particularly in developing countries, the 
institutional conditions are integral facets of development. On the basis of the findings 
of this research paper, particularly the focused investigation that examines the impact 
of financial integration on growth, illustrates that high levels of financial openness 
reduces the prospect of high growth, in fact it is growth retarding. Therefore, the 
prospect of having unregulated financial markets is ruled out as a policy measure to 
induce growth in developing countries. The justification for this policy 
recommendation would be in part due to the fact that developing countries do not 
have the infrastructural framework or the institutional capacity that would allow for 
smooth absorption of unregulated financial influx. Therefore, without sound 
institutional conditions there must be regulation of the financial markets in developing 
countries. This is to ensure that liberalization does not exceed the threshold limit, 
because as it has been proven in this researching study, that beyond this threshold 
level, it is growth retarding. The scenario is different for the case of emerging 
economies, as growth levels increase both below and above the threshold and 
therefore it goes to show that emerging economies have a higher absorptive capacity 
or better equipped institutions to facilitate financial influx. Even then, one cannot 
overlook the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and thereby must proceed with caution 
when it comes to financial liberalization. Hence, policymakers must ensure for 
developing countries, the general consensus would be to liberalize partially or 
regulate moderately.   
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5.3.2 Inclusion in Global Financial Integration  
 
A fundamental criticism that can be attributed to financial integration is the 
notion of inclusive growth. A staunch criticism of global financial integration and 
interconnectedness of global financial markets is that it fails to incorporate the poorest 
10% and 20% of the population. This thesis reaffirmed the notion that while increase 
in financial integration does reduce poverty, at the same time, it also reduces the 
income share of the poorest 10% and 20% while increasing the income share of the 
richest 20% and 10%. Furthermore, it is observed from this thesis that increase in 
openness also increases income inequality. There is a clear tradeoff between 
alleviation of poverty and increase in income inequality even though in the early 
stages of financial openness income share for all income groups increase and poverty 
decreases, this is not the case after a certain threshold level of financial openness. A 
key reason why this is fundamental in the policymaking level is due to the fact that 
income disparity induces social unrest. In populous developing nations, if there is an 
insurgency against the wealthiest few, this could potentially be calamitous both from 
the political viewpoint as well as the socio-economic viewpoint. Thus, governments 
and policymakers alike must acknowledge the political risks associated with 
burgeoning inequality in the developing world. Governments and policymakers must 
develop an institutional setup that allows for the poorest 10% and 20% to realize the 
benefits of financial integration, otherwise serious questions will be asked of those 
that govern these countries and the elitists that reside in these nations – as a populous 
class struggle would be detrimental for all.    
 
5.3.3 Mitigating Crises 
 
Arguably greatest threat associated to financial integration is the prospect of 
crises. This research paper examines the impact of the intensity of financial 
liberalization on the likelihood of crises. Contrary to popular belief that liberalization 
precedes a crisis, the findings in this thesis illustrates that increase in the intensity of 
financial liberalization in fact reduces the likelihood of a banking, currency and twin 
crises. It also denotes that it does not reject the argument that there is a greater 
likelihood of crises post-liberalization. However, there are other factors that can 
independently and jointly (with the intensity of financial liberalization) impact the 
 298 
 
likelihood of crises. For instance, governments and policymakers must seriously take 
into account the role of key political factors and key political players in the context of 
being the drivers of growth as well as crises. A conundrum that arises from this 
research paper is the fact that with greater political polarization the likelihood of 
crises increases. In this case, one cannot recommend that the developing nations 
should be free of political polarization as the democratic rights of the people will be 
tarnished completely, resulting in an authoritarian regime. However, institutional 
improvements, both in the context of the improvement of macroeconomic institutions 
as well as political institutions reduce the likelihood of crises and the government 
must focus on improving these institutions in order to mitigate the risks associated to 
financial integration and the possibility of crises.  
 
5.4 Limitations of the Thesis  
 
It could be argued that one of the biggest limitations of the thesis is the 
inability to answer or venture into the avenues that are both thought stimulating and 
thought-provoking, but it would not have been within the scope of this researching 
thesis, due to the restrictions of a thesis that is being composed under academic 
guidelines. However, the thesis that has already been produced there are limitations 
and possible criticisms and arguably the most important limitation would be the lack 
of serious consideration for key political factors in the discussion of growth and 
poverty and inequality. The crises chapter discusses it, although, there could have 
been a standalone paper that focuses chiefly on political factors jointly with financial 
liberalization. However, due to the fact that there is a word limit and venturing into 
this researching path would mean that this could constitute to be an entirely 
distinctive thesis. Therefore, this standalone researching avenue was not explored to 
the desired extent. The other limitation of this thesis is that the KAOPEN variable 
developed by Chinn and Ito (2006) is considered to be exogenous despite the fact that 
numerous papers have used this variable in their research papers for regression 
analysis. 
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5.5 Avenues for Further Research  
 
There are several researching trajectories that this thesis could have taken. 
However, due to the limitations in the guidelines in the composition of the thesis, one 
cannot supersede or leave a researching question incomplete or unexamined. 
Therefore, there were interesting researching questions and avenues that were not 
investigated. For further research, in this section, interesting researching avenues that 
could and very well should be explored, are discussed. This thesis critically examines 
the impact of financial integration on growth, deploying both the PTR and LSTR 
methodologies. However, for further work, an interesting addition would be to 
examine other institutional factors interacted with the de jure measure of financial 
integration. This would be particularly relevant in the policymaking level as this 
would also allow governments to calibrate their macroeconomic policies that are 
fundamental for macroeconomic stability and growth. For instance, the determination 
of the required level of government spending or the target inflation rate in conjunction 
with financial liberalization would be an effective tool for policymakers to weigh the 
pros and cons of their decisions. Similarly, in order to grasp a greater understanding 
as well as a greater policymaking action plan in order to alleviate poverty but also 
reduce the burgeoning inequality, institutional interaction terms must be used jointly 
with the intensity of financial liberalization. With regards to crises, an interesting 
researching avenue would be to deploy threshold measures that would take into 
account financial openness and the level after which it is susceptible to a banking, 
currency or twin crises. This would be interesting to examine and hugely beneficial 
on the policymaking level.  
 
 Arguably the most important researching avenue that has not been explored to 
the desired extent is the significance of key political factors and their subsequent 
impact on growth, poverty and inequality and the likelihood of crises both 
independently and jointly with financial liberalization. However, this researching 
avenue would in itself constitute a separate thesis as the scale of the researching 
question is large and due to the scarcity of empirical research papers, it would be 
novel and useful for policymaking purposes. Critical examinations of particular 
geographic zones of developing regions would be even more interesting as the 
dynamics and the political culture will have similarities. Additionally, in the context 
 300 
 
of political factors determining economic outcomes, it would also be interesting to 
examine the manner in which economic outcomes have a bearing on distinctive 
political outcomes of which, a researching route that could be of particular interest 
would be the examination of political reforms or political liberalization after periods 
of economic distress.  
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